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The Passage of Time, Misc

Edited by Stephan Torre (University of Aberdeen, Northern Institute of Philosophy)
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Summary This category includes papers on the passage of time that don't fit into any of its sibling categories.
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  1. Pedro M. S. Alves (2008). Objective Time and the Experience of Time: Husserl's Theory of Time in Light of Some Theses of A. Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity. [REVIEW] Husserl Studies 24 (3):205-229.
    In this paper, I start with the opposition between the Husserlian project of a phenomenology of the experience of time, started in 1905, and the mathematical and physical theory of time as it comes out of Einstein’s special theory of relativity in the same year. Although the contrast between the two approaches is apparent, my aim is to show that the original program of Husserl’s time theory is the constitution of an objective time and a time of the world, starting (...)
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  2. Richard Arthur, On the Flow of Time.
    During the last hundred years the notion of time flow has been held in low esteem by philosophers of science. Since the metaphor depends heavily on the analogy with motion, criticisms of time flow have either attacked the analogy as poorly founded, or else argued by analogy from a “static” conception of motion. Thus (1) Bertrand Russell argued that just as motion can be conceived as existence at successive places at successive times without commitment to a state of motion at (...)
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  3. Lynn Rudder Baker (1979). On the Mind-Dependence of Temporal Becoming. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 39 (3):341-357.
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  4. Lynne Rudder Baker (1974). Temporal Becoming: The Argument From Physics. Philosophical Forum 6:218-236.
    Arguments about temporal becoming often get nowhere. One reason for the impasse lies in the fact that the issue has been formulated as a choice between science on the one hand and common sense (or ordinary language) on the other as the primary source of ontological commitment.' Often' proponents of attributing temporal becoming to the physical universe look to everyday temporal concepts, find them infested with notions involving temporal becoming and conclude that becoming is a basic feature of the physical (...)
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  5. Michelle Beer (1988). Temporal Indexicals and the Passage of Time. Philosophical Quarterly 38 (151):158-164.
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  6. Jiri Benovsky (2012). The Causal Efficiency of the Passage of Time. Philosophia 40 (4):763-769.
    Does mere passage of time have causal powers ? Are properties like "being n days past" causally efficient ? A pervasive intuition among metaphysicians seems to be that they don't. Events and/or objects change, and they cause or are caused by other events and/or objects; but one does not see how just the mere passage of time could cause any difference in the world. In this paper, I shall discuss a case where it seems that mere passage of time does (...)
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  7. Tomasz Bigaj (2008). On Temporal Becoming, Relativity, and Quantum Mechanics. In Dennis Dieks (ed.), The Ontology of Spacetime II.
    In the first section of the chapter, I scrutinize Howard Stein’s 1991 definition of a transitive becoming relation that is Lorentz invariant. I argue first that Stein’s analysis gives few clues regarding the required characteristics of the relation complementary to his becoming—i.e. the relation of indefiniteness. It turns out that this relation cannot satisfy the condition of transitivity, and this fact can force us to reconsider the transitivity requirement as applied to the relation of becoming. I argue that the relation (...)
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  8. Darren Bradley (2013). Dynamic Beliefs and the Passage of Time. In A. Capone & N. Feit (eds.), Attitudes De Se. University of Chicago.
    How should our beliefs change over time? Much has been written about how our beliefs should change in the light of new evidence. But that is not the question I’m asking. Sometimes our beliefs change without new evidence. I previously believed it was Sunday. I now believe it’s Monday. In this paper I discuss the implications of such beliefs for philosophy of language. I will argue that we need to allow for ‘dynamic’ beliefs, that we need new norms of belief (...)
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  9. E. P. Brandon (1986). What's Become of Becoming? Philosophia 16 (1):71-77.
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  10. Sarah Broadie (1982). Passage and Possibility: A Study of Aristotle's Modal Concepts. Oxford University Press.
    Aristotle connects modality and time in ways strange and perplexing to modern readers. In this book the author proposes a new solution to this exegetical problem. Although primarily expository, this work explores topics of central concern for current investigations into causality, time, and change.
