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  1. George Ainslie (2014). Selfish Goals Must Compete for the Common Currency of Reward. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 38 (1):135-136.
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  2. Horacio Arló-Costa (2005). Models of Preference Reversals and Personal Rules: Do They Require Maximizing a Utility Function with a Specific Structure? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):650-651.
    One of the reasons for adopting hyperbolic discounting is to explain preference reversals. Another is that this value structure suggests an elegant theory of the will. I examine the capacity of the theory to solve Newcomb's problem. In addition, I compare Ainslie's account with other procedural theories of choice that seem at least equally capable of accommodating reversals of preference.
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  3. BA Aune (2000). Puzzles for the Will. International Philosophical Quarterly 40 (1):103-105.
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  4. Benjamin Bayer, Believing at Will and the Will to Believe the Truth.
    I defend of a version of doxastic voluntarism, by criticizing an argument advanced recently by Pamela Hieronymi against the possibility of belief at will. Conceiving of belief at will as believing immediately in response to practical reasons, Hieronymi claims that none of the forms of control we exercise over our beliefs measure up to this standard. While there is a form of direct control we exercise over our beliefs, "evaluative control," she claims it does not give us the power to (...)
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  5. Lawrence C. Becker & Charlotte B. Becker (eds.) (2001). Encyclopedia of Ethics. Routledge.
    The editors, working with a team of 325 renowned authorities in the field of ethics, have revised, expanded, and updated this classic encyclopedia. Along with the addition of 150 new entries, all of the original articles have been newly peer-reviewed and revised, bibliographies have been updated throughout, and the overall design of the work has been enhanced for easier access to cross-references and other reference features. New entries include * Aristotelian Ethics * Avicenna * Bad Faith * Beneficence * Categorical (...)
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  6. J. Bishop (2001). McCANN, HJ-The Works of Agency. Philosophical Books 42 (3):232-232.
  7. Vincent Blok (2013). "Massive Voluntarism" or Heidegger's Confrontation with the Will. Studie Phaenomenologica 13 (1):449-465.
    One of the controversial issues in the development of Heidegger’s thought is the problem of the will. Th e communis opinio is that Heidegger embraced the concept of the will in a non-critical manner at the beginning of the thirties and , in particular, he employed it in his political speeches of 1933–1934. Jacques Derrida for instance speaks about a “massive voluntarism” in relation to Heidegger’s thought in this period. Also Brett Davis discerns a period of “existential voluntarism” in 1930–1934, (...)
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  8. Vincent Blok (2013). 'Massive Voluntarism' or Heidegger's Confrontation with the Will. Studie Phaenomenologica 13 (1):449-465.
    One of the controversial issues in the development of Heidegger’s thought is the problem of the will. Th e communis opinio is that Heidegger embraced the concept of the will in a non-critical manner at the beginning of the thirties and , in particular, he employed it in his political speeches of 1933–1934. Jacques Derrida for instance speaks about a “massive voluntarism” in relation to Heidegger’s thought in this period. Also Brett Davis discerns a period of “existential voluntarism” in 1930–1934, (...)
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  9. Jean Beer Blumenfeld (1983). Is Acting Willing? Noûs 17 (2):183-195.
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  10. Stephen Boulter (2009). Aquinas on Action and Action Explanation. In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave Macmillan.
  11. Johannes L. Brandl, Marian David & Leopold Stubenberg (2001). Agents and Their Actions. Rodopi.
    IntroductionE.J. LOWE: Event Causation and Agent CausationRalf STOECKER: Agents in ActionGeert KEIL: How Do We Ever Get Up? On the Proximate Causation of Actions and EventsMaria ALVAREZ: Letting Happen, Omissions, and CausationFrederick STOUTLAND: Responsive Action and the Belief-Desire ModelMarco IORIO: How Are Agents Related to Their Actions? The Existentialist ResponseJens KULENKAMPFF: What Oedipus Did When He Married Jocasta or What Ancient Tragedy Tells Us About Agents, Their Actions, and the WorldRüdiger BITTNER: Agents as RulersMonika BETZLER: How Can an Agent Rationally (...)
