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  1. Julian Albrecht-Gervasi (1969). Ontological Dimensions of Self-Consciousness in M. F. Sciacca's Idealism. The Modern Schoolman 46 (4):289-299.
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  2. Sophie Allen (2009). The Definition of Consciousness: Is Triviality or Falsehood Inevitable? Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (5):127-138.
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  3. Adrian Alsmith (2014). Eric Schwitzgebel: Perplexities of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (3):497-501.
    A glance at the contents of this book might be enough to persuade that it is absolutely required reading for anyone interested in the study of consciousness. The discussion is replete with insight into a number of neglected topics: colour in dream experience (chapter 1), echolocation in auditory experience (chapter 4) and closed-eye visualisations (chapter 8). More familiar themes such as the spatial qualities presented in visual experience (chapter 2), visual imagery (chapter 3), the introspectionist movement (chapter 5), conscious attention (...)
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  4. David Leech Anderson (2007). Consciousness and Realism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):1-17.
    There is a long and storied history of debates over 'realism' that has touched literally every academic discipline. Yet realism- antirealism debates play a relatively minor role in the contemporary study of consciousness. In this paper four basic varieties of realism and antirealism are explored (existential, epistemological, semantic, and ontological) and their potential impact on the study of consciousness is considered. Reasons are offered to explain why there is not more debate over these issues, including a discussion of the powerful (...)
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  5. Ciano Aydin (forthcoming). The Artifactual Mind: Overcoming the 'Inside–Outside' Dualism in the Extended Mind Thesis and Recognizing the Technological Dimension of Cognition. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-22.
    This paper explains why Clark’s Extended Mind thesis is not capable of sufficiently grasping how and in what sense external objects and technical artifacts can become part of our human cognition. According to the author, this is because a pivotal distinction between inside and outside is preserved in the Extended Mind theorist’s account of the relation between the human organism and the world of external objects and artifacts, a distinction which they proclaim to have overcome. Inspired by Charles S. Peirce’s (...)
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  6. Bernard J. Baars (2006). Conscious Cognition and Blackboard Architectures. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (1):70-71.
    van der Velde & de Kamps make a case for neural blackboard architectures to address four questions raised by human language. Unfortunately, they neglect a sizable literature relating blackboard architectures to other fundamental cognitive questions, specifically consciousness and voluntary control. Called “global workspace theory,” this literature integrates a large body of brain and behavioral evidence to come to converging conclusions.
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  7. Ned Block (1996). How Not to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness. In João Branquinho (ed.), [Book Chapter] (Unpublished). Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1.
    There are two concepts of consciousness that are easy to confuse with one another, access-consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. However, just as the concepts of water and H2O are different concepts of the same thing, so the two concepts of consciousness may come to the same thing in the brain. The focus of this paper is on the problems that arise when these two concepts of consciousness are conflated. I will argue that John Searle’s reasoning about the function of consciousness goes (...)
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  8. Jason Brown (2012). What is Consciousness? Process Studies 41 (1):21-41.
    This paper summarizes the main features of the microgenetic account of consciousness, of the transition from self to image, act and object, the epochal nature of this transition, and its relation to introspection, imagination, and agency. The affinities of microgenetic theory to many aspects of process thought should be evident to readers of this journal, but the theory, which was developed in pathological case study, rests on a wealth of clinical detail that is beyond the scope of this article. In (...)
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  9. Monima Chadha (forthcoming). Meditation and Unity of Consciousness: A Perspective From Buddhist Epistemology. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-17.
    The paper argues that empirical work on Buddhist meditation has an impact on Buddhist epistemology, in particular their account of unity of consciousness. I explain the Buddhist account of unity of consciousness and show how it relates to contemporary philosophical accounts of unity of consciousness. The contemporary accounts of unity of consciousness are closely integrated with the discussion of neural correlates of consciousness. The conclusion of the paper suggests a new direction in the search for neural correlates of state consciousness (...)
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  10. William C. Charron (1972). "Brain, Mind and Computers," by Stanley L. Jaki. The Modern Schoolman 49 (3):270-273.
  11. Philip Clapson, The Theory of Brain-Sign: A Physical Alternative to Consciousness.
    Consciousness and the mind are prescientific concepts that begin with Greek theorizing. They suppose human rationality and reasoning placed in the human head by God, who structured the universe he created with the same kind of underlying characteristics. Descartes’ development of the model included scientific objectivity by placing the mind outside the physical universe. In its failure under evidential scrutiny and without physical explanation, this model is destined for terminal decline. Instead, a genuine biological and physical function for the brain (...)
