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  1. A. Ahmed (forthcoming). Signaling Systems and the Transcendental Deduction. In T. Goldschmidt K. Pearce (ed.), Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics.
    The paper offers a model of Kant's claim that unity of consciousness entails objectivity of experience. This claim has nothing especially to do with thought, language or the categories but is a general truth about arbitrary signaling systems of the sort modeled in the paper. In conclusion I draw some consequences for various forms of idealism.
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  2. Torin Alter, What Do Split-Brain Cases Show About the Unity of Consciousness?
    The startling empirical data that concern us here are well known. Severing the corpus callosum produces a kind of mental bifurcation (Sperry 1968). In one experiment, a garlic smell is presented to a patient.
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  3. Torin Alter (2010). A Defense of the Necessary Unity of Phenomenal Consciousness. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (1):19-37.
    Some argue that split-brain cases undermine the thesis that phenomenal consciousness is necessarily unified. This paper defends the phenomenal unity thesis against Michael Tye's (2003 ) version of that argument. Two problems are identified. First, his argument relies on a questionable analysis of the split-brain data. Second, his analysis leads to the view that in experimental situations split-brain patients are not single subjects – a result that would render the analysis harmless to the phenomenal unity thesis.
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  4. Robert M. Anderson & Joseph F. Gonsalves (1981). Sensory Suppression and the Unity of Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (1):99.
  5. Scot William Anderson (1988). The Problem of the Unity of Consciousness: A Study of Apperception and Reflection. Dissertation, University of Colorado at Boulder
    The problem of the unity of consciousness gains its impetus from the work of Immanuel Kant in The Critique of Pure Reason. The problem Kant leaves us is that the unity of consciousness is taken to be the ground for and basis of the very possibility of our having the kinds of experiences that we have. Yet while this unity explains all sorts of phenomena, it itself remains in some very real sense beyond our grasp. To unravel the problem of (...)
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  6. Victor Argonov (2012). Neural Correlate of Consciousness in a Single Electron: Radical Answer to “Quantum Theories of Consciousness”. Neuroquantology 12 (2):276-285.
    We argue that human consciousness may be a property of single electron in the brain. We suppose that each electron in the universe has at least primitive consciousness. Each electron subjectively “observes” its quantum dynamics (energy, momentum, “shape” of wave function) in the form of sensations and other mental phenomena. However, some electrons in neural cells have complex “human” consciousnesses due to complex quantum dynamics in complex organic environment. We discuss neurophysiological and physical aspects of this hypothesis and show that: (...)
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  7. Felix Arnold (1905). The Unity of Mental Life. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 2 (18):487-493.
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  8. F. E. B. (1959). The Unity and Disunity of the Church. Review of Metaphysics 12 (3):487-487.
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  9. Kent Bach (1988). Critical Notice. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press
    As philosophical topics go, self-deception has something for everyone. It raises basic questions about the nature of belief and the relation of belief to thought, desire, and the will. It provokes further questions on such topics as reasoning, attention, self-knowledge, the unity of the self, intentional action, motivation, self-esteem, psychic defenses, the unconscious, personal character, and interpersonal relations. There are two basic questions about self-deception itself, which each take a familiar philosophical form: What is it? How is it possible? These (...)
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  10. Andrew R. Bailey (1999). Beyond the Fringe: William James on the Transitive Parts of the Stream of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (2-3):141-53.
    One of the aspects of consciousness deserving of study is what might be called its subjective unity - the way in which, though conscious experience moves from object to object, and can be said to have distinct ‘states', it nevertheless in some sense apparently forms a singular flux divided only by periods of unconsciousness. The work of William James provides a valuable, and rather unique, source of analysis of this feature of consciousness; however, in my opinion, this component of James’ (...)
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  11. Kent Baldner (1996). Subjectivity and the Unity of the World. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (184):333-346.
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  12. Peter Baumann (2007). Experiencing Things Together: What is the Problem? Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):9 - 26.
    Suppose someone hears a loud noise and at the same time sees a yellow flash. It seems hard to deny that the person can experience loudness and yellowness together. However, since loudness is experienced by the auditory sense whereas yellowness is experienced by the visual sense it also seems hard to explain how.
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  13. T. Bayne (forthcoming). The Unity of Consciousness and the Commissurotomy Syndrome. Journal of Philosophy.
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  14. T. Bayne (2014). Replies to Commentators. Analysis 74 (3):520-529.
