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  1. Derek Allan (2012). 'Les Liaisons Dangereuses' Through the Eyes of André Malraux. Journal of European Studies 42 (2):123-139.
    Choderlos de Laclos’s novel 'Les Liaisons dangereuses', first published in 1782, is regarded as one of the outstanding works of French literature. This article concerns a well known commentary by the twentieth-century writer André Malraux which, though often mentioned by critics, has seldom been studied in detail. The article argues that, while Malraux endorses the favourable modern assessments of 'Les Liaisons dangereuses', his analysis diverges in important respects from prevailing critical opinion. In particular, he regards the work as the commencement (...)
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  2. Leslie Allan, Animal Rights and the Wrongness of Killing.
    This essay explores the moral reasoning underpinning the common view that it is worse to kill a human compared with killing an animal. After examining the serious deficiencies of traditional approaches, the author develops an alternative utilitarian-based framework that proportions the seriousness of killing to levels of sentience. He demonstrates how this new approach avoids the problems faced by the application of standard utilitarian formulae in weighing the seriousness of killing many low-sentience animals vis-á-vis killing a single human. The author (...)
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  3. Ben Bramble (2015). Consequentialism About Meaning in Life. Utilitas 27 (4):445-459.
    What is it for a life to be meaningful? In this article, I defend what I call Consequentialism about Meaning in Life, the view that one's life is meaningful at time t just in case one's surviving at t would be good in some way, and one's life was meaningful considered as a whole just in case the world was made better in some way for one's having existed.
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  4. Ben Bramble (2015). On Susan Wolf’s “Good-for-Nothings". Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (5):1071-1081.
    According to welfarism about value, something is good simpliciter just in case it is good for some being or beings. In her recent Presidential Address to the American Philosophical Association, “Good-For-Nothings”, Susan Wolf argues against welfarism by appeal to great works of art, literature, music, and philosophy. Wolf provides three main arguments against this view, which I call The Superfluity Argument, The Explanation of Benefit Argument, and The Welfarist’s Mistake. In this paper, I reconstruct these arguments and explain where, (...)
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  5. Ben Bramble (2014). On William James’s “Is Life Worth Living?”. Ethics 125 (1):217-219,.
  6. John Broome (1985). Professor. Economica 52:281-94.
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  7. Stephen M. Campbell & Sven Nyholm (2015). Anti-Meaning and Why It Matters. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (4): 694-711.
    It is widely recognized that lives and activities can be meaningful or meaningless, but few have appreciated that they can also be anti-meaningful. Anti-meaning is the polar opposite of meaning. Our purpose in this essay is to examine the nature and importance of this new and unfamiliar topic. In the first part, we sketch four theories of anti-meaning that correspond to leading theories of meaning. In the second part, we argue that anti-meaning has significance not only for our attempts to (...)
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  8. Stephen M. Campbell & Lance Wahlert (2015). Is Disability Conservationism Rooted in Status Quo Bias? American Journal of Bioethics 15 (6):20-22.
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  9. Marc Fleurbaey & Alex Voorhoeve (2015). On the Social and Personal Value of Existence. In Iwao Hirose & Andrew Reisner (eds.), Weighing and Reasoning: Themes from the Work of John Broome. Oxford University Press 95-109.
    If a potential person would have a good life if he were to come into existence, can we regard his coming into existence as better for him than his never coming into existence? And can we regard the situation in which he never comes into existence as worse for him? In this paper, we argue that both questions should be answered affirmatively.
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  10. Lisl Marburg Goodman (1981/1983). Death and the Creative Life. Penguin Books.
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  11. Chris Heathwood (2013). Organic Unities. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley
    A short encyclopedia entry on the issue of whether the value of a whole is equal to the sum of the values of its parts.
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  12. William James (1895). Is Life Worth Living? International Journal of Ethics 6 (1):1-24.
    Reprinted in James The Will to Believe and Other Essays.
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  13. Aleksandar Jokic (2011). Unjust Honoris Causa. Freedom Activities Centre.
