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  1. Daniel R. Ames, Eric D. Knowles, Michael W. Morris, Charles W. Kalish, Andrea D. Rosati & Alison Gopnik (2001). The Social Folk Theorist: Insights From Social and Cultural Psychology on The. In Bertram Malle, L. J. Moses & Dare Baldwin (eds.), Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition. MIT Press
  2. Louise M. Antony (ed.) (2003). Chomsky and His Critics. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing.
    In this compelling volume, ten distinguished thinkers – William G. Lycan, Jeffrey Poland, Galen Strawson, Frances Egan, Georges Rey, Peter Ludlow, Paul ...
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  3. Ian Apperly (2010). Mindreaders: The Cognitive Basis of "Theory of Mind". Psychology Press.
    Introduction -- Evidence from children -- Evidence form infants and non-human animals -- Evidence from neuroimaging and neuropsychology -- Evidence from adults -- The cognitive basis of mindreading -- Elaborating and applying the theory.
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  4. Angela Joan Arkway (1995). Psychological Explanation: Tacit Theory or Simulation? Dissertation, City University of New York
    In this dissertation an attempt is made to find a satisfactory account of the nature of commonsense psychological explanation of behavior. The starting point is the current debate in philosophy of mind between the theory theory of folk psychology and the simulation theory. The discussion in the first chapter shows that although simulationists claim that their view can replace the theory theory across the board, their arguments are directed merely at the strand of the theory theory that is to do (...)
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  5. Theodore Bach (2014). A Unified Account of General Learning Mechanisms and Theory‐of‐Mind Development. Mind and Language 29 (3):351-381.
    Modularity theorists have challenged that there are, or could be, general learning mechanisms that explain theory-of-mind development. In response, supporters of the ‘scientific theory-theory’ account of theory-of-mind development have appealed to children's use of auxiliary hypotheses and probabilistic causal modeling. This article argues that these general learning mechanisms are not sufficient to meet the modularist's challenge. The article then explores an alternative domain-general learning mechanism by proposing that children grasp the concept belief through the progressive alignment of relational structure that (...)
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  6. Theodore Bach (2013). Psychological Concept Acquisition. In N. Payette (ed.), Connected Minds: Cognition and Interaction in the Social World. Cambridge Scholars Publishing
    This essay adjudicates between theoretical models of psychological concept acquisition. I provide new reasons to be skeptical about both simulationist and modularist models. I then defend the scientific-theory-theory account against familiar objections. I conclude by arguing that the scientific-theory-theory account must be supplemented by an account of hypothesis discovery.
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  7. Theodore Bach (2011). Structure-Mapping: Directions From Simulation to Theory. Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):23-51.
    The theory of mind debate has reached a “hybrid consensus” concerning the status of theory-theory and simulation-theory. Extant hybrid models either specify co-dependency and implementation relations, or distribute mentalizing tasks according to folk-psychological categories. By relying on a non-developmental framework these models fail to capture the central connection between simulation and theory. I propose a “dynamic” hybrid that is informed by recent work on the nature of similarity cognition. I claim that Gentner’s model of structure-mapping allows us to understand simulation (...)
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  8. Luca Barlassina (2013). Simulation is Not Enough: A Hybrid Model of Disgust Attribution on the Basis of Visual Stimuli. Philosophical Psychology 26 (3):401-419.
    Mindreading is the ability to attribute mental states to other individuals. According to the Theory-Theory (TT), mindreading is based on one's possession of a Theory of Mind. On the other hand, the Simulation Theory (ST) maintains that one arrives at the attribution of a mental state by simulating it in one's own mind. In this paper, I propose a ST-TT hybrid model of the ability to attribute disgust on the basis of visual stimuli such as facial expressions, body postures, etc. (...)
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  9. Simon Baron-Cohen (1988). Without a Theory of Mind One Cannot Participate in a Conversation. Cognition 29 (1):83-84.
  10. Simon Baron-Cohen, Alan M. Leslie & Uta Frith (1985). Does the Autistic Child Have a “Theory of Mind”? Cognition 21 (1):37-46.
    We use a new model of metarepresentational development to predict a cognitive deficit which could explain a crucial component of the social impairment in childhood autism. One of the manifestations of a basic metarepresentational capacity is a ‘ theory of mind ’. We have reason to believe that autistic children lack such a ‘ theory ’. If this were so, then they would be unable to impute beliefs to others and to predict their behaviour. This hypothesis was tested using Wimmer (...)
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  11. Timothy Bayne (1997). Alison Gopnik and Andrew N. Meltzoff, Words, Thoughts, and Theories Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 17 (4):254-256.
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  12. Timothy Bayne (1997). Alison Gopnik and Andrew N. Meltzoff, Words, Thoughts, and Theories. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 17:254-256.