    This article is a response to commentaries by Chris Hill, Farid Masrour and Robert van Gulick on "The Unity of Consciousness" . Topics covered in the discussion include the phenomenal unity relation, the respect in which the unity of consciousness is a necessary feature of consciousness, and challenges to the idea that the self might be a merely virtual entity.
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  15. Tim Bayne, The Unity of Consciousness: A Cartography.
    theorists insist that consciousness is essentially unified. Other theorists assert that the unity of consciousness is an illusion, and that consciousness is often, if not invariably, disunified. Unfortunately, it is rare for proponents of either side of the debate to explain what the unity of consciousness might involve. What would it mean for consciousness to be unified? In this chapter I provide a brief cartography of the unity of consciousness. In the next section I introduce a number of unity relations (...)
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  16. Tim Bayne (2012). The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Tim Bayne draws on philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience in defence of the claim that consciousness is unified. He develops an account of what it means to say that consciousness is unified, and then applies this account to a variety of cases - drawn from both normal and pathological forms of experience - in which the unity of consciousness is said to break down. He goes on to explore the implications of the unity of consciousness for theories of consciousness, for the (...)
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  17. Tim Bayne (2008). The Unity of Consciousness and the Split-Brain Syndrome. Journal of Philosophy 105 (6):277-300.
    According to conventional wisdom, the split-brain syndrome puts paid to the thesis that consciousness is necessarily unified. The aim of this paper is to challenge that view. I argue both that disunity models of the split-brain are highly problematic, and that there is much to recommend a model of the split-brain—the switch model—according to which split-brain patients retain a fully unified consciousness at all times. Although the task of examining the unity of consciousness through the (...)
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  18. Tim Bayne (2007). Hypnosis and the Unity of Consciousness. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press 93-109.
    Hypnosis appears to generate unusual—and sometimes even astonishing—changes in the contents of consciousness. Hypnotic subjects report perceiving things that are not there, they report not perceiving things that are there, and they report unusual alterations in the phenomenology of agency. In addition to apparent alterations in the contents of consciousness, hypnosis also appears to involve alterations in the structure of consciousness. According to many theorists—most notably Hilgard—hypnosis demonstrates that the unity of consciousness is an illusion (Hilgard 1977).
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  19. Tim Bayne (2007). Hypnosis and the Unity of Consciousness. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press
    Hypnosis appears to generate unusual—and sometimes even astonishing—changes in the contents of consciousness. Hypnotic subjects report perceiving things that are not there, they report not perceiving things that are there, and they report unusual alterations in the phenomenology of agency. In addition to apparent alterations in the contents of consciousness, hypnosis also appears to involve alterations in the structure of consciousness. According to many theorists—most notably Hilgard—hypnosis demonstrates that the unity of consciousness is an illusion (Hilgard 1977).
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  20. Tim Bayne (2005). Divided Brains and Unified Phenomenology: A Review Essay on Michael Tye's Consciousness and Persons. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):495-512.
    In Consciousness and persons, Michael Tye (Tye, M. (2003). Consciousness and persons. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.) develops and defends a novel approach to the unity of consciousness. Rather than thinking of the unity of consciousness as involving phenomenal relations between distinct experiences, as standard accounts do, Tye argues that we should regard the unity of consciousness as involving relations between the contents of consciousness. Having developed an account of what it is for consciousness to be unified, Tye goes on to (...)
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  21. Timothy J. Bayne (forthcoming). Unified Phenomenology and Divided Brains: Critical Notice of Michael Tye's Consciousness and Persons. Philosophical Psychology.
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  22. Timothy J. Bayne (2005). Divided Brains and Unified Phenomenology: A Review Essay on Michael Tye's Consciousness and Persons. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):495-512.
    In Consciousness and persons, Michael Tye (Tye, M. (2003). Consciousness and persons. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.) develops and defends a novel approach to the unity of consciousness. Rather than thinking of the unity of consciousness as involving phenomenal relations between distinct experiences, as standard accounts do, Tye argues that we should regard the unity of consciousness as involving relations between the contents of consciousness. Having developed an account of what it is for consciousness to be unified, Tye goes on to (...)
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  23. Timothy J. Bayne (2004). Self-Consciousness and the Unity of Consciousness. The Monist 87 (2):219-236.
