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Summary This section contains works that offer theories of concepts that do not fall neatly into any of the other categories listed here. An example would be ability-based theories of concepts.
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  1. André J. Abath (2011). Doing Without Concepts – Edouard Machery. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):654-655.
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  2. Derek Ball (2014). Indexicality, Transparency, and Mental Files. Inquiry 58 (4):353-367.
    Francois Recanati’s Mental Files presents a picture of the mind on which mental representations are indexical and transparent. I dispute this picture: there is no clear case for regarding mental representations as indexical, and there are counterexamples to transparency.
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  3. Lawrence Barsalou (1992). Frames, Concepts, and Conceptual Fields. In E. Kittay & A. Lehrer (eds.), Frames, Fields, and Contrasts: New Essays in Semantic and Lexical Organization. Erlbaum 21-74.
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  4. George Bealer (1998). A Theory of Concepts and Concepts Possession. Philosophical Issues 9:261-301.
    The paper begins with an argument against eliminativism with respect to the propositional attitudes. There follows an argument that concepts are sui generis ante rem entities. A nonreductionist view of concepts and propositions is then sketched. This provides the background for a theory of concept possession, which forms the bulk of the paper. The central idea is that concept possession is to be analyzed in terms of a certain kind of pattern of reliability in one’s intuitions regarding the behavior of (...)
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  5. A. K. Bierman (1965). D. A. Schon's "Displacement of Concepts". [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 25 (4):601.
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  6. Corinne L. Bloch (2011). Edouard Machery,Doing Without Concepts. Pragmatics and Cognitionpragmatics and Cognition 19 (1):133-140.
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  7. Nick Braisby (1998). Compositionality and the Modelling of Complex Concepts. Minds and Machines 8 (4):479-508.
    The nature of complex concepts has important implications for the computational modelling of the mind, as well as for the cognitive science of concepts. This paper outlines the way in which RVC – a Relational View of Concepts – accommodates a range of complex concepts, cases which have been argued to be non-compositional. RVC attempts to integrate a number of psychological, linguistic and psycholinguistic considerations with the situation-theoretic view that information-carrying relations hold only relative to background situations. The central tenet (...)
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  8. J. R. Busemeyer (1992). Frames, Concepts, and Conceptual Fields. In E. Kittay & A. Lehrer (eds.), Frames, Fields, and Contrasts: New Essays in Semantic and Lexical Organization. Erlbaum
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  9. James David Byrd (2003). Is a Unified Account of Concepts Possible? Dissertation, University of California, Davis
    This dissertation investigated the extent to which a unified account of concepts was possible. The sense of unification intended was whether a theory of concepts could satisfy two prominent roles psychologists take concepts to play: that they are psychological structures that enable categorization, and that these structures are compositional. Of the three current theories of concepts , prototype theory has been held by the cognitive science community to be the most plausible, and yet there have been substantial criticisms that such (...)
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  10. H. Cohen & C. Leferbvre (eds.) (forthcoming). Categorization and Cognitive Science. Elsevier.
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  11. Annalisa Coliva (2004). I concetti: Teorie ed esercizi. Carocci.
  12. Adrian Cussins (1990). The Connectionist Construction of Concepts. In Margaret A. Boden (ed.), The Philosophy of Ai. Oxford University Press
    The character of computational modelling of cognition depends on an underlying theory of representation. Classical cognitive science has exploited the syntax/semantics theory of representation that derives from logic. But this has had the consequence that the kind of psychological explanation supported by classical cognitive science is " _conceptualist_: " psychological phenomena are modelled in terms of relations that hold between concepts, and between the sensors/effectors and concepts. This kind of explanation is inappropriate for the Proper Treatment of Connectionism.
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  13. Paul F. Dhooghe & Guido Peeters (1992). The Principle of the Topological Localization of Symbols and the Meaning of the Ultimate-Meaning-a Contribution From the Human Behavioral and Social-Sciences. Ultimate Reality and Meaning 15 (4):296-305.
    A topological model of elementary semiotic schemes is presented. Implications are discussed with respect to the establishment of abstract terms and the search for ultimate meaning.
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  14. Eric Dietrich (2001). AI, Concepts, and the Paradox of Mental Representation, with a Brief Discussion of Psychological Essentialism. J. Of Exper. And Theor. AI 13 (1):1-7.
    Mostly philosophers cause trouble. I know because on alternate Thursdays I am one -- and I live in a philosophy department where I watch all of them cause trouble. Everyone in artificial intelligence knows how much trouble philosophers can cause (and in particular, we know how much trouble one philosopher -- John Searle -- has caused). And, we know where they tend to cause it: in knowledge representation and the semantics of data structures. This essay is about a recent case (...)