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  12. J. Bransen (2013). Backsliding: Understanding Weakness of WillBy Alfred R. Mele. Analysis 73 (3):585-587.
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  13. Michael E. Bratman (2014). Temptation and the Agent's Standpoint. Inquiry 57 (3):293-310.
    Suppose you resolve now to resist an expected temptation later while knowing that once the temptation arrives your preference or evaluative assessment will shift in favor of that temptation. Are there defensible norms of rational planning agency that support sticking with your prior intention in the face of such a shift at the time of temptation and in the absence of relevant new information? This article defends the idea that it might be rational to stick with your prior intention in (...)
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  14. Robert Briscoe (2011). The Elusive Experience of Agency. Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):262-267.
    I here present some doubts about whether Mandik’s (2010) proposed intermediacy and recurrence constraints are necessary and sufficient for agentive experience. I also argue that in order to vindicate the conclusion that agentive experience is an exclusively perceptual phenomenon (Prinz, 2007), it is not enough to show that the predictions produced by forward models of planned motor actions are conveyed by mock sensory signals. Rather, it must also be shown that the outputs of “comparator” mechanisms that compare these predictions against (...)
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  15. G. Anthony Bruno (forthcoming). Schelling on the Possibility of Evil: Rendering Pantheism, Freedom and Time Consistent. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy.
  16. V. C. C. (1955). Belief and Will. Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume XXVIII. The Symposia Read at the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association at Oxford, July 9th-11th, 1954. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 9 (2):365-365.
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  17. Richmond Campbell (2001). Puzzles for the Will. Dialogue 40 (3):634-635.
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  18. Gregg Caruso (ed.) (2013). Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Lexington Books.
    This book explores the philosophical and scientific arguments for free will skepticism and their implications. Skepticism about free will and moral responsibility has been on the rise in recent years. In fact, a significant number of philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists now either doubt or outright deny the existence of free will and/or moral responsibility—and the list of prominent skeptics appears to grow by the day. Given the profound importance that the concepts of free will and moral responsibility play in our (...)
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  19. Gregg Caruso (2013). Introduction: Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility. In Gregg D. Caruso (ed.), Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Lexington Books.
    This introductory chapter discusses the philosophical and scientific arguments for free will skepticism and their implications--including the debate between Saul Smilansky's "illusionism," Thomas Nadelhoffer's "disillusionism," Shaun Nichols' "anti-revolution," and the "optimistic skepticism" of Derk Pereboom, Bruce Waller, Tamler Sommers, and others.
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  20. Gregg Caruso (2012). Free Will and Consciousness: A Determinist Account of the Illusion of Free Will. Lexington Books.
    In recent decades, with advances in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences, the idea that patterns of human behavior may ultimately be due to factors beyond our conscious control has increasingly gained traction and renewed interest in the age-old problem of free will. In this book I examine both the traditional philosophical problems long associated with the question of free will, such as the relationship between determinism and free will, as well as recent experimental and theoretical work directly related to consciousness (...)
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  21. Thomas Cavanaugh (1997). Aquinas's Account of Double Effect. The Thomist 61:107-121.
    Double-effect reasoning (DER) is attributed to Aquinas "tout court". Aquinas's account, however, differs from contemporary DER insofar as Thomas considers the ethical status of "risking" an assailant's life while contemporary accounts focus on actions causing harm inevitably. Since one cannot claim to risk the inevitable, and since there is a significant difference between risking harm and causing harm inevitably. Thomas's account does not extend to cases of inevitable harm. Thus, the received understanding of Aquinas's account is flawed and leads to (...)
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  22. Marcia Cavell (1989). Book Review:Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception and Self-Control. Alfred R. Mele. [REVIEW] Ethics 99 (2):429-.
