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  1. John L. Ackrill (1978). Aristotle on Action. Mind 87 (348):595-601.
  2. Frederick Adams & Alfred Mele (1989). The Role of Intention in Intentional Action. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):511 - 531.
  3. Jesús H. Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff (2009). Agency, Consciousness, and Executive Control. Philosophia 37 (1):21-30.
    On the Causal Theory of Action (CTA), internal proper parts of an agent such as desires and intentions are causally responsible for actions. CTA has increasingly come under attack for its alleged failure to account for agency. A recent version of this criticism due to François Schroeter proposes that CTA cannot provide an adequate account of either the executive control or the autonomous control involved in full-fledged agency. Schroeter offers as an alternative a revised understanding of the proper role of (...)
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  4. Jesús H. Aguilar, Andrei A. Buckareff & Keith Frankish (eds.) (2010). New Waves in Philosophy of Action. Palgrave Macmillan.
  5. Roman Altshuler (2009). Agency and the A-Series. Southwest Philosophy Review 25 (1):153-161.
    Debates between A-theorists and B-theorists about time often center on our experiential beliefs about reality. Because we experience events as past, present, or future, the A-theorists argue, a tenseless theory of time cannot account for reality. B-theorists, in response, have sought to painstakingly explain away every argument for the existence of A-properties on the basis of experience. Recently, the dominant strategy in this response has involved turning our attention away from our beliefs about experience and toward the truth-makers of those (...)
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  6. Chrisoula Andreou (2014). The Good, the Bad, and the Trivial. Philosophical Studies 169 (2):209-225.
    Dreadful and dreaded outcomes are sometimes brought about via the accumulation of individually trivial effects. Think about inching toward terrible health or toward an environmental disaster. In some such cases, the outcome is seen as unacceptable but is still gradually realized via an extended sequence of moves each of which is trivial in terms of its impact on the health or environment of those involved. Cases of this sort are not only practically challenging, they are theoretically challenging as well. For, (...)
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  7. L. Apostel (1956). The Formal Structure of Action. Synthese 10 (1):349 - 356.
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  8. Lennart Åqvist (2002). Old Foundations for the Logic of Agency and Action. Studia Logica 72 (3):313-338.
    The paper presents an infinite hierarchy of sound and complete axiomatic systems for Two-Dimensional Modal Tense Logic with Historical Necessity, Agents and Acts. A main novelty of these logics is their capacity to represent formally (i) basic action-sentences asserting that such and such an act is performed/omitted by an agent, as well as (ii) causative action-sentences asserting that by performing/omitting a certain act, an agent causes that such and such a state-of-affairs is realized (e.g. comes about/ceases/remains/remains absent). We illustrate how (...)
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  9. Karl Aschenbrenner (1964). The Roots of Conflict and Action. Inquiry 7 (1-4):245 – 267.
    To understand human action in general we must look toward its determinants in the agent's cognitive assessment of an existing situation and in the attitudes this has prompted. But we cannot fully determine why a deed is done without reference also to evaluative appraisal which reveals basic commitment to prescripts. Naturalism either overlooks the autonomy of commitment vis- -vis attitude and cognitive assessment or, erroneously assimilating it to attitude, wholly distorts the plain fact of the clash of duty and inclination. (...)
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  10. M. M. Bakhtin (1993). Toward a Philosophy of the Act. University of Texas Press.
    Rescued in 1972 from a storeroom in which rats and seeping water had severely damaged the fifty-year-old manuscript, this text is the earliest major work (1919-1921) of the great Russian philosopher M. M. Bakhtin. Toward a Philosophy of the Act contains the first occurrences of themes that occupied Bakhtin throughout his long career. The topics of authoring, responsibility, self and other, the moral significance of "outsideness," participatory thinking, the implications for the individual subject of having "no-alibi in existence," the difference (...)
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  11. John Bishop (1990). Searle on Natural Agency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (3):282 – 300.
  12. John Bishop (1987). Sensitive and Insensitive Responses to Deviant Action. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (4):452 – 469.
