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  1. George Ainslie (2014). Selfish Goals Must Compete for the Common Currency of Reward. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 38 (1):135-136.
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  2. Holly Andersen, Two Causal Mistakes in Wegner's Illusion of Conscious Will.
    Daniel Wegner argues that our feelings of conscious will are illusory: these feelings are not causally involved in the production of action, which is rather governed by unconscious neural processes. I argue that Wegner's interpretation of neuroscientific results rests on two fallacious causal assumptions, neither of which are supported by the evidence. Each assumption involves a Cartesian disembodiment of conscious will, and it is this disembodiment that results in the appearance of causal inefficacy, rather than any interesting features of conscious (...)
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  3. Páll S. Árdal (1965). Motives, Intentions and Responsibility. Philosophical Quarterly 15 (59):146-154.
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  4. Horacio Arló-Costa (2005). Models of Preference Reversals and Personal Rules: Do They Require Maximizing a Utility Function with a Specific Structure? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):650-651.
    One of the reasons for adopting hyperbolic discounting is to explain preference reversals. Another is that this value structure suggests an elegant theory of the will. I examine the capacity of the theory to solve Newcomb's problem. In addition, I compare Ainslie's account with other procedural theories of choice that seem at least equally capable of accommodating reversals of preference.
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  5. Nomy Arpaly (2006). Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage: An Essay on Free Will. Princeton University Press.
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  6. Thomas Atwater (1980). Theory of Action. New Scholasticism 54 (1):111-115.
  7. BA Aune (2000). Puzzles for the Will. International Philosophical Quarterly 40 (1):103-105.
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  8. Winston H. F. Barnes, W. D. Falk & A. E. Duncan-Jones (1945). Symposium: Intention, Motive and Responsibility. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 19:230 - 288.
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  9. Melissa Barry (2007). Realism, Rational Action, and the Humean Theory of Motivation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):231-242.
    Realists about practical reasons agree that judgments regarding reasons are beliefs. They disagree, however, over the question of how such beliefs motivate rational action. Some adopt a Humean conception of motivation, according to which beliefs about reasons must combine with independently existing desires in order to motivate rational action; others adopt an anti-Humean view, according to which beliefs can motivate rational action in their own right, either directly or by giving rise to a new desire that in turn motivates the (...)
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  10. Benjamin Bayer, Believing at Will and the Will to Believe the Truth.
    I defend of a version of doxastic voluntarism, by criticizing an argument advanced recently by Pamela Hieronymi against the possibility of belief at will. Conceiving of belief at will as believing immediately in response to practical reasons, Hieronymi claims that none of the forms of control we exercise over our beliefs measure up to this standard. While there is a form of direct control we exercise over our beliefs, "evaluative control," she claims it does not give us the power to (...)
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  11. Monroe C. Beardsley (1980). Motives and Intentions. Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy 2:71-79.
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  12. Lawrence C. Becker & Charlotte B. Becker (eds.) (2001). Encyclopedia of Ethics. Routledge.
    The editors, working with a team of 325 renowned authorities in the field of ethics, have revised, expanded, and updated this classic encyclopedia. Along with the addition of 150 new entries, all of the original articles have been newly peer-reviewed and revised, bibliographies have been updated throughout, and the overall design of the work has been enhanced for easier access to cross-references and other reference features. New entries include * Aristotelian Ethics * Avicenna * Bad Faith * Beneficence * Categorical (...)
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  13. Daniel Clark Bennett (1960). Action and the Will. Dissertation, Stanford University
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  14. Monika Betzler (2001). How Can an Agent Rationally Guide His Actions? Grazer Philosophische Studien 61 (1):159-177.
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  15. J. Bishop (2001). McCANN, HJ-The Works of Agency. Philosophical Books 42 (3):232-232.
  16. John Bishop (1991). Natural Agency. Mind 100 (2):287-290.
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  17. Vincent Blok (2013). 'Massive Voluntarism' or Heidegger's Confrontation with the Will. Studie Phaenomenologica 13 (1):449-465.
