Related categories
Siblings:
98 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
1 — 50 / 98
  1. Matthew D. Adler (2011). Well-Being and Fair Distribution: Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis. Oxford University Press.
    This book addresses a range of relevant theoretical issues, including the possibility of an interpersonally comparable measure of well-being, or “utility” metric; the moral value of equality, and how that bears on the form of the social welfare function; social choice under uncertainty; and the possibility of integrating considerations of individual choice and responsibility into the social-welfare-function framework. This book also deals with issues of implementation, and explores how survey data and other sources of evidence might be used to calibrate (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  2. Richard Arneson (2012). Rethinking Luck Egalitarianism and Unacceptable Inequalities. Philosophical Topics 40 (1):153-169.
    Luck egalitarianism is a social justice doctrine that holds that it is morally bad and unfair if some people are worse off than others through no fault or choice of their own. The doctrine has attracted criticisms. G. A. Cohen has defended luck egalitarianism without conceding ground to its critics by affirming that some inequalities that egalitarian justice principles do not condemn are nonetheless incompatible with an antimarket ideal of community that we should accept and—subject to feasibility constraints—implement. This essay (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Richard Arneson (2011). Luck Egalitarianism–A Primer. In Carl Knight & Zofia Stemplowska (eds.), Responsibility and Distributive Justice. Oxford University Press 24--50.
  4. Richard Arneson, Egalitarianism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  5. Christian Barry & David Wiens (forthcoming). What Second-Best Scenarios Reveal About Ideals of Global Justice. In Thom Brooks (ed.), Oxford Handbook to Global Justice.
    In theory, there need be no conflict between addressing global inequality (inequalities between people worldwide) and addressing domestic inequality (inequalities between people within a political community). Yet, in practice, there are likely instances in which the feasible mechanisms for reducing global inequality risk aggravating domestic inequality. The burgeoning literature on global justice has tended to overlook the latter type of scenario. This chapter explores ways in which tradeoffs between promoting domestic and global equality may arise and how they may be (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. Brian Berkey (2015). Double Counting, Moral Rigorism, and Cohen’s Critique of Rawls: A Response to Alan Thomas. Mind 124 (495):849-874.
    In a recent article in this journal, Alan Thomas presents a novel defence of what I call ‘Rawlsian Institutionalism about Justice’ against G. A. Cohen’s well-known critique. In this response I aim to defend Cohen’s rejection of Institutionalism against Thomas’s arguments. In part this defence requires clarifying precisely what is at issue between Institutionalists and their opponents. My primary focus, however, is on Thomas’s critical discussion of Cohen’s endorsement of an ethical prerogative, as well as his appeal to the institutional (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  7. Harry Brighouse & Adam Swift (2006). Equality, Priority, and Positional Goods. Ethics 116 (3):471-497.
  8. Thom Brooks (ed.) (2011). Ethics and Moral Philosophy. Brill.
    Ethics and moral philosophy is an area of particular interest today. This book brings together some of the most important essays in this area.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Thom Brooks & Martha C. Nussbaum (eds.) (2015). Rawls's Political Liberalism. Cup.
    Widely hailed as one of the most significant works in modern political philosophy, John Rawls's _Political Liberalism_ defended a powerful vision of society that respects reasonable ways of life, both religious and secular. These core values have never been more critical as anxiety grows over political and religious difference and new restrictions are placed on peaceful protest and individual expression. This anthology of original essays suggests new, groundbreaking applications of Rawls's work in multiple disciplines and contexts. Thom Brooks, Martha Nussbaum, (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. John Broome (2015). Equality Versus Priority: A Useful Distinction. Economics and Philosophy 31 (2):219-228.
  11. John Broome (1991). Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty and Time. Wiley-Blackwell.
    This study uses techniques from economics to illuminate fundamental questions in ethics, particularly in the foundations of utilitarianism. Topics considered include the nature of teleological ethics, the foundations of decision theory, the value of equality and the moral significance of a person's continuing identity through time.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   137 citations  
  12. Alexander Brown (2014). What Should Egalitarians Believe If They Really Are Egalitarian? A Reply to Martin O'Neill. European Journal of Political Theory 13 (4):453-469.
    In his article, ‘What Should Egalitarians Believe?’, Martin O’Neill argues, amongst other things, that egalitarians should reject both Telic and Deontic Egalitarianism and that they should adopt in their place a version of Non-Intrinsic Egalitarianism, specifically, the Pluralist Non-Intrinsic Egalitarian View. The central purpose of my article is to challenge O’Neill’s assumption that he can defend each of the various propositions that make up his position simultaneously. I do this with two arguments. First, I argue that in order to justify (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Campbell Brown (2005). Matters of Priority. Dissertation, Australian National University
  14. Campbell Brown (2003). Giving Up Levelling Down. Economics and Philosophy 19 (1):111-134.
    The so-called “Levelling Down Objection” is commonly believed to occupy a central role in the debate between egalitarians and prioritarians. Egalitarians think that equality is good in itself, and so they are committed to finding value even in such equality as may only be achieved by “levelling down”–i.e., by merely reducing the better off to the level of the worse off. Although egalitarians might deny that levelling down could ever make for an all-things-considered improvement, they cannot deny that it may (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  15. Alexander W. Cappelen & Bertil Tungodden (2006). A Liberal Egalitarian Paradox. Economics and Philosophy 22 (3):393-408.
