This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
28 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
  1. EC Barnes (1999). The Quantitative Problem of Old Evidence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (2):249-264.
    The quantitative problem of old evidence is the problem of how to measure the degree to which e confirms h for agent A at time t when A regards e as justified at t. Existing attempts to solve this problem have applied the e-difference approach, which compares A's probability for h at t with what probability A would assign h if A did not regard e as justified at t. The quantitative problem has been widely regarded as unsolvable primarily on (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. David Christensen (1999). Measuring Confirmation. Journal of Philosophy 96 (9):437-461.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Paul Draper, Kai Draper & Joel Pust (2007). Probabilistic Arguments for Multiple Universes. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (3):288–307.
    In this paper, we discuss three probabilistic arguments for the existence of multiple universes. First, we provide an analysis of total evidence and use that analysis to defend Roger White's "this universe" objection to a standard fine-tuning argument for multiple universes. Second, we explain why Rodney Holder's recent cosmological argument for multiple universes is unconvincing. Third, we develop a "Cartesian argument" for multiple universes. While this argument is not open to the objections previously noted, we show that, given certain highly (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. John Earman (1992). Bayes or Bust? Bradford.
    There is currently no viable alternative to the Bayesian analysis of scientific inference, yet the available versions of Bayesianism fail to do justice to several aspects of the testing and confirmation of scientific hypotheses. Bayes or Bust? provides the first balanced treatment of the complex set of issues involved in this nagging conundrum in the philosophy of science. Both Bayesians and anti-Bayesians will find a wealth of new insights on topics ranging from Bayes's original paper to contemporary formal learning theory. (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. John Earman (1992). Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory. Mit Press.
  6. John Earman (ed.) (1984). Testing Scientific Theories. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
    Rich with historical and cultural value, these works are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Kenny Easwaran (2011). Bayesianism II: Applications and Criticisms. Philosophy Compass 6 (5):321-332.
    In the first paper, I discussed the basic claims of Bayesianism (that degrees of belief are important, that they obey the axioms of probability theory, and that they are rationally updated by either standard or Jeffrey conditionalization) and the arguments that are often used to support them. In this paper, I will discuss some applications these ideas have had in confirmation theory, epistemol- ogy, and statistics, and criticisms of these applications.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Ellery Eells & Branden Fitelson (2000). Comments and Criticism: Measuring Confirmation and Evidence. Journal of Philosophy 97 (12):663-672.
    Bayesian epistemology suggests various ways of measuring the support that a piece of evidence provides a hypothesis. Such measures are defined in terms of a subjective probability assignment, pr, over propositions entertained by an agent. The most standard measure (where “H” stands for “hypothesis” and “E” stands for “evidence”) is: the difference measure: d(H,E) = pr(H/E) - pr(H).0 This may be called a “positive (probabilistic) relevance measure” of confirmation, since, according to it, a piece of evidence E qualitatively confirms a (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Simon Evnine, Old Evidence Again.
    A critique of Mark Kaplan's attempt to solve the problem of old evidence by restricting the principle of when something is evidence explicitly to cases in which we are less than certain of it.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Branden Fitelson (2008). Goodman's "New Riddle". Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (6):613 - 643.
    First, a brief historical trace of the developments in confirmation theory leading up to Goodman's infamous "grue" paradox is presented. Then, Goodman's argument is analyzed from both Hempelian and Bayesian perspectives. A guiding analogy is drawn between certain arguments against classical deductive logic, and Goodman's "grue" argument against classical inductive logic. The upshot of this analogy is that the "New Riddle" is not as vexing as many commentators have claimed (especially, from a Bayesian inductive-logical point of view). Specifically, the analogy (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Branden Fitelson (2003). Review: The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory. [REVIEW] Mind 112 (447):545-551.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Clark Glymour (1980). Theory and Evidence. Princeton University Press.
  13. James Hawthorne (2005). Degree-of-Belief and Degree-of-Support: Why Bayesians Need Both Notions. Mind 114 (454):277-320.
    I argue that Bayesians need two distinct notions of probability. We need the usual degree-of-belief notion that is central to the Bayesian account of rational decision. But Bayesians also need a separate notion of probability that represents the degree to which evidence supports hypotheses. Although degree-of-belief is well suited to the theory of rational decision, Bayesians have tried to apply it to the realm of hypothesis confirmation as well. This double duty leads to the problem of old evidence, a problem (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. James Hawthorne (2004). Three Models of Sequential Belief Updating on Uncertain Evidence. Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (1):89-123.
    Jeffrey updating is a natural extension of Bayesian updating to cases where the evidence is uncertain. But, the resulting degrees of belief appear to be sensitive to the order in which the uncertain evidence is acquired, a rather un-Bayesian looking effect. This order dependence results from the way in which basic Jeffrey updating is usually extended to sequences of updates. The usual extension seems very natural, but there are other plausible ways to extend Bayesian updating that maintain order-independence. I will (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Colin Howson & Peter Urbach (1993). Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach. Open Court.
    Scientific reasoning is—and ought to be—conducted in accordance with the axioms of probability. This Bayesian view—so called because of the central role it accords to a theorem first proved by Thomas Bayes in the late eighteenth ...
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Franz Huber (2005). Subjective Probabilities as Basis for Scientific Reasoning? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (1):101-116.