  23. Vere Chappell (1995). Free Willing: Comments on Hoffman's “Freedom and Strength of Will”. Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):273 - 281.
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  24. Andy Clark, Julian Kiverstein & Tillmann Vierkant (eds.) (2013). Decomposing the Will. OUP USA.
    There is growing evidence from the science of human behavior that our everyday, folk understanding of ourselves as conscious, rational, responsible agents may be mistaken. The new essays in this volume display and explore this radical claim. folk concept of the responsible agent after abandoning the image of a central executive and "decomposing" the notion of the conscious will into multiple interlocking aspects and functions.
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  25. Randolph Clarke (1998). Review: Thomas Pink's The Psychology of Freedom (1996 CUP). [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 107 (4):634-637.
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  26. Roger Crisp (1987). Persuasive Advertising, Autonomy, and the Creation of Desire. Journal of Business Ethics 6 (5):413 - 418.
    It is argued that persuasive advertising overrides the autonomy of consumers, in that it manipulates them without their knowledge and for no good reason. Such advertising causes desires in such a way that a necessary condition of autonomy — the possibility of decision — is removed. Four notions central to autonomous action are discussed — autonomous desire, rational desire and choice, free choice, and control or manipulation — following the strategy of Robert Arrington in a recent paper in this journal. (...)
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  27. Thomas Crowther (2009). Perceptual Activity and the Will. In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press. 173.
  28. Lara Denis (2010). Review: McCarty, Kant's Theory of Action. [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (4):533-535.
    This significant, stimulating contribution to Kantian practical philosophy strives to interpret Kant’s theory of action in ways that will increase readers’ understanding and appreciation of Kant’s moral theory. Its thesis is that Kant combines metaphysical freedom and psychological determinism: our actions within the phenomenal world are causally determined by our prior psychological states in that world and are appearances of our free action in the noumenal world. McCarty argues for a metaphysical, “two-worlds” interpretation of Kant’s transcendental distinction between appearances and (...)
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  29. Ulrich Diehl (2012). Jaspers on Drives, Wants and Volitions. Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Karl-Jaspers-Gesellschaft 25:101-125.
    In § 6 of his General Psychopathology (1st edition 1913) Jaspers distinguished between drives, wants and volitions as three different and irreducible kinds of motivational phenomena which are involved in human decision making and which may lead to successful actions. He has characterized the qualitative differences between volitions in comparison with basic vital drives and emotional wants such as being (a.) intentional, (b.) content-specific and (b.) directed towards concrete objects and actions as goals. Furthermore, Jaspers has presented and discussed three (...)
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  30. Brendan Dill & Richard Holton (2014). The Addict in Us All. Frontiers in Psychiatry 5 (139):01-20.
    In this paper, we contend that the psychology of addiction is similar to the psychology of ordinary, non-addictive temptation in important respects, and explore the ways in which these parallels can illuminate both addiction and ordinary action. The incentive salience account of addiction proposed by Robinson and Berridge (1993; 2001; 2008) entails that addictive desires are not in their nature different from many of the desires had by non-addicts; what is different is rather the way that addictive desires are acquired, (...)
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  31. Nir Eisikovits (2012). Willing, Wanting, Waiting by Richard Holton. [REVIEW] Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (4):603-606.
    What is a disability? What sorts of limitations do persons with disabilities or impairments experience? What is there about having a disability or impairment that makes it disadvantageous for the individuals with it? Are persons with severe cognitive impairments capable of making autonomous decisions? What role should disability play in the construction of theories of justice? Is it ever ethical for parents to seek to create a child with an impairment? This anthology addresses these and other questions and is a (...)
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  32. Luca Ferrero (2012). Willing, Wanting, Waiting by Richard Holton. [REVIEW] Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (3):443-457.