    One of the controversial issues in the development of Heidegger’s thought is the problem of the will. Th e communis opinio is that Heidegger embraced the concept of the will in a non-critical manner at the beginning of the thirties and , in particular, he employed it in his political speeches of 1933–1934. Jacques Derrida for instance speaks about a “massive voluntarism” in relation to Heidegger’s thought in this period. Also Brett Davis discerns a period of “existential voluntarism” in 1930–1934, (...)
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  18. Vincent Blok (2013). "Massive Voluntarism" or Heidegger's Confrontation with the Will. Studie Phaenomenologica 13 (1):449-465.
    One of the controversial issues in the development of Heidegger’s thought is the problem of the will. Th e communis opinio is that Heidegger embraced the concept of the will in a non-critical manner at the beginning of the thirties and , in particular, he employed it in his political speeches of 1933–1934. Jacques Derrida for instance speaks about a “massive voluntarism” in relation to Heidegger’s thought in this period. Also Brett Davis discerns a period of “existential voluntarism” in 1930–1934, (...)
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  19. Jean Beer Blumenfeld (1983). Is Acting Willing? Noûs 17 (2):183-195.
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  20. Stephen Boulter (2009). Aquinas on Action and Action Explanation. In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave Macmillan
  21. Jeffrey Charles Brand-Ballard (1999). Sharing Fate: Contractualism, Individualism and Collective Agency. Dissertation, University of Michigan
    In this project I develop a theory of collective agency for Kantian social contract theory . Contractualists lack a unified, coherent theory of agency. At some points they endorse an individualistic theory of the agent. Elsewhere they recognize the possibility of collective agents, but they never take seriously the concept of an irreducibly collective agent. ;Contractualism makes more sense, and can better achieve its own goals, if reinterpreted in terms of a theory of agency which avoids these equivocations. Drawing on (...)
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  22. Johannes L. Brandl, Marian David & Leopold Stubenberg (2001). Agents and Their Actions. Rodopi.
    IntroductionE.J. LOWE: Event Causation and Agent CausationRalf STOECKER: Agents in ActionGeert KEIL: How Do We Ever Get Up? On the Proximate Causation of Actions and EventsMaria ALVAREZ: Letting Happen, Omissions, and CausationFrederick STOUTLAND: Responsive Action and the Belief-Desire ModelMarco IORIO: How Are Agents Related to Their Actions? The Existentialist ResponseJens KULENKAMPFF: What Oedipus Did When He Married Jocasta or What Ancient Tragedy Tells Us About Agents, Their Actions, and the WorldRüdiger BITTNER: Agents as RulersMonika BETZLER: How Can an Agent Rationally (...)
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  23. R. B. Brandt (1991). Overvold on Self-Interest and Self-Sacrifice. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:353-363.
    In order to explain the idea that sacrifice involves voluntary diminution of the agent’s well-being, “well-being” must be explained. The thesis that an agent’s well-being just consists in the occurrence of events wanted is rejected. Overvold replaces it by the view that the motivating desires involve the existence of the agent, alive, at the time of their satisfaction. This view seems counterintuitive. The whole desire-satisfaction theory is to be rejected partly because we dont’t think an event worthwile if it is (...)
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  24. J. Bransen (2013). Backsliding: Understanding Weakness of WillBy Alfred R. Mele. Analysis 73 (3):585-587.
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  25. Michael E. Bratman (2014). Temptation and the Agent's Standpoint. Inquiry 57 (3):293-310.
    Suppose you resolve now to resist an expected temptation later while knowing that once the temptation arrives your preference or evaluative assessment will shift in favor of that temptation. Are there defensible norms of rational planning agency that support sticking with your prior intention in the face of such a shift at the time of temptation and in the absence of relevant new information? This article defends the idea that it might be rational to stick with your prior intention in (...)
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  26. Michael E. Bratman (2003). Autonomy and Hierarchy. Social Philosophy and Policy 20 (2):156-176.
    In autonomous action the agent herself directs and governs the action. But what is it for the agent herself to direct and to govern? One theme in a series of articles by Harry G. Frankfurt is that we can make progress in answering this question by appeal to higher-order conative attitudes. Frankfurt's original version of this idea is that in acting of one's own free will, one is not acting simply because one desires so to act. Rather, it is also (...)