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  11. Robert S. Brumbaugh (1980). Time Passes: Platonic Variations. Review of Metaphysics 33 (4):711 - 726.
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  12. Robert S. Brumbaugh (1966). Applied Metaphysics: Truth and Passing Time. Review of Metaphysics 19 (4):647 - 666.
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  13. Richard N. Burnor (1994). A Structural Model for Temporal Passage. Southern Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):1-18.
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  14. Craig Callender (2008). The Common Now. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):339-361.
    The manifest image is teeming with activity. Objects are booming and buzzing by, changing their locations and properties, vivid perceptions are replaced, and we seem to be inexorably slipping into the future. Time—or at least our experience in time— seems a very turbulent sort of thing. By contrast, time in the scientist image seems very still. The fundamental laws of physics don’t differentiate between past and future, nor do they pick out a present moment that flows. Except for a minus (...)
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  15. Craig Callender (ed.) (2002). Time, Reality & Experience. Cambridge Univ Pr.
    Collection of original essays by leading philosophers on a range of questions about time.
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  16. Barry Dainton (2011). Time, Passage and Immediate Experience. In Craig Callender (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time. Oxford University Press. 382.
  17. Natalja Deng (2013). Fine's Mctaggart, Temporal Passage, and the a Versus B‐Debate. Ratio 26 (1):19-34.
    I offer an interpretation and a partial defense of Kit Fine's ‘Argument from Passage’, which is situated within his reconstruction of McTaggart's paradox. Fine argues that existing A-theoretic approaches to passage are no more dynamic, i.e. capture passage no better, than the B-theory. I argue that this comparative claim is correct. Our intuitive picture of passage, which inclines us towards A-theories, suggests more than coherent A-theories can deliver. In Finean terms, the picture requires not only Realism about tensed facts, but (...)
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  18. Natalja Deng (2013). Our Experience of Passage on the B-Theory. Erkenntnis 78 (4):713-726.
    Elsewhere I have suggested that the B-theory includes a notion of passage, by virtue of including succession. Here, I provide further support for that claim by showing that uncontroversial elements of the B-theory straightforwardly ground a veridical sense of passage. First, I argue that the B-theory predicts that subjects of experience have a sense of passivity with respect to time that they do not have with respect to space, which they are right to have, even according to the B-theory. I (...)
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  19. Dennis Dieks, Becoming, Relativity and Locality.
    It is a central aspect of our ordinary concept of time that history unfolds and events come into being. It is only natural to take this seriously. However, it is notoriously difficult to explain further what this `becoming' consists in, or even to show that the notion is consistent at all. In this article I first argue that the idea of a global temporal ordering, involving a succession of cosmic nows, is not indispensable for our concept of time. Our experience (...)
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  20. John Earman (2008). Reassessing the Prospects for a Growing Block Model of the Universe. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (2):135 – 164.
    Although C. D. Broad's notion of Becoming has received a fair amount of attention in the philosophy-of-time literature, there are no serious attempts to show how to replace the standard 'block' spacetime models by models that are more congenial to Broad's idea that the sum total of existence is continuously increased by Becoming or the coming into existence of events. In the Newtonian setting Broad-type models can be constructed in a cheating fashion by starting with a Newtonian block model, carving (...)
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  21. Helena Eilstein (1996). Prof. Shimony on “the Transient Now”. Synthese 107 (2):223 - 247.
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  22. Arthur E. Falk (2003). Perceiving Temporal Passage. In Amita Chatterjee (ed.), Perspectives on Consciousness. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.
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  23. Matt Farr (2012). On A- and B-Theoretic Elements of Branching Spacetimes. Synthese 188 (1):85-116.
    This paper assesses branching spacetime theories in light of metaphysical considerations concerning time. I present the A, B, and C series in terms of the temporal structure they impose on sets of events, and raise problems for two elements of extant branching spacetime theories—McCall’s ‘branch attrition’, and the ‘no backward branching’ feature of Belnap’s ‘branching space-time’—in terms of their respective A- and B-theoretic nature. I argue that McCall’s presentation of branch attrition can only be coherently formulated on a model with (...)