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  15. Eric Dietrich (2001). Concepts: Fodor's Little Semantic BBs of Thought - A Critical Look at Fodor's Theory of Concepts -. J. Of Experimental and Theoretical AI 13 (2):89-94.
    I find it interesting that AI researchers don't use concepts very often in their theorizing. No doubt they feel no pressure to. This is because most AI researchers do use representations which allow a system to chunk up its environment, and basically all we know about concepts is that they are representations which allow a system to chunk up its environment.
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  16. Richard Dietz (2013). Comparative Concepts. Synthese 190 (1):139-170.
    Comparative concepts such as greener than or higher than are ways of ordering objects. They are fundamental to our grasp of gradable concepts, that is, the type of meanings expressed by gradable general terms, such as "is green" or "is high", which are embeddable in comparative constructions in natural language. Some comparative concepts seem natural, whereas others seem gerrymandered. The aim of this paper is to outline a theoretical approach to comparative concepts that bears both on the account of naturalness (...)
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  17. Dennis Earl, The Classical Theory of Concepts. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  18. Gilles Fauconnier (2002). The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind's Hidden Complexities. Basic Books.
    Until recently, cognitive science focused on such mental functions as problem solving, grammar, and pattern-the functions in which the human mind most closely resembles a computer. But humans are more than computers: we invent new meanings, imagine wildly, and even have ideas that have never existed before. Today the cutting edge of cognitive science addresses precisely these mysterious, creative aspects of the mind.The Way We Think is a landmark analysis of the imaginative nature of the mind. Conceptual blending is already (...)
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  19. Marco Fenici (2009). Doing Without Concepts - Edouard Machery. [REVIEW] Humana.Mente 11.
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  20. J. A. Fodor, M. F. Garrett, E. C. T. Walker & C. H. Parkes (1980). Against Definitions. Cognition 8 (3):263-367.
  21. Bradley Franks (1992). Realism and Folk Psychology in the Ascription of Concepts. Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):369-390.
    This paper discusses some requirements on a folk-psychological, computational account of concepts. Although most psychological views take the folk-psychological stance that concept-possession requires capacities of both representation and classification, such views lack a philosophical context. In contrast, philosophically motivated views stress one of these capacities at the expense of the other. This paper seeks to provide some philosophical motivation for the (folk-) psychological stance. Philosophical and psychological constraints on a computational level account provide the context for evaluating two theses. The (...)
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  22. Dr Liane M. Gabora, Dr Eleanor Rosch & Dr Diederik Aerts (forthcoming). Toward an Ecological Theory of Concepts. Philosophical Explorations.
    Psychology has had difficulty accounting for the creative, context-sensitive manner in which concepts are used. We believe this stems from the view of concepts as identifiers rather than bridges between mind and world that participate in the generation of meaning. This paper summarizes the history and current status of concepts research, and provides a non-technical summary of work toward an ecological approach to concepts. We outline the rationale for applying generalizations of formalisms originally developed for use in quantum mechanics to (...)
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  23. C. Gauker (2014). Replies to Matthen, Weiskopf and Wikforss. Analysis 75 (1):121-131.
    This article consists of replies to three commentaries on the book, Words and Images: An Essay on the Origin of Ideas (Oxford 2011).
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  24. C. Gauker (2014). Summary. Analysis 75 (1):81-83.
    This is a summary of the book, Words and Images: An Essay on the Origin of Ideas (Oxford 2011). This summary serves as an introduction to a symposium on this book, featuring contributions by Mohan Matthen, Daniel Weiskopf and Åsa Wikforss, and a reply by Gauker.
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  25. Christopher Gauker (2011). Words and Images: An Essay on the Origin of Ideas. Oxford University Press.
    At least since Locke, philosophers and psychologists have usually held that concepts arise out of sensory perceptions, thoughts are built from concepts, and language enables speakers to convey their thoughts to hearers. Christopher Gauker holds that this tradition is mistaken about both concepts and language. The mind cannot abstract the building blocks of thoughts from perceptual representations. More generally, we have no account of the origin of concepts that grants them the requisite independence from language. Gauker's alternative is to show (...)
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  26. Christopher Gauker (2007). A Critique of the Similarity Space Theory of Concepts. Mind and Language 22 (4):317–345.
    A similarity space is a hyperspace in which the dimensions represent various dimensions on which objects may differ. The similarity space theory of concepts is the thesis that concepts are regions of similarity spaces that are somehow realized in the brain. Proponents of such a theory of concepts include Paul Churchland and Peter Gärdenfors. This paper argues that the similarity space theory of concepts is mistaken because regions of similarity spaces cannot serve as the components of judgments. It emerges that (...)