  13. John Bishop (1985). Causal Deviancy and Multiple Intentions: A Reply to James Montmarquet. Analysis 45 (3):163 - 168.
  14. Raymond Bradley (2002). Love and Power, and the Development of the Brain, Mind, and Agency. World Futures 58 (2 & 3):175 – 211.
    In drawing on my own research and collaborative work with Karl Pribram, I show that love (affective attachment) and power (social control) play a central role in psychosocial evolution. When these relations are coupled in a self-regulating system of cooperative interactions, brain growth is stimulated, mind and agency develop, and stable forms of collective social organization are generated. Focusing on the endogenous dynamics of social collectives, the article is organized in four parts. (A "social collective" is defined as a (...)
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  15. Michael Bratman (1983). Taking Plans Seriously. Social Theory and Practice 9 (2/3):271-287.
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  16. Michael E. Bratman (1992). Planning and the Stability of Intention. Minds and Machines 2 (1):1-16.
    I sketch my general model of the roles of intentions in the planning of agents like us-agents with substantial resource limitations and with important needs for coordination. I then focus on the stability of prior intentions: their rational resistance to reconsideration. I emphasize the importance of cases in which one's nonreconsideration of a prior intention is nondeliberative and is grounded in relevant habits of reconsideration. Concerning such cases I argue for a limited form of two-tier consequentialism, one that is restricted (...)
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  17. Michael E. Bratman (1989). Intention and Personal Policies. Philosophical Perspectives 3:443-469.
  18. Bruce Bridgeman (2003). Grammar Originates in Action Planning, Not in Cognitive and Sensorimotor Visual Systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (3):287-287.
    While the PREDICATE(x) structure requires close coordination of subject and predicate, both represented in consciousness, the cognitive (ventral), and sensorimotor (dorsal) pathways operate in parallel. Sensorimotor information is unconscious and can contradict cognitive spatial information. A more likely origin of linguistic grammar lies in the mammalian action planning process. Neurological machinery evolved for planning of action sequences becomes applied to planning communicatory sequences.
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  19. Andrei A. Buckareff (2011). Action-Individuation and Doxastic Agency. Theoria 77 (4):312-332.
    In this article, I challenge the dominant view of the importance of the debate over action-individuation. On the dominant view, it is held that the conclusions we reach about action-individuation make little or no difference for other debates in the philosophy of action, much less in other areas of philosophy. As a means of showing that the dominant view is mistaken, I consider the implications of accepting a given theory of action-individuation for thinking about doxastic agency. In particular, I am (...)
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  20. Erik Carlson (2002). Deliberation, Foreknowledge, and Morality as a Guide to Action. Erkenntnis 57 (1):71-89.
    In Section 1, I rehearse some arguments for the claim that morality should be ``action-guiding'', and try to state the conditions under which a moral theory is in fact action-guiding. I conclude that only agents who are cognitively and conatively ``ideal'' are in general able to use a moral theory as a guide to action. In Sections 2 and 3, I discuss whether moral ``actualism'' implies that morality cannot be action-guiding even for ideal agents. If actualism is true, an ideal (...)
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  21. Peter Carruthers (2011). Creative Action in Mind. Philosophical Psychology 24 (4):437 - 461.
    The goal of this article is to display the attractiveness of a novel account of the place of creativity in the human mind. This is designed to supplement (and perhaps replace) the widespread assumption that creativity is thought-based, involving novel combinations of concepts to form creative thoughts, with the creativity of action being parasitic upon prior creative thinking. According to the proposed account, an additional (or perhaps alternative) locus of creativity lies in the assembly and activation of action-schemata, with creative (...)
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  22. Man Kit Chang (1998). Predicting Unethical Behavior: A Comparison of the Theory of Reasoned Action and the Theory of Planned Behavior. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 17 (16):1825-1834.
    This study is a comparison of the validity of theory of reasoned action and theory of planned behavior as applied to the area of moral behavior (i.e., illegal copying of software) using structural equation modeling. Data were collected from 181 university students on the various components of the theories and used to asses the influence of attitude, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control on the intention to make unauthorized software copies. Theory of planned behavior was found to be better than (...)
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  23. Ruth Chang (2001). Two Conceptions of Reasons for Action. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):447–453.
  24. Sara Rachel Chant (2006). The Special Composition Question in Action. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):422–441.
    Just as we may ask whether, and under what conditions, a collection of objects composes a single object, we may ask whether, and under what conditions, a collection of actions composes a single action. In the material objects literature, this question is known as the "special composition question," and I take it that there is a similar question to be asked of collections of actions. I will call that question the "special composition question in action," and argue that the correct (...)
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  25. Timothy Chappell (2002). Two Distinctions That Do Make a Difference: The Action/Omission Distinction and the Principle of Double Effect. Philosophy 77 (2):211-233.
    The paper outlines and explores a possible strategy for defending both the action/omission distinction (AOD) and the principle of double effect (PDE). The strategy is to argue that there are degrees of actionhood, and that we are in general less responsible for what has a lower degree of actionhood, because of that lower degree. Moreover, what we omit generally has a lower degree of actionhood than what we actively do, and what we do under known-but-not-intended descriptions generally has a lower (...)
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  26. Roderick M. Chisholm (1964). The Descriptive Element in the Concept of Action. Journal of Philosophy 61 (20):613-625.
  27. Ron Chrisley & J. Parthemore (2007). Synthetic Phenomenology:Exploiting Embodiment to Specify the Non-Conceptual Content of Visual Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):44-58.
    Not all research in machine consciousness aims to instantiate phenomenal states in artefacts. For example, one can use artefacts that do not themselves have phenomenal states, merely to simulate or model organisms that do. Nevertheless, one might refer to all of these pursuits -- instantiating, simulating or modelling phenomenal states in an artefact -- as 'synthetic phenomenality'. But there is another way in which artificial agents (be they simulated or real) may play a crucial role in understanding or creating consciousness: (...)
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  28. Randolph Clarke (2010). Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action, by E. J. Lowe. Mind 119 (475):820-823.
  29. Arthur B. Cody (1998). The Onslaught of Mental States. Inquiry 41 (1):89 – 97.
    The causal theory of action had suffered from inattention or linguistically motivated rejection until it was revived in 1963 by Donald Davidson. Since then the causal theory has had a continuing acceptance without having had an inspection of its assumptions. There are reasons to suspect that the theory is as unfounded as it is undoubted. Those reasons are reviewed here which have to do with the definitive moment when states such as beliefs and desires must change character to become causal (...)
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  30. Timothy Paul Cronan & Sulaiman Al-Rafee (2008). Factors That Influence the Intention to Pirate Software and Media. Journal of Business Ethics 78 (4):527 - 545.
    This study focuses on one of the newer forms of software piracy, known as digital piracy, and uses the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) as a framework to attempt to determine factors that influence digital piracy (the illegal copying/downloading of copyrighted software and media files). This study examines factors, which could determine an individual’s intention to pirate digital material (software, media, etc.). Past piracy behavior and moral obligation, in addition to the prevailing theories of behavior (Theory of Planned Behavior), were (...)
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  31. T. D., G. Knoblich, M. Erb & J. T. (2003). Observing One's Hand Become Anarchic: An fMRI Study of Action Identification. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):597-608.
    The self seems to be a unitary entity remaining stable across time. Nevertheless, current theorizing conceptualizes the self as a number of interacting sub-systems involving perception, intention and action (self-model). One important function of such a self-model is to distinguish between events occurring as a result of one's own actions and events occurring as the result of somebody else's actions. We conducted an fMRI experiment that compared brain activation after an abrupt mismatch between one's own movement and its visual consequences (...)
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  32. Donald Davidson (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford University Press.
  33. Lawrence H. Davis (1979). Theory of Action. Prentice Hall.
  34. Sanneke de Haan & Leon de Bruin (2010). Reconstructing the Minimal Self, or How to Make Sense of Agency and Ownership. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):373-396.