    In his book Willing, Wanting, Waiting Holton defends a comprehensive view of the will. His central claims are: that we have a capacity of choice, independent of judgment about what is best to do, that resistance to temptation requires a special kind of intentions, resolutions, and the exercise of an executive capacity, willpower, there is a distinction between weakness of will and akrasia. I argue that Holton is right about these claims, but I raise a few concerns: I am unclear (...)
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  33. Luca Ferrero (2009). What Good Is a Diachronic Will? Philosophical Studies 144 (3):403 - 430.
    There are two standard conceptions of the functioning of and rationale for the diachronic will, i.e., for an agent's capacity to settle on her future conduct in advance. According to the pragmatic-instrumentalist view, the diachronic will benefits us by increasing the long-term satisfaction of our rational preferences. According to the cognitive view, it benefits us by satisfying our standing desire for self-knowledge and self-understanding. Contrary to these views, I argue for a constitutive view of the diachronic will: the rationale for (...)
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  34. Harry Frankfurt (1992). The Faintest Passion. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 66 (3):5-16.
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  35. Danny Frederick (2013). Free Will and Probability. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):60-77.
    The chance objection to incompatibilist accounts of free action maintains that undetermined actions are not under the agent's control. Some attempts to circumvent this objection locate chance in events posterior to the action. Indeterministic-causation theories locate chance in events prior to the action. However, neither type of response gives an account of free action which avoids the chance objection. Chance must be located at the act of will if actions are to be both undetermined and under the agent's control. This (...)
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  36. A. J. C. Freeman (2000). Responsibility Without Choice. A First-Person Approach. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (10):61-68.
    Individuals are generally held to be morally and legally responsible only for actions carried out freely and deliberately, that is to say, for actions that result from our free choice. However, there is a quite widespread view that all of our actions are the result of the scientific laws that govern our physical bodies. If this should prove to be the case, then human choice would be an illusion, and therefore -- on the generally accepted principle just stated -- personal (...)
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  37. A. J. C. Freeman (1999). Decisive Action. Personal Responsibility All the Way Down. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8-9):8-9.
    I do not approach the question of free will as a scientist, like Colin Blakemore, or a lawyer, like David Hodgson, or philosopher, like Daniel Dennett, but as a priest -- someone who feels responsible for my own actions and who is called upon to counsel and absolve such as come to me with their shame and their guilt. Should I say that their sense of responsibility is illusory? Or should I encourage them to accept responsibility, and then to deal (...)
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  38. Walter Freeman (2008). Nonlinear Brain Dynamics and Intention According to Aquinas. Mind and Matter 6 (2):207-234.
    We humans and other animals continuously construct and main- tain our grasp of the world by using astonishingly small snippets of sensory information. Recent studies in nonlinear brain dynamics have shown how this occurs: brains imagine possible futures and seek and use sensory stimulation to select among them as guides for chosen actions. On the one hand the scientific explanation of the dynamics is inaccessible to most of us. On the other hand the philosophical foundation from which the sciences grew (...)
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  39. James Andrew Fulton (1973). Motive and Intention. International Philosophical Quarterly 13 (4):575-581.
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  40. J. L. A. Garcia (1991). On the Irreducibility of the Will. Synthese 86 (3):349 - 360.
    This paper criticizes the thesis that intending to do something is reducible to some combination of beliefs and desires. Against Audi's recent formulation of such a view I offer as counterexample a case wherein an agent who wants and expects to V has not yet decided whether to V and hence does not yet intend to. I try to show that whereas belief that one will V is not necessary for intending to V, as illustrated in cases of desperate attempts (...)
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  41. Ken Gemes, Strangers to Ourselves: Nietzsche on The Will to Truth, The Scientific Spirit, Free Will, and Genuine Selfhood.
