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  1. Alexander Batthyany & Avshalom C. Elitzur (eds.) (2006). Mind and its Place in the World: Non-Reductionist Approaches to the Ontology of Consciousness. Ontos.
    By presenting a wide spectrum of non-reductive theories, the volume endeavors to overcome the dichotomy between dualism and monism that keeps plaguing the debate in favor of new and more differentiated positions.
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  2. Michael Cerullo (2011). Integrated Information Theory A Promising but Ultimately Incomplete Theory of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (11-12):11-12.
    Tononi has proposed a fundamental theory of consciousness he terms Integrated Information Theory (IIT). IIT purports to explain the quantity of conscious experience by linking it with integrated information: information shared by the system as a whole and quantified by adopting a modified version of Shannon's definition of information. Since the fundamental aspect of IIT is information the theory allows for the multiple realizability of consciousness. While there are several concepts within IIT that need further theoretical development, the main failings (...)
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  3. John Dilworth (2008). Free Action as Two Level Voluntary Control. Philosophical Frontiers 3 (1):29-45.
    The naturalistic voluntary control (VC) theory explains free will and consciousness in terms of each other. It is central to free voluntary control of action that one can control both what one is conscious of, and also what one is not conscious of. Furthermore, the specific cognitive ability or skill involved in voluntarily controlling whether information is processed consciously or unconsciously can itself be used to explain consciousness. In functional terms, it is whatever kind of cognitive processing occurs when a (...)
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  4. John Dilworth (2007). Conscious Perceptual Experience as Representational Self-Prompting. Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (2):135-156.
    Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 no. 2 (2007), pp. 135-156. The self-prompting theory of consciousness holds that conscious perceptual experience occurs when non-routine perceptual data prompt the activation of a plan in an executive control system that monitors perceptual input. On the other hand, routine, non-conscious perception merely provides data about the world, which indicatively describes the world correctly or incorrectly. Perceptual experience instead involves data that are about the perceiver, not the world. Their function is that of imperatively (...)
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  5. Daniel D. Hutto (2009). Wittgenstein and Reason. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (2).
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  6. Joshua Knobe (2008). Can a Robot, an Insect or God Be Aware? Scientific American.
  7. Timothy Lane & Caleb Liang (2011). Self-Consciousness and Immunity. Journal of Philosophy 108 (2):78-99.
    Sydney Shoemaker, developing an idea of Wittgenstein’s, argues that we are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun. Although we might be liable to error when “I” (or its cognates) is used as an object, we are immune to error when “I” is used as a subject (as when one says, “I have a toothache”). Shoemaker claims that the relationship between “I” as-subject and the mental states of which it is introspectively aware is tautological: when, say, we (...)
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  8. Luca Malatesti, Forum on Peter, Carruthers. Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Forum 2 SWIF Philosophy of Mind Review.
    A book symposium on Peter, Carruthers. Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Contents: Author's précis Colin Allen, Evolving Phenomenal Consciousness - Carruthers's reply. José Luis Bermúdez, Commentary - Carruthers's reply - Reply to Carruthers: Properties, first-order representationalism and reinforcement. Joseph Levine, Commentary - Carruthers's reply. William Seager, Dispositions and Consciousness - Carruthers's reply.
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  9. Fernando Martínez-Manrique & Agustin Vicente (2010). What The...! The Role of Inner Speech in Conscious Thought. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (9-10):141-67.
    Abstract: Introspection reveals that one is frequently conscious of some form of inner speech, which may appear either in a condensed or expanded form. It has been claimed that this speech reflects the way in which language is involved in conscious thought, fulfilling a number of cognitive functions. We criticize three theories that address this issue: Bermúdez’s view of language as a generator of second-order thoughts, Prinz’s development of Jackendoff’s intermediate-level theory of consciousness, and Carruthers’s theory of inner speech as (...)
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  10. Gregory Nixon (2000). Max Velmans' *Understanding Consciousness*. [REVIEW] Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (10):96-99.
    This is a fine book. In what has become a crowded field, it stands out as direct, deep, and daring. It should place Max Velmans amongst the stars in the field like Chalmers, Dennett, Searle, and Churchland who are most commonly referenced in consciousness studies books and articles. It is direct in that the de rigueur history and review of the body-mind problem is illuminating and concise. It is deep in that Velmans deconstructs the usual idea of an objective world (...)
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  11. Max Velmans (1992). Synopsis of 'Consciousness, Brain and the Physical World'. Philosophical Psychology 5 (2):153-157.
    (1992). Synopsis of ‘consciousness, brain and the physical world’. Philosophical Psychology: Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 153-157. doi: 10.1080/09515089208573049.