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  12. Axel Cleeremans, A Short Review of 'Consciousness in Action'.
    Consider Susan Hurley's depiction of mainstream views of the mind: "The mind is a kind of sandwich, and cognition is the filling" (p. 401). This particular sandwich (with perception as the bottom loaf and action as the top loaf) tastes foul to Hurley, who devotes most of "Consciousness in Action" to a systematic and sometimes extraordinarily detailed critique of what has otherwise been dubbed "classical" models of the mind. This critique then provides the basis for her alternative proposal, in which (...)
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  13. Axel Cleeremans (2008). Consciousness: The Radical Plasticity Thesis. In Rahul Banerjee & B. K. Chakrabarti (eds.), Models of Brain and Mind: Physical, Computational, and Psychological Approaches. Elsevier.
    In this chapter, I sketch a conceptual framework which takes it as a starting point that conscious and unconscious cognition are rooted in the same set of interacting learning mechanisms and representational systems. On this view, the extent to which a representation is conscious depends in a graded manner on properties such as its stability in time or its strength. Crucially, these properties are accrued as a result of learning, which is in turn viewed as a mandatory process that always (...)
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  14. Fabrice Clément & Abraham J. Malerstein (2003). What is It Like to Be Conscious? The Ontogenesis of Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):67 – 85.
    In recent years, numerous studies have tried to highlight, from a naturalistic point of view, the apparent mysteries of consciousness. Many authors concentrated their efforts on explaining the phylogenetic origins of consciousness. Paradoxically, comments on the ontogenesis of consciousness are almost nonexistent. By crossing the results of psychology of development with a philosophical analysis, this paper aims to make up for this omission. After having characterized the different conceptual aspects of consciousness, we combine these, with observations made by developmental psychologists, (...)
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  15. Allan Combs & S. Kripner (2008). Collective Consciousness and the Social Brain. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (s 10-11):264-276.
    This paper discusses supportive neurological and social evidence for 'collective consciousness', here understood as a shared sense of being together with others in a single or unified experience. Mirror neurons in the premotor and posterior parietal cortices respond to the intentions as well as the actions of other individuals. There are also mirror neurons in the anterior insula and anterior cingulate cortices which have been implicated in empathy. Many authors have considered the likely role of such mirror systems in the (...)
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  16. Lyle Crawford (2013). Freak Observers and the Simulation Argument. Ratio 26 (3):250-264.
    The simulation hypothesis claims that the whole observable universe, including us, is a computer simulation implemented by technologically advanced beings for an unknown purpose. The simulation argument (as I reconstruct it) is an argument for this hypothesis with moderately plausible premises. I develop two lines of objection to the simulation argument. The first takes the form of a structurally similar argument for a conflicting conclusion, the claim that I am a so-called freak observer, formed spontaneously in a quantum or thermodynamic (...)
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  17. Jan Degenaar & Fred Keijzer (2009). Workspace and Sensorimotor Theories: Complementary Approaches to Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (9):77-102.
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  18. Donelson E. Dulany (1999). Consciousness, Connectionism, and Intentionality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):154-155.
    Connectionism can provide useful theories in which consciousness is the exclusive vehicle of explicit representation. The theories may not, however, handle some phenomena adequately: sense of agency, modes and contents of awareness, propositional and deliberative thought, metacognitive awareness and consciousness of self. They should, however, be useful in describing automatic, activational relations among nonpropositional conscious contents.
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  19. Shimon Edelman & Tomer Fekete (2012). Being in Time. In Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete & Neta Zach (eds.), Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience. John Benjamins. 88--81.
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  20. Shaun Gallagher (2001). Book Review. The Bodily Nature of Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind Kathleen Wider. [REVIEW] Mind 110 (438):577-582.
  21. Lorna Green, Author's Bio 2012.
    Consciousness and not matter is the basis of the universe. Here is my biography and a list of some of my works.
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  22. Lorna Green (2003). Beyond Chance and Necessity. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 17 (4):270-286.
    These essays propose a new "Copernican Revolution": Consciousness, not matter, is basic in the universe. They are non-technical, simply and clearly written.
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  23. Jennifer Greenwood (2013). Is Mind Extended or Scaffolded? Ruminations on Sterelney's (2010) Extended Stomach. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-22.
