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  1. Andrew Altman (2004). Breathing Life Into a Dead Argument: G.E. Moore and the Open Question. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 117 (3):395-408.
    A century after its publication, G.E. Moore''sPrincipia Ethica stands as one of theclassic statements of anti-naturalism inethics. Moore claimed that the most basic ethicalproperties were denoted by `good'' and `bad'' andthat all naturalist accounts of thoseproperties were inadequate. His open-questionargument aimed to refute any proposedidentification of good with some naturalproperty, and Moore concluded from theargument that good must be a nonnaturalproperty.The received view is that the open-questionargument is a failure. In this paper,my aim is to breathe some life back intoMoore''s (...)
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  2. Peter Alward, Comments on Mark Kalderon's “The Open Question Argument, Frege's Puzzle, and Leibniz's Law”.
    A standard strategy for defending a claim of non-identity is one which invokes Leibniz’s Law. (1) Fa (2) ~Fb (3) (∀x)(∀y)(x=y ⊃ (∀P)(Px ⊃ Py)) (4) a=b ⊃ (Fa ⊃ Fb) (5) a≠b In Kalderon’s view, this basic strategy underlies both Moore’s Open Question Argument (OQA) as well as (a variant formulation of) Frege’s puzzle (FP). In the former case, the argument runs from the fact that some natural property—call it “F-ness”—has, but goodness lacks, the (2nd order) property of its (...)
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  3. Derek Baker (2016). Intuitions About Disagreement Do Not Support the Normativity of Meaning. Dialectica 70 (1):65-84.
    Allan Gibbard () argues that the term ‘meaning’ expresses a normative concept, primarily on the basis of arguments that parallel Moore's famous Open Question Argument. In this paper I argue that Gibbard's evidence for normativity rests on idiosyncrasies of the Open Question Argument, and that when we use related thought experiments designed to bring out unusual semantic intuitions associated with normative terms we fail to find such evidence. These thought experiments, moreover, strongly suggest there are basic requirements for a theory (...)
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  4. Thomas Baldwin (2010). Open Question Arguments. In John Skorupski (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Ethics. Routledge
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  5. Stephen W. Ball (1988). Reductionism in Ethics and Science: A Contemporary Look at G. E. Moore's Open-Question Argument. American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (3):197 - 213.
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  6. Matthew S. Bedke (2012). Against Normative Naturalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):111 - 129.
    This paper considers normative naturalism, understood as the view that (i) normative sentences are descriptive of the way things are, and (ii) their truth/falsity does not require ontology beyond the ontology of the natural world. Assuming (i) for the sake of argument, I here show that (ii) is false not only as applied to ethics, but more generally as applied to practical and epistemic normativity across the board. The argument is a descendant of Moore's Open Question Argument and Hume's Is-Ought (...)
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  7. Radim Bělohrad (2011). The Is-Ought Problem, the Open Question Argument, and the New Science of Morality. Human Affairs 21 (3):262-271.
    The article deals with a recent attack by Sam Harris on two famous arguments that purport to establish a gap between factual and evaluative statements—Hume’s Is-Ought Problem and Moore’s Open Question Argument. I present the arguments, analyze the relationship between them and critically assess Harris’ attempt to refute them. I conclude that Harris’ attempt fails.
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  8. David Brax, Hedonic Naturalism.
    Published (in Swedish) in the journal Filosofisk tidskrift as "Hedonistisk naturalism", 2011/3.
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  9. David Braybrooke (2003). What Truth Does the Emotive-Imperative Answer to the Open-Question Argument Leave to Moral Judgments? Journal of Value Inquiry 37 (3):341-352.
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  10. Lorin Wayne Browning (1972). The Open Question Argument in Moore and Hare. Dissertation, Michigan State University
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  11. William D. Casebeer (2005). Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition. A Bradford Book.