    Bayesianism is the position that scientific reasoning is probabilistic and that probabilities are adequately interpreted as an agent's actual subjective degrees of belief, measured by her betting behaviour. Confirmation is one important aspect of scientific reasoning. The thesis of this paper is the following: if scientific reasoning is at all probabilistic, the subjective interpretation has to be given up in order to get right confirmation—and thus scientific reasoning in general. The Bayesian approach to scientific reasoning Bayesian confirmation theory The example (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. James Joyce (1999). The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory. Cambridge University Press.
  18. Cory Juhl (2006). Fine-Tuning is Not Surprising. Analysis 66 (292):269–275.
    This paper is a response to Stephen Leeds’s "Juhl on Many Worlds". Contrary to what Leeds claims, we can legitimately argue for nontrivial conclusions by appeal to our existence. The ’problem of old evidence’, applied to the ’old evidence’ that we exist, seems to be a red herring in the context of determining whether there is a rationally convincing argument for the existence of many universes. A genuinely salient worry is whether multiversers can avoid illicit reuse of empirical evidence in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Patrick Maher (1996). Subjective and Objective Confirmation. Philosophy of Science 63 (2):149-174.
    Confirmation is commonly identified with positive relevance, E being said to confirm H if and only if E increases the probability of H. Today, analyses of this general kind are usually Bayesian ones that take the relevant probabilities to be subjective. I argue that these subjective Bayesian analyses are irremediably flawed. In their place I propose a relevance analysis that makes confirmation objective and which, I show, avoids the flaws of the subjective analyses. What I am proposing is in some (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Bradley Monton (2006). God, Fine-Tuning, and the Problem of Old Evidence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):405-424.
    The fundamental constants that are involved in the laws of physics which describe our universe are finely tuned for life, in the sense that if some of the constants had slightly different values life could not exist. Some people hold that this provides evidence for the existence of God. I will present a probabilistic version of this fine-tuning argument which is stronger than all other versions in the literature. Nevertheless, I will show that one can have reasonable opinions such that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Bradley Monton (2006). God, Fine-Tuning, and the Problem of Old Evidence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):405-424.
    The fundamental constants that are involved in the laws of physics which describe our universe are finely-tuned for life, in the sense that if some of the constants had slightly different values life could not exist. Some people hold that this provides evidence for the existence of God. I will present a probabilistic version of this fine-tuning argument which is stronger than all other versions in the literature. Nevertheless, I will show that one can have reasonable opinions such that the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Steve Petersen, Comments on Carl Wagner's Jeffrey Conditioning and External Bayesianity.
    Jeffrey conditioning allows updating in Bayesian style when the evidence is uncertain. A weighted average, essentially, over classically updating on the alternatives. Unlike classical Bayesian conditioning, this allows learning to be unlearned.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Joel Pust (2008). Horgan on Sleeping Beauty. Synthese 160 (1):97 - 101.
    With the notable exception of David Lewis, most of those writing on the Sleeping Beauty problem have argued that 1/3 is the correct answer. Terence Horgan has provided the clearest account of why, contrary to Lewis, Beauty has evidence against the proposition that the coin comes up heads when she awakens on Monday. In this paper, I argue that Horgan’s proposal fails because it neglects important facts about epistemic probability.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Joel Pust (2007). Cartesian Knowledge and Confirmation. Journal of Philosophy 104 (6):269-289.
    Bayesian conceptions of evidence have been invoked in recent arguments regarding the existence of God, the hypothesis of multiple physical universes, and the Doomsday Argument. Philosophers writing on these topics often claim that, given a Bayesian account of evidence, our existence or something entailed by our existence (perhaps in conjunction with some background knowledge or assumption) may serve as evidence for each of us. In this paper, I argue that this widespread view is mistaken. The mere fact of one's existence (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Jan Sprenger, Surprise and Evidence in Statistical Model Checking.
    There is considerable confusion about the role of p-values in statistical model checking. To clarify that point, I introduce the distinction between measures of surprise and measures of evidence which come with different epistemological functions. I argue that p-values, often understood as measures of evidence against a null model, do not count as proper measures of evidence and are closer to measures of surprise. Finally, I sketch how the problem of old evidence may be tackled by acknowledging the epistemic role (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Carl G. Wagner (1999). Old Evidence and New Explanation II. Philosophy of Science 66 (2):283-288.
    Additional results are reported on the author's earlier generalization of Richard Jeffrey's solution to the problem of old evidence and new explanation.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Carl G. Wagner (1997). Old Evidence and New Explanation. Philosophy of Science 64 (4):677-691.
    Jeffrey has devised a probability revision method that increases the probability of hypothesis H when it is discovered that H implies previously known evidence E. A natural extension of Jeffrey's method likewise increases the probability of H when E has been established with sufficiently high probability and it is then discovered, quite apart from this, that H confers sufficiently higher probability on E than does its logical negation H̄.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Timothy Williamson (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press.
    Knowledge and its Limits presents a systematic new conception of knowledge as a kind of mental stage sensitive to the knower's environment. It makes a major contribution to the debate between externalist and internalist philosophies of mind, and breaks radically with the epistemological tradition of analyzing knowledge in terms of true belief. The theory casts new light on such philosophical problems as scepticism, evidence, probability and assertion, realism and anti-realism, and the limits of what can be known. The arguments are (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation