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  1. P. D. M. A. (1961). Causation in the Law. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 15 (1):192-192.
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  2. Horacio Abeledo (2000). Lewis, Causation, Barometers: Dubious Fate of an Example. Critica 32 (94):127 - 144.
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  3. Horacio Abeledo (1995). Lewis's Causation: An Almost Fatal Example. Critica 27 (81):79 - 100.
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  4. M. M. Agrawal (1986). Causal Necessity. Ratio 28 (2):196.
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  5. Lynne Rudder Baker (1993). Metaphysics and Mental Causation. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press 75-96.
    My aim is twofold: first, to root out the metaphysical assumptions that generate the problem of mental causation and to show that they preclude its solution; second, to dissolve the problem of mental causation by motivating rejection of one of the metaphysical assumptions that give rise to it. There are three features of this metaphysical background picture that are important for our purposes. The first concerns the nature of reality: all reality depends on physical reality, where physical reality consists of (...)
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  6. Indu Banga (1992). Historical Causation. In Jayant Vishnu Narlikar, Indu Banga & Chhanda Gupta (eds.), Philosophy of Science: Perspectives From Natural and Social Sciences. Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers 40--208.
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  7. Michael Baumgartner (2013). A Regularity Theoretic Approach to Actual Causation. Erkenntnis 78 (1):85-109.
    The majority of the currently flourishing theories of actual (token-level) causation are located in a broadly counterfactual framework that draws on structural equations. In order to account for cases of symmetric overdeterminiation and preemption, these theories resort to rather intricate analytical tools, most of all, to what Hitchcock (J Philos 98:273–299, 2001) has labeled explicitly nonforetracking counterfactuals. This paper introduces a regularity theoretic approach to actual causation that only employs material (non-modal) conditionals, standard Boolean minimization procedures, and a (non-modal) stability (...)
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  8. H. Beebee (1998). Review. Causation & Persistence: A Theory of Causation. D Ehring. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1):181-184.
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  9. Tomasz Bigaj (2012). Causation Without Influence. Erkenntnis 76 (1):1-22.
    David Lewis’s latest theory of causation defines the causal link in terms of the relation of influence between events. It turns out, however, that one event’s influencing another is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for its being a cause of that event. In the article one particular case of causality without influence is presented and developed. This case not only serves as a counterexample to Lewis’s influence theory, but also threatens earlier counterfactual analyses of causation by admitting a particularly (...)
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  10. Alexander Bird (2010). Causation and the Manifestation of Powers. In Anna Marmodoro (ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations. Routledge
    It is widely agreed that many causal relations can be regarded as dependent upon causal relations that are in some way more basic. For example, knocking down the first domino in a row of one hundred dominoes will be the cause of the hundredth domino falling. But this causal relation exists in virtue of the knocking of the first domino causing the falling of the second domino, and so forth. In such a case, A causes B in virtue of there (...)
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  11. Jim Bogen (2005). Regularities and Causality; Generalizations and Causal Explanations. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 36 (2):397-420.
    Machamer, Darden, and Craver argue (Mechanism) that causal explanations explain effects by describing the operations of the mechanisms (systems of entities engaging in productive activities) which produce them. One of this paper’s aims is to take advantage of neglected resources of Mechanism to rethink the traditional idea (Regularism) that actual or counterfactual natural regularities are essential to the distinction between causal and non-causal co-occurrences, and that generalizations describing natural regularities are essential components of causal explanations. I think that causal productivity (...)
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  12. Jim Bogen, What We Talk About When We Talk About Causality.
    This paper compares the relative merits of two alternatives to traditional accounts of causal explanation: Jim Woodward's counterfactual invariance account, and the Mechanistic account of Machamer, Darden, and Craver. Mechanism wins (a) because we have good causal explanations for chaotic effects whose production does not exhibit the counterfactual regularities Woodward requires, and (b)because arguments suggested by Belnap's and Green's discussion of prediction (in'Facing the Future' chpt 6)show that the relevant counterfactuals about ideal interventions on non-deterministic and deterministic systems lack truth (...)
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  13. Thomas D. Bontly (2006). What is an Empirical Analysis of Causation? Synthese 151 (2):177 - 200.
    Philosophical accounts of causation have traditionally been framed as attempts to analyze the concept of a cause. In recent years, however, a number of philosophers have proposed instead that causation be empirically reduced to some relation uncovered by the natural sciences: e.g., a relation of energy transfer. This paper argues that the project of empirical analysis lacks a clearly defined methodology, leaving it uncertain how such views are to be evaluated. It proposes several possible accounts of empirical analysis and argues (...)
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  14. Myles Brand (1972). R. M. MacIver, "Social Causation". [REVIEW] Theory and Decision 2 (3):295.
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  15. Myles Brand & Marshall Swain (1970). On the Analysis of Causation. Synthese 21 (2):222 - 227.
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  16. Alex Broadbent (2007). A Reverse Counterfactual Analysis of Causation. Dissertation, University of Cambridge
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  17. Alex Broadbent, The New Riddle of Causation.
    We commonly distinguish causes from mere conditions, for example by saying that the strike caused the match to light but by failing to mention the presence of oxygen. Philosophers from Mill to Lewis have dismissed this common practice as irrelevant to the philosophical analysis of causation. In this paper, however, I argue that causal selection poses a puzzle of just the same form as Hume's sceptical challenge to the notion of necessary connection. I then propose a solution in terms of (...)
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  18. Mario Augusto Bunge & Emile Meyerson (1971). Les Theories de la Causalite. Presses Universitaires de France.
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  19. Martin Bunzl (1980). Causal Preemption and Counterfactuals. Philosophical Studies 37 (2):115 - 124.
  20. Ronald Burr (1975). Chinese Theories of Causation: Commentary. Philosophy East and West 25 (1):23-29.
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  21. Jeremy Butterfield (1992). David Lewis Meets John Bell. Philosophy of Science 59 (1):26-43.
    The violation of the Bell inequality means that measurement-results in the two wings of the experiment cannot be screened off from one another, in the sense of Reichenbach. But does this mean that there is causation between the results? I argue that it does, according to Lewis's counterfactual analysis of causation and his associated views. The reason lies in his doctrine that chances evolve by conditionalization on intervening history. This doctrine collapses the distinction between the conditional probabilities that are used (...)
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  22. John Campbell (2006). An Interventionist Approach to Causation in Psychology. In Alison Gopnik & Larry J. Schulz (eds.), Causal Learning: Psychology, Philosophy and Computation. OUP 58--66.
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  23. William W. Carlile (1896). Causation.--Its Alleged Universality. Mind 5 (17):90-96.
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  24. John W. Carroll (1988). General Causation. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:311 - 317.
    The traditional model and the contextual unanimity model are two probabilistic accounts of general causation subject to many well-known problems; e.g. cases of epiphenomena, causes raising their own probability, effects raising the probability of the cause, et cetera. After reviewing these problems and raising a new problem for the two models, I suggest the beginnings of an alternative probabilistic account. My suggestion avoids the problems encountered by earlier models, in large part, by an appeal to singular causation.
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  25. J. P. W. Cartwright (1986). Causation in the Law. Philosophical Books 27 (4):254-256.
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  26. Nancy Cartwright (2004). Causation: One Word, Many Things. Philosophy of Science 71 (5):805-819.
    We currently have on offer a variety of different theories of causation. Many are strikingly good, providing detailed and plausible treatments of exemplary cases; and all suffer from clear counterexamples. I argue that, contra Hume and Kant, this is because causation is not a single, monolithic concept. There are different kinds of causal relations imbedded in different kinds of systems, readily described using thick causal concepts. Our causal theories pick out important and useful structures that fit some familiar cases—cases we (...)
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  27. Andrew Chignell & Derk Pereboom (2010). Kant's Theory of Causation and its Eighteenth-Century German Background. Philosophical Review 119 (4):565-591.
    This critical notice highlights the important contributions that Eric Watkins's writings have made to our understanding of theories about causation developed in eighteenth-century German philosophy and by Kant in particular. Watkins provides a convincing argument that central to Kant's theory of causation is the notion of a real ground or causal power that is non-Humean (since it doesn't reduce to regularities or counterfactual dependencies among events or states) and non-Leibnizean because it doesn't reduce to logical or conceptual relations. However, we (...)
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  28. Sungho Choi (2002). Causation and Gerrymandered World Lines: A Critique of Salmon. Philosophy of Science 69 (1):105-117.
    In this paper I examine Salmon's response to two counterexamples to his conserved quantity (CQ) theory of causation. The first counterexample that I examine involves a time‐wise gerrymandered world line of a series of patches of wall that is absorbing energy as a result of being illuminated in an astrodome. Salmon says that since the gerrymandered world line does not fulfill his “no‐interaction requirement,” his CQ theory does not suffer from the counterexample. But I will argue that his response fails (...)
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  29. Sungho Choi (2002). The ‘Actual Events’ Clause in Noordhof’s Account of Causation. Analysis 62 (273):41–46.
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  30. F. John Clendinnen (1992). Nomic Dependence and Causation. Philosophy of Science 59 (3):341-360.
    The paper proposes an explication of causation in terms of laws and their explanatory systematization. A basic notion is "nomic dependence". The definition given by David Lewis is suitable for deterministic laws, and a general definition drawing on Wesley Salmon's statistical-relevance model of explanation is proposed. A test is offered for establishing that one chain of nomically dependent events is more direct than another that ends with the same event by considering the relationship between the two chains when an explanation (...)
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  31. David Anthony Coady (1999). Preemption and the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation. Dissertation, City University of New York
    Since David Lewis first published "Causation" it has been a widely accepted dogma that the most straightforward counterfactual analysis of causation cannot succeed, because of a class of counterexamples which, following Lewis's nomenclature, have come to be called cases of "preemption". Consequently, there has been a debate amongst philosophers including Tim Maudlin, Paul Horwich, Jonathan Bennett, David Armstrong, Martin Bunzl, Douglas Ehring, Ned Hall, Michael McDermott, Richard Miller, Murali Ramachandran, Laurie Paul, Jonathan Schaffer, and others, about how to respond to (...)