    In Natural Ethical Facts William Casebeer argues that we can articulate a fully naturalized ethical theory using concepts from evolutionary biology and cognitive science, and that we can study moral cognition just as we study other forms of cognition. His goal is to show that we have "softly fixed" human natures, that these natures are evolved, and that our lives go well or badly depending on how we satisfy the functional demands of these natures. Natural Ethical Facts is a comprehensive (...)
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  12. William D. Casebeer (2003). Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition. A Bradford Book.
    In Natural Ethical Facts William Casebeer argues that we can articulate a fully naturalized ethical theory using concepts from evolutionary biology and cognitive science, and that we can study moral cognition just as we study other forms of cognition. His goal is to show that we have "softly fixed" human natures, that these natures are evolved, and that our lives go well or badly depending on how we satisfy the functional demands of these natures. Natural Ethical Facts is a comprehensive (...)
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  13. Andrew Cullison (2009). Three Millian Ways to Resolve Open Questions. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 3 (1):1-17.
    Millianism is a thesis in philosophy of language that the meaning of a proper name is simply its referent. Millianism faces certain puzzles called Frege's Puzzles. Some Millians defend the view by appealing to a metaphysics of belief that involves Ways of Believing. In the first part of this paper, I argue that ethical naturalists can adopt this Millian strategy to resist Moore’s Open Question argument. While this strategy of responding to the Open Question Argument has already appeared in the (...)
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  14. Jay Elliott (2006). Ethics and Nature. Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 3 (3):321-334.
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  15. Fred Feldman (2005). The Open Question Argument: What It Isn't; and What It Is. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):22–43.
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  16. Wayne Fenske (1995). A New Theory of Noncognitivism. Dissertation, Dalhousie University (Canada)
    In the dissertation, I attempt to defend a new theory of noncognitivism. I do this by discussing four issues, three of which pertain to the views of a group of scholars who have come to be known as "The Cornell Moral Realists". One of the most impressive aspects of the Cornell metaethics is its theoretical expansiveness. It encompasses views in philosophy of language, philosophy of science, philosophical psychology, as well as normative ethics. As such, it serves as a useful foil (...)
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  17. Andrew Fisher (2005). Good, God, and the Open-Question Argument. Religious Studies 41 (3):335-341.
    In Finite and Infinite Goods, Robert Adams defends his metaphysical account that good is resemblance to God via an ‘open-question’ intuition. It is, however, unclear what this intuition amounts to. I give two possible readings: one based on the semantic framework Adams employs, and another based on Adams's account of humankind's epistemological limitations. I argue that neither of these readings achieves Adams's advertised aim.
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  18. Daniel Greco (2015). Epistemological Open Questions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):509-523.
    While there has been a great deal of recent interest in parallels between metaethics and metaepistemology, there has been little discussion of epistemological analogues of the open question argument. This is somewhat surprising—the general trend in recent work is in the direction of emphasizing the continuity between metaethics and metaepistemology, and to treat metanormative questions as arising in parallel in these two normative domains. And while the OQA has been subjected to a wide variety of objections, it is still influential (...)
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  19. Chris Heathwood (2009). Moral and Epistemic Open-Question Arguments. Philosophical Books 50 (2):83-98.
    An important and widely-endorsed argument for moral realism is based on alleged parallels between that doctrine and epistemic realism -- roughly the view that there are genuine epistemic facts, facts such as that it is reasonable to believe that astrology is false. I argue for an important disanalogy between moral and epistemic facts. Epistemic facts, but not moral facts, are plausibly identifiable with mere descriptive facts about the world. This is because, whereas the much-discussed moral open-question argument is compelling, the (...)
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  20. Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons (1992). Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: The 'Open-Question Argument'Revived. Philosophical Papers 21:153-175.
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  21. Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons (1992). Troubles for New Wave Moral Semantics: The 'Open Question Argument' Revived. Philosophical Papers 21 (3):153-175.
    (1992). TROUBLES FOR NEW WAVE MORAL SEMANTICS: THE ‘OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT’ REVIVED. Philosophical Papers: Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 153-175. doi: 10.1080/05568649209506380.