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  27. Christopher Gauker (1993). An Extraterrestrial Perspective on Conceptual Development. Mind and Language 8 (1):105-30.
    The network theory of conceptual development is the theory that conceptual developmentmay be represented as a process of constructing a network of linked nodes. The nodes of such a network represent concepts and the links between nodes represent relations between concepts. The structure of such a network is not determined by experience alone but must evolve in accordance with abstraction heuristics, which constrain the varieties of network between which experience must decide. This paper criticizes the network theory on the grounds (...)
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  28. Christopher Gauker (1991). If Children Thought Like Adults: A Critical Review of Markman'sCategorization and Naming in Childrenand Keil'sConcepts, Kinds and Cognitive Development. Philosophical Psychology 4 (1):139-146.
  29. Raymond W. Gibbs (2006). Embodiment and Cognitive Science. New York ;Cambridge University Press.
    This book explores how people's subjective, felt experiences of their bodies in action provide part of the fundamental grounding for human cognition and language. Cognition is what occurs when the body engages the physical and cultural world and must be studied in terms of the dynamical interactions between people and the environment. Human language and thought emerge from recurring patterns of embodied activity that constrain ongoing intelligent behavior. We must not assume cognition to be purely internal, symbolic, computational, and disembodied, (...)
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  30. Leon J. Goldstein (1993). Theories of Concepts. International Studies in Philosophy 25 (1):117-118.
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  31. Renison J. Gonsalves (1988). For Definitions: A Reply to Fodor, Garrett, Walker, and Parkes. Cognition 29 (1):73-82.
  32. David Hommen (2016). Wittgensteinian Pragmatism in Humean Concepts. Philosophia 44 (1):117-135.
    David Hume’s and later Ludwig Wittgenstein’s views on concepts are generally presented as standing in stark opposition to each other. In a nutshell, Hume’s theory of concepts is taken to be subjectivistic and atomistic, while Wittgenstein is metonymic with a broadly pragmatistic and holistic doctrine that gained much attention during the second half of the 20th century. In this essay, I shall argue, however, that Hume’s theory of concepts is indeed much more akin to the views of Wittgenstein and his (...)
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  33. David Hommen, Christoph Kann & Tanja Osswald (eds.) (2016). Concepts and Categorization. Systematic and Historical Perspectives. Mentis.
    The study of concepts lies at the intersection of various disciplines, both analytic and empiric. The rising cognitive sciences, for instance, are interested in concepts insofar as they are used in an explanation of such diverse epistemic phenomena like categorization, inference, memory, learning, and decision-making. In philosophy, the challenge imposed by conceptualization consists, among other things, in accommodating reverse intuitions about concepts like shareability, mind-dependency, mediation between reference, knowledge and reality, etc. While researchers have collaborated more and more to contribute (...)
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  34. Frank C. Keil & Robert A. Wilson (2000). The Concept Concept: The Wayward Path of Cognitive Science. Mind and Language 15 (2-3):308-318.
    Critical discussion of Jerry Fodor's Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong (1998).
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  35. Joshua Knobe, Sandeep Prasada & George Newman (2013). Dual Character Concepts and the Normative Dimension of Conceptual Representation. Cognition 127 (2):242-257.
    Five experiments provide evidence for a class of ‘dual character concepts.’ Dual character concepts characterize their members in terms of both (a) a set of concrete features and (b) the abstract values that these features serve to realize. As such, these concepts provide two bases for evaluating category members and two different criteria for category membership. Experiment 1 provides support for the notion that dual character concepts have two bases for evaluation. Experiments 2-4 explore the claim that dual character concepts (...)
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  36. Vladimir Kuznersov (1999). On the Triplet Frame for Concept Analysis. Theoria 14 (1):39-62.
    The paper has two objectives: to introduce the fundamentals of a triplet model of a concept, and to show that the main concept models may be structurally treated as its partial cases. The triplet model considers a concept as a mental representation and characterizes it from three interrelated perspectives. The first deals with objects (and their attributes of various orders) subsumed under a concept. The second focuses on representing structures that depict objects and their attributes in some intelligent system. The (...)
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  37. Vladimir Kuznetsov (2009). Variables of Scientific Concept Modeling and Their Formalization. In В.И Маркин (ed.), Philosophy of mathematics: current problems. Proceedings of the second international conference (Философия математики: актуальные проблемы. Тезисы второй международной конференции). Макс Пресс 268-270.
    There are no universally adopted answers to the natural questions about scientific concepts: What are they? What is their structure? What are their functions? How many kinds of them are there? Do they change? Ironically, most if not all scientific monographs or articles mention concepts, but the scientific studies of scientific concepts are rare in occurrence. It is well known that the necessary stage of any scientific study is constructing the model of objects in question. Many years logical modeling was (...)