    Consciousness has a number of puzzling features. One such feature is its unity: the experiences and other conscious states that one has at a particular time seem to occur together in a certain way. I am currently enjoying visual experiences of my computer screen, auditory experiences of bird-song, olfactory experiences of coffee, and tactile experiences of feeling the ground beneath my feet. Conjoined with these perceptual experiences are proprioceptive experiences, experiences of agency, affective and emotional experiences, and conscious thoughts of (...)
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  24. Timothy J. Bayne (2001). Co-Consciousness: Review of Barry Dainton's Stream of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (3):79-92.
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  25. Timothy J. Bayne (2000). The Unity of Consciousness: Clarification and Defence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):248-254.
    In "The Disunity of Consciousness," Gerard O'Brien and Jon Opie argue that human consciousness is not synchronically unified. They suggest that the orthodox conception of the unity of consciousness admits of two readings, neither of which they find persuasive. According to them, "a conscious individual does not have a single consciousness, but several distinct phenomenal consciousnesses, at least one for each of the senses, running in parallel." They call this conception of consciousness the _multi-track account. I make three points in (...)
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  26. Timothy J. Bayne & David J. Chalmers (2003). What is the Unity of Consciousness? In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press
    At any given time, a subject has a multiplicity of conscious experiences. A subject might simultaneously have visual experiences of a red book and a green tree, auditory experiences of birds singing, bodily sensations of a faint hunger and a sharp pain in the shoulder, the emotional experience of a certain melancholy, while having a stream of conscious thoughts about the nature of reality. These experiences are distinct from each other: a subject could experience the red book without the singing (...)
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  27. J. O. Beahrs (1983). Co-Consciousness: A Common Denominator in Hypnosis, Multiple Personality, and Normalcy. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis 26:100-13.
  28. J. O. Beahrs (1982). Unity and Multiplicity: Multilevel Consciousness of Self in Hypnosis, Psychiatric Disorder, and Mental Health. Brunner/Mazel.
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  29. Kathy Behrendt (2003). The New Neo-Kantian and Reductionist Debate. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4):331-350.
    Has Derek Parfit modified his views on personal identity in light of Quassim Cassam’s neo-Kantian argument that to experience the world as objective, we must think of ourselves as enduring subjects of experience? Both parties suggest there is no longer a serious dispute between them. I retrace the path that led to this truce, and contend that the debate remains open. Parfit’s recent work reveals a re-formulation of his ostensibly abandoned claim that there could be impersonal descriptions of reality. I (...)
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  30. David Bennett & Chris Hill (eds.) (forthcoming). Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness. MIT Press.
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  31. Alexandre Billon (2011). Have We Vindicated the Motivational Unconscious Yet? A Conceptual Review. Frontiers in Psychoanalysis and Neuropsychoanalysis 2.
    Motivationally unconscious (M-unconscious) states are unconscious states that can directly motivate a subject’s behavior and whose unconscious character typically results from a form of repression. The basic argument for M-unconscious states claims that they provide the best explanation to some seemingly non rational behaviors, like akrasia, impulsivity or apparent self-deception. This basic argument has been challenged on theoretical, empirical and conceptual grounds. Drawing on recent works on apparent self-deception and on the ‘cognitive unconscious’ I assess those objections. I argue that (...)
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  32. Jan Bransen (1995). The Unity of the Mind. Philosophical Books 36 (3):192-194.
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  33. Franz Brentano (1944). Psychologie du point de vue empirique. Montaigne.
    Dans son ouvrage de 1874, repris et complété en 1911, puis augmenté à nouveau par une série d’appendices tardifs, dans l’édition procurée par Oscar Kraus, en 1924, Brentano n’est pas seulement celui qui ouvre le dossier très complet des questions psychologiques débattues dans l’après-Kant et jusqu’à la fin du XIXe siècle, dans l’espace intellectuel germanique, mais aussi et principalement anglophone; pas seulement celui qui, à la faveur de la redéfinition, à la fois très ancienne et novatrice, des phénomènes psychiques, caractérisés (...)
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  34. Franz Brentano (1874/1973/1973). Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint. Routledge.
  35. Franz Brentano (1874). Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte. Duncker & Humblot.
    Im Zentrum der 1874 erschienenen bewußtseinspsychologischen Abhandlungen Brentanos steht die Beschreibung und Analyse des Psychischen. Damit bahnte sich jene Abwendung von der sensualistischen Tradition der philosophischen Bewußtseinslehre an, die in der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls vollendet wurde.