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  12. Max Velmans (1992). The World as-Perceived, the World as-Described by Physics, and the Thing-Itself: A Reply to Rentoul and Wetherick. Philosophical Psychology 5 (2):167 – 172.
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  13. Dave Ward, Tom Roberts & Andy Clark (2011). Knowing What We Can Do: Actions, Intentions, and the Construction of Phenomenal Experience. Synthese 181 (3):375-394.
    How do questions concerning consciousness and phenomenal experience relate to, or interface with, questions concerning plans, knowledge and intentions? At least in the case of visual experience the relation, we shall argue, is tight. Visual perceptual experience, we shall argue, is fixed by an agent’s direct unmediated knowledge concerning her poise (or apparent poise) over a currently enabled action space. An action space, in this specific sense, is to be understood not as a fine-grained matrix of possibilities for bodily movement, (...)
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Dualism about Consciousness
  1. Istvan A. Aranyosi (2005). Type-A Dualism: A Novel Theory of the Mental-Physical Nexus. Dissertation, Central European University
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  2. R. Banerjee, A. Bhattacharya, A. Genc & B. M. Arora (2006). Structure of Twins in Gaas Nanowires Grown by the Vapour-Liquid-Solid Process. Philosophical Magazine Letters 86 (12):807-816.
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  3. Jeffrey A. Barrett (2006). A Quantum-Mechanical Argument for Mind–Body Dualism. Erkenntnis 65 (1):97 - 115.
    I argue that a strong mind–body dualism is required of any formulation of quantum mechanics that satisfies a relatively weak set of explanatory constraints. Dropping one or more of these constraints may allow one to avoid the commitment to a mind–body dualism but may also require a commitment to a physical–physical dualism that is at least as objectionable. Ultimately, it is the preferred basis problem that pushes both collapse and no-collapse theories in the direction of a strong dualism in resolving (...)
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  4. Alexander Batthyany & Avshalom C. Elitzur (eds.) (2006). Mind and its Place in the World: Non-Reductionist Approaches to the Ontology of Consciousness. Ontos.
    By presenting a wide spectrum of non-reductive theories, the volume endeavors to overcome the dichotomy between dualism and monism that keeps plaguing the debate in favor of new and more differentiated positions.
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  5. Karen Bennett, Why I Am Not a Dualist.
    Dualists think that not all the facts are physical facts. They think that there are facts about phenomenal consciousness that cannot be explained in purely physical terms—facts about what it’s like to see red, what it’s like to feel sandpaper, what it’s like to run 10 miles when it’s 15° F out, and so on. These phenomenal facts are genuine ‘extras’, not fixed by the physical facts and the physical laws. To use the standard metaphor: even after God settled the (...)
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  6. Kirsten Birkett (2006). Conscious Objections: God and the Consciousness Debates. Zygon 41 (2):249-266.
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  7. Colin Blakemore & Susan A. Greenfield (1987). Mindwaves: Thoughts on Intelligence, Identity, and Consciousness. Blackwell.
  8. Tomas Bogardus (2013). Undefeated Dualism. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):445-466.
    In the standard thought experiments, dualism strikes many philosophers as true, including many non-dualists. This ‘striking’ generates prima facie justification: in the absence of defeaters, we ought to believe that things are as they seem to be, i.e. we ought to be dualists. In this paper, I examine several proposed undercutting defeaters for our dualist intuitions. I argue that each proposal fails, since each rests on a false assumption, or requires empirical evidence that it lacks, or overgenerates defeaters. By the (...)
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  9. John Bricke (1973). The Attribute Theory of Mind. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (December):226-237.
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  10. Scott Calef, Dualism and Mind. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  11. Chhanda Chakraborti (2002). Metaphysics of Consciousness, and David Chalmers's Property Dualism. Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 19 (2):59-84.
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  12. Jason Costanzo (2014). Shadows of Consciousness: The Problem of Phenomenal Properties. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-15.
    The aim of this essay is to show that phenomenal properties are contentless modes of appearances of representational properties. The essay initiates with examination of the first-person perspective of the conscious observer according to which a “reference to I” with respect to the observation of experience is determined. A distinction is then drawn between the conscious observer and experience as observed, according to which, three distinct modifications of experience are delineated. These modifications are then analyzed with respect to the content (...)
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  13. Liam P. Dempsey (2006). Written in the Flesh: Isaac Newton on the Mind–Body Relation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (3):420-441.