    In his paper, in this journal, Sterelney (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9:465–481, 2010) claims that cases of extended mind are limiting cases of environmental scaffolding and that a niche construction model is a more helpful, general framework for understanding human action. He further claims that extended mind cases fit into a corner of a 3D space of environmental scaffolds of cognitive competence. He identifies three dimensions which determine where a resource fits into this space and suggests that extended mind (...)
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  24. Patrick Grüneberg (2010). Selbstbezüglichkeit und Geltung – ein methodenkritischer Beitrag zur Bewusstseinsphilosophie. In Edmundo Balsemão. Pires, Burkhard Nonnenmacher & Stefan Büttner-von Stülpnagel (eds.), Relations of the Self. Coimbra University Press. 155--173.
    »Keine Bewusstseinstheorie ohne Wissenstheorie«, d.h. die Reflexion auf die grundbegrifflichen Voraussetzungen ist notwendig, um gültige Aussagen über das Bewusstsein treffen zu können. Im Gegensatz zum Realmonismus handelt es sich bei dieser kritischen Position um einen transzendentalen Dualismus, der die Form des Bewusstseins eigens reflektiert, um damit die Voraussetzungen zu klären, unter denen das Bewusstsein überhaupt thematisiert werden muss. Der wissenstheoretische Anteil umfasst diese transzendentale Reflexion als eine reflexive Epistemologie mit einem eige- nem, d.h. hier insbesondere nicht-empirischem Geltungsanspruch: Wissen basiert nicht (...)
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  25. P. M. S. Hacker (2012). The Sad and Sorry History of Consciousness: Being, Among Other Things, a Challenge to the 'Consciousness-Studies Community'. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 70:149-168.
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  26. Daniel D. Hutto (1998). An Ideal Solution to the Problems of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (3):328-43.
    This paper distinguishes three conceptual problems that attend philosophical accounts of consciousness. The first concerns the problem of properly characterizing the nature of consciousness itself, the second is the problem of making intelligible the relation between consciousness and the ‘physical’, and the third is the problem of creating the intellectual space for a shift in philosophical framework that would enable us to deal adequately with the first two problems. It is claimed that physicalism, in both its reductive and non-reductive forms, (...)
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  27. Frank Jackson (1997). Naturalism and the Fate of the M-Worlds. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):247 - 282.
    We make a huge variety of claims framed in vocabularies drawn from physics and chemistry, everyday talk, neuroscience, ethics, mathematics, semantics, folk and professional psychology, and so on and so forth. We say, for example, that Jones feels cold, that Carlton might win, that there are quarks, that murder is wrong, that there are four fundamental forces, and that a certain level of neurological activity is necessary for thought. If we follow Huw Price's Carnapian lead, we can put this by (...)
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  28. Peter G. Jones, The Metaphysics of Consciousness.
    Some time ago, in an article for the Journal of Consciousness Studies, David Chalmers challenged his peers to identify the ingredient missing from our current theories of consciousness, the absence of which prevents us from solving the 'hard' problem and forces us to make do with nonreductive theories. Here I respond to this challenge. I suggest that consciousness is a metaphysical problem and as such can be solved only within a global metaphysical theory. Such a theory would look very like (...)
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  29. Paul Katsafanas (2005). Nietzsche's Theory of Mind: Consciousness and Conceptualization. European Journal of Philosophy 13 (1):1–31.
    I show that Nietzsche's puzzling and seemingly inconsistent claims about consciousness constitute a coherent and philosophically fruitful theory. Drawing on some ideas from Schopenhauer and F.A. Lange, Nietzsche argues that conscious mental states are mental states with conceptually articulated content, whereas unconscious mental states are mental states with non-conceptually articulated content. Nietzsche's views on concepts imply that conceptually articulated mental states will be superficial and in some cases distorting analogues of non-conceptually articulated mental states. Thus, the claim that conscious states (...)
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  30. Joachim Keppler (2013). A New Perspective on the Functioning of the Brain and the Mechanisms Behind Conscious Processes. Frontiers in Psychology, Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 4 (Article 242):1-6.
    An essential prerequisite for the development of a theory of consciousness is the clarification of the fundamental mechanisms underlying conscious processes. In this article I present an approach that sheds new light on these mechanisms. This approach builds on stochastic electrodynamics (SED), a promising theoretical framework that provides a deeper understanding of quantum systems and reveals the origin of quantum phenomena. I outline the most important concepts and findings of SED and interpret the neurophysiological body of evidence in the context (...)