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  22. Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons (1991). New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:447-465.
    There have been times in the history of ethical theory, especially in this century, when moral realism was down, but it was never out. The appeal of this doctrine for many moral philosophers is apparently so strong that there are always supporters in its corner who seek to resuscitate the view. The attraction is obvious: moral realism purports to provide a precious philosophical good, viz., objectivity and all that this involves, including right answers to moral questions, and the possibility of (...)
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  23. Timo Kajamies (2009). Euthyphro And The Open Question. Minerva 13:99-113.
    In his excellent introduction to metaethics, Alexander Miller argues that there are affinities between G. E.Moore's open-question argument and Socrates’ argumentation in Euthyphro dialogue. Miller is also led toask how Moore's argument can be disdained without being unsympathetic to Socrates’ argument. Thispaper answers to Miller's question by showing that the two arguments are quite different. It is also arguedthat the two arguments merit different assessments: one may well appreciate Socrates’ reasoning and yetbe unconvinced by Moore's.
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  24. Mark Eli Kalderon (2004). Open Questions and the Manifest Image. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):251–289.
    The essay argues that, on their usual metalinguistic reconstructions, the open question argument and Frege’s puzzle are variants of the same argument. Each are arguments to a conclusion about a difference in meaning; each deploy compositionality as a premise; and each deploy a premise linking epistemic features of sentences with their meaning (which, given certain meaning-platonist assumptions, can be interpreted as a universal instantiation of Leibniz’s law). Given these parallels, each is sound just in case the other is. They are, (...)
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  25. Lee F. Kerckhove (1994). Re-Thinking Ethical Naturalism: Nietzsche's ?Open Question? Argument. [REVIEW] Man and World 27 (2):149-159.
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  26. Thomas King (1972). Is "Good" Indefinable for the Same Reason That Terms Like "Yellow" or "Bitter" or "Pleasure" Are Indefinable? Southwest Philosophical Studies.
  27. John F. Lange (1966). R. M. Hare's Reformulation of the Open Question. Mind 75 (298):244-247.
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  28. John Frederick Lange (1963). In Defense of Ethical Naturalism: An Examination of Certain Aspects of the Naturalistic Fallacy, with Particular Attention to the Logic of the Open Question Argument. Dissertation, Princeton University
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  29. James Lenman (2009). Naturalism Without Tears. Ratio 22 (1):1-18.
    Parfit argues that naturalistic theories that seek to understand normative concepts either as simply descriptive of certain natural facts about our desires or as expressive of our desires commit us to a bleak normative nihilism whereby nothing matters. I here defend such naturalism, in particular its expressivist variety, against this charge. It is true that such views commit us to there being no reasons as Parfit understands them. But for Parfit to suppose that equivalent to there being no reasons leaves (...)
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  30. Jimmy Lenman, Moral Naturalism.
    While "moral naturalism" is sometimes used to refer to any approach to metaethics intended to cohere with naturalism in metaphysics more generally, the label is more usually reserved for naturalistic forms of moral realism according to which there are objective moral facts and properties and these moral facts and properties are natural facts and properties. Views of this kind appeal to many as combining the advantages of naturalism and realism but have seemed to many others to do inadequate justice to (...)
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  31. Hallvard Lillehammer (2016). An Assumption of Extreme Significance: Moore, Ross and Spencer on Ethics and Evolution. In Uri D. Leibowitz & Neil Sinclair (eds.), Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability. Oxford University Press
    In recent years there has been a growing interest among mainstream Anglophone moral philosophers in the empirical study of human morality, including its evolution and historical development. This chapter compares these developments with an earlier point of contact between moral philosophy and the moral sciences in the early decades of the Twentieth century, as manifested in some of the less frequently discussed arguments of G. E. Moore and W. D. Ross. It is argued that a critical appreciation of Moore and (...)
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  32. David Londey (1984). An Open Question Argument in Cicero. Apeiron 18 (2):144 - 147.
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  33. David Londey (1984). An Open Question Argument in Cicero. Apeiron 18 (2).