    A liberal egalitarian theory of justice seeks to combine the values of equality, personal freedom, and personal responsibility. It is considered a much more promising position than strict egalitarianism, because it supposedly provides a fairness argument for inequalities reflecting differences in choice. However, we show that it is inherently difficult to fulfill this ambition. We present a liberal egalitarian paradox which shows that there does not exist any robust reward system that satisfies a minimal egalitarian and a minimal liberal requirement. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  16. Alan Carter (2011). Some Groundwork for a Multidimensional Axiology. Philosophical Studies 154 (3):389 - 408.
    By distinguishing between contributory values and overall value, and by arguing that contributory values are variable values insofar as they contribute diminishing marginal overall value, this article helps to establish the superiority of a certain kind of maximizing, value-pluralist axiology over both sufficientarianism and prioritarianism, as well as over all varieties of value-monism, including utilitarianism and pure egalitarianism.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Alan Carter (2006). A Defense of Egalitarianism. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):269 - 302.
    Recently in this journal, Michael Huemer has attempted to refute egalitarianism. His strategy consists in: first, distinguishing between three possible worlds (one with an equal distribution of well-being, one with an unequal distribution at every moment but with an equal distribution overall, and one with an unequal distribution at every moment as well as overall); second, showing that the first world is equal in value to the second world; third, dividing the second and third worlds into two temporal segments each, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  18. Alan Carter (2004). The Quest for an Egalitarian Metric. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 7 (1):94-113.
    For two decades, egalitarian analytical philosophers have sought to identify the metric to be employed in order to ascertain whether any distribution is equal or not. This essay provides a review of the seminal contributions to this debate by Amartya Sen, Ronald Dworkin, Richard Arneson and G.A. Cohen.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  19. Paula Casal (2007). Why Sufficiency is Not Enough. Ethics 117 (2):296-326.
  20. Roger Crisp (2011). In Defence of the Priority View: A Response to Otsuka and Voorhoeve. Utilitas 23 (1):105-108.
  21. Roger Crisp (2003). Egalitarianism and Compassion. Ethics 114 (1):119-126.
    In "Egalitarianism Defended," Larry Temkin attempted to rebut criticisms of egalitarianism I had made in my article, "Equality, Priority, and Compassion." Temkin's response is interesting and illuminating, but, in this article, I shall claim that his arguments miss their target and that the failure of egalitarianism may have implications more serious than some have thought.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  22. Roger Crisp (2003). Equality, Priority, and Compassion. Ethics 113 (4):745-763.
    In recent years there has been a good deal of discussion of equality’s place in the best account of distribution or distributive justice. One central question has been whether egalitarianism should give way to a principle requiring us to give priority to the worse off. In this article, I shall begin by arguing that the grounding of equality is indeed insecure and that the priority principle appears to have certain advantages over egalitarianism. But I shall then claim that the priority (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   38 citations  
  23. Brett Doran (2001). Reconsidering the Levelling-Down Objection Against Egalitarianism. Utilitas 13 (1):65.
    The levelling-down objection rejects the egalitarian view that it is intrinsically good to eliminate the inequality of an outcome by lowering the relevant good of those better off to the level of those worse off. Larry Temkin suggests that the position underlying this objection is an exclusionary version of the person-affecting view, in which an outcome can be better or worse only if persons are affected for better or worse. Temkin then defends egalitarianism by rejecting this position. In this essay, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. D. Dorsey (2014). Equality-Tempered Prioritarianism. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 13 (1):45-61.
    In this paper, I present and explore an alternative to a standard prioritarian axiology. Equality-tempered prioritarianism holds that the value of welfare increases should be balanced against the value of equality. However, given that, under prioritarianism, the value of marginal welfare benefits decreases as the welfare of beneficiaries increases, equality-tempered prioritarianism holds that the intrinsic value of equality will be sufficient to alter a prioritarian verdict only in cases in which welfare benefits are granted to the very well-off. I argue (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. Marc Fleurbaey (2015). Equality Versus Priority: How Relevant is the Distinction? Economics and Philosophy 31 (2):203-217.
