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  1. Brad Armendt (1992). Dutch Strategies for Diachronic Rules: When Believers See the Sure Loss Coming. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:217 - 229.
    Two criticisms of Dutch strategy arguments are discussed: One says that the arguments fail because agents who know the arguments can use that knowledge to avoid Dutch strategy vulnerability, even though they violate the norm in question. The second consists of cases alleged to be counterexamples to the norms that Dutch strategy arguments defend. The principle of Reflection and its Dutch strategy argument are discussed, but most attention is given to the rule of Conditionalization and to Jeffrey's rule for fallible (...)
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  2. Brad Armendt (1980). Is There a Dutch Book Argument for Probability Kinematics? Philosophy of Science 47 (4):583-588.
    Dutch Book arguments have been presented for static belief systems and for belief change by conditionalization. An argument is given here that a rule for belief change which under certain conditions violates probability kinematics will leave the agent open to a Dutch Book.
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  3. Frank Arntzenius (2003). Self-Locating Beliefs, Reflection, Conditionalization and Dutch Books. Journal of Philosophy 100:356-370.
  4. Frank Arntzenius (2003). Some Problems for Conditionalization and Reflection. Journal of Philosophy 100 (7):356-370.
  5. Frank Arntzenius (2003). Some Problems for Conditionalization and Reflection. Journal of Philosophy 100 (7):356-370.
  6. Paul Bartha, How to Put Self-Locating Information in its Place.
    How can self-locating propositions be integrated into normal patterns of belief revision? Puzzles such as Sleeping Beauty seem to show that such propositions lead to violation of ordinary principles for reasoning with subjective probability, such as Conditionalization and Reflection. I show that sophisticated forms of Conditionalization and Reflection are not only compatible with self-locating propositions, but also indispensable in understanding how they can function as evidence in Sleeping Beauty and similar cases.
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  7. Stephanie Beardman (2013). A Non-Factualist Defense of the Reflection Principle. Synthese 190 (15):2981-2999.
    Are there plausible synchronic constraints on how a subject thinks of herself extended over time? At first glance, Bas van Fraassen’s principle of Reflection seems to prescribe the sort of epistemic authority one’s future self should be taken by one to have over one’s current epistemic states. (The gist of this principle is that I should now believe what I’m convinced I will believe tomorrow.) There has been a general consensus that, as a principle concerning epistemic authority, Reflection does not (...)
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  8. L. Bovens & J. L. Ferreira (2010). Monty Hall Drives a Wedge Between Judy Benjamin and the Sleeping Beauty: A Reply to Bovens. Analysis 70 (3):473-481.
    Consider van Fraassen's ( 1981) Judy Benjamin (JB) problem. Judy is dropped in an area that is divided vertically in Blue (B) and Red (R) and horizontally in Headquarters (Q) and Second Company (S). These divisions define four quadrants, as in Figure 1 (roman script headings). Judy initially believes that there is an equal chance of being in each quadrant. She is then told by a fully reliable source that if she is in R, then there is a chance of (...)
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  9. Rachael Briggs (2009). Distorted Reflection. Philosophical Review 118 (1):59-85.
    Diachronic Dutch book arguments seem to support both conditionalization and Bas van Fraassen's Reflection principle. But the Reflection principle is vulnerable to numerous counterexamples. This essay addresses two questions: first, under what circumstances should an agent obey Reflection, and second, should the counterexamples to Reflection make us doubt the Dutch book for conditionalization? In response to the first question, this essay formulates a new "Qualified Reflection" principle, which states that an agent should obey Reflection only if he or she is (...)
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  10. Aaron Bronfman (2015). Reflection and Self‐Trust. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):75-82.
    The Reflection principle expresses a kind of epistemic deference to one's future self. There is a plausible intuitive argument to the effect that, if one believes one will reason well and gain information over time, then one ought to satisfy Reflection. There are also associated formal arguments that show that, if one's beliefs about one's current and future selves meet certain criteria, then one is committed by the axioms of probability to satisfy Reflection. The formal arguments, however, rely on an (...)
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  11. John Cantwell (2002). The Pragmatic Stance. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):319-336.
    The view that decision methods can only be justified by appeal to pragmatic considerations is defended. Pragmatic considerations are viewed as providing the underlying subject matter (“semantics”) of decision theories. It is argued that other approaches (e.g. justifying principles by appeal to obviousness, common usage, etc.) fail to provide grounds for a normative decision theory.It is argued that preferences that can lead to pragmatically adverse outcomes in a relevantly similar possible decision situation are pragmatically unsound, even if the decision situation (...)