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  34. Tristram McPherson (2013). Semantic Challenges to Normative Realism. Philosophy Compass 8 (2):126-136.
    Normative realists might be assumed to have few worries about semantics. After all, a realist might initially hope to simply adopt the best semantic theory about ordinary descriptive language. However, beginning with the non‐cognitivist appropriation of the open question argument, a number of philosophers have posed serious objections to the realist’s ability to offer a plausible semantic theory. This paper introduces the two most influential semantic challenges to normative realism: the open question argument, and the Moral Twin Earth argument. It (...)
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  35. Niklas Möller (2013). Direct Reference and the Open Question Argument. Dialectica 67 (4):383-402.
    Moore's Open Question Argument has been heavily debated ever since it was presented over 100 years ago. In the current paper, it is argued that for the realist, and contrary to the received view by many theorists in the debate, the argument in fact lends strong support for non-naturalism. In particular, David Brink's naturalist defense utilizing direct reference theory is scrutinized. It is argued that an application of direct reference to moral kinds, rather than defusing the Open Question Argument, actually (...)
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  36. Susana & Gary Nuccetelli & Seay (ed.) (2007). Themes From G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics. Oxford University Press.
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  37. Susana Nuccetelli (ed.) (2007). Themes From G.E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics. Oxford University Press.
    These thirteen original essays, whose authors include some of the world's leading philosophers, examine themes from the work of the Cambridge philosopher G. E. Moore, and demonstrate his considerable continuing influence on philosophical debate. Part I bears on epistemological topics, such as skepticism about the external world, the significance of common sense, and theories of perception. Part II is devoted to themes in ethics, such as Moore's open question argument, his non-naturalism, utilitarianism, and his notion of organic unities.
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  38. Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay, The Semantic Naturalist Fallacy.
    More than a century ago, G. E. Moore famously attempted to refute all versions of moral naturalism by offering the open question argument (OQA) followed by the “naturalistic fallacy” charge (NF).1 Although there is consensus that this extended inference fails to undermine all varieties of moral naturalism, OQA is often vindicated as an argument against analytical moral naturalism. By contrast, NF usually finds no takers at all. ln this paper we argue that analytical naturalism of the sort recently proposed by (...)
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  39. Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (2011). Does Semantic Naturalism Rest on a Mistake? In Nuccetelli & Seay Susana & Gary (ed.), Ethical Naturalism: Current Debates. Cambridge University Press
    More than a century ago, G. E. Moore famously attempted to refute ethical naturalism by offering the so-called open question argument (OQA), also charging that all varieties of ethical naturalism commit the naturalistic fallacy. Although there is consensus that OQA and the naturalistic-fallacy charge both fail, OQA is sometimes vindicated, but only as an argument against naturalistic semantic analyses. The naturalistic-fallacy charge, by contrast, usually finds no takers at all. This paper provides new grounds for an OQA thus restricted. But (...)
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  40. Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.) (2007). Themes From G.E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics. Oxford University Press.
    These thirteen original essays, whose authors include some of the world's leading philosophers, examine themes from the work of the Cambridge philosopher G. E. Moore (1873-1958), and demonstrate his considerable continuing influence on philosophical debate. Part I bears on epistemological topics, such as skepticism about the external world, the significance of common sense, and theories of perception. Part II is devoted to themes in ethics, such as Moore's open question argument, his non-naturalism, utilitarianism, and his notion of organic unities.
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  41. Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (2007). What's Right with the Open Question Argument. In Susana & Gary Nuccetelli & Seay (ed.), Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics. Oxford University Press
    Ethics . . . [is] partly analysis of what’s meant by ‘good’, ‘ought’, ‘right’, ‘wrong’, ‘valuable’, etc. And if certain analyses of these are right, then other ethical propositions, ones which aren’t analytic, wouldn’t be philosophical at all, but belong to psychology, sociology, and the theory of evolution.