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  32. Mendel F. Cohen (1987). Causation in History. Philosophy 62 (241):341 - 360.
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  33. Morris Raphael Cohen (1942). Causation and its Application to History. [N. P..
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  34. John D. Collier (1999). Causation is the Transfer of Information. In Howard Sankey (ed.), Causation and Laws of Nature. Kluwer 215--245.
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  35. Ethan R. Colton (2003). Advancing the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation. Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
    What does it mean to say that one event is a cause of another? The simplest counterfactual analyses identify causation with one of two counterfactual-dependence relations: if event c had not occurred, then event e would not have occurred; if c had not occurred, e's probability would have been lower. These analyses enjoy some success. For the first: the dart-throw caused the balloon-pop, because if the throw had not occurred, the pop would not have occurred. For the second: suppose two (...)
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  36. Ottar Dahl (1956). Om Årsaksproblemer I Historisk Forskning Forsø På En Vitenskapsteoritisk Analyse. Problems of Causation in Historical Research. Universitetsforlaget.
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  37. David Danks (2013). Functions and Cognitive Bases for the Concept of Actual Causation. Erkenntnis 78 (1):111-128.
    Our concept of actual causation plays a deep, ever-present role in our experiences. I first argue that traditional philosophical methods for understanding this concept are unlikely to be successful. I contend that we should instead use functional analyses and an understanding of the cognitive bases of causal cognition to gain insight into the concept of actual causation. I additionally provide initial, programmatic steps towards carrying out such analyses. The characterization of the concept of actual causation that results is quite different (...)
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  38. Wayne A. Davis (1980). Swain's Counterfactual Analysis of Causation. Philosophical Studies 38 (2):169 - 176.
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  39. Henk W. de Regt (2004). Review of James Woodward, Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (7).
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  40. Leen De Vreese, An Interdisciplinary Focus on the Concept of Causation: What Philosophy Can Learn From Psychology.
    In philosophy of science, it is still a mainstream practice to search for the ‘truth’ about fundamental scientific concepts in isolation, blind to knowledge achieved in other domains of science. I focus on the topic of causation. I argue that it is worthwhile for philosophy of science to leave its metaphysical tower in order to pick up knowledge from other domains where empirical research on causal reasoning is carried out, such as psychology. I will demonstrate what the psychologist Peter White’s (...)
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  41. Leen De Vreese & Erik Weber (2008). Confusion and Bad Arguments in the Conceptual Analysis of Causation. Logique Et Analyse 201:81-99.
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  42. Georges Dicker (2000). Regularity, Conditionality, and Asymmetry in Causation. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 7:129-138.
    In this paper I explore the relationship between the “Humean” regularity view of causation, the view that a cause is a necessary condition of its effect, and the asymmetry of causation—the principle that if an event e1 causes e2, then it is false that e2 causes e1. I argue that the regularity view, in combination with the view that a cause is a necessary condition of its effect, is inconsistent with the asymmetry of causation, and that the inconsistency can be (...)
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  43. L. Doncaster (1917). The Causation of Sex in Man. The Eugenics Review 9 (2):141.
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  44. Phil Dowe, Causal Processes. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  45. Phil Dowe (2004). Causation and Misconnections. Philosophy of Science 71 (5):926-931.
    In this paper I show how the conserved quantity theory, or more generally the process theory of Wesley Salmon and myself, provides a sufficient condition in an analysis of causation. To do so I will show how it handles the problem of alleged 'misconnections'. I show what the conserved quantity theory says about such cases, and why intuitions are not to be taken as sacrosanct.
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  46. Phil Dowe (2000). The Conserved Quantity Theory Defended. Theoria 15 (1):11-31.
    I defend the conserved quantity theory of causation against two objections: firstly, that to tie the notion of “cause” to conservation laws is impossible, circular or metaphysically counterintuitive; and secondly, that the conserved quantity theory entails an undesired notion of identity through time. My defence makes use of an important meta-philosophical distinction between empirical analysis and conceptual analysis. My claim is that the conserved quantity theory of causation must be understood primarily as an empirical, not a conceptual, analysis of causation.
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  47. Phil Dowe (1999). Good Connections: Causation and Causal Processes. In Howard Sankey (ed.), Causation and Laws of Nature. Kluwer 247--263.
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  48. Phil Dowe (1995). Causality and Conserved Quantities: A Reply to Salmon. Philosophy of Science 62 (2):321-333.
    In a recent paper (1994) Wesley Salmon has replied to criticisms (e.g., Dowe 1992c, Kitcher 1989) of his (1984) theory of causality, and has offered a revised theory which, he argues, is not open to those criticisms. The key change concerns the characterization of causal processes, where Salmon has traded "the capacity for mark transmission" for "the transmission of an invariant quantity." Salmon argues against the view presented in Dowe (1992c), namely that the concept of "possession of a conserved quantity" (...)
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  49. Kenneth M. Ehrenberg (2013). Law's Authority is Not a Claim to Preemption. In Wilfrid J. Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of the Nature of Law. Oxford University Press 51.
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  50. Douglas Ehring (2009). Abstracting Away From Preemption. The Monist 92 (1):41-71.
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