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  1. Julian Albrecht-Gervasi (1969). Ontological Dimensions of Self-Consciousness in M. F. Sciacca's Idealism. Modern Schoolman 46 (4):289-299.
  2. Alexander Batthyany & Avshalom C. Elitzur (eds.) (2006). Mind and its Place in the World: Non-Reductionist Approaches to the Ontology of Consciousness. Ontos.
    By presenting a wide spectrum of non-reductive theories, the volume endeavors to overcome the dichotomy between dualism and monism that keeps plaguing the debate in favor of new and more differentiated positions.
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  3. Michael Cerullo (2011). Integrated Information Theory A Promising but Ultimately Incomplete Theory of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (11-12):11-12.
    Tononi has proposed a fundamental theory of consciousness he terms Integrated Information Theory (IIT). IIT purports to explain the quantity of conscious experience by linking it with integrated information: information shared by the system as a whole and quantified by adopting a modified version of Shannon's definition of information. Since the fundamental aspect of IIT is information the theory allows for the multiple realizability of consciousness. While there are several concepts within IIT that need further theoretical development, the main failings (...)
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  4. John Dilworth (2008). Free Action as Two Level Voluntary Control. Philosophical Frontiers 3 (1):29-45.
    The naturalistic voluntary control (VC) theory explains free will and consciousness in terms of each other. It is central to free voluntary control of action that one can control both what one is conscious of, and also what one is not conscious of. Furthermore, the specific cognitive ability or skill involved in voluntarily controlling whether information is processed consciously or unconsciously can itself be used to explain consciousness. In functional terms, it is whatever kind of cognitive processing occurs when a (...)
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  5. John Dilworth (2007). Conscious Perceptual Experience as Representational Self-Prompting. Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (2):135-156.
    Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 no. 2 , pp. 135-156. The self-prompting theory of consciousness holds that conscious perceptual experience occurs when non-routine perceptual data prompt the activation of a plan in an executive control system that monitors perceptual input. On the other hand, routine, non-conscious perception merely provides data about the world, which indicatively describes the world correctly or incorrectly. Perceptual experience instead involves data that are about the perceiver, not the world. Their function is that of imperatively (...)
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  6. William Eastman (1956). A Critical Discussion of Russell's Neutral Monism. Dissertation, Brown University
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  7. S. Grampp (2008). Dualism Still at Work. On Wittgenstein's Certainty. Constructivist Foundations 3 (3):221-225.
    Problem: A dualistic position faces considerable problems as Mitterer, inter alia, clearly pointed out. Mitterer not only wants to name these problems, but to provide a genuine alternative with his non-dualism. However, this non-dualistic alternative also contains severe problems. Thus this text suggests preferring Wittgenstein's concept of a pragmatic investigation of language-games to Mitterer's non-dualism in order to tackle the problems of dualism. Solution: With recourse to Wittgenstein's pragmatic investigation of language-games, a fundamental problem of dualism can be solved. With (...)
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  8. Robert E. Haraldsen, The Flow of the Oscillating Universe.
    A deeper understanding of the dynamics of consciousness, not only in the trivial sense of immaterial psychological relations, but as the prerequisite of the universe itself, may lead to an understanding of gravitation. The following argument acknowledges theories of higher dimensions, such as string-M-theory as important descriptive models along with the embedded theories of quantum mechanics and an expanded relativity theory. It is also presumed that the unexploited consequence of special relativity; extreme relativistic aberration , will turn out to be (...)
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  9. Robert E. Haraldsen, Mind, Matter and Extreme Relativistic Aberration -ERA. Mind and Matter - a Scientific Approach.
    On consciousness and the flow of spacetime with emphasis on Relativity, Quantum Mechanics and extra dimensions from the perspective of extreme relativistic aberration - ERA -/- From the beginning of consciousness we are shaped into an illusive subjective world of inherited collective projections built on phenomenological interactions, obeying solely the realm of purely abstract mathematics.