    This book offers a detailed account and analysis of the academic scandal regarding the honorary doctorate awarded to Professor Michael Walzer by Belgrade University and the events that followed.
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  14. Antti Kauppinen (2015). What's So Great About Experience? Res Philosophica 92 (2):371-388.
    Suppose that our life choices result in unpredictable experiences, as L.A. Paul has recently argued. What does this mean for the possibility of rational prudential choice? Not as much as Paul thinks. First, what’s valuable about experience is its broadly hedonic quality, and empirical studies suggest we tend to significantly overestimate the impact of our choices in this respect. Second, contrary to what Paul suggests, the value of finding out what an outcome is like for us does not suffice to (...)
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  15. Antti Kauppinen (2014). Flourishing and Finitude. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy:1-6.
    It would be terrible for us if humanity ceased to exist after we all die. But of course, eventually humanity will go out of existence. Does this result in a vicious regress if our flourishing hangs on what happens after us? Mark Johnston thinks so. In this note, I explain how Johnston's objection can be avoided. Briefly, our activities have a meaning horizon that extends for some generations after us. What matters is that we make a positive difference to the (...)
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  16. Avery Kolers (2015). The Grasshopper’s Error: Or, On How Life is a Game. Dialogue 54 (4):727-746.
    I here defend the thesis that the best life is the life that one plays as a game—specifically, a ‘Suitsian’ game that meets the definition proposed in The Grasshopper by Bernard Suits. Even more specifically, it is a nested, open, role-playing game where the life’s quality as a game partly depends on there being no more people than players. To defend this thesis I refute two powerful challenges to it, one from Thomas Hurka (2006) and another from within The Grasshopper (...)
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  17. Bartlomiej Lenart (2014). Humanist Geography: An Individual’s Search for Meaning. [REVIEW] Nature and Human Life (4):24-26.
  18. Nicholas Maxwell (1999). Are There Objective Values? The Dalhousie Review 79 (3):301-317.
    In this paper I demolish three influential arguments - moral, metaphysical and epistemological - against value realism. We have good reasons to believe, and no good reasons not to believe, that value-features, value-facts, really do exist in the world.
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  19. Thaddeus Metz (2014). Life Worth Living. In Alex Michalos (ed.), Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Well-being Research. Springer 3602-05.
    In this encyclopedia entry, I seek to distinguish the concept of a worthwhile life from related ones such as a happy or meaningful life, to draw key distinctions that arise in discussion of worthwhileness (e.g., between life worth starting and life worth continuing), and to discuss some of the contemporary debates among ethicists about when a life is indeed worth living and when it's not.
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  20. Thaddeus Metz (2012). Contemporary Anti-Natalism, Featuring Benatar's Better Never to Have Been. South African Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):1-9.
    A critical overview of the latest discussion of anti-natalism, with particular reference to David Benatar's work and three additional rationales for anti-natalism that differ from Benatar's.
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  21. Thaddeus Metz (2012). The Meaningful and the Worthwhile: Clarifying the Relationships. Philosophical Forum 43 (4):435-448.
    The question I seek to answer is what the relationship is between judgments of people’s lives as meaningful, on the one hand, and as worth living, on the other. Several in the analytic and Continental literature, including the likes of Albert Camus and Ludwig Wittgenstein, and more recently, Robert Solomon and Julian Baggini, have maintained that the two words mean the same thing, in that they have the same referents or even the same sense. My primary aim is to refute (...)
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  22. Joe Mintoff (2008). Transcending Absurdity. Ratio 21 (1):64–84.
    Many of us experience the activities which fill our everyday lives as meaningful, and to do so we must (and do) hold them to be important. However, reflection undercuts this confidence: our activities are aimed at ends which are arbitrary, in that we have reason to regard our taking them so seriously as lacking justification; they are comparatively insignificant; and they leave little of any real permanence. Even though we take our activities seriously, and our everyday lives to be important, (...)
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  23. Francesco Orsi (2014). Climate Change and the Intuition of Neutrality. In Marcello Di Paola & Gianfranco Pellegrino (eds.), Canned Heat. Ethics and Politics of Global Climate Change. Routledge 160-176.