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  12. John Cantwell (2002). The Pragmatic Stance, Whither Dutch Books and Money Pumps? Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):319-336.
    The view that decision methods can only be justified by appeal to pragmatic considerations is defended. Pragmatic considerations are viewed as providing the underlying subject matter of decision theories. It is argued that other approaches fail to provide grounds for a normative decision theory.It is argued that preferences that can lead to pragmatically adverse outcomes in a relevantly similar possible decision situation are pragmatically unsound, even if the decision situation never arises. This rebuts several standard objections to money-pump and Dutch (...)
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  13. Fabrizio Cariani (forthcoming). Chance, Credence and Circles. Episteme.
    This is a discussion of Richard Pettigrew's book "Accuracy and the Laws of Credence". I target Pettigrew's application of the accuracy framework to derive chance-credence principles. My principal contention is that Pettigrew's preferred version of the argument might in one sense be circular and, moreover, that Pettigrew's premises have content that go beyond that of standard chance-credence principles.
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  14. Jake Chandler & Adam Rieger (2011). Self-Respect Regained. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (2pt2):311-318.
    In a recent article, David Christensen casts aspersions on a restricted version of van Fraassen's Reflection principle, which he dubs ‘Self-Respect’(sr). Rejecting two possible arguments for sr, he concludes that the principle does not constitute a requirement of rationality. In this paper we argue that not only has Christensen failed to make a case against the aforementioned arguments, but that considerations pertaining to Moore's paradox indicate that sr, or at the very least a mild weakening thereof, is indeed a plausible (...)
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  15. David Christensen (2010). Rational Reflection. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):121-140.
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  16. David Christensen (2007). Epistemic Self-Respect. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):319-337.
  17. Vincent Conitzer (2015). A Devastating Example for the Halfer Rule. Philosophical Studies 172 (8):1985-1992.
    How should we update de dicto beliefs in the face of de se evidence? The Sleeping Beauty problem divides philosophers into two camps, halfers and thirders. But there is some disagreement among halfers about how their position should generalize to other examples. A full generalization is not always given; one notable exception is the Halfer Rule, under which the agent updates her uncentered beliefs based on only the uncentered part of her evidence. In this brief article, I provide a simple (...)
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  18. Eleonora Cresto (forthcoming). Lost in Translation: Unknowable Propositions in Probabilistic Frameworks. Synthese:1-23.
    Some propositions are structurally unknowable for certain agents. Let me call them ‘Moorean propositions’. The structural unknowability of Moorean propositions is normally taken to pave the way towards proving a familiar paradox from epistemic logic—the so-called ‘Knowability Paradox’, or ‘Fitch’s Paradox’—which purports to show that if all truths are knowable, then all truths are in fact known. The present paper explores how to translate Moorean statements into a probabilistic language. A successful translation should enable us to derive a version of (...)
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  19. A. Eagle (ed.) (2011). Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge.
    _Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings_ is the first anthology to collect essential readings in this important area of philosophy. Featuring the work of leading philosophers in the field such as Carnap, Hájek, Jeffrey, Joyce, Lewis, Loewer, Popper, Ramsey, van Fraassen, von Mises, and many others, the book looks in depth at the following key topics: subjective probability and credence probability updating: conditionalization and reflection Bayesian confirmation theory classical, logical, and evidential probability frequentism physical probability: propensities and objective chances. The book (...)
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  20. Antony Eagle (ed.) (2011). Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge.
    _Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings_ is the first anthology to collect essential readings in this important area of philosophy. Featuring the work of leading philosophers in the field such as Carnap, Hájek, Jeffrey, Joyce, Lewis, Loewer, Popper, Ramsey, van Fraassen, von Mises, and many others, the book looks in depth at the following key topics: subjective probability and credence probability updating: conditionalization and reflection Bayesian confirmation theory classical, logical, and evidential probability frequentism physical probability: propensities and objective chances. The book (...)
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  21. Antony Eagle (ed.) (2010). Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge.
    Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings is the first anthology to collect essential readings in this important area of philosophy. Featuring the work of leading philosophers in the field such as Carnap, Hájek, Jeffrey, Joyce, Lewis, Loewer, Popper, Ramsey, van Fraassen, von Mises, and many others, the book looks in depth at the following key topics: subjective probability and credence probability updating: conditionalization and reflection Bayesian confirmation theory classical, logical, and evidential probability frequentism physical probability: propensities and objective chances. The book (...)
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  22. Kenny Easwaran (2013). Expected Accuracy Supports Conditionalization—and Conglomerability and Reflection. Philosophy of Science 80 (1):119-142.
  23. Adam Elga (2007). Reflection and Disagreement. Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
    How should you take into account the opinions of an advisor? When you completely defer to the advisor's judgment, then you should treat the advisor as a guru. Roughly, that means you should believe what you expect she would believe, if supplied with your extra evidence. When the advisor is your own future self, the resulting principle amounts to a version of the Reflection Principle---a version amended to handle cases of information loss. When you count an advisor as an epistemic (...)
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  24. Simon J. Evnine (2007). Personhood and Future Belief: Two Arguments for Something Like Reflection. Erkenntnis 67 (1):91 - 110.
    This paper offers two new arguments for a version of Reflection, the principle that says, roughly, that if one knew now what one would believe in the future, one ought to believe it now. The most prominent existing argument for the principle is the coherence-based Dutch Strategy argument advanced by Bas van Fraassen (and others). My two arguments are quite different. The first is a truth-based argument. On the basis of two substantive premises, that people’s beliefs generally get better over (...)
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  25. Simon J. Evnine (2005). Containing Multitudes: Reflection, Expertise and Persons as Groups. Episteme 2 (1):57-64.
    The thesis of the paper is that persons are similar to a kind of group: multiple-expert epistemic unities (MEUs). MEUs are groups in which there are multiple experts on whom other members of the group model their opinion. An example would be a group of children playing Telephone. Any child nearer the source is an 'expert' for any child further away. I argue that, with certain important qualifications, it is both rational and necessary for persons to treat their future selves (...)
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  26. Simon J. Evnine (2003). Epistemic Unities. Erkenntnis 59 (3):365 - 388.
    I bring together social ontology and social epistemology by consideringsocial entities (``epistemic unities'') that are constituted by the holdingof epistemic relations between their members. In particular, I focus onthe relation of taking someone as an expert. Among the types of structuresexamined are ones with a single expert and one or more non-experts whomay or may not know of each other's situation; and ones with more thanone expert, including cases in which the relation between the experts ishierarchical and cases in which (...)
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  27. Bas C. Van Fraassen (1995). Belief and the Problem of Ulysses and the Sirens. Philosophical Studies 77 (1):7 - 37.
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  28. C. Van Fraassen (1984). Belief and the Will. Journal of Philosophy 81 (5):235 - 256.
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  29. Christopher A. Fuchs & Rüdiger Schack (2012). Bayesian Conditioning, the Reflection Principle, and Quantum Decoherence. In Yemima Ben-Menahem & Meir Hemmo (eds.), Probability in Physics. Springer 233--247.
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  30. Mitchell S. Green & Christopher R. Hitchcock (1994). Reflections on Reflection: Van Fraassen on Belief. Synthese 98 (2):297 - 324.
    In Belief and the Will, van Fraassen employed a diachronic Dutch Book argument to support a counterintuitive principle called Reflection. There and subsequently van Fraassen has put forth Reflection as a linchpin for his views in epistemology and the philosophy of science, and for the voluntarism (first-person reports of subjective probability are undertakings of commitments) that he espouses as an alternative to descriptivism (first-person reports of subjective probability are merely self-descriptions). Christensen and others have attacked Reflection, taking it to have (...)
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  31. Berry Groisman (2008). The End of Sleeping Beauty's Nightmare. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):409-416.
    The way a rational agent changes her belief in certain propositions/hypotheses in the light of new evidence lies at the heart of Bayesian inference. The basic natural assumption, as summarized in van Fraassen's Reflection Principle, would be that in the absence of new evidence the belief should not change. Yet, there are examples that are claimed to violate this assumption. The apparent paradox presented by such examples, if not settled, would demonstrate the inconsistency and/or incompleteness of the Bayesian approach, and (...)
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  32. Edward Hinchman (2012). Reflection, Disagreement, and Context. American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):95.