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  31. Joachim Keppler (2012). A Conceptual Framework for Consciousness Based on a Deep Understanding of Matter. Philosophy Study 2 (10):689-703.
    One of the main challenges in consciousness research is widely known as the hard problem of consciousness. In order to tackle this problem, I utilize an approach from theoretical physics, called stochastic electrodynamics (SED), which goes one step beyond quantum theory and sheds new light on the reality behind matter. According to this approach, matter is a resonant oscillator that is orchestrated by an all-pervasive stochastic radiation field, called zero-point field (ZPF). The properties of matter are not intrinsic but acquired (...)
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  32. Jean Khalfa (2001). Comments on John Horgan's the Undiscovered Mind. Brain and Mind 2 (2):249-252.
  33. Michael D. Kirchhoff (2013). Cognitive Assembly: Towards a Diachronic Conception of Composition. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-21.
    In this paper, I focus on a recent debate in extended cognition known as “cognitive assembly” and how cognitive assembly shares a certain kinship with the special composition question advanced in analytical metaphysics. Both the debate about cognitive assembly and the special composition question ask about the circumstances under which entities (broadly construed) compose or assemble another entity. The paper argues for two points. The first point is that insofar as the metaphysics of composition presupposes that composition is a synchronic (...)
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  34. Charles D. Laughlin & Vincenza A. Tiberia (2012). Archetypes: Toward a Jungian Anthropology of Consciousness. Anthropology of Consciousness 23 (2):127-157.
    It is very curious that C.G. Jung has had so little influence upon the anthropology of consciousness. In this paper, the reasons for this oversight are given. The archetypal psychology of Jung is summarized and shown to be more complex and useful than extreme constructivist accounts would acknowledge. Jung's thinking about consciousness fits very well with a modern neuroscience view of the psyche and acts as a corrective to relativist notions of consciousness and its relation to the self.
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  35. JeeLoo Liu, Philosophy Seminar: The Nature of Consciousness Fall 1998.
    Course Description: This course is designed as an upper-level seminar, with heavy emphasis on reading and writing. The reading materials are all from contemporary sources. We will cover topics such as the definitions of 'consciousness,' the neurophysiological basis of consciousness, the explanation of consciousness, and the possibility of forming a unified theory of consciousness. Student participation in class discussion is greatly encouraged.
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  36. Dan Lloyd (1999). Consciousness Should Not Mean, but Be. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):158-159.
    O'Brien & Opie's vehicle hypothesis is an attractive framework for the study of consciousness. To fully embrace the hypothesis, however, two of the authors' claims should be extended: first, since phenomenal content is entirely dependent on occurrent brain events and only contingently correlated with external events, it is no longer necessary to regard states of consciousness as representations. Second, the authors' insistence that only stable states of a neural network are conscious seems ad hoc.
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  37. Robert W. Lurz (2004). In Search of the Metaphor of the Mind: A Critical Review of Baars' in the Theater of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 17 (2):297 – 307.
    Metaphors of the mind abound. The mind has been metaphorically described as an aviary, a telephone switchboard, a ghost in a machine, and a computer - to name but a few. Bernard Baars, in his In the theater of consciousness, adds to this venerable list, arguing that the mind can be instructively thought of as a working theater. Baars argues for the aptness of his theater metaphor by showing how it can be used to tell "a unified story" of all (...)
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  38. Ashok Kumar Malhotra (2011). Reflections on the Clash or Reconciliation of Civilizations. Dialogue and Universalism 21 (1):95-107.
    The thesis of the paper is that the root cause of clash or reconciliation among civilizations is housed in the drama of consciousness! Two models of consciousness that highlight this drama are put forward here. First is Jean Gebser’s view, which asserts that the history of human civilization is nothing more than the manifestations of the development of consciousness. This development has taken place through five distinct stages: the archaic, magical, mythic, mental and integrative. Clash in civilizations is due to (...)
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  39. Paul Noordhof (2006). The Success of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 7-8):109-127.
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  40. Fiona O'Doherty (2013). A Contribution to Understanding Consciousness: Qualia as Phenotype. [REVIEW] Biosemiotics 6 (2):191-203.