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  38. Vladimir Kuznetsov (2006). Fuzzy Concepts and Relations between Them. In М Попович (ed.), Problems of Mentality Theory. Наукова Думка 163-197.
    It is proposed to analyze fuzzy concepts and relations between them in the frame of triplet concept modeling. Fuzzy concepts are introduced by means of the so-called fuzzification of dichotomous concepts. The cognitive and psychological aspects of concept possession are separated and studied.
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  39. Vladimir Kuznetsov (ed.) (1997). A concept and its structures. Methodological analysis. Institute of Philosophy.
    The triplet model treats a concept as complex structure that expresses three kinds of information. The first is about entities subsumed under a concept,their properties and relations. The second is about means and ways of representing the first information in intelligent systems. The third is about linkage between the first and second ones and methods of its constructing. The application of triplet models to generalization and development of concept models in philosophy, logic, cognitive psychology, cognitive science, linguistics, artificial intelligence has (...)
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  40. Vladimir Kuznetsov (1997). On Triplet Classification of Concepts. Knowledge Organization 24 (3):163-175.
    The scheme for classifications of concepts is introduced. It has founded on the triplet model of concepts. In this model a concept is depicted by means of three kinds of knowledge: a concept base, a concept representing part and the linkage between them. The idea of triplet classifications of concepts is connected with a usage of various specifications of these knowledge kinds as classification criteria.
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  41. Vladimir Kuznetsov & Elena Kuznetsova (1998). Types of Concept Fuzziness. Fuzzy Sets and Systems 96 (2):129-138.
    The short exposition of the triplet model of concepts and some definitions connected with it are given. In this model any concept may be depicted as having three characteristics: a base, a representing part and the linkage between them. The paper introduces the fuzzification of concepts in terms of the triplet model.
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  42. Jack Kwong (2010). Edouard Machery, Doing Without Concepts. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 30:115-117.
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  43. Elisabetta Lalumera (2010). Concepts Are a Functional Kind. Comment on Machery's Doing Without Concepts. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):217-18.
    This commentary focuses on Machery's eliminativist claim, that ought to be eliminated from the theoretical vocabulary of psychology because it fails to denote a natural kind. I argue for the more traditional view that concepts are a functional kind, which provides the simplest account of the empirical evidence discussed by Machery.
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  44. Margolis Laurence (2010). Concepts and Theoretical Unification. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33:219-220.
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  45. Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis (1999). Concepts and Cognitive Science. In Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (eds.), Concepts: Core Readings. MIT 3-81.
    Given the fundamental role that concepts play in theories of cognition, philosophers and cognitive scientists have a common interest in concepts. Nonetheless, there is a great deal of controversy regarding what kinds of things concepts are, how they are structured, and how they are acquired. This chapter offers a detailed high-level overview and critical evaluation of the main theories of concepts and their motivations. Taking into account the various challenges that each theory faces, the chapter also presents a novel approach (...)
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  46. J. Levine (2008). Demonstrative Concepts. Croation Journal of Philosophy 8 (24):328-336.
    Recently philosophers have appealed to the notion of a “demonstrative concept” to solve various puzzles. McDowell employs it to support his view that perceptual experience is conceptual, and Loar and others use it to provide an account of phenomenal concepts. The idea is that some concepts acquire their contents through demonstrations. I argue that there is no legitimate notion of demonstrative concept that can do this job.
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  47. Edouard Machery (forthcoming). One Hundred Years of Psychology of Concepts: Theoretical Notions and Their Operationalization. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science.
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  48. Edouard Machery (2009). Doing Without Concepts. Oxford University Press.
    Over recent years, the psychology of concepts has been rejuvenated by new work on prototypes, inventive ideas on causal cognition, the development of neo-empiricist theories of concepts, and the inputs of the budding neuropsychology of concepts. But our empirical knowledge about concepts has yet to be organized in a coherent framework. -/- In Doing without Concepts, Edouard Machery argues that the dominant psychological theories of concepts fail to provide such a framework and that drastic conceptual changes are required to make (...)
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  49. Edouard Machery (2007). 100 Years of Psychology of Concepts: The Theoretical Notion of Concept and its Operationalization. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 38 (1):63-84.
    The operationalization of scienti?c notions is instrumental in enabling experimental evidence to bear on scienti?c propositions. Conceptual change should thus translate into operationalization change. This article describes some important experimental works in the psychology of concepts since the beginning of the twentieth century. It is argued that since the early days of this ?eld, psy- chologists.
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  50. Edouard Machery (2005). Concepts Are Not a Natural Kind. Philosophy of Science 72 (3):444-467.
    In cognitive psychology, concepts are those data structures that are stored in long-term memory and are used by default in human beings.
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