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  27. Michael Edward Bratman (1974). Thought, Action, and Acting Against One's Best Judgment. Dissertation, The Rockefeller University
  28. Robert Briscoe (2011). The Elusive Experience of Agency. Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):262-267.
    I here present some doubts about whether Mandik’s (2010) proposed intermediacy and recurrence constraints are necessary and sufficient for agentive experience. I also argue that in order to vindicate the conclusion that agentive experience is an exclusively perceptual phenomenon (Prinz, 2007), it is not enough to show that the predictions produced by forward models of planned motor actions are conveyed by mock sensory signals. Rather, it must also be shown that the outputs of “comparator” mechanisms that compare these predictions against (...)
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  29. Jerome S. Bruner (1969). On Voluntary Action and its Hierarchical Structure* Jerome S. Bruner. In Arthur Koestler & John R. Smythies (eds.), Beyond Reductionism: New Perspectives in the Life Sciences. London, Hutchinson 161.
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  30. G. Anthony Bruno (forthcoming). Schelling on the Possibility of Evil: Rendering Pantheism, Freedom and Time Consistent. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy.
  31. Andrei A. Buckareff (2011). Maria Alvarez , Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action . Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 31 (4):245-247.
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  32. V. C. C. (1955). Belief and Will. Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume XXVIII. The Symposia Read at the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association at Oxford, July 9th-11th, 1954. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 9 (2):365-365.
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  33. Peter G. Campbell (1994). Rational and Irrational Agency. Dissertation, The University of British Columbia (Canada)
    Only with a comprehensive detailed theory of the practical processes which agents engage in prior to successful action can one get a picture of all those junctures at which the mechanism of rationality may be applied, and at which irrationality may therefore occur. Rationality, I argue, is the exercise of normatives, such as believable and desirable, whose function is to control the formation of the stages in practical processes by determining what content and which functions of practical states are allowed (...)
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  34. Richmond Campbell (2001). Puzzles for the Will. Dialogue 40 (3):634-635.
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  35. George Carlson (1982). Internalism and Self-Determination. Philosophy Research Archives 8:415-427.
    As part of an attempt to give a “libertarian” account of some aspects of human agency, the author articulates and defends a modified interpretation of “internalism” which makes coherent the notion of a genuinely, self-determined choice amongst fundamental conceptions of practical reason. That such choices are “nomologically irreducible” is evidenced by the fact that although (contextually) unavoidable, they are nonetheless under-determined with respect to any combination of the agent’s (specific) desires and circumstances. Alternatively, to the extent that orthodox “externalism” subordinates (...)
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  36. Gregg Caruso (ed.) (2013). Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Lexington Books.
    This book explores the philosophical and scientific arguments for free will skepticism and their implications. Skepticism about free will and moral responsibility has been on the rise in recent years. In fact, a significant number of philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists now either doubt or outright deny the existence of free will and/or moral responsibility—and the list of prominent skeptics appears to grow by the day. Given the profound importance that the concepts of free will and moral responsibility play in our (...)
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  37. Gregg Caruso (2013). Introduction: Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility. In Gregg D. Caruso (ed.), Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Lexington Books
    This introductory chapter discusses the philosophical and scientific arguments for free will skepticism and their implications--including the debate between Saul Smilansky's "illusionism," Thomas Nadelhoffer's "disillusionism," Shaun Nichols' "anti-revolution," and the "optimistic skepticism" of Derk Pereboom, Bruce Waller, Tamler Sommers, and others.
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  38. Gregg Caruso (2012). Free Will and Consciousness: A Determinist Account of the Illusion of Free Will. Lexington Books.
    In recent decades, with advances in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences, the idea that patterns of human behavior may ultimately be due to factors beyond our conscious control has increasingly gained traction and renewed interest in the age-old problem of free will. In this book I examine both the traditional philosophical problems long associated with the question of free will, such as the relationship between determinism and free will, as well as recent experimental and theoretical work directly related to consciousness (...)
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  39. Thomas Cavanaugh (1997). Aquinas's Account of Double Effect. The Thomist 61:107-121.
    Double-effect reasoning (DER) is attributed to Aquinas "tout court". Aquinas's account, however, differs from contemporary DER insofar as Thomas considers the ethical status of "risking" an assailant's life while contemporary accounts focus on actions causing harm inevitably. Since one cannot claim to risk the inevitable, and since there is a significant difference between risking harm and causing harm inevitably. Thomas's account does not extend to cases of inevitable harm. Thus, the received understanding of Aquinas's account is flawed and leads to (...)
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  40. Marcia Cavell (1989). Book Review:Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception and Self-Control. Alfred R. Mele. [REVIEW] Ethics 99 (2):429-.
  41. Chappell (1998). Locke on the Suspension of Desire. Locke Studies 29:23-38.
    In the first edition of the Essay concerning Human Understanding, Locke claims that human beings have freedom of action - that is, that some of their actions are free - but that they do not have freedom of will - that is, that none of their volitions are free. Volitions themselves are actions for Locke; they are operations of the will and hence acts of willing. And volitions give rise to other actions: an action that follows and is caused by (...)
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  42. Vere Chappell (1995). Free Willing: Comments on Hoffman's “Freedom and Strength of Will”. Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):273 - 281.
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  43. Andy Clark, Julian Kiverstein & Tillmann Vierkant (eds.) (2013). Decomposing the Will. OUP USA.
    There is growing evidence from the science of human behavior that our everyday, folk understanding of ourselves as conscious, rational, responsible agents may be mistaken. The new essays in this volume display and explore this radical claim. folk concept of the responsible agent after abandoning the image of a central executive and "decomposing" the notion of the conscious will into multiple interlocking aspects and functions.
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  44. Randolph Clarke (1998). Review: Thomas Pink's The Psychology of Freedom (1996 CUP). [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 107 (4):634-637.
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  45. Thomas D. Connor (2014). Self-Control, Willpower and the Problem of Diminished Motivation. Philosophical Studies 168 (3):783-796.
    Self-control has been described as the ability to master motivation that is contrary to one’s better judgement; that is, an ability that prevents such motivation from resulting in behaviour that is contrary to one’s overall better judgement (Mele, Irrationality: An essay on Akrasia, self-deception and self-control, p. 54, 1987). Recent discussions in philosophy have centred on the question of whether synchronic self-control, in which one exercises self-control whilst one is currently experiencing opposing motivation, is actional or non-actional. The actional theorist (...)
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  46. J. Cottingham (2006). Review: The Will and Human Action From Antiquity to the Present Day. [REVIEW] Mind 115 (459):793-796.
  47. Roger Crisp (1987). Persuasive Advertising, Autonomy, and the Creation of Desire. Journal of Business Ethics 6 (5):413 - 418.
    It is argued that persuasive advertising overrides the autonomy of consumers, in that it manipulates them without their knowledge and for no good reason. Such advertising causes desires in such a way that a necessary condition of autonomy — the possibility of decision — is removed. Four notions central to autonomous action are discussed — autonomous desire, rational desire and choice, free choice, and control or manipulation — following the strategy of Robert Arrington in a recent paper in this journal. (...)
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  48. Thomas Crowther (2009). Perceptual Activity and the Will. In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press 173.
  49. Lara Denis (2010). Review: McCarty, Kant's Theory of Action. [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (4):533-535.
    This significant, stimulating contribution to Kantian practical philosophy strives to interpret Kant’s theory of action in ways that will increase readers’ understanding and appreciation of Kant’s moral theory. Its thesis is that Kant combines metaphysical freedom and psychological determinism: our actions within the phenomenal world are causally determined by our prior psychological states in that world and are appearances of our free action in the noumenal world. McCarty argues for a metaphysical, “two-worlds” interpretation of Kant’s transcendental distinction between appearances and (...)
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  50. Ulrich Diehl (2012). Jaspers on Drives, Wants and Volitions. Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Karl-Jaspers-Gesellschaft 25:101-125.
    In § 6 of his General Psychopathology (1st edition 1913) Jaspers distinguished between drives, wants and volitions as three different and irreducible kinds of motivational phenomena which are involved in human decision making and which may lead to successful actions. He has characterized the qualitative differences between volitions in comparison with basic vital drives and emotional wants such as being (a.) intentional, (b.) content-specific and (b.) directed towards concrete objects and actions as goals. Furthermore, Jaspers has presented and discussed three (...)
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