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  13. Michael A. Bishop (2002). The Theory Theory Thrice Over: The Child as Scientist, Superscientist, or Social Institution? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 33 (1):121-36.
    Alison Gopnik and Andrew Meltzoff have argued for a view they call the ‘theory theory’: theory change in science and children are similar. While their version of the theory theory has been criticized for depending on a number of disputed claims, we argue that there is a fundamental problem which is much more basic: the theory theory is multiply ambiguous. We show that it might be claiming that a similarity holds between theory change in children and (i) individual scientists, (ii) (...)
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  14. Nick Bostrom, Cortical Integration: Possible Solutions to the Binding and Linking Problems in Perception, Reasoning and Long Term Memory.
    The problem of cortical integration is described and various proposed solutions, including grandmother cells, cell assemblies, feed-forward structures, RAAM and synchronization, are reviewed. One method, involving complex attractors, that has received little attention in the literature, is explained and developed. I call this binding through annexation. A simulation study is then presented which suggests ways in which complex attractors could underlie our capacity to reason. The paper ends with a discussion of the efficiency and biological plausibility of the proposals as (...)
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  15. George Botterill (1994). Review: Recent Work in Folk Psychology. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 44 (175):246 - 251.
  16. Stephen Butterfill, Ian Apperly, Hannes Rakoczy, Shannon Spaulding & Tadeusz Zawidzki, Symposium on S. Butterfill and I. Apperly, "How to Construct a Minimal Theory of Mind". Mind and Language Symposia at the Brains Blog.
  17. Peter Carruthers (2009). ""Banishing" I" and" We" From Accounts of Metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):148.
    SHORT ABSTRACT: A number of accounts of the relationship between third-person mindreading and first-person metacognition are compared and evaluated. While three of these accounts endorse the existence of introspection for propositional attitudes, the fourth (defended here) claims that our knowledge of our own attitudes results from turning our mindreading capacities upon ourselves. The different types of theory are developed and evaluated, and multiple lines of evidence are reviewed, including evolutionary and comparative data, evidence of confabulation when self-attributing attitudes, phenomenological evidence (...)
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  18. Willem DeVries (2006). Folk Psychology, Theories, and the Sellarsian Roots. In Michael P. Wolf (ed.), Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities. Rodopi 53-84.
    Wilfrid Sellars has often be proclaimed the father of the "theory theory" of psychological knowledge. This article exposes what is true and and what is false in this claim.
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  19. W. H. Dittrich & S. E. G. Lea (1993). Intentionality, Mind and Folk Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.
    The comment addresses central issues of a "theory theory" approach as exemplified in Gopnik' and Goldman's BBS-articles. Gopnik, on the one hand, tries to demonstrate that empirical evidence from developmental psychology supports the view of a "theory theory" in which common sense beliefs are constructed to explain ourselves and others. Focusing the informational processing routes possibly involved we would like to argue that his main thesis (e.g. idea of intentionality as a cognitive construct) lacks support at least for two reasons: (...)
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  20. Stephen M. Downes (1999). Can Scientific Development and Children's Cognitive Development Be the Same Process? Philosophy of Science 66 (4):565-578.
    In this paper I assess Gopnik and Meltzoff's developmental psychology of science as a contribution to the understanding of scientific development. I focus on two specific aspects of Gopnik and Meltzoff's approach: the relation between their views and recapitulationist views of ontogeny and phylogeny in biology, and their overall conception of cognition as a set of veridical processes. First, I discuss several issues that arise from their appeal to evolutionary biology, focusing specifically on the role of distinctions between ontogeny and (...)
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  21. A. Fine (1996). Science as Child's Play: Tales From the Crib. Philosophy of Science 63 (4):534-37.
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  22. J. A. Fodor (1992). A Theory of the Child's Theory of Mind. Cognition 44 (3):283-296.
  23. Thomas Fuchs (2013). The Phenomenology and Development of Social Perspectives. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):655-683.
    The paper first gives a conceptual distinction of the first, second and third person perspectives in social cognition research and connects them to the major present theories of understanding others (simulation, interaction and theory theory). It then argues for a foundational role of second person interactions for the development of social perspectives. To support this thesis, the paper analyzes in detail how infants, in particular through triangular interactions with persons and objects, expand their understanding of perspectives and arrive at a (...)
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  24. Shaun Gallagher (2011). Strong Interaction and Self-Agency. Humana.Mente 15:55-76.
    The interaction theory of social cognition contends that intersubjective interaction is characterized by both immersion and irreducibility. This motivates a question about autonomy and self-agency: If I am always caught up in processes of interaction, and interaction always goes beyond me and my ultimate control, is there any room for self-agency? I outline an answer to this question that points to the importance of communicative and narrative practices.
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  25. Shaun Gallagher (2008). Inference or Interaction: Social Cognition Without Precursors. Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):163 – 174.
