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  1. David Barrett (2014). Consciousness, Attention, and Working Memory: An Empirical Evaluation of Prinz's Theory of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (9-10):7-29.
    A popular issue in mind is to explain why conscious mental states are conscious. Prinz (2012) defends three claims in an effort to make such an explanation: (i)mental states become conscious when and only when we attend to them; (ii)attention is a process by which mental states become available to working memory; so (iii) mental states are conscious when and only when they become available to working memory. Here I attack Prinz's theory, made explicit in (iii), by showing that there (...)
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  2. Samuel Bellini-Leite & Alfredo Pereira (2013). Is Global Workspace a Cartesian Theater? How the Neuro-Astroglial Interaction Model Solves Conceptual Issues. Journal of Cognitive Science 14 (4):335-360.
    The Global Workspace Theory (GWT) proposed by Bernard Baars (1988) along with Daniel Dennett’s (1991) Multiple Drafts Model (MDM) of consciousness are renowned cognitive theories of consciousness bearing similarities and differences. Although Dennett displays sympathy for GWT, his own MDM does not seem to be fully compatible with it. This work discusses this compatibility, by asking if GWT suffers from Daniel Dennett’s criticism of what he calls a “Cartesian Theater”. We identified in Dennett 10 requirements for avoiding the Cartesian Theater. (...)
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  3. Susan Brower-Toland (2014). William Ockham on the Scope and Limits of Consciousness. Vivarium 52:197-219.
    Ockham holds what nowadays would be characterized as a “higher-order perception” theory of consciousness. Among the most common objections to such a theory is the charge that it gives rise to an infinite regress in higher-order states. In this paper, I examine Ockham’s various responses to the regress problem, focusing in particular on his attempts to restrict the scope of consciousness so as to avoid it. In his earlier writings, Ockham holds that we are conscious only of those states to (...)
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  4. Elio Conte (2011). On the Logical Origins of Quantum Mechanics Demonstrated By Using Clifford Algebra: A Proof That Quantum Interference Arises in a Clifford Algebraic Formulation of Quantum Mechanics. Electronic Journal of Theoretical Physics 8 (25):109-126.
    We review a rough scheme of quantum mechanics using the Clifford algebra. Following the steps previously published in a paper by another author [31], we demonstrate that quantum interference arises in a Clifford algebraic formulation of quantum mechanics. In 1932 J. von Neumann showed that projection operators and, in particular, quantum density matrices can be interpreted as logical statements. In accord with a previously obtained result by V. F Orlov , in this paper we invert von Neumann’s result. Instead of (...)
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  5. James Garvey (2006). Consciousness and Absence. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 7-8):44-60.
  6. Simone Gozzano (2009). La Coscienza. Carocci.
    Quale sia la natura della coscienza è uno dei problemi più analizzati e discussi sia nella ricerca filosofica sia in quella scientifica. Ogni mese nel mondo vengono pubblicati diversi libri dedicati a questo argomento, e decine di riviste specialistiche ospitano articoli e saggi volti a chiarirne le varie componenti; sotto una tale pressione sono nate alcune riviste scientifiche dedicate esclusivamente all'argomento. A questo fiorire di ricerche corrisponde una quantità altrettanto elevata di approcci. Una rivista come il Journal of consciousness studies, (...)
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  7. Elizabeth Irvine (2012). Old Problems with New Measures in the Science of Consciousness. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):627-648.
    Introspective and phenomenological methods are once again being used to support the use of subjective reports, rather than objective behavioural measures, to investigate and measure consciousness. Objective measures are often seen as useful ways of investigating the range of capacities subjects have in responding to phenomena, but are fraught with the interpretive problems of how to link behavioural capacities with consciousness. Instead, gathering subjective reports is seen as a more direct way of assessing the contents of consciousness. This article explores (...)
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  8. Anthony Jaffey, Consciousness: A Quasi-Identity Approach.
    Abstract: The article considers how the relationship between consciousness and neural events in the brain should be viewed. The approach is that conscious experiences – perceptions, feelings and mental images – are the subjective versions of the neural events. It is the conscious experiences that are the essence of intentionality and meaning; the neural events do the causative work. From this viewpoint there are discussions of the neural representations that figure in thinking and their corresponding subjective experiences – in what (...)