  26. Christopher Freiman (2014). Priority and Position. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):341-360.
    Positional goods are goods whose relative amount determines their absolute value. Many goods appear to have positional aspects. For example, one’s relative standing in the distribution of education and wealth may determine one’s absolute condition with respect to goods like employment opportunities, self-respect, and social inclusion. Positional goods feature in recent arguments from T.M. Scanlon, Brian Barry, and Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift that assert that we should favor egalitarian distributions of positional goods even if we reject equality as a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Walter Glannon (1995). Equality, Priority, and Numbers. Social Theory and Practice 21 (3):427-455.
  28. Daniel M. Hausman (2015). Equality Versus Priority: A Misleading Distinction. Economics and Philosophy 31 (2):229-238.
    People condemn inequalities for many reasons. For example, many who have no concern with distribution per se criticize inequalities in health care, because these inequalities lessen the benefits provided by the resources that are devoted to health care. Others who place no intrinsic value on distribution believe that a just society must show a special concern for those who are worst off. Some people, on the other hand, do place an intrinsic value on equality of distribution, regardless of its contribution (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Daniel M. Hausman & Matt Sensat Waldren (2011). Egalitarianism Reconsidered. Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (4):567-586.
    This paper argues that egalitarian theories should be judged by the degree to which they meet four different challenges. Fundamentalist egalitarianism, which contends that certain inequalities are intrinsically bad or unjust regardless of their consequences, fails to meet these challenges. Building on discussions by T.M. Scanlon and David Miller, we argue that egalitarianism is better understood in terms of commitments to six egalitarian objectives. A consequence of our view, in contrast to Martin O'Neill's “non-intrinsic egalitarianism,“ is that egalitarianism is better (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  30. Iwao Hirose (2014). Egalitarianism. Routledge.
    Some people are worse off than others. Does this fact give rise to moral concern? Egalitarianism claims that it does, for a wide array of reasons. It is one of the most important and hotly debated problems in moral and political philosophy, occupying a central place in the work of John Rawls, Thomas Nagel, G. A. Cohen and Derek Parfit. It also plays an important role in practical contexts such as the allocation of health care resources, the design of education (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. Iwao Hirose (2009). Reconsidering the Value of Equality. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):301-312.
    Some people believe that the equality of people's well-being makes an outcome better, other things being constant. Call this Telic Egalitarianism. In this paper I will propose a new interpretation of Telic Egalitarianism, and compare it with the interpretation that is proposed by Derek Parfit 1995 and widely accepted by many philosophers. I will argue that my proposed interpretation is more plausible than Parfit's. One of the virtues in my interpretation is that it shows his Levelling Down Objection does not (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  32. Iwao Hirose (2005). Intertemporal Distributive Judgement. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4):371 - 386.
    This paper considers the simple two-person two-period case of distributive judgement, and argues (a) that sensible intertemporal distributive principle should consider both the distribution of people's life time well-being and the distribution of people's well-being at each period and (b) that, if (a) is correct, Egalitarianism is more acceptable than Prioritarianism since the latter must choose either one.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. Iwao Hirose, Equality, Priority, and Aggregation.
    In this dissertation, I discuss two distributive principles in moral philosophy: Derek Parfit's Prioritarianism and Egalitarianism. I attempt to defend a version of Egalitarianism, which I call Weighted Egalitarianism. Although Parfit claims that Egalitarianism is subject to what he calls the Levelling Down Objection, I show (a) that my proposed Weighted Egalitarianism is not subject to the Objection, and (b) that it gives priority to the worse off people. The real difference between the two principles lies in how the weight (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Nils Holtug (2007). A Note on Conditional Egalitarianism. Economics and Philosophy 23 (1):45-63.
    Roughly, according to conditional egalitarianism, equality is non-instrumentally valuable, but only if it benefits at least one individual. Some political theorists have argued that conditional egalitarianism has the important virtue that it allows egalitarians to avoid the so-called objection. However, in the present article I argue that conditional egalitarianism does not offer the egalitarian a plausible escape route from this objection. First, I explain the levelling down objection and suggest some particular concerns from which it derives its force. Then I (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  35. Nils Holtug (2007). Prioritarianism. In Nils Holtug & Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (eds.), Egalitarianism: New Essays on the Nature and Value of Equality. Clarendon Press 125--156.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  36. Nils Holtug & Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2007). An Introduction to Contemporary Egalitarianism. In Nils Holtug & Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (eds.), Egalitarianism: New Essays on the Nature and Value of Equality. Clarendon Press 1--37.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Adam Hosein, Fairness, Distributive Justice and Global Justice.
    In this paper I discuss justice in the distribution of resources, both within states and across different states. On one influential view, it is always unjust for one person to have less than another through no fault of her own. State borders, on this account, have no importance in determining which distributions are just. I show that an alternative approach is needed. I argue that distributions of wealth are only unjust in so far as they issue from unfair treatment. It (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. Michael Huemer (2012). Against Equality and Priority. Utilitas 24 (04):483-501.