    How far, if at all, do our intrapersonal and our interpersonal epistemic obligations run in parallel? This paper treats the question as addressing the stability of doxastic commitment in the two dimensions. In the background lies an analogy between doxastic and practical commitment. We’ll pursue the question of doxastic stability by coining a doxastic analogue of Gregory Kavka’s much-discussed toxin case. In this new case, you foresee that you will rationally abandon a doxastic commitment by undergoing a shift in the (...)
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  33. Colin Howson & Paul Castell (1996). Epistemic Probability. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 70 (1):63 - 94.
  34. Leendert Huisman (2015). Reflecting on Finite Additivity. Synthese 192 (6):1785-1797.
    An infinite lottery experiment seems to indicate that Bayesian conditionalization may be inconsistent when the prior credence function is finitely additive because, in that experiment, it conflicts with the principle of reflection. I will show that any other form of updating credences would produce the same conflict, and, furthermore, that the conflict is not between conditionalization and reflection but, instead, between finite additivity and reflection. A correct treatment of the infinite lottery experiment requires a careful treatment of finite additivity. I (...)
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  35. Simon M. Huttegger (2013). In Defense of Reflection. Philosophy of Science 80 (3):413-433.
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  36. Adam Rieger Jake Chandler (2011). Self‐Respect Regained. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (2pt2):311-318.
    In a recent article, David Christensen casts aspersions on a restricted version of van Fraassen's Reflection principle, which he dubs ‘Self‐Respect’. Rejecting two possible arguments for sr, he concludes that the principle does not constitute a requirement of rationality. In this paper we argue that not only has Christensen failed to make a case against the aforementioned arguments, but that considerations pertaining to Moore's paradox indicate that sr, or at the very least a mild weakening thereof, is indeed a plausible (...)
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  37. Brian Kierland, Bradley Monton & Samuel Ruhmkorff (2008). Avoiding Certain Frustration, Reflection, and the Cable Guy Paradox. Philosophical Studies 138 (3):317 - 333.
    We discuss the cable guy paradox, both as an object of interest in its own right and as something which can be used to illuminate certain issues in the theories of rational choice and belief. We argue that a crucial principle—The Avoid Certain Frustration (ACF) principle—which is used in stating the paradox is false, thus resolving the paradox. We also explain how the paradox gives us new insight into issues related to the Reflection principle. Our general thesis is that principles (...)
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  38. Peter J. Lewis (2010). Credence and Self-Location. Synthese 175 (3):369-382.
    All parties to the Sleeping Beauty debate agree that it shows that some cherished principle of rationality has to go. Thirders think that it is Conditionalization and Reflection that must be given up or modified; halfers think that it is the Principal Principle. I offer an analysis of the Sleeping Beauty puzzle that allows us to retain all three principles. In brief, I argue that Sleeping Beauty’s credence in the uncentered proposition that the coin came up heads should be 1/2, (...)
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  39. Patrick Maher (1992). Diachronic Rationality. Philosophy of Science 59 (1):120-141.
    This is an essay in the Bayesian theory of how opinions should be revised over time. It begins with a discussion of the principle that van Fraassen has dubbed "Reflection". This principle is not a requirement of rationality; a diachronic Dutch argument, that purports to show the contrary, is fallacious. But under suitable conditions, it is irrational to actually implement shifts in probability that violate Reflection. Conditionalization and probability kinematics are special cases of the principle not to implement shifts that (...)
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  40. Anna Mahtani (2016). Deference, Respect and Intensionality. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    This paper is about the standard Reflection Principle :235–256, 1984) and the Group Reflection Principle :478–502, 2007; Bovens and Rabinowicz in Episteme 8:281–300, 2011; Titelbaum in Quitting certainties: a Bayesian framework modeling degrees of belief, OUP, Oxford, 2012; Hedden in Mind 124:449–491, 2015). I argue that these principles are incomplete as they stand. The key point is that deference is an intensional relation, and so whether you are rationally required to defer to a person at a time can depend on (...)
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  41. Anna Mahtani (2015). Dutch Books, Coherence, and Logical Consistency. Noûs 49 (3):522-537.
    In this paper I present a new way of understanding Dutch Book Arguments: the idea is that an agent is shown to be incoherent iff he would accept as fair a set of bets that would result in a loss under any interpretation of the claims involved. This draws on a standard definition of logical inconsistency. On this new understanding, the Dutch Book Arguments for the probability axioms go through, but the Dutch Book Argument for Reflection fails. The question of (...)