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  9. Claus Janew (2011). Omnipresent Consciousness and Free Will. Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 2 (6):78-86.
    This article is not an attempt to explain consciousness in terms basically of quantum physics or neuro-biology. Instead I should like to place the term "Consciousness" on a broader footing. I shall therefore proceed from everyday reality, precisely where we experience ourselves as conscious beings. I shall use the term in such a general way as to resolve the question whether only a human being enjoys consciousness, or even a thermostat. Whilst the difference is considerable, it is not fundamental. Every (...)
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  10. Timothy Lane (2014). When Actions Feel Alien: An Explanatory Model. In Tzu-Wei Hung (ed.), Communicative Action. Springer Science+Business 53-74.
    It is not necessarily the case that we ever have experiences of self, but human beings do regularly report instances for which self is experienced as absent. That is there are times when body parts, mental states, or actions are felt to be alien. Here I sketch an explanatory framework for explaining these alienation experiences, a framework that also attempts to explain the “mental glue” whereby self is bound to body, mind, or action. The framework is a multi-dimensional model that (...)
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  11. Pablo López-Silva (2014). Self Awareness and the Self-Presenting Character of Abnormal Conscious Experience.
    Some philosophers suggest that a minimal form of self-awareness is an integral element of the way in which all experiences are given (SPC: self-presenting claim). The main argument for this is that the phenomenological quality of ‘mineness’ of the experience reveals the self as a part of all experiences. Since the sense of mineness is taken as intrinsic to the givenness of the experience, it counts as an argument for the SPC. In this essay, I assess this claim and its (...)
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  12. Pablo López-Silva (2014). Self Awareness and the Self-Presenting Character of Abnormal Conscious Experience.
    Some philosophers suggest that a minimal form of self-awareness is an integral element of the way in which all experiences are given (SPC: self-presenting claim). The main argument for this is that the phenomenological quality of ‘mineness’ of the experience reveals the self as a part of all experiences. Since the sense of mineness is taken as intrinsic to the givenness of the experience, it counts as an argument for the SPC. In this essay, I assess this claim and its (...)
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  13. Pablo López-Silva (2014). Self Awareness and the Self-Presenting Character of Abnormal Conscious Experience. BoD Germany.
    Some philosophers suggest that a minimal form of self-awareness is an integral element of the way in which all experiences are given (SPC: self-presenting claim). The main argument for this is that the phenomenological quality of ‘mineness’ of the experience reveals the self as a part of all experiences. Since the sense of mineness is taken as intrinsic to the givenness of the experience, it counts as an argument for the SPC. In this essay, I assess this claim and its (...)
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  14. Mohan Matthen (2014). Review of Thomas Natsoulas, Consciousness and Perceptual Experience. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2014.
    A review of Thomas Natsoulas's "Consciousness and Perceptual Experience.".
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  15. Nicholas Maxwell (1985). Methodological Problems of Neuroscience. In David Rose & Vernon Dobson (eds.), Models of the Visual Cortex. New York: John Wiley & Sons
    In this paper I argue that neuroscience has been harmed by the widespread adoption of seriously inadequate methodologies or philosophies of science - most notably inductivism and falsificationism. I argue that neuroscience, in seeking to understand the human brain and mind, needs to follow in the footsteps of evolution.
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  16. Brian P. McLaughlin & Ronald J. Planer (2014). The Contributions of U.T. Place, H. Feigl, and J.J.C. Smart to the Identity Theory of Consciousness. In Andrew Bailey (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers. Bloomsbury Academic 103-128.
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  17. Neil Mehta (2013). Beyond Transparency: The Spatial Argument for Experiential Externalism. Philosophers' Imprint 13 (8).
    I highlight a neglected but striking phenomenological fact about our experiences: they have a pervasively spatial character. Specifically, all (or almost all) phenomenal qualities – roughly, the introspectible, philosophically puzzling properties that constitute ‘what it’s like’ to have an experience – introspectively seem instantiated in some kind of space. So, assuming a very weak charity principle about introspection, some phenomenal qualities are instantiated in space. But there is only one kind of space – the ordinary space occupied by familiar objects. (...)