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  24. Jan Faye (2002). When Time Gets Off Track. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 50:1-.
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  25. M. Oreste Fiocco (2007). Passage, Becoming and the Nature of Temporal Reality. Philosophia 35 (1):1-21.
    I first distinguish several notions that have traditionally been conflated (or otherwise neglected) in discussions of the metaphysics of time. Thus, for example, I distinguish between the passage of time and temporal becoming. The former is, I maintain, a confused notion that does not represent a feature of the world; whereas a proper understanding of the latter provides the key for a plausible and comprehensive account of the nature of temporal reality. There are two general classes of views of the (...)
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  26. Paul Fitzgerald (1985). Four Kinds of Temporal Becoming. Philosophical Topics 13 (3):145-177.
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  27. Paul Fitzgerald (1982). Temporality, Secondary Qualities, and the Location of Sensations. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:293 - 303.
    Several philosophers have argued that "temporal becoming" is mind-dependent, a claim they see as analogous to the traditional one about the mind-dependence of secondary qualities. They have tended to assume that the classical secondary qualities are mind-dependent, and also that the close analogue for time of directly experienced secondary qualities is an irreducibly indexical nowness. In an earlier article it was argued that we should reject the second assumption. Here it is shown why there is indeed a genuine problem of (...)
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  28. Paul Fitzgerald (1976). Review: Swinburne's Space and Time. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 43 (4):618 - 637.
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  29. Paul Fitzgerald (1972). Nowness and the Understanding of Time. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1972:259 - 281.
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  30. Roman Frigg, Review of 'the Images of Time. An Essay on Temporal Representation' by Robin le Poidevin. [REVIEW]
    We experience time in different ways, and we construct different kinds of representation of time. What kinds of representation are there and how do they work? In particular, how do we integrate temporal features of the world into our understanding of the mechanisms underlying representations in the media of perception, memory, art, and narrative? Le Poidevin’s well written and carefully argued book is an exploration of these questions. Although interesting in its own right, Le Poidevin pursues this question as a (...)
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  31. William Grey (1997). Time and Becoming. Cogito 11 (3):215-220.
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  32. David Ray Griffin (ed.) (1986). Physics and the Ultimate Significance of Time. State University of New York Press.
    But there is considerable consensus, even among writers who disagree radically about the ultimate significance of time so understood, that time as ...
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  33. Stuart R. Hameroff (2003). Time, Consciousness, and Quantum Events in Fundamental Space-Time Geometry. In R. Buccheri (ed.), The Nature of Time: Geometry, Physics and Perception. 77-89.
    1. Introduction: The problems of time and consciousness What is time? St. Augustine remarked that when no one asked him, he knew what time was; however when someone asked him, he did not. Is time a process which flows? Is time a dimension in which processes occur? Does time actually exist? The notion that time is a process which "flows" directionally may be illusory (the "myth of passage") for if time did flow it would do so in some medium or (...)
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  34. Richard Healey (2008). Review of Tim Maudlin, The Metaphysics Within Physics. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (2).
  35. Chris Heathwood (2005). The Real Price of the Dead Past: A Reply to Forrest and to Braddon-Mitchell. Analysis 65 (287):249–251.
    Non-presentist A-theories of time (such as the growing block theory and the moving spotlight theory) seem unacceptable because they invite skepticism about whether one exists in the present. To avoid this absurd implication, Peter Forrest appeals to the "Past is Dead hypothesis," according to which only beings in the objective present are conscious. We know we're present because we know we're conscious, and only present beings can be conscious. I argue that the dead past hypothesis undercuts the main reason for (...)
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  36. Shadworth H. Hodgson (1897). In What Sense, If Any, Do Past and Future Time Exist? Mind 6 (22):228 - 240.
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  37. Christoph Hoerl (forthcoming). Time and the Domain of Consciousness. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences.
    It is often thought that there is little that seems more obvious from experience than that time objectively passes, and that time is, in this respect, quite unlike space. Yet nothing in the physical picture of the world seems to correspond to the idea of such an objective passage of time. In this paper, I discuss some attempts to explain this apparent conflict between appearance and reality. I argue that existing attempts to explain the conflict as the result of a (...)