    In this paper I defend interaction theory (IT) as an alternative to both theory theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST). IT opposes the basic suppositions that both TT and ST depend upon. I argue that the various capacities for primary and secondary intersubjectivity found in infancy and early childhood should not be thought of as precursors to later developing capacities for using folk psychology or simulation routines. They are not replaced or displaced by such capacities in adulthood, but rather continue (...)
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  26. Shaun Gallagher & Daniel D. Hutto (2008). Understanding Others Through Primary Interaction and Narrative Practice. In J. Zlatev, T. Racine, C. Sinha & E. Itkonen (eds.), The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity. John Benjamins 17–38.
    We argue that theory-of-mind (ToM) approaches, such as “theory theory” and “simulation theory”, are both problematic and not needed. They account for neither our primary and pervasive way of engaging with others nor the true basis of our folk psychological understanding, even when narrowly construed. Developmental evidence shows that young infants are capable of grasping the purposeful intentions of others through the perception of bodily movements, gestures, facial expressions etc. Trevarthen’s notion of primary intersubjectivity can provide a theoretical framework for (...)
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  27. Christopher Gauker (2005). The Belief-Desire Law. Facta Philosophica 7 (2):121-144.
    Many philosophers hold that for various reasons there must be psychological laws governing beliefs and desires. One of the few serious examples that they offer is the _belief-desire law_, which states, roughly, that _ceteris paribus_ people do what they believe will satisfy their desires. This paper argues that, in fact, there is no such law. In particular, decision theory does not support the contention that there is such a law.
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  28. Christopher Gauker (2003). Attitudes Without Psychology. Facta Philosophica 5 (2):239-56.
    Many philosophers hold that beliefs and desires are theoretical entities postulated for the sake of predicting and explaining people's behaviors. This paper offers a very different perspective on the nature of beliefs and desires. According to this, the first step is to understand the nature of assertion and command. Then, to understand the nature of belief and desire, what one must do is extend one's understanding of assertion and commandto assertions and commands on behalf of others; for to attribute a (...)
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  29. Rocco J. Gennaro (2009). Animals, Consciousness, and I-Thoughts. In Robert W. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds. Cambridge University Press 184--200.
    I argue that recent developments in animal cognition support the conclusion that HOT theory is consistent with animal consciousness. There seems to be growing evidence that many animals are indeed capable of having I-thoughts, including episodic memory, as well as have the ability to understand the mental states of others.
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  30. Stuart S. Glennan (2005). The Modeler in the Crib. Philosophical Explorations 8 (3):217-227.
    A number of developmental psychologists have argued for a theory they call the theory theory - a theory of cognitive development that suggests that infants and small children make sense of their world by constructing cognitive representations that have many of the attributes of scientific theories. In this paper I argue that there are indeed close parallels between the activities of children and scientists, but that these parallels will be better understood if one recognizes that both scientists and children are (...)
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  31. C. Glymour (2000). Android Epistemology for Babies. Synthese 122 (1-2):53-68.
    _Words_, _Thoughts and Theories _argues that infants and children discover the physical and psychological features of the world by a process akin to scientific inquiry, more or less as conceived by philosophers of science in the 1960s (the theory theory). This essay discusses some of the philosophical background to an alternative, more popular, “modular” or “maturational” account of development, dismisses an array of philosoph- ical objections to the theory theory, suggests that the theory theory offers an undeveloped project for artificial (...)
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  32. Alison Gopnik (2003). The Theory Theory as an Alternative to the Innateness Hypothesis. In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Chomsky and His Critics. Blackwell 238--254.
  33. Alison Gopnik (1997). The Scientist as Child. Philosophy of Science 63 (4):485-514.
    This paper argues that there are powerful similarities between cognitive development in children and scientific theory change. These similarities are best explained by postulating an underlying abstract set of rules and representations that underwrite both types of cognitive abilities. In fact, science may be successful largely because it exploits powerful and flexible cognitive devices that were designed by evolution to facilitate learning in young children. Both science and cognitive development involve abstract, coherent systems of entities and rules, theories. In both (...)
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  34. Alison Gopnik (1990). Developing the Idea of Intentionality: Children's Theories of Mind. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):89-114.
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  35. Alison Gopnik & Andrew N. Meltzoff (1998). Theories Vs. Modules: To the Max and Beyond: A Reply to Poulin-Dubois and to Stich and Nichols. Mind and Language 13 (3):450-456.
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  36. Alison Gopnik & H. M. Wellman (1992). Why the Child's Theory of Mind Really is a Theory. Mind and Language 7 (1-2):145-71.
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  37. R. Gordon (1992). The Simulation Theory and the Theory Theory. Mind and Language 7 (1/2):11-35.
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  38. Robert M. Gordon (2008). Beyond Mindreading. Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):219 – 222.