    Isaac Newton’s views on the mind–body relation are of interest not only because of their somewhat unique departure from popular early modern conceptions of mind and its relation to body, but also because of their connections with other aspects of Newton’s thought. In this paper I argue that (1) Newton accepted an interesting sort of mind–body monism, one which defies neat categorization, but which clearly departs from Cartesian substance dualism, and (2) Newton took the power by which we move our (...)
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  14. John M. DePoe (2013). RoboMary, Blue Banana Tricks, and the Metaphysics of Consciousness: A Critique of Daniel Dennett's Apology for Physicalism. Philosophia Christi 15 (1):119-132.
    Daniel Dennett has argued that consciousness can be satisfactorily accounted for in terms of physical entities and processes. In some of his most recent publications, he has made this case by casting doubts on purely conceptual thought experiments and proposing his own thought experiments to "pump" the intuition that consciousness can be physical. In this paper, I will summarize Dennett's recent defenses of physicalism, followed by a careful critique of his position. The critique presses two flaws in Dennett's defense of (...)
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  15. Eric Dietrich (1999). Fodor's Gloom, or What Does It Mean That Dualism Seems True? Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 11 (2):145-152.
    Any time you have philosophers working on a problem, you know you’ve got troubles. If a question has attracted the attention of the philosophers that means that either it is intractably difficult with convolutions and labyrinthine difficulties that would make other researchers blanch, or that it is just flat out impossible to solve. Impossible problems masquerade as intractable problems until someone either proves the problem is impossible (which can only happen in mathematics), or someone shows all solutions to the problem (...)
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  16. Eric Dietrich (1998). Review of David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 8 (3):441-461.
    When Charles Darwin died in April, 1882, he left behind a world changed forever. Because of his writings, most notably, of course, The Origin of Species, by 1882, evolution was an almost universally acknowledged fact. What remained in dispute, however, was how evolution occurred. So because of Darwin’s work, everyone accepted that new species emerge over time, yet few agreed with him that it was natural selection that powered the change, as Darwin hypothesized. Chalmers’ book, The Conscious Mind , reminds (...)
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  17. Frank B. Dilley (2004). Taking Consciousness Seriously: A Defense of Cartesian Dualism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 55 (3):135-153.
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  18. John C. Eccles (1987). Brain and Mind: Two or One? In Colin Blakemore & Susan A. Greenfield (eds.), Mindwaves. Blackwell.
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  19. Christina E. Erneling (ed.) (2004). The Mind As a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture. Oxford University Press.
    Clearly the Cartesian ontological commitments that have dominated the scientific study of the mind up to the present have not been helpful. ...
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  20. John A. Foster (1989). A Defense of Dualism. In J. Smythies & John Beloff (eds.), The Case for Dualism. University of Virginia Press.
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  21. Martina Fürst (2014). A Dualist Account of Phenomenal Concepts. In Andrea Lavazza & Howard Robinson (eds.), Contemporary Dualism. A Defense. 112-135. Routledge. 112-135.
    The phenomenal concept strategy is considered a powerful response to anti-physicalist arguments. This physicalist strategy aims to provide a satisfactory account of dualist intuitions without being committed to ontological dualist conclusions. In this paper I first argue that physicalist accounts of phenomenal concepts fail to explain their cognitive role. Second, I develop an encapsulation account of phenomenal concepts that best explains their particularities. Finally, I argue that the encapsulation account, which features self-representing experiences, implies non-physical referents. Therefore, the account of (...)
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  22. Martina Fürst, Wolfgang Gombocz & Christian Hiebaum (eds.) (2009). Gehirne Und Personen. ontos.
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  23. Igor Gasparov (2013). Substance Dualism and the Unity of Consciousness. Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 18 (1).
    n this paper I would like to defend the three interconnected claims. The first one is based on that fact that the definition of substance dualism proposed recently by Dean Zimmerman needs some essential adjustments in order to capture the genuine spirit of this doctrine. In this paper I will formulate the conditions for the genuine substance dualism in contrast to quasi-dualisms and provide the definition for the genuine substance dualism which I consider to be more appropriate than the Zimmerman's (...)
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  24. Benedikt Paul Göcke (ed.) (2012). After Physicalism. The University of Notre Dame Press.
    Although physicalism has been the dominant position in recent work in the philosophy of mind, this dominance has not prevented a small but growing number of philosophers from arguing that physicalism is untenable for several reasons: both ontologically and epistemologically it cannot reduce mentality to the realm of the physical, and its attempts to reduce subjectivity to objectivity have thoroughly failed. The contributors to After Physicalism provide powerful alternatives to the physicalist account of the human mind from a dualistic point (...)
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  25. Benedikt Paul Göcke (2009). From Physicalism to Theological Idealism. In Martina Fürst, Wolfgang Gombocz & Christian Hiebaum (eds.), Gehirne und Personen. ontos.