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  36. Bill Brewer (1994). Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  37. Andrew Brook (2012). Review of 'The Unity of Consciousness', by Tim Bayne. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):599-602.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1-4, Ahead of Print.
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  38. Andrew Brook (2002). Unified Consciousness and the Self. In Shaun Gallagher & Jonathan Shear (eds.), Journal of Consciousness Studies. Thorverton Uk: Imprint Academic 5-6.
    I am in complete sympathy with Galen Strawson's conclusions in ‘The Self’ . He takes a careful, measured approach to a topic that lends itself all too easily to speculation and intellectual extravaganzas. The results are for the most part balanced and plausible. I am even in sympathy with his claim that a memory-produced sense of continuity over time is less central to selfhood than many researchers think, though he may go too far in the opposite direction. Thus my purpose (...)
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  39. Andrew Brook (2000). The Unity of Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):S49 - S49.
    Human consciousness usually displays a striking unity. When one experiences a noise and, say, a pain, one is not conscious of the noise and then, separately, of the pain. One is conscious of the noise and pain together, as aspects of a single conscious experience. Since at least the time of Immanuel Kant (1781/7), this phenomenon has been called the unity of consciousness . More generally, it is consciousness not of A and, separately, of B and, separately, of C, but (...)
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  40. Andrew Brook (1998). Unified Consciousness and the Self. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6):583-591.
    I am in virtually complete sympathy with Galen Strawson's conclusions in 'The Self'. He takes a careful, measured approach to a topic that lends itself all too easily to speculation and intellectual extravaganzas. The results he achieves are for the most part balanced and plausible. I even have a lot of sympathy with his claim that a memory-produced sense of continuity across time is less central to selfhood than many philosophers think, though I will argue that he goes too far (...)
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  41. Andrew Brook (1997). Unity of Consciousness and Other Mental Unities. In Proceedings of the 19th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Ablex Press
    Though there has been a huge resurgence of interest in consciousness in the past decade, little attention has been paid to what the philosopher Immanuel Kant and others call the unity of consciousness. The unity of consciousness takes different forms, as we will see, but the general idea is that each of us is aware of many things in the world at the same time, and often many of one's own mental states and of oneself as their single common subject, (...)
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  42. Andrew Brook & Paul Raymont (forthcoming). A Unified Theory of Consciousness. MIT Press.
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  43. D. H. M. Brooks (1995). The Unity of the Mind. St Martin's Press.
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  44. D. H. M. Brooks (1985). Strawson, Hume, and the Unity of Consciousness. Mind 94 (October):583-86.
  45. Eugene M. Brooks (2005). Multiplicity of Consciousness. Imagination, Cognition and Personality 24 (3):271-280.
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  46. Bruce W. Brotherston (1933). Immediate Empiricism and Unity. Journal of Philosophy 30 (6):141-149.
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  47. Richard Brown, Kant, Polysolipsism, and the Real Unity of Experience.
    The question I am interested in revolves around Kant’s notion of the unity of experience. My central claim will be that, apart from the unity of experiencings and the unity of individual substances, there is a third unity: the unity of Experience. I will argue that this third unity can be conceived of as a sort of ‘experiential space’ with the Aesthetic and Categories as dimensions. I call this ‘Euclidean Experience’ to emphasize the idea that individual experiencings have a ‘location’ (...)
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  48. Derek Browne (2005). Review of Murray Clarke's, Reconstructing Reason and Representation. [REVIEW] Psyche 11.
    Consciousness has been defined as that annoying period between naps, and this grumpy definition may not be wholly facetious, if Michael Tye’s latest book is right. Tye’s main goal here is to develop a theory of the phenomenal unity of experience at a time, and its diachronic analog, the moment-to-moment continuity of one’s experiential stream from the time one wakes up to the time consciousness lapses.
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  49. Quassim Cassam (1989). Kant and Reductionism. Review of Metaphysics 43 (September):72-106.
  50. Monima Chadha (2015). Meditation and Unity of Consciousness: A Perspective From Buddhist Epistemology. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):111-127.
    The paper argues that empirical work on Buddhist meditation has an impact on Buddhist epistemology, in particular their account of unity of consciousness. I explain the Buddhist account of unity of consciousness and show how it relates to contemporary philosophical accounts of unity of consciousness. The contemporary accounts of unity of consciousness are closely integrated with the discussion of neural correlates of consciousness. The conclusion of the paper suggests a new direction in the search for neural correlates of state consciousness (...)
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