    The intuition of neutrality, as discussed by John Broome, says that the addition of people does not, by itself, produce or subtract value from the world. Such intuition allows us to disregard the effects of climate change policy onto the size of populations, effectively allowing us to make policy recommendations. Broome has argued that the intuition has to go. Orsi responds by urging a normative (rather than Broome's axiological) interpretation of neutrality in terms of an exclusionary permission to disregard the (...)
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  24. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2002). Hedonism, Preferentialism, and Value Bearers. Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (4):463-472.
  25. Desh Raj Sirswal (2010). PHILOSOPHY AND VALUES IN SCHOOL EDUCATION OF INDIA. Suvidya Journal of Philosophy and Religion 4 (02):00.
    In this paper an attempt is made to draw out the contemporary relevance of philosophy in school education of India. It includes some studies done in this field and also reports on philosophy by such agencies like UNESCO & NCERT. Many European countries emphasises on the above said theme. There are lots of work and research done by many philosophers on philosophy for children. Indian values system is different from the West and more important than others. Education has become a (...)
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  26. Aaron Smuts, A Life Worth Living.
    Theories of well-being tell us what makes a life good for the one who lives it. But there is more to what makes a life worth living than just well-being. We care about the worth of our lives, and we are right to do so. I defend an objective list theory of the worth of a life: The most worthwhile lives are those high in various objective goods. These principally include welfare and meaning. By distinguishing between worth and welfare, we (...)
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  27. Aaron Smuts (2013). To Be or Never to Have Been: Anti-Natalism and a Life Worth Living. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (4):1-19.
    David Benatar argues that being brought into existence is always a net harm and never a benefit. I disagree. I argue that if you bring someone into existence who lives a life worth living (LWL), then you have not all things considered wronged her. Lives are worth living if they are high in various objective goods and low in objective bads. These lives constitute a net benefit. In contrast, lives worth avoiding (LWA) constitute a net harm. Lives worth avoiding are (...)
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  28. Aaron Smuts (2008). Wings of Desire: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality. Film and Philosophy 13 (1):137-151.
    The question Wings of Desire (Wim Wenders, 1987) forces us to answer is whether we too would be willing to renounce immortality? Or, to put it conversely, would we be wise to exchange our current mortal existence for immortality? If a state of senseless, inefficacious existence is undesirable, the question of the value of immortality becomes one of the conceivably of an alternative to the angels' form of existence. By contemplating the existence of the angels in Wings of Desire, we (...)
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  29. Brooke Alan Trisel (2015). Does Death Give Meaning to Life? Journal of Philosophy of Life 5 (2):62-81.
    Some people claim that death makes our lives meaningless. Bernard Williams and Viktor Frankl have made the opposite claim that death gives meaning to life. Although there has been much scrutiny of the former claim, the latter claim has received very little attention. In this paper, I will explore whether and how death gives meaning to our lives. As I will argue, there is not sufficient support for the strong claim that death is necessary for one's life to be meaningful. (...)
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  30. Brooke Alan Trisel (2007). Judging Life and Its Value. Sorites (18):60-75.
    One’s life can be meaningful, but not worth living, or worth living, but not meaningful, which demonstrates that an evaluation of whether life is worth living differs from an evaluation of whether one’s life is meaningful. But how do these evaluations differ? As I will argue, an evaluation of whether life is worth living is a more comprehensive evaluation than the evaluation of whether one’s individual life or life in general is meaningful. In judging whether one finds life worth living, (...)
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  31. Bojan Žalec (2011). On Not Knowing Who We Are: The Ethical Importance of Transcendent Anthropology. Synthesis Philosophica 26 (1):105-115.
    The article is dealing with the ethical importance of the acceptance of the transcendence of every person. The author argues in favor of the following thesis: Transcendent anthropology is a positive factor of personalism; Violation of solidarity is fundamental evil; Apophatic anthropology is a realistic view; We should avoid the extreme positions regarding identities: nihilist or neutralist at one hand and non-critical acceptance and their ossification at the other. The proper approach to identities is critical realism and dialogic universalism; The (...)
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