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  1. Matthew D. Adler (2011). Well-Being and Fair Distribution: Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis. Oxford University Press.
    This book addresses a range of relevant theoretical issues, including the possibility of an interpersonally comparable measure of well-being, or “utility” metric; the moral value of equality, and how that bears on the form of the social welfare function; social choice under uncertainty; and the possibility of integrating considerations of individual choice and responsibility into the social-welfare-function framework. This book also deals with issues of implementation, and explores how survey data and other sources of evidence might be used to calibrate (...)
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  2. Richard Arneson (2011). Luck Egalitarianism–A Primer. In Carl Knight & Zofia Stemplowska (eds.), Responsibility and Distributive Justice. Oxford University Press. 24--50.
  3. Richard Arneson, Egalitarianism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  4. Richard Arneson, Rethinking Luck Egalitarianism and Unacceptable Inequalities.
    Even a cursory glance around the contemporary world shows that some people lead miserable lives, and some people are far worse off than others. The first fact is surely morally undesirable. What should we say about the second? Inequalities in people’s condition might be thought morally objectionable because they are bad in themselves or because they lead to other bads, or for both reasons combined. The last section of this essay explores what to say about inequalities that are instrumentally bad. (...)
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  5. Harry Brighouse & Adam Swift (2006). Equality, Priority, and Positional Goods. Ethics 116 (3):471-497.
  6. Thom Brooks (ed.) (2011). Ethics and Moral Philosophy. Brill.
    Ethics and moral philosophy is an area of particular interest today. This book brings together some of the most important essays in this area.
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  7. John Broome (forthcoming). Equality Versus Priority: A Useful Distinction. In Daniel Wikler (ed.), Fairness and Goodness in Health. World Health Organization.
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  8. John Broome (1991). Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty and Time. Wiley-Blackwell.
  9. Alexander Brown (forthcoming). What Should Egalitarians Believe If They Really Are Egalitarian? A Reply to Martin O'Neill. European Journal of Political Theory:1474885113506710.
    In his article, ‘What Should Egalitarians Believe?’, Martin O’Neill argues, amongst other things, that egalitarians should reject both Telic and Deontic Egalitarianism and that they should adopt in their place a version of Non-Intrinsic Egalitarianism, specifically, the Pluralist Non-Intrinsic Egalitarian View. The central purpose of my article is to challenge O’Neill’s assumption that he can defend each of the various propositions that make up his position simultaneously. I do this with two arguments. First, I argue that in order to justify (...)
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  10. Campbell Brown (2005). Matters of Priority. Dissertation, Australian National University
  11. Campbell Brown (2003). Giving Up Levelling Down. Economics and Philosophy 19 (1):111-134.
  12. Alexander W. Cappelen & Bertil Tungodden (2006). A Liberal Egalitarian Paradox. Economics and Philosophy 22 (3):393-408.
    A liberal egalitarian theory of justice seeks to combine the values of equality, personal freedom, and personal responsibility. It is considered a much more promising position than strict egalitarianism, because it supposedly provides a fairness argument for inequalities reflecting differences in choice. However, we show that it is inherently difficult to fulfill this ambition. We present a liberal egalitarian paradox which shows that there does not exist any robust reward system that satisfies a minimal egalitarian and a minimal liberal requirement. (...)
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  13. Alan Carter (2011). Some Groundwork for a Multidimensional Axiology. Philosophical Studies 154 (3):389 - 408.
    By distinguishing between contributory values and overall value, and by arguing that contributory values are variable values insofar as they contribute diminishing marginal overall value, this article helps to establish the superiority of a certain kind of maximizing, value-pluralist axiology over both sufficientarianism and prioritarianism, as well as over all varieties of value-monism, including utilitarianism and pure egalitarianism.
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  14. Alan Carter (2006). A Defense of Egalitarianism. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):269 - 302.
    Recently in this journal, Michael Huemer has attempted to refute egalitarianism. His strategy consists in: first, distinguishing between three possible worlds (one with an equal distribution of well-being, one with an unequal distribution at every moment but with an equal distribution overall, and one with an unequal distribution at every moment as well as overall); second, showing that the first world is equal in value to the second world; third, dividing the second and third worlds into two temporal segments each, (...)
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  15. Alan Carter (2004). The Quest for an Egalitarian Metric. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 7 (1):94-113.
    For two decades, egalitarian analytical philosophers have sought to identify the metric to be employed in order to ascertain whether any distribution is equal or not. This essay provides a review of the seminal contributions to this debate by Amartya Sen, Ronald Dworkin, Richard Arneson and G.A. Cohen.
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  16. Paula Casal (2007). Why Sufficiency is Not Enough. Ethics 117 (2):296-326.