    In this model consciousness is a form of memory. We are essentially “living in the past” as our experience, the qualia, is always of past events. Consciousness represents the storage of past events for use in future situations and it is altered by external experience of the organism. Psychological frameworks of conditioning and learning theory are used to explain this model along with recent neuropsychological research on synaesthesia and phantom limb pain. Consciousness results from the gradual evolutionary development of the (...)
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  41. John Pickering & Martin Skinner (eds.) (1990). From Sentience to Symbols: Readings on Consciousness. Harvester Wheatsheaf.
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  42. Steven Pinker, Will the Mind Figure Out How the Brain Works?
    Imagine this scene from the future. You are staring at a screen flickering with snow. Scientists have hidden one of two patterns in the dots, and eventually you spot one. But you don't have to tell the scientists what you are seeing; they already know. They are looking at the electrical signals from one of the billions of cells in your brain. When the cell fires, you see one pattern; when it stops, you see another‹your awareness can be read from (...)
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  43. Antti Revonsuo (1995). On the Nature of Consciousness: Theoretical and Empirical Explorations. Yliopisto.
  44. Komarine Romdenh-Romluc (2011). Time for Consciousness: Intention and Introspection. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (3):369-376.
    We assume that we can act—in at least some cases—by consciously intending to do so. Wegner (2002) appeals to empirical research carried out by Libet et al. (1983) to challenge this assumption. I argue that his conclusion presupposes a particular view of conscious intention. But there is an alternative model available, which has been developed by various writers in the phenomenological tradition, and most recently defended by Moran (2001). If we adopt this alternative account of conscious intention, Wegner’s argument no (...)
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  45. Mark A. Schroll (2010). The Future of a Discipline: Considering the Ontological/Methodological Future of the Anthropology of Consciousness, Part I. Anthropology of Consciousness 21 (1):1-29.
    Calling for an expanded framework of EuroAmerican science's methodology whose perspective acknowledges both quantitative/etic and qualitative/emic orientations is the broad focus of this article. More specifically this article argues that our understanding of shamanic and/or other related states of consciousness has been greatly enhanced through ethnographic methods, yet in their present form these methods fail to provide the means to fully comprehend these states. They fail, or are limited, because this approach is only a “cognitive interpretation” or “metanarrative” of the (...)
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  46. Mark F. Sharlow, Which Systems Are Conscious? Readings in From Brain to Cosmos.
    This document consists primarily of an excerpt (chapter 14) from the author’s book From Brain to Cosmos. In that excerpt, the author uses the concept of subjective fact developed earlier in the book to address a question about consciousness: which physical systems (organisms or machines) are conscious? (This document depends heavily upon the concept of subjective fact developed in From Brain to Cosmos. Readers unfamiliar with that concept are strongly advised to read chapters 2 and 3 of From Brain to (...)
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  47. Mark F. Sharlow, Which Systems Are Conscious?
    This document consists primarily of an excerpt (chapter 14) from the author’s book From Brain to Cosmos. In that excerpt, the author uses the concept of subjective fact developed earlier in the book to address a question about consciousness: which physical systems (organisms or machines) are conscious? (This document depends heavily upon the concept of subjective fact developed in From Brain to Cosmos. Readers unfamiliar with that concept are strongly advised to read chapters 2 and 3 of From Brain to (...)
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  48. Jerome L. Singer, Jefferson A. Singer & Peter Salovey (eds.) (1999). At Play in the Fields of Consciousness: Essays in Honor of Jerome L. Singer. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
    This collection of articles pays homage to the creativity and scientific rigor Jerome Singer has brought to the study of consciousness and play. It will interest personality, social, clinical and developmental psychologists alike.
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  49. Gerd Sommerhoff (1990). Life, Brain, and Consciousness: New Perceptions Through Targeted Systems Analysis. Distributors for the U.S. And Canada, Elsevier Science Pub. Co..
    In this volume the author tackles this problem in a rigorous analysis which begins with the general dynamics of living systems and leads the reader step-by-step ...
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  50. Maurizio Tirassa (1994). Is Consciousness Necessary to High-Level Control Systems? [Journal (on-Line/Unpaginated)].
    Building on Bringsjord's (1992, 1994) and Searle's (1992) work, I take it for granted that computational systems cannot be conscious. In order to discuss the possibility that they might be able to pass refined versions of the Turing Test, I consider three possible relationships between consciousness and control systems in human-level adaptive agents.
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