    On the Genealogy of Morals contains the puzzling claim that the will to truth is the last expression of the ascetic ideal. Part I of this essay argues that Nietzsche’s claim is that our will to truth functions as a tool allowing us to take a passive stance to the world, leading us to repress and split off part of our nature. Part II deals with Nietzsche’s account of the sovereign individual and his related, novel, account of free will. Both (...)
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  42. Jeanine M. Grenberg (2001). Feeling, Desire and Interest in Kant's Theory of Action. Kant-Studien 92 (2):153-179.
    Henry Allison's “Incorporation Thesis” has played an important role in recent discussions of Kantian ethics. By focussing on Kant's claim that “a drive [Triebfeder] can determine the will to an action only so far as the individual has incorporated it into his maxim,” (Rel 19, translation slightly modified) Allison has successfully argued against Kant's critics that desire-based non-moral action can be free action. His work has thus opened the door for a wide range of discussions which integrate feeling into (...)
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  43. Thor Grünbaum (2008). Trying and the Arguments From Total Failure. Philosophia 36 (1):67-86.
    New Volitionalism is a name for certain widespread conception of the nature of intentional action. Some of the standard arguments for New Volitionalism, the so-called arguments from total failure, have even acquired the status of basic assumptions for many other kinds of philosophers. It is therefore of singular interest to investigate some of the most important arguments from total failure. This is what I propose to do in this paper. My aim is not be to demonstrate that these arguments are (...)
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  44. Daniel Guevara (2009). The Will as Practical Reason and the Problem of Akrasia. Review of Metaphysics 62 (3):525-550.
    This article argues for the possibility of aggressive akrasia, or the akrasia rooted in “unqualified knowingness.” The aggressive akratic acts knowledgeably and voluntarily for a bad end. Many philosophers reject the very possibility of aggressive akrasia given a prior commitment to closely identifying the will with practical reason, thereby effectively dismissing the possibility of an agent’s full responsibility for a morally evil act. Hence, these philosophers try to explain akrasia by challenging the voluntariness of the akratic’s action, or his knowledge, (...)
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  45. Don Gustafson (2007). Neurosciences of Action and Noncausal Theories. Philosophical Psychology 20 (3):367–374.
    Recent neuroscience and psychology of behavior have suggested that conscious decisions may have no causal role in the etiology of intentional action. Such results pose a threat to traditional philosophical analyses of action. On such views beliefs, desires and conscious willing are part of the causal structure of intentional action. But if the suggestions from neuroscience/psychology are correct, analyses of this kind are wrong. Conscious antecedents of action are epiphenomenal. This essay explores this consequence. It also notes that the traditional (...)
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  46. Peter Hacker (2009). Agential Reasons and the Explanation of Human Behaviour. In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave Macmillan. 75--93.
  47. Ishtiyaque H. Haji (2007). Modest Libertarianism, Luck, and Control. Polish Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):77-89.
    Whether indeterminism undermines moral responsibility by subverting one or more of responsibility’s requirements is something that has received close attention in the recent literature on free will. In this paper, I take issue with Gerald Harrison’s attempt to deflect various considerations for the view that indeterminism threatens responsibility either by threatening the control that responsibility requires or by posing a problem of luck.
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  48. Joseph Heath & Joel Anderson (2010). Procrastination and the Extended Will. In Chrisoula Andreou & Mark D. White (eds.), The Thief of Time. Oxford University Press. 233--253.
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  49. Pamela Hieronymi, Research Overview.
    In this document I survey my work to date (i.e., to September 2010) and connect it to the larger themes that have been animating it.
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  50. Pamela Hieronymi (2009). Believing at Will. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 35 (sup1):149-187.
    It has seemed to many philosophers—perhaps to most—that believing is not voluntary, that we cannot believe at will. It has seemed to many of these that this inability is not a merely contingent psychological limitation but rather is a deep fact about belief, perhaps a conceptual limitation. But it has been very difficult to say exactly why we cannot believe at will. I earlier offered an account of why we cannot believe at will. I argued that nothing could qualify both (...)
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