    I argue that there is no conflict between the simulation theory, once it is freed from certain constraints carried over from theory theory, and Gallagher's view that our primary and pervasive way of engaging with others rests on 'direct', non-mentalizing perception of the 'meanings' of others' facial expressions, gestures, and intentional actions.
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  39. Robert M. Gordon (2000). Sellars's Rylean Ancestors Revisited. Protosociology 14:102-114.
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  40. Richard E. Grandy (1996). No Simulation Without (Some) Theory (Somewhere, Some Kind): Comments on Henderson. Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (S1):95-98.
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  41. Adam Green (2014). Mapping Others: Representation and Mindreading. Essays in Philosophy 15 (2):279-298.
    Thinking about the representational qualities of maps and models allows one to offer a new perspective on the nature of mindreading. The recent critiques of our dominant paradigms for mindreading, theory theory and simulation theory by enactivists such as Daniel Hutto reveal a flaw in the standard options for thinking about how we think about others. Views that rely on theorizing or simulation to account for the way in which we understand others often appear to over-intellectualize social interaction. In contrast, (...)
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  42. John D. Greenwood (2007). Unnatural Epistemology. Mind and Language 22 (2):132-149.
    ‘Naturalized’ philosophers of mind regularly appeal to the empirical psychological literature in support of the ‘theory-theory’ account of the natural epistemology of mental state ascription (to self and others). It is argued that such appeals are not philosophically neutral, but in fact presuppose the theory-theory account of mental state ascription. It is suggested that a possible explanation of the popularity of the theory-theory account is that it is generally assumed that alternative accounts in terms of introspection (and simulation) presuppose a (...)
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  43. Paul L. Harris (1992). From Simulation to Folk Psychology: The Case for Development. Mind and Language 7 (1‐2):120-144.
  44. J. Heal (2005). Review: Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness and Understanding Other Minds. [REVIEW] Mind 114 (453):181-184.
  45. David Henderson (2011). Lets Be Flexible: Our Interpretive/Explanatory Toolbox, or In Praise of Using a Range of Tools. Journal of the Philosophy of History 5 (2):261-299.
    This paper explores the role and limits of cognitive simulation in understanding or explaining others. In simulation, one puts one's own cognitive processes to work on pretend input similar to that one supposes that the other plausibly had. Such a process is highly useful. However, it is also limited in important ways. Several limitations fall out from the various forms of cognitive diversity. Some of this diversity results from cultural differences, or from differences in individuals' cognitive biographies. Such diversity is (...)
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  46. Mitchell Herschbach (2008). Folk Psychological and Phenomenological Accounts of Social Perception. Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):223 – 235.
    Theory theory and simulation theory share the assumption that mental states are unobservable, such that mental state attribution requires an extra psychological step beyond perception. Phenomenologists deny this, contending that we can directly perceive people's mental states. Here I evaluate objections to theory theory and simulation theory as accounts of everyday social perception offered by Dan Zahavi and Shaun Gallagher. I agree that their phenomenological claims have bite at the personal level, distinguishing direct social perception from conscious theorizing and simulation. (...)
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  47. Daniel D. Hutto (2005). Starting Without Theory: Confronting the Paradox of Conceptual Development. In B. Malle & S. Hodges (eds.), Other Minds. Guilford 56--72.
    There is a paradox about how our social understanding develops if we take seriously both theory theory and the cognitivist dictum that all skilful interaction has robust conceptual underpinnings. On the one hand, it is clear that young infants demonstrate a capacity to reliably detect and respond to other’s intentions. For example, recent experimental evidence confirms that they have the capacity to appropriately parse what would otherwise be an undifferentiated behaviour stream at its mentalistic joints. If we follow the cognitivist (...)
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  48. Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.) (2007). Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. Kluwer/Springer Press.
    This is a truly groundbreaking work that examines today’s notions of folk psychology. Bringing together disciplines as various as cognitive science and anthropology, the authors analyze and question key assumptions about the nature, scope and function of folk psychology.
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  49. Frank Jackson (2000). Psychological Explanation and Implicit Theory. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):83-95.
    I offer an account of the relation between explanations of behaviour in terms of psychological states and explanations in terms of neural states that: makes it transparent how they can be true together; explains why explanations in terms of psychological states are characteristically of behaviour described in general and relational terms, and explains why certain sorts of neurological investigations undermine psychological explanations of behaviour, while others leave them intact. In the course of the argument, I offer an account of implicit (...)
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  50. Joshua Johnson (2013). The Private Language Argument and a Second-Person Approach to Mindreading. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (4).
    I argue that if Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument is correct, then both Theory Theory and Simulation Theory are inadequate accounts of how we come to know other minds since both theories assume the reality of a private language. Further, following the work of a number of philosophers and psychologists, I defend a ‘Second-Person Approach’ to mindreading according to which it is possible for us to be directly aware of at least some of the mental states of others. Because it is (...)
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