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  18. Christophe Menant, Proposal for an Evolutionary Approach to Self-Consciousness (Feb 8th 2014).
    It is pretty obvious to most of us that self-consciousness is a product of evolution. But its nature is unknown. We propose here a scenario addressing a possible evolutionary nature of self-consciousness covering the segment linking pre-human primates to humans. The scenario is based on evolutions of representations and of inter-subjectivity that could have taken place within the minds of our pre-human ancestors . We begin by situating self-consciousness relatively to other aspects of human consciousness. With the help of anthropology, (...)
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  19. Christopher Mole (2013). Review of Jesse J. Prinz, The Conscious Brain. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Phiilosophical Reviews.
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  20. Anthony Peressini (2013). Consciousness as Integrated Information: A Provisional Philosophical Critique. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (1-2):180-206.
    Giulio Tononi (2008) has offered his integrated information theory of consciousness (IITC) as a “provisional manifesto.” I critically examine how the approach fares. I point out some (relatively) internal concerns with the theory and then more broadly philosophical ones; finally I assess the prospects for IITC as a fundamental theory of consciousness. I argue that the IITC’s scientific promise does carry over to a significant extent to broader philosophical theorizing about qualia and consciousness, though not as directly as Tononi suggests, (...)
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  21. Mark Pettinelli, How Does Cognition Influence Emotion?
    A brief article reviewing the links between emotion, cognition, mental processes and images and the nature of cognitive thought in consciousness.
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  22. Matthew Stuart Piper (2012). You Can't Eat Causal Cake with an Abstract Fork: An Argument Against Computational Theories of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (11-12):154-90.
    Two of the most important concepts in contemporary philosophy of mind are computation and consciousness. This paper explores whether there is a strong relationship between these concepts in the following sense: is a computational theory of consciousness possible? That is, is the right kind of computation sufficient for the instantiation of consciousness. In this paper, I argue that the abstract nature of computational processes precludes computations from instantiating the concrete properties constitutive of consciousness. If this is correct, then not only (...)
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  23. Varanasi Ramabrahmam, A Modern Scientific Insight of Soonya Vaada of Buddhism: Its Implications to Delineate Origin and Role of Rationalism in Shaping Buddhist Thought and Life. Http://Www.Srilankaguardian.Org/2013/04/Soonya-Vaada-of-Buddhism.Html.
    Soonya Vaada, the prime and significant contribution to Indian philosophical thought from Buddhism will be scientifically developed and presented. How this scientific understanding helped to sow seeds of origin of rationalism and its development in Buddhist thought and life will be delineated. Its role in the shaping of Buddhist and other Indian philosophical systems will be discussed. Its relevance and use in the field of cognitive science and development of theories of human consciousness and mind will be put forward. The (...)
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  24. Wilfrid Sellars (1981). Foundations for a Metaphysics of Pure Process: The Carus Lectures of Wilfrid Sellars. The Monist 64:3-90.
  25. Pär Sundström (2007). Colour and Consciousness: Untying the Metaphysical Knot. Philosophical Studies 136 (2):123 - 165.
    Colours and consciousness both present us with metaphysical problems. But what exactly are the problems? According to standard accounts, they are roughly the following. On the one hand, we have reason to believe, about both colour and consciousness, that they are identical with some familiar natural phenomena. But on the other hand, it is hard to see how these identities could obtain. I argue that this is an adequate characterisation of our metaphysical problem of colour, but a mischaracterisation of the (...)
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  26. János Tőzsér (2012). PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE METAPHYSIСs OF MIND. In N. D. Kruckova (ed.), Stavropolskij almanah Rossijskogo obŝestvo intellektualnoj istorii. Stavropol: Severo-Kavkazskij Federalnij Universitet 219-231..
    My paper consists of five parts. In the first part I explain what I mean by the phenomenology of mind. In the second part I show that in contemporary analytic philosophy the prevailing metaphysical theories of the mind are typically not connected to the phenomenology of mind. Views on the nature of the mind are developed without considering the phenomenological facts. In the third part I outline a notion of metaphysics connected to the phenomenology of mind, then in the fourth (...)
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