  17. Roger Crisp (2011). In Defence of the Priority View: A Response to Otsuka and Voorhoeve. Utilitas 23 (1):105-108.
  18. Roger Crisp (2003). Egalitarianism and Compassion. Ethics 114 (1):119-126.
    In "Egalitarianism Defended," Larry Temkin attempted to rebut criticisms of egalitarianism I had made in my article, "Equality, Priority, and Compassion." Temkin's response is interesting and illuminating, but, in this article, I shall claim that his arguments miss their target and that the failure of egalitarianism may have implications more serious than some have thought.
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  19. Roger Crisp (2003). Equality, Priority, and Compassion. Ethics 113 (4):745-763.
    In recent years there has been a good deal of discussion of equality’s place in the best account of distribution or distributive justice. One central question has been whether egalitarianism should give way to a principle requiring us to give priority to the worse off. In this article, I shall begin by arguing that the grounding of equality is indeed insecure and that the priority principle appears to have certain advantages over egalitarianism. But I shall then claim that the priority (...)
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  20. Brett Doran (2001). Reconsidering the Levelling-Down Objection Against Egalitarianism. Utilitas 13 (01):65-.
    The levelling-down objection rejects the egalitarian view that it is intrinsically good to eliminate the inequality of an outcome by lowering the relevant good of those better off to the level of those worse off. Larry Temkin suggests that the position underlying this objection is an exclusionary version of the person-affecting view, in which an outcome can be better or worse only if persons are affected for better or worse. Temkin then defends egalitarianism by rejecting this position. In this essay, (...)
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  21. Dale Dorsey (2013). Equality-Tempered Prioritarianism. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 13 (1):1470594-13483479.
    In this paper, I present and explore an alternative to a standard prioritarian axiology. Equality-tempered prioritarianism holds that the value of welfare increases should be balanced against the value of equality. However, given that, under prioritarianism, the value of marginal welfare benefits decreases as the welfare of beneficiaries increases, equality-tempered prioritarianism holds that the intrinsic value of equality will be sufficient to alter a prioritarian verdict only in cases in which welfare benefits are granted to the very well-off. I argue (...)
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  22. Marc Fleurbaey (forthcoming). Equality Vs Priority: How Relevant is the Distinction? In Christopher Murray (ed.), Fairness and goodness in health. World Health Organization.
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  23. Christopher Freiman (2014). Priority and Position. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):341-360.
    Positional goods are goods whose relative amount determines their absolute value. Many goods appear to have positional aspects. For example, one’s relative standing in the distribution of education and wealth may determine one’s absolute condition with respect to goods like employment opportunities, self-respect, and social inclusion. Positional goods feature in recent arguments from T.M. Scanlon, Brian Barry, and Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift that assert that we should favor egalitarian distributions of positional goods even if we reject equality as a (...)
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  24. Walter Glannon (1995). Equality, Priority, and Numbers. Social Theory and Practice 21 (3):427-455.
  25. Daniel M. Hausman, Equality Versus Priority: A Badly Misleading Distinction.
    People condemn inequalities for many reasons. For example, many who have no concern with distribution per se criticize inequalities in health care, because these inequalities lessen the benefits provided by the resources that are devoted to health care. Others who place no intrinsic value on distribution believe that a just society must show a special concern for those who are worst off. Some people, on the other hand, do place an intrinsic value on equality of distribution, regardless of its contribution (...)
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  26. Daniel M. Hausman & Matt Sensat Waldren (2012). Egalitarianism Reconsidered. Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (4):567-586.
    This paper argues that egalitarian theories should be judged by the degree to which they meet four different challenges. Fundamentalist egalitarianism, which contends that certain inequalities are intrinsically bad or unjust regardless of their consequences, fails to meet these challenges. Building on discussions by T.M. Scanlon and David Miller, we argue that egalitarianism is better understood in terms of commitments to six egalitarian objectives. A consequence of our view, in contrast to Martin O'Neill's “non-intrinsic egalitarianism,“ is that egalitarianism is better (...)
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  27. Iwao Hirose (2014). Egalitarianism. Routledge.
    Some people are worse off than others. Does this fact give rise to moral concern? Egalitarianism claims that it does, for a wide array of reasons. It is one of the most important and hotly debated problems in moral and political philosophy, occupying a central place in the work of John Rawls, Thomas Nagel, G. A. Cohen and Derek Parfit. It also plays an important role in practical contexts such as the allocation of health care resources, the design of education (...)
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  28. Iwao Hirose (2009). Reconsidering the Value of Equality. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):301-312.