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  10. John Harvey (2007). Neutral Monism and the Social Character of Consciousness. Philosophy Today 51 (1):52-59.
    After thousands of years of work, the mind-body problem endures as one of the most tantalizing issues in metaphysics. For my purposes I formulate the question as: What is the relation between consciousness and matter? The solution to the mind-body problem that I offer is a version of neutral monism, the view that mental and physical events are both to be derived from some stuff that in itself is neither physical nor mental. This paper specifies the conditions under which consciousness (...)
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  11. Daniel D. Hutto (2009). Wittgenstein and Reason. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (2).
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  12. Peter Joannides (1955). Neutral Monism in Mach. Dissertation, Cornell University
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  13. Joshua Knobe (2008). Can a Robot, an Insect or God Be Aware? Scientific American.
  14. Timothy Lane & Caleb Liang (2011). Self-Consciousness and Immunity. Journal of Philosophy 108 (2):78-99.
    Sydney Shoemaker, developing an idea of Wittgenstein’s, argues that we are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun. Although we might be liable to error when “I” (or its cognates) is used as an object, we are immune to error when “I” is used as a subject (as when one says, “I have a toothache”). Shoemaker claims that the relationship between “I” as-subject and the mental states of which it is introspectively aware is tautological: when, say, we (...)
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  15. Luca Malatesti, Forum on Peter, Carruthers. Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Forum 2 SWIF Philosophy of Mind Review.
    A book symposium on Peter, Carruthers. Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Contents: Author's précis Colin Allen, Evolving Phenomenal Consciousness - Carruthers's reply. José Luis Bermúdez, Commentary - Carruthers's reply - Reply to Carruthers: Properties, first-order representationalism and reinforcement. Joseph Levine, Commentary - Carruthers's reply. William Seager, Dispositions and Consciousness - Carruthers's reply.
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  16. Fernando Martínez-Manrique & Agustin Vicente (2010). What The...! The Role of Inner Speech in Conscious Thought. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (9-10):141-67.
    Abstract: Introspection reveals that one is frequently conscious of some form of inner speech, which may appear either in a condensed or expanded form. It has been claimed that this speech reflects the way in which language is involved in conscious thought, fulfilling a number of cognitive functions. We criticize three theories that address this issue: Bermúdez’s view of language as a generator of second-order thoughts, Prinz’s development of Jackendoff’s intermediate-level theory of consciousness, and Carruthers’s theory of inner speech as (...)
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  17. Robert Wallace Murungi (1967). Bertrand Russell's Theory of Neutral Monism. Dissertation, Columbia University
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  18. Ibrahim Yusuf Najjar (1986). A Study of Russell's Theory of Desire in Connection with His Doctrine of Neutral Monism in "the Analysis of Mind". Dissertation, University of Toronto (Canada)
    In The Analysis of Mind , Russell criticizes a theory that considers desire a conscious mental phenomenon directed towards an imagined object and offers instead an account of desire in terms of behaviour-cycles. ;This theory has been criticized on various grounds: that it is circular and incoherent, that it applies only to needs, and that it is too behaviouristic. I argue that these criticisms are incorrect and that Russell's critics have ignored his doctrine of neutral monism. I study Russell's modified (...)
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  19. Gregory Nixon (2000). Max Velmans' *Understanding Consciousness*. [REVIEW] Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (10):96-99.
    This is a fine book. In what has become a crowded field, it stands out as direct, deep, and daring. It should place Max Velmans amongst the stars in the field like Chalmers, Dennett, Searle, and Churchland who are most commonly referenced in consciousness studies books and articles. It is direct in that the de rigueur history and review of the body-mind problem is illuminating and concise. It is deep in that Velmans deconstructs the usual idea of an objective world (...)
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  20. Chris Nunn (2013). On Taking Monism Seriously. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (9-10):9-10.
