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Summary Some have argued that miracles are impossible because the laws of nature or the causal structure of the world leaves no room for this. Others have held that the existence of probabilistic, chancy processes makes miracles possible. A third position is that even without probabilistic processes there is room for miracles. This category contains also texts that investigate whether there is ’room’ for miracles and how they fit into the causal structure of the world.
Key works That miracles are impossible has been claimed by Spinoza unknown, ch. 6, Voltaire 1972 (‘Miracles’) and Feuerbach 1881, ch. 13. More recently, many members of the Divine Action Project have assumed that miracles are impossible. See Russell et al 1993. The possibility of miracles has been defended by Swinburne 1970 and Larmer 1988. Fales 2010 argues that a non-temporal God cannot intervene. von Wachter 2009 argues that miracles are also possible if there are no probabilistic processes and that miracles are not violations of the laws of nature.
Introductions Encyclopedia: McGrew 2011, § 3.1.1. Treatise: Larmer 1988.
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  1. Evan Fales (2010). Divine Intervention: Metaphysical and Epistemological Puzzles. Routledge.
    Introduction -- How does God do things? -- Divine governance and the laws of nature -- Trouble with time -- Eternal God as author of nature -- What can God know? -- Healed hearts, inspired minds -- Mystical revelations -- Is science a mystic's friend? -/- Divine Intervention is a new look at the question how God can act upon the world, and whether the world can affect God. What, exactly, are miracles, and can God perform them? If so, how? (...)
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  2. Evan Fales (1997). Divine Intervention. Faith and Philosophy 14 (2):170-194.
    Some philosophers deny that science can investigate the supernatural - specifically, the nature and actions of God. If a divine being is atemporal, then, indeed, this seems plausible - but only, I shall argue, because such a being could not causally interact with anything. Here I discuss in detail two major attempts, those of Stump and Kretzmann, and of Leftow, to make sense of theophysical causation on the supposition that God is eternal. These views are carefully worked out, and their (...)
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