    Some people believe that the equality of people's well-being makes an outcome better, other things being constant. Call this Telic Egalitarianism. In this paper I will propose a new interpretation of Telic Egalitarianism, and compare it with the interpretation that is proposed by Derek Parfit 1995 and widely accepted by many philosophers. I will argue that my proposed interpretation is more plausible than Parfit's. One of the virtues in my interpretation is that it shows his Levelling Down Objection does not (...)
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  29. Iwao Hirose (2005). Intertemporal Distributive Judgement. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4):371 - 386.
    This paper considers the simple two-person two-period case of distributive judgement, and argues (a) that sensible intertemporal distributive principle should consider both the distribution of people's life time well-being and the distribution of people's well-being at each period and (b) that, if (a) is correct, Egalitarianism is more acceptable than Prioritarianism since the latter must choose either one.
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  30. Iwao Hirose, Equality, Priority, and Aggregation.
    In this dissertation, I discuss two distributive principles in moral philosophy: Derek Parfit's Prioritarianism and Egalitarianism. I attempt to defend a version of Egalitarianism, which I call Weighted Egalitarianism. Although Parfit claims that Egalitarianism is subject to what he calls the Levelling Down Objection, I show (a) that my proposed Weighted Egalitarianism is not subject to the Objection, and (b) that it gives priority to the worse off people. The real difference between the two principles lies in how the weight (...)
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  31. Nils Holtug (2007). A Note on Conditional Egalitarianism. Economics and Philosophy 23 (1):45-63.
    Roughly, according to conditional egalitarianism, equality is non-instrumentally valuable, but only if it benefits at least one individual. Some political theorists have argued that conditional egalitarianism has the important virtue that it allows egalitarians to avoid the so-called objection. However, in the present article I argue that conditional egalitarianism does not offer the egalitarian a plausible escape route from this objection. First, I explain the levelling down objection and suggest some particular concerns from which it derives its force. Then I (...)
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  32. Nils Holtug (2007). Prioritarianism. In Nils Holtug & Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (eds.), Egalitarianism: New Essays on the Nature and Value of Equality. Clarendon Press. 125--156.
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  33. Nils Holtug & Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2007). An Introduction to Contemporary Egalitarianism. In Nils Holtug & Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (eds.), Egalitarianism: New Essays on the Nature and Value of Equality. Clarendon Press. 1--37.
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  34. Adam Hosein, Fairness, Distributive Justice and Global Justice.
    In this paper I discuss justice in the distribution of resources, both within states and across different states. On one influential view, it is always unjust for one person to have less than another through no fault of her own. State borders, on this account, have no importance in determining which distributions are just. I show that an alternative approach is needed. I argue that distributions of wealth are only unjust in so far as they issue from unfair treatment. It (...)
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  35. Michael Huemer (2012). Against Equality and Priority. Utilitas 24 (04):483-501.
    -/- I start from three premises, roughly as follows: (1) that if possible world x is better than world y for every individual who exists in either world, then x is better than y; (2) that if x has a higher average utility, a higher total utility, and no more inequality than y, then x is better than y; (3) that better than is transitive. From these premises, it follows that benefits given to the worse off contribute no more to (...)
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  36. Michael Huemer (2003). Non-Egalitarianism. Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):147 - 171.
    Equality of welfare among persons has no intrinsic value. This follows from three axiological principles: (i) a principle of the indifference of the distribution of utility across time within an individual’s life, (ii) a strong supervenience principle for value, and (iii) a principle of the additivity of value across disjoint time periods. (iii) is the most likely target for attack by the egalitarian; but the rejection of (iii) creates decision-theoretic paradoxes.
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  37. Karsten Klint Jensen (2003). What is the Difference Between (Moderate) Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism? Economics and Philosophy 19 (1):89-109.
    It is common to define egalitarianism in terms of an inequality ordering, which is supposed to have some weight in overall evaluations of outcomes. Egalitarianism, thus defined, implies that levelling down makes the outcome better in respect of reducing inequality; however, the levelling down objection claims there can be nothing good about levelling down. The priority view, on the other hand, does not have this implication. This paper challenges the common view. The standard definition of egalitarianism implicitly assumes a context. (...)
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  38. A. J. Julius (2006). Nagel's Atlas. Philosophy and Public Affairs 34 (2):176–192.
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  39. Klemens Kappel (1997). Equality, Priority, and Time. Utilitas 9 (02):203-.
    The lifetime equality view (the view that it is good if people's lives on the whole are equally worth living) has recently been met with the objection that it does not rule out simultaneous inequality: two persons may lead equally good lives on the whole and yet there may at any time be great differences in their level of well-being. And simultaneous inequality, it is held, ought to be a concern of egalitarians. The paper discusses this and related objections to (...)
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  40. Matthew Lister (2012). Review of Carl Knight, Luck Egalitarianism. [REVIEW] Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (1):127-30.