    Analogy with the monisms of fundamental physics suggests that a concept of symmetry breaking is likely to help towards developing an understanding of mind/matter monism. I explore some possible consequences of this concept, arguing that a broken symmetry, involving energy and 'what-it-is-like-to-be-ness'along with time, may occur and may manifest in the course of energy measurements. The resultant proto-panpsychist picture has the advantage of indicating how our complex, human consciousness could emerge from proto-conscious elements. It's an account that has empirical, refutable (...)
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  21. Bertrand Russell (1914). On the Nature of II. Neutral Monism. The Monist 24:161.
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  22. M. Staude (2008). Meaning and Description in Non-Dualism: A Formalization and Extension. Constructivist Foundations 3 (3):231-248.
    Problem: The article seeks to tackle three problems of Mitterer's non-dualistic philosophy. Firstly, the key term description remains not only rather unclear and rudimentary but also isolated from relevant neighboring terms and theories of other disciplines. Secondly, a logical reconstruction and formal model of non-dualism is still lacking. Thirdly, there are hardly any extensions of philosophical non-dualism to non-philosophical disciplines and fields. Findings: The three main findings of the article are based on the abovementioned problems. Firstly, the non-dualistic term description (...)
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  23. J. Brenton Stearns (1963). 25. For the Best Discussion as to Whether or Not It is Illuminating to Say That Phenomenalism and the Mobile Movie Camera Came Into Being at About the Same Time. Review of Metaphysics 16 (3):575-577.
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  24. Patrick Stokes (2010). Whats Missing in Episodic Self-Experience? A Kierkegaardian Response to Galen Strawson. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (1-2):1-2.
    In a series of important papers, Galen Strawson has articulated a spectrum of “temporal temperaments,” populated at one end by “Diachronics”, who experience their selves (understood as the “mental entity” they are at this moment) as something that existed in the past and will exist in the future, and at the other end by “Episodics”, who lack any such sense of temporal extension. As a self-declared Episodic, Strawson provides lucid descriptions of what episodicity is like, but cannot furnish a corresponding (...)
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  25. P. Strasser (2008). It, the Nameless God of Dualism. Some Remarks on St. John, the First Non-Dualist, and His Renowned Follower, Josef Mitterer. Constructivist Foundations 3 (3):269-271.
    Excerpt: Can you imagine a non-observable, un-describable state?... There are trivialities that hide abysses... To solve the paradox of the very beginning of the world one has to reject dualistic ontology... From now on, all of the perceptions and ideas embedded in God's mind have never been anything other than descriptions so far and from now on.
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  26. Max Velmans (1992). Synopsis of 'Consciousness, Brain and the Physical World'. Philosophical Psychology 5 (2):153-157.
    (1992). Synopsis of ‘consciousness, brain and the physical world’. Philosophical Psychology: Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 153-157. doi: 10.1080/09515089208573049.
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  27. Max Velmans (1992). The World as-Perceived, the World as-Described by Physics, and the Thing-Itself: A Reply to Rentoul and Wetherick. Philosophical Psychology 5 (2):167 – 172.
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  28. Dave Ward, Tom Roberts & Andy Clark (2011). Knowing What We Can Do: Actions, Intentions, and the Construction of Phenomenal Experience. Synthese 181 (3):375-394.
    How do questions concerning consciousness and phenomenal experience relate to, or interface with, questions concerning plans, knowledge and intentions? At least in the case of visual experience the relation, we shall argue, is tight. Visual perceptual experience, we shall argue, is fixed by an agent’s direct unmediated knowledge concerning her poise (or apparent poise) over a currently enabled action space. An action space, in this specific sense, is to be understood not as a fine-grained matrix of possibilities for bodily movement, (...)
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  29. S. Weber (2008). The Object of Description is the Description of the Object So Far: Non-Dualism and Beyond. Constructivist Foundations 3 (3):140-147.
