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  1. Ralph Adolphs (2004). 'Edison' & 'Russel': Definitions Versus Inventions in the Analysis of Emotion. In J. Fellous (ed.), Who Needs Emotions. Oxford University Press.
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  2. Guenther Stern Anders (1950). Emotion and Reality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 10 (4):553-562.
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  3. Claire Armon-jones (1985). Prescription, Explication and the Social Construction of Emotion. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 15 (1):1–22.
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  4. James R. Auerill (1974). An Analysis of Psychophysiological Symbolism and its Influence on Theories of Emotion. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 4 (2):147–190.
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  5. A. Ben-ze'ev (2004). Emotion as a Subtle Mental Mode. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.
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  6. A. Ben-ze'ev (1987). The Nature of Emotions. Philosophical Studies 52 (November):393-409.
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  7. Vincent Bergeron & Mohan Matthen (2008). Assembling the Emotions. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press. 185-212.
    In this article, we discuss the modularity of the emotions. In a general methodological section, we discuss the empirical basis for the postulation of modularity. Then we discuss how certain modules -- the emotions in particular -- decompose into distinct anatomical and functional parts.
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  8. Margaret A. Boden (1996). Commentary on Towards a Design-Based Analysis of Emotional Episodes. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (2):135-136.
  9. Maria Borges (2004). What Can Kant Teach Us About Emotions. Journal of Philosophy 101 (3):140-158.
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  10. Matt Bower & Shaun Gallagher (2013). Bodily Affects as Prenoetic Elements in Enactive Perception. Phenomenology and Mind 4 (1):78-93.
    In this paper we attempt to advance the enactive discourse on perception by highlighting the role of bodily affects as prenoetic constraints on perceptual experience. Enactivists argue for an essential connection between perception and action, where action primarily means skillful bodily intervention in one’s surroundings. Analyses of sensory-motor contingencies (as in Noë 2004) are important contributions to the enactive account. Yet this is an incomplete story since sensory-motor contingencies are of no avail to the perceiving agent without motivational pull in (...)
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  11. Robert