  41. Andrew Mason (2001). Egalitarianism and the Levelling Down Objection. Analysis 61 (3):246–254.
    In an important piece of work Derek Parfit distinguishes two different forms of egalitarianism, ‘Deontic’ and ‘Telic’ (Parfit 1995; see also Parfit 1997). He contrasts these with what he calls the Priority View, which is not strictly a form of egalitarianism at all, since it is not essentially concerned with how well off people are relative to each other. His main aim is to generate an adequate taxonomy of the positions available, but in the process he draws attention to some (...)
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  42. David McCarthy (forthcoming). Distributive Equality. Mind.
    Egalitarians think that equality in the distribution of goods somehow matters. But what exactly is egalitarianism? This article argues for a characterization based on novel principles essentially involving risk. The characterization is used to resolve disputed questions about egalitarianism, such as its compatibility with strong separability and its relation to other distributive theories. But egalitarianism is subject to a particularly severe form of the levelling down objection, and is claimed to be false.
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  43. David McCarthy (forthcoming). Distributive Equality. Mind.
    Egalitarians think that equality in the distribution of goods somehow matters. But what exactly is egalitarianism? This article argues for a characterization based on novel principles essentially involving risk. The characterization is used to resolve disputed questions about egalitarianism, such as its compatibility with strong separability and its relation to other distributive theories. But egalitarianism is subject to a particularly severe form of the levelling down objection, and is claimed to be false.
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  44. David McCarthy (forthcoming). The Structure of Good. Oxford University Press.
  45. Dennis Mckerlie (2003). Understanding Egalitarianism. Economics and Philosophy 19 (1):45-60.
    The paper considers some differences in the ways that economics and philosophy study equality and egalitarianism in general. First, economics tends to understand a value simply as an ordering over outcomes while philosophy attempts to find a deeper explanation of the ordering in terms of intuitive ideas about the value. Sometimes the supposedly deeper explanation turns out to be insightful, but, in other cases, it is misleading or fails to be explanatory. Second, economists often propose impossibility results intended to (...)
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  46. Dennis McKerlie (1988). Egalitarianism and the Separateness of Persons. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):205 - 225.
  47. Donovan Miyasaki (forthcoming). (2014) A Nietzschean Case for Egalitarianism. In Barry Stocker & Manuel Knoll (eds.), Nietzsche as Political Philosopher. Walter de Gruyter.
    This paper draws on Friedrich Nietzsche’s work to defend the (admittedly non-Nietzschean) conclusion that a non-liberal egalitarian society is superior in two ways: first, as a moral ideal, it does not rest on questionable claims about essential human equality and, second, such a society would provide the optimal psychological and political conditions for individual wellbeing, social stability, and cultural achievement. I first explain Nietzsche’s distinction between forms of egalitarianism: noble and slavish. The slavish form promotes equality, defined negatively as the (...)
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  48. Donovan Miyasaki (2013). Nietzsche's Will to Power as Naturalist Critical Ontology. History of Philosophy Quarterly 30 (3):251-69.
    In this paper, I argue that Nietzsche’s published works contain a substantial, although implicit, argument for the will to power as ontology—a critical and descriptive, rather than positive and explanatory, theory of reality. Further, I suggest this ontology is entirely consistent with a naturalist methodology. The will to power ontology follows directly from Nietzsche’s naturalist rejection of three metaphysical presuppositions: substance, efficient causality, and final causality. I show that a number of interpretations, including those of Clark, Schacht, Reginster, and Richardson, (...)
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  49. Rekha Nath (2011). Equal Standing in the Global Community. The Monist 94 (4):593-614.
    What bearing does living in an increasingly globalized world have upon the moral assessment of global inequality? This paper defends an account of global egalitarianism that differs from standard accounts with respect to both the content of and the justification for the imperative to reduce global inequality. According to standard accounts of global egalitarianism, the global order unjustly allows a person’s relative life prospects to track the morally arbitrary trait of where she happens to be born. After raising some worries (...)
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  50. Matthew B. O'Brien (2012). Why Liberal Neutrality Prohibits Same-Sex Marriage: Rawls, Political Liberalism, and the Family. British Journal of American Legal Studies 1 (2):411-466.
    John Rawls’s political liberalism and its ideal of public reason are tremendously influential in contemporary political philosophy and in constitutional law as well. Many, perhaps even most, liberals are Rawlsians of one stripe or another. This is problematic, because most liberals also support the redefinition of civil marriage to include same-sex unions, and as I show, Rawls’s political liberalism actually prohibits same- sex marriage. Recently in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, however, California’s northern federal district court reinterpreted the traditional rational basis review (...)
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