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  42. Michael Pelczar (2009). The Knowledge Argument, the Open Question Argument, and the Moral Problem. Synthese 171 (1):25 - 45.
    Someone who knew everything about the world’s physical nature could, apparently, suffer from ignorance about various aspects of conscious experience. Someone who knew everything about the world’s physical and mental nature could, apparently, suffer from moral ignorance. Does it follow that there are ways the world is, over and above the way it is physically or psychophysically? This paper defends a negative answer, based on a distinction between knowing the fact that p and knowing that p. This distinction is made (...)
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  43. Charles Pigden (2007). Desiring to Desire: Russell, Lewis and G.E.Moore. In Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Themes from G.E.Moore. Oxford University Press 244-260.
    I have two aims in this paper. In §§2-4 I contend that Moore has two arguments (not one) for the view that that ‘good’ denotes a non-natural property not to be identified with the naturalistic properties of science and common sense (or, for that matter, the more exotic properties posited by metaphysicians and theologians). The first argument, the Barren Tautology Argument (or the BTA), is derived, via Sidgwick, from a long tradition of anti-naturalist polemic. But the second argument, the Open (...)
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  44. Charles Pigden (2007). Russell's Moral Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    A 27000 word survey of Russell’s ethics for the SEP. I argue that Russell was a meta-ethicist of some significance. In the course of his long philosophical career, he canvassed most of the meta-ethical options that have dominated debate in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries — naturalism, non-naturalism, emotivism and the error-theory (anticipating Stevenson and Ayer on the one hand and Mackie on the other), and even, to some extent, subjectivism and relativism. And though none of his theories quite worked (...)
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  45. Charles Pigden (2004). Review of G.E.Moore’s Ethical Theory by Brian Hutchinson. [REVIEW] International Philosophical Quarterly:543-547.
    The history of philosophy can be seen either as a contribution to history or a contribution to philosophy or perhaps as a bit of both. Hutchinson fail on both counts. The book is bad: bad in itself (since it quite definitely ought not to be) and bad as a companion to Principia (since it sets students a bad example of slapdash, lazy and pretentious philosophizing and would tend to put them off reading Moore). As a conscientious reviewer I ploughed through (...)
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  46. Charles Pigden (1991). Naturalism. In Peter Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics. Blackwell 421-431.
    Survey article on Naturalism dealing with Hume's NOFI (including Prior's objections), Moore's Naturalistic Fallacy and the Barren Tautology Argument. Naturalism, as I understand it, is a form of moral realism which rejects fundamental moral facts or properties. Thus it is opposed to both non-cognitivism, and and the error theory but also to non-naturalism. General conclusion: as of 1991: naturalism as a program has not been refuted though none of the extant versions look particularly promising.
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  47. Charles R. Pigden (2012). Identifying Goodness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):93 - 109.
    The paper reconstructs Moore's Open Question Argument (OQA) and discusses its rise and fall. There are three basic objections to the OQA: Geach's point, that Moore presupposes that ?good? is a predicative adjective (whereas it is in fact attributive); Lewy's point, that it leads straight to the Paradox of Analysis; and Durrant's point that even if 'good' is not synonymous with any naturalistic predicate, goodness might be synthetically identical with a naturalistic property. As against Geach, I argue that 'good' has (...)
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  48. James Rachels (2000). Naturalism. In Hugh LaFollette - (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory. Blackwell Publishers
    Twentieth century philosophy began with the rejection of naturalism. Many modern philosophers had assumed that their subject was continuous with the sciences, and that facts about human nature and other such information were relevant to the great questions of ethics, logic, and knowledge. Against this, Frege argued that “psychologism” in logic was a mistake. Logic, he said, is an autonomous subject with its own standards of truth and falsity, and those standards have nothing to do with how the mind works (...)
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  49. Douglas B. Rasmussen (1982). The Open-Question Argument and the Issue of Conceivability. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 56:162-172.
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  50. Connie S. Rosati (2003). Agency and the Open Question Argument. Ethics 113 (3):490-527.
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