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  38. Christoph Hoerl (2013). Do We (Seem to) Perceive Passage? Philosophical Explorations (2):1-15.
    I examine some recent claims put forward by L. A. Paul, Barry Dainton and Simon Prosser, to the effect that perceptual experiences of movement and change involve an (apparent) experience of ‘passage’, in the sense at issue in debates about the metaphysics of time. Paul, Dainton and Prosser all argue that this supposed feature of perceptual experience – call it a phenomenology of passage – is illusory, thereby defending the view that there is no such a thing as passage, conceived (...)
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  39. Christoph Hoerl (2013). Tense and the Psychology of Relief. Topoi:1-15.
    At the centre of Arthur Prior’s ‘Thank goodness’ argument for the A-theory of time is a particular form of relief. Time must objectively pass, Prior argues, or else the relief felt when a painful experience has ended is not intelligible. In this paper, I offer a detailed analysis of the type of relief at issue in this argument, which I call temporal relief, and distinguish it from another form of relief, which I refer to as counterfactual relief. I also argue (...)
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  40. Ronald C. Hoy (1978). Becoming and Persons. Philosophical Studies 34 (3):269 - 280.
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  41. Galen A. Johnson (1999). Inside and Outside: Ontological Considerations. In Dorothea Olkowski and James Morley (ed.), Merleau-Ponty, Interiority and Exteriority, Psychic Life and the World.
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  42. Galen A. Johnson (1993). Generosity and Forgetting in the History of Being: Merleau-Ponty and Nietzsche. In Hugh J. Silverman (ed.), Questioning Foundations: Truth/Subjectivity/Culture.
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  43. Galen A. Johnson (1984). Historicity, Narratives, and the Understanding of Human Life. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 15:37-54.
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  44. Peter Kroes (1984). Objective Versus Minddependent Theories of Time Flow. Synthese 61 (3):423 - 446.
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  45. Baptiste Le Bihan (2014). The Unrealities of Time. Dialogue.
    Is time flowing? A-theorists say yes, B-theorists say no. But both take time to be real. It means that B-theorists accept that time might be real, even if lacking a property usually ascribed to it. In this paper, I want to ask what are the different properties usually ascribed to time in order to draw the list of different possible kinds of realism and anti-realism about time. As we will see, there are three main kinds of anti-realism. I will claim (...)
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  46. Arnold B. Levison (1987). Events and Time's Flow. Mind 96 (383):341-353.
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  47. Murray Macbeath (1986). Clipping Time's Wings. Mind 95 (378):233-237.
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  48. Ned Markosian (1993). How Fast Does Time Pass? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):829-844.
    I believe that time passes. In the last one hundred years or so, many philosophers have rejected this view. Those who have done so have generally been motivated by at least one of three different arguments: (i) McTaggart's argument, (ii) an argument from the theory of relativity, and (iii) an argument concerning the alleged incoherence of talk about the rate of the passage of time. There has been a great deal of literature on McTaggart's argument (although no concensus has been (...)
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  49. Ned Markosian (1992). On Language and the Passage of Time. Philosophical Studies 66 (1):1 - 26.
    Since the early part of this century there has been a considerable amount of discussion of the question 'Does time pass?'. A useful way of approaching the debate over the passage of time is to consider the following thesis: The space-time thesis (SPT): Time is similar to the dimensions of space in at least this one respect: there is no set of properties such that (i) these properties are possessed by time, (ii) these properties are not possessed by any dimension (...)
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  50. Iain Martel, Reichenbach on Indeterminism and Becoming.
    In this paper, I criticize a common misinterpretation of Hans Reichenbach’s argument that indeterminism is both necessary and sufficient for temporal becoming. I show that Reichenbach’s argument rests on the assumption of a particular variety of verificationism (which I call ‘Weak Probabilistic Verificationism’) and that Reichenbach’s critics have failed to notice this premise. The purpose of the paper is not to defend Reichenbach’s thesis—I offer no argument in support of this verificationist premise. My aim is simply to set the historical (...)
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