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  42. Anna Mahtani (2012). Diachronic Dutch Book Arguments. Philosophical Review 121 (3):443-450.
    The Reflection Principle can be defended with a Diachronic Dutch Book Argument (DBA), but it is also defeated by numerous compelling counter-examples. It seems then that Diachronic DBAs can lead us astray. Should we reject them en masse—including Lewis’s Diachronic DBA for Conditionalization? Rachael Briggs’s “suppositional test” is supposed to differentiate between Diachronic DBAs that we can safely ignore (including the DBA for Reflection) and Diachronic DBAs that we should find compelling (including the DBA for Conditionalization). I argue that Brigg’s (...)
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  43. Ioannis Mariolis, Revealing the Beauty Behind the Sleeping Beauty Problem.
    A large number of essays address the Sleeping Beauty problem, which undermines the validity of Bayesian inference and Bas Van Fraassen's 'Reflection Principle'. In this study a straightforward analysis of the problem based on probability theory is presented. The key difference from previous works is that apart from the random experiment imposed by the problem's description, a different one is also considered, in order to negate the confusion on the involved conditional probabilities. The results of the analysis indicate that no (...)
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  44. Bradley Monton (2002). Sleeping Beauty and the Forgetful Bayesian. Analysis 62 (1):47–53.
    1. Consider the case of Sleeping Beauty: on Sunday she is put to sleep, and she knows that on Monday experimenters will wake her up, and then put her to sleep with a memory-erasing drug that causes her to forget that waking-up. The researchers will then flip a fair coin; if the result is Heads, they will allow her to continue to sleep, and if the result is Tails, they will wake her up again on Tuesday. Thus, when she is (...)
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  45. Ilho Park (2012). Rescuing Reflection. Philosophy of Science 79 (4):473-489.
    In this article, I suggest an argument that seems to show a conflict between the reflection principle and conditionalization. In particular, I show that when the reflection principle is formulated in a standard way, the principle conflicts with Jeffrey conditionalization. And it is argued that the source of the conflict resides in an ambiguity of the standard formulation. Furthermore, I attempt to rescue the principle using Bayes factors. That is, I suggest a new formulation of the principle so as to (...)
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  46. Richard Pettigrew & Michael G. Titelbaum (2014). Deference Done Right. Philosophers' Imprint 14 (35):1-19.
    There are many kinds of epistemic experts to which we might wish to defer in setting our credences. These include: highly rational agents, objective chances, our own future credences, our own current credences, and evidential probabilities. But exactly what constraint does a deference requirement place on an agent's credences? In this paper we consider three answers, inspired by three principles that have been proposed for deference to objective chances. We consider how these options fare when applied to the other kinds (...)
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  47. Wlodek Rabinowicz (2006). Levi on Money Pumps and Diachronic Dutch Books. In Erik J. Olsson (ed.), Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi. Cambridge University Press
    The paper's focus is on pragmatic arguments for various ‘rationality constraints’ on a decision maker’s state of mind: on his beliefs or preferences. An argument of this kind purports to show that a violator of a given constraint can be exposed to a decision problem in which he will act to his guaranteed disadvantage. Dramatically put, he can be exploited by a clever bookie who doesn’t know more than the agent himself. Examples of pragmatic arguments of this kind are synchronic (...)
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  48. Wlodek Rabinowicz & Luc Bovens (2011). Bets on Hats: On Dutch Books Against Groups, Degrees of Belief as Betting Rates, and Group-Reflection. Episteme 8 (3):281-300.
    The Story of the Hats is a puzzle in social epistemology. It describes a situation in which a group of rational agents with common priors and common goals seems vulnerable to a Dutch book if they are exposed to different information and make decisions independently. Situations in which this happens involve violations of what might be called the Group-Reflection Principle. As it turns out, the Dutch book is flawed. It is based on the betting interpretation of the subjective probabilities, but (...)
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  49. James H. Schmerl (1995). A Reflection Principle and its Applications to Nonstandard Models. Journal of Symbolic Logic 60 (4):1137-1152.
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  50. Michael J. Shaffer (2014). Reflection, Conditionalization and Indeterminacy About the Future. The Reasoner 8:65-66.
    This paper shows that any view of future contingent claims that treats such claims as having indeterminate truth values or as simply being false implies probabilistic irrationality. This is because such views of the future imply violations of reflection, special reflection and conditionalization.
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