    We challenge Gallagher’s distinction between the sense of ownership (SO) and the sense of agency (SA) as two separable modalities of experience of the minimal self and argue that a careful investigation of the examples provided to promote this distinction in fact reveals that SO and SA are intimately related and modulate each other. We propose a way to differentiate between the various notions of SO and SA that are currently used interchangeably in the debate, and suggest a more gradual (...)
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  35. Hanne De Jaegher & Tom Froese (2009). On the Role of Social Interaction in Individual Agency. Adaptive Behavior 17 (5):444-460.
    Is an individual agent constitutive of or constituted by its social interactions? This question is typically not asked in the cognitive sciences, so strong is the consensus that only individual agents have constitutive efficacy. In this article we challenge this methodological solipsism and argue that interindividual relations and social context do not simply arise from the behavior of individual agents, but themselves enable and shape the individual agents on which they depend. For this, we define the notion of autonomy as (...)
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  36. David DeGrazia (1994). Autonomous Action and Autonomy-Subverting Psychiatric Conditions. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 19 (3):279-297.
    The following theses are defended in this paper: (1) The concept of autonomous action is centrally relevant to understanding numerous psychiatric conditions, namely, conditions that subvert autonomy; (2) The details of an analysis of autonomous action matter; a vague or rough characterization is less illuminating; (3) A promising analysis for this purpose (and generally) is a version of the "multi-tier model". After opening with five vignettes, I begin the discussion by highlighting strengths and weaknesses of contributions by other authors who (...)
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  37. Lara Denis (2010). Review: McCarty, Kant's Theory of Action. [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (4):533-535.
    This significant, stimulating contribution to Kantian practical philosophy strives to interpret Kant’s theory of action in ways that will increase readers’ understanding and appreciation of Kant’s moral theory. Its thesis is that Kant combines metaphysical freedom and psychological determinism: our actions within the phenomenal world are causally determined by our prior psychological states in that world and are appearances of our free action in the noumenal world. McCarty argues for a metaphysical, “two-worlds” interpretation of Kant’s transcendental distinction between appearances and (...)
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  38. Jan Doroszewski (1987). Unity and Diversity of the Medical Action: A Review of its Components and Their Interconnections. [REVIEW] Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 2 (2):155-168.
    In this paper, the main components of the medical action are divided into three types: cognitive operations, value judgments and instrumental reasoning. The study aims at fraiming some specific methodological problems in order to encourage further research on the theory of planning and effectivity of the medical action.
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  39. Berent Enç (2003). How We Act: Causes, Reasons, and Intentions. Oxford University Press.
    Talking about action comes easily to us. We quickly make distinctions between voluntary and non-voluntary actions; we think we can tell what intentions are; we are confident about evaluating reasons offered in rational justification of action. Berent Enc provides a philosopher's sustained examination of these issues: he portrays action as belonging to the causal order of events in nature, a theory from which new and surprising accounts of intention and voluntary action emerge. Philosophers and cognitive scientists alike will find How (...)
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  40. David Enoch (2006). Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won't Come From What is Constitutive of Action. Philosophical Review 115 (2):169-198.
    There is a fairly widespread—and very infl uential—hope among philosophers interested in the status of normativity that the solution to our metaethical and, more generally, metanormative problems will emerge from the philosophy of action. In this essay, I will argue that these hopes are groundless. I will focus on the metanormative hope, but—as will become clear—showing that the solution to our metanormative problems will not come from what is constitutive of action will also devastate the hope of gaining significant insight (...)
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  41. Flannery (2009). The Division of Action in Thomas Aquinas. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 83 (3):421 - 440.
    Aquinas accepts that (i) some kinds of voluntary action are (qua voluntary) “basic,” not divisible into (non-fictional) further kinds; (ii) a concrete individual action may belong to more than one basic kind; (iii) the basic kinds to which it belongs are determined by the agent’s intentions qua performing the action; (iv) some intentions may stand to others as means to ends; (v) there can be concrete individual actions in which the agent’s intended means are disordered with respect to the ends; (...)
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  42. Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.) (2011). Essays on Anscombe's Intention. Harvard University Press.