    Context: The short history of the reception of the philosophy of non-dualism in science is a history of misunderstandings and cursory reception -- the latter especially concerns Mitterer's main work Das Jenseits der Philosophie (The Beyond of Philosophy, which still has not been translated into English). Non-dualism so far is mostly seen either as a kind of constructivism replacing the rhetoric of "construction" with a rhetoric of "description" or as an overall philosophical critique of the use of dualisms, dichotomies or (...)
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Dualism about Consciousness
  1. Istvan A. Aranyosi (2005). Type-a Dualism: A Novel Theory of the Mental-Physical Nexus. Dissertation, Central European University
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  2. R. Banerjee, A. Bhattacharya, A. Genc & B. M. Arora (2006). Structure of Twins in Gaas Nanowires Grown by the Vapour-Liquid-Solid Process. Philosophical Magazine Letters 86 (12):807-816.
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  3. Jeffrey A. Barrett (2006). A Quantum-Mechanical Argument for Mind–Body Dualism. Erkenntnis 65 (1):97 - 115.
    I argue that a strong mind–body dualism is required of any formulation of quantum mechanics that satisfies a relatively weak set of explanatory constraints. Dropping one or more of these constraints may allow one to avoid the commitment to a mind–body dualism but may also require a commitment to a physical–physical dualism that is at least as objectionable. Ultimately, it is the preferred basis problem that pushes both collapse and no-collapse theories in the direction of a strong dualism in resolving (...)
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  4. Alexander Batthyany & Avshalom C. Elitzur (eds.) (2006). Mind and its Place in the World: Non-Reductionist Approaches to the Ontology of Consciousness. Ontos.
    By presenting a wide spectrum of non-reductive theories, the volume endeavors to overcome the dichotomy between dualism and monism that keeps plaguing the debate in favor of new and more differentiated positions.
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  5. Karen Bennett, Why I Am Not a Dualist.
    Dualists think that not all the facts are physical facts. They think that there are facts about phenomenal consciousness that cannot be explained in purely physical terms—facts about what it’s like to see red, what it’s like to feel sandpaper, what it’s like to run 10 miles when it’s 15° F out, and so on. These phenomenal facts are genuine ‘extras’, not fixed by the physical facts and the physical laws. To use the standard metaphor: even after God settled the (...)
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  6. Daniele Bertini (2007). Fondazione del problema del pensare. Segni E Comprensione 21 (62):124-140.
    My main claim is that, in order to account for the nature of human mind, philosophy of mind should embody topics usually treated by disciplines as ethics or applied philosophy so as to enrich the pure notion of cognitive experience to the extent of treating the whole of human experience. I begin with considering the Cartesian approach to the "cogito". I argue for the claim that cartesian-like dualists (Descartes and Locke, Kant and Husserl) fail in treating the opposition of internalism (...)
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  7. Kirsten Birkett (2006). Conscious Objections: God and the Consciousness Debates. Zygon 41 (2):249-266.
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  8. Colin Blakemore & Susan A. Greenfield (1987). Mindwaves: Thoughts on Intelligence, Identity, and Consciousness. Blackwell.
  9. Tomas Bogardus (2013). Undefeated Dualism. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):445-466.
    In the standard thought experiments, dualism strikes many philosophers as true, including many non-dualists. This ‘striking’ generates prima facie justification: in the absence of defeaters, we ought to believe that things are as they seem to be, i.e. we ought to be dualists. In this paper, I examine several proposed undercutting defeaters for our dualist intuitions. I argue that each proposal fails, since each rests on a false assumption, or requires empirical evidence that it lacks, or overgenerates defeaters. By the (...)
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  10. John Bricke (1973). The Attribute Theory of Mind. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (December):226-237.
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  11. Scott Calef, Dualism and Mind. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  12. Chhanda Chakraborti (2002). Metaphysics of Consciousness, and David Chalmers's Property Dualism. Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 19 (2):59-84.
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  13. Marc Champagne (2014). Referring to the Qualitative Dimension of Consciousness: Iconicity Instead of Indexicality. Dialogue 53 (1):135-182.
    This paper suggests that reference to phenomenal qualities is best understood as involving iconicity, that is, a passage from sign-vehicle to object that exploits a similarity between the two. This contrasts with a version of the ‘phenomenal concept strategy’ that takes indexicality to be central. However, since it is doubtful that phenomenal qualities are capable of causally interacting with anything, indexical reference seems inappropriate. While a theorist like David Papineau is independently coming to something akin to iconicity, I think some (...)
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  14. Jason Costanzo (2014). Shadows of Consciousness: The Problem of Phenomenal Properties. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-15.
    The aim of this essay is to show that phenomenal properties are contentless modes of appearances of representational properties. The essay initiates with examination of the first-person perspective of the conscious observer according to which a “reference to I” with respect to the observation of experience is determined. A distinction is then drawn between the conscious observer and experience as observed, according to which, three distinct modifications of experience are delineated. These modifications are then analyzed with respect to the content (...)
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  15. Liam P. Dempsey (2006). Written in the Flesh: Isaac Newton on the Mind–Body Relation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (3):420-441.
    Isaac Newton’s views on the mind–body relation are of interest not only because of their somewhat unique departure from popular early modern conceptions of mind and its relation to body, but also because of their connections with other aspects of Newton’s thought. In this paper I argue that (1) Newton accepted an interesting sort of mind–body monism, one which defies neat categorization, but which clearly departs from Cartesian substance dualism, and (2) Newton took the power by which we move our (...)
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  16. John M. DePoe (2013). RoboMary, Blue Banana Tricks, and the Metaphysics of Consciousness: A Critique of Daniel Dennett's Apology for Physicalism. Philosophia Christi 15 (1):119-132.
    Daniel Dennett has argued that consciousness can be satisfactorily accounted for in terms of physical entities and processes. In some of his most recent publications, he has made this case by casting doubts on purely conceptual thought experiments and proposing his own thought experiments to "pump" the intuition that consciousness can be physical. In this paper, I will summarize Dennett's recent defenses of physicalism, followed by a careful critique of his position. The critique presses two flaws in Dennett's defense of (...)
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  17. Eric Dietrich (1999). Fodor's Gloom, or What Does It Mean That Dualism Seems True? Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 11 (2):145-152.
    Any time you have philosophers working on a problem, you know you’ve got troubles. If a question has attracted the attention of the philosophers that means that either it is intractably difficult with convolutions and labyrinthine difficulties that would make other researchers blanch, or that it is just flat out impossible to solve. Impossible problems masquerade as intractable problems until someone either proves the problem is impossible (which can only happen in mathematics), or someone shows all solutions to the problem (...)
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  18. Eric Dietrich (1998). Review of David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 8 (3):441-461.
    When Charles Darwin died in April, 1882, he left behind a world changed forever. Because of his writings, most notably, of course, The Origin of Species, by 1882, evolution was an almost universally acknowledged fact. What remained in dispute, however, was how evolution occurred. So because of Darwin’s work, everyone accepted that new species emerge over time, yet few agreed with him that it was natural selection that powered the change, as Darwin hypothesized. Chalmers’ book, The Conscious Mind , reminds (...)
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  19. Frank B. Dilley (2004). Taking Consciousness Seriously: A Defense of Cartesian Dualism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 55 (3):135-153.
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  20. Steve Dzemidzenka, Some Thoughts on Mathematical Universe and the Hard Problem of Consciousness.
    In the beautiful words of David Chalmers - consciousness poses the most baffling problem in science. There is nothing that we know more intimately than conscious experience, but there is nothing that is harder to explain. All sorts of phenomena have yielded to scientific investigation in recent years, but consciousness has stubbornly resisted. Many have tried to explain it, but the explanations always seem to fall short of the target. Some have been led to suppose that the problem is intractable, (...)
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  21. John C. Eccles (1987). Brain and Mind: Two or One? In Colin Blakemore & Susan A. Greenfield (eds.), Mindwaves. Blackwell
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