    -/- I start from three premises, roughly as follows: (1) that if possible world x is better than world y for every individual who exists in either world, then x is better than y; (2) that if x has a higher average utility, a higher total utility, and no more inequality than y, then x is better than y; (3) that better than is transitive. From these premises, it follows that benefits given to the worse off contribute no more to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Michael Huemer (2003). Non-Egalitarianism. Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):147 - 171.
    Equality of welfare among persons has no intrinsic value. This follows from three axiological principles: (i) a principle of the indifference of the distribution of utility across time within an individual’s life, (ii) a strong supervenience principle for value, and (iii) a principle of the additivity of value across disjoint time periods. (iii) is the most likely target for attack by the egalitarian; but the rejection of (iii) creates decision-theoretic paradoxes.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40. Karsten Klint Jensen (2003). What is the Difference Between (Moderate) Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism? Economics and Philosophy 19 (1):89-109.
    It is common to define egalitarianism in terms of an inequality ordering, which is supposed to have some weight in overall evaluations of outcomes. Egalitarianism, thus defined, implies that levelling down makes the outcome better in respect of reducing inequality; however, the levelling down objection claims there can be nothing good about levelling down. The priority view, on the other hand, does not have this implication. This paper challenges the common view. The standard definition of egalitarianism implicitly assumes a context. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  41. A. J. Julius (2006). Nagel's Atlas. Philosophy and Public Affairs 34 (2):176–192.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   15 citations  
  42. Klemens Kappel (1997). Equality, Priority, and Time. Utilitas 9 (2):203.
    The lifetime equality view has recently been met with the objection that it does not rule out simultaneous inequality: two persons may lead equally good lives on the whole and yet there may at any time be great differences in their level of well-being. And simultaneous inequality, it is held, ought to be a concern of egalitarians. The paper discusses this and related objections to the lifetime equality view. It is argued that rather than leading to a revision of the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  43. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2015). Luck Egalitarianism. Bloomsbury Academic.
  44. Matthew Lister (2012). Review of Carl Knight, Luck Egalitarianism. [REVIEW] Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (1):127-30.
  45. Ryan Long (2016). Luck Egalitarianism, Responsibility, and Political Liberalism. Dialogue:1-24.
    Luck egalitarians argue that distributive justice should be understood in terms of our capacity to be responsible for our choices. Both proponents and critics assume that the theory must rely on a comprehensive conception of responsibility. I respond to luck egalitarianism’s critics by developing a political conception of responsibility that remains agnostic on the metaphysics of free choice. I construct this political conception by developing a novel reading of John Rawls’ distinction between the political and the comprehensive. A surprising consequence (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. Ryan Long (2011). The Incompleteness of Luck Egalitarianism. Social Philosophy Today 27:87-96.
    Luck egalitarianism makes a fundamental distinction between inequalities for which agents are responsible and inequalities stemming from luck. I give several reasons to find luck egalitarianism a compelling view of distributive justice. I then argue that it is an incomplete theory of equality. Luck egalitarianism lacks the normative resources to achieve its ends. It is unable to specify the prior conditions under which persons are situated equivalently such that their choices can bear this tremendous weight. This means that luck egalitarians (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Tomer Lotan (2010). Equality Once Again: Social Polic and the Idea of Levelling Down. Dissertation, London School of Economics
    The striving for a more equal society has been an inspiring ideal for social policy and a powerful engine for the foundations of the welfare state. However, equality as a political concept has been subject to ongoing criticism and has been gradually denounced. In an attempt to reclaim the appeal of economic equality, this paper endeavors to cross the common boundaries of redistribution and to offer a different equalizing strategy titled "Levelling Down". This strategy has been extensively debated in political (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. Douglas Mackay (2016). Incentive Inequalities and Freedom of Occupational Choice. Economics and Philosophy 32 (1):21-49.
    In Rescuing Justice and Equality, G.A. Cohen argues that the incentive inequalities permitted by John Rawls's difference principle are unjust since people cannot justify them to their fellow citizens. I argue that citizens of a Rawlsian society can justify their acceptance of a wide range of incentive inequalities to their fellow citizens. They can do so because they possess the right to freedom of occupational choice, and are permitted – as a matter of justice – to exercise this right by (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. Andrew Mason (2001). Egalitarianism and the Levelling Down Objection. Analysis 61 (3):246–254.
    In an important piece of work Derek Parfit distinguishes two different forms of egalitarianism, ‘Deontic’ and ‘Telic’. He contrasts these with what he calls the Priority View, which is not strictly a form of egalitarianism at all, since it is not essentially concerned with how well off people are relative to each other. His main aim is to generate an adequate taxonomy of the positions available, but in the process he draws attention to some of the different problems they face. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  50. David McCarthy (forthcoming). The Structure of Good. Oxford University Press.
1 — 50 / 98