    This collection of ten essays elucidates some of the more challenging aspects of Anscombe’s work and affirms her reputation as one of our most original ...
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  43. Danny Frederick (2013). Free Will and Probability. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):60-77.
    The chance objection to incompatibilist accounts of free action maintains that undetermined actions are not under the agent's control. Some attempts to circumvent this objection locate chance in events posterior to the action. Indeterministic-causation theories locate chance in events prior to the action. However, neither type of response gives an account of free action which avoids the chance objection. Chance must be located at the act of will if actions are to be both undetermined and under the agent's control. This (...)
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  44. Danny Frederick (2010). Popper and Free Will. Studia Philosophica Estonica 3 (1):21-38.
    Determinism seems incompatible with free will. However, even indeterminism seems incompatible with free will, since it seems to make free actions random. Popper contends that free agents are not bound by physical laws, even indeterministic ones, and that undetermined actions are not random if they are influenced by abstract entities. I argue that Popper could strengthen his account by drawing upon his theories of propensities and of limited rationality; but that even then his account would not fully explain why free (...)
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  45. Walter Freeman (2008). Nonlinear Brain Dynamics and Intention According to Aquinas. Mind and Matter 6 (2):207-234.
    We humans and other animals continuously construct and main- tain our grasp of the world by using astonishingly small snippets of sensory information. Recent studies in nonlinear brain dynamics have shown how this occurs: brains imagine possible futures and seek and use sensory stimulation to select among them as guides for chosen actions. On the one hand the scientific explanation of the dynamics is inaccessible to most of us. On the other hand the philosophical foundation from which the sciences grew (...)
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  46. Patrick R. Frierson (2005). Kant's Empirical Account of Human Action. Philosophers' Imprint 5 (7):1-34.
    In the first Critique, Kant says, “[A]ll the actions of a human being are determined in accord with the order of nature,” adding that “if we could investigate all the appearances . . . there would be no human action we could not predict with certainty.” Most Kantian treatments of human action discuss action from a practical perspective, according to which human beings are transcendentally free, and thus do not sufficiently lay out this Kant’s empirical, causal description of human action. (...)
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  47. John Gibbons (2009). Reason in Action. In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press. 72.
    There is a problem with a very common theory of the nature of action. The problem stems from the fact that causation by practical reasons may be a necessary condition for being an intentional action, but it can’t be a sufficient condition. After all, desires and intentions are caused by practical reasons that rationalize them, but they’re clearly not actions. Even if all actions are events or changes and desires and intentions aren’t, the acquistion of a desire or an intention (...)
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  48. Kathrin Gluer (2011). Donald Davidson: A Short Introduction. OUP USA.
    Donald Davidson was one of the 20th Century's deepest analytic thinkers. He developed a systematic picture of the human mind and its relation to the world, an original and sustained vision that exerted a shaping influence well beyond analytic philosophy of mind and language. At its center is an idea of minded creatures as essentially rational animals: Rational animals can be interpreted, their behavior can be understood, and the contents of their thoughts are, in principle, open to others. The combination (...)
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  49. Thor Grünbaum (2011). Commonsense Psychology, Dual Visual Streams, and the Individuation of Action. Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):25 - 47.
    Psychologists and philosophers are often tempted to make general claims about the importance of certain experimental results for our commonsense notions of intentional agency, moral responsibility, and free will. It is a strong intuition that if the agent does not intentionally control her own behavior, her behavior will not be an expression of agency, she will not be morally responsible for its consequences, and she will not be acting as a free agent. It therefore seems natural that the interest centers (...)
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  50. Ishtiyaque Haji (2008). Authentic Springs of Action and Obligation. Journal of Ethics 12 (3/4):239 - 261.
    What is the connection between action that is caused by inauthentic antecedent springs of action, such as surreptitiously engineered-in desires and beliefs, and moral obligation? If, for example, an agent performs an action that derives from such antecedent springs can it be that the agent is not obligated to perform this action owing to the inauthenticity of its causal antecedents? I defend an affirmative response, assuming that we morally ought to bring about the states of affairs that occur in the (...)
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