    In the first part elements and entailments of an adequate thesis of physicalism are presented. In the second part an argument against these is elaborated. Based on this argument a thesis of theological idealism is sketched.
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  26. Irwin Goldstein (1996). Ontology, Epistemology, and Private Ostensive Definition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):137-147.
    People see five kinds of views in epistemology and ontology as hinging on there being words a person can learn only by private ostensive definitions, through direct acquaintance with his own sensations: skepticism about other minds, 2. skepticism about an external world, 3. foundationalism, 4. dualism, and 5. phenomenalism. People think Wittgenstein refuted these views by showing, they believe, no word is learnable only by private ostensive definition. I defend these five views from Wittgenstein’s attack.
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  27. Ted Honderich (1981). Nomological Dualism: Reply to Four Critics. Inquiry 24 (December):419-438.
    Three theses about the mind, when conjoined with a certain understanding of lawlike connection, escape the objection that they constitute an epiphenomenalism and so conflict with our conviction of the efficacy of the mental. Certain alternatives to the given picture of the mind, one of them an Identity Theory, are in various respects less defensible. The given picture can be defended against considerations deriving from a contextual conception of the mental, and from an elaborated objection having to do with the (...)
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  28. Ted Honderich (1981). Psychophysical Law-Like Connections and Their Problems. Inquiry 24 (October):277-303.
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  29. Amy Kind (2005). The Irreducibility of Consciousness. Disputatio 1 (19):1 - 18.
    In this paper, by analyzing the Chalmers-Searle debate about Chalmers� zombie thought experiment, I attempt to determine the implications that the irreducibility of consciousness has for the truth of materialism. While Chalmers claims that the irreducibility of consciousness forces us to embrace dualism, Searle claims that it has no deep metaphysical import and, in particular, that it is fully consistent with his materialist theory of mind. I argue that this disagreement hinges on the notion of physical identity in play in (...)
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  30. Ran Lahav & N. Shanks (1992). How to Be a Scientifically Respectable 'Property Dualist'. Journal of Mind and Behavior 13 (3):211-32.
  31. Eric LaRock (2013). From Biological Naturalism to Emergent Subject Dualism. Philosophia Christi 15 (1):97-118.
    I argue (1) that Searle's reductive stance about mental causation is unwarranted on evolutionary, logical, and neuroscientific grounds; and (2) that his theory of weak emergence, called biological naturalism, fails to provide a satisfactory account of objectual unity and subject unity. Finally I propose a stronger variety of emergence called emergent subject dualism (ESD) to fill the gaps in Searle's account, and support ESD on grounds of recent evidence in neuroscience. Hence I show how it is possible, if not also (...)
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  32. Noa Latham (1998). Chalmers on the Addition of Consciousness to the Physical World. Philosophical Studies 98 (1):71-97.
  33. E. J. Lowe (2005). Uwe Meixner, the Two Sides of Being: A Reassessment of Psycho-Physical Dualism, Paderborn, Mentis, 2004, 486 Pp. ISBN: 3-89785-376-. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 62 (2):290-294.
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  34. David Ludwig (2011). Beyond Physicalism and Dualism? Putnam’s Pragmatic Pluralism and the Philosophy of Mind. European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 3 (1).
  35. William Lycan (2009). Giving Dualism its Due. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):551-563.
    Despite the current resurgence of modest forms of mind?body dualism, traditional Cartesian immaterial-substance dualism has few, if any, defenders. This paper argues that no convincing case has been made against substance dualism, and that standard objections to it can be credibly answered.
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  36. William G. Lycan (2007). Recent Naturalistic Dualisms. In E. Meyers, R. Styers & A. Lange (eds.), Light Against Darkness: Dualism in Ancient Mediterranean Religion and the Contemporary World. Brill Academic Publishers.
    This paper is about a certain family of philosophical positions on the mind-body problem. The positions are dualist, but only in a minimal sense of that term employed by philosophers: according to the positions in question, mental entities are immaterial and distinct from all physical things.
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  37. Fiona Macpherson (2006). Property Dualism and the Merits of Solutions to the Mind-Body Problem: A Reply to Strawson. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 10-11):72-89.
    This paper is divided into two main sections. The first articulates what I believe Strawson's position to be. I contrast Strawson's usage of 'physicalism' with the mainstream use. I then explain why I think that Strawson's position is one of property dualism and substance monism. In doing this, I outline his view and Locke's view on the nature of substance. I argue that they are similar in many respects and thus it is no surprise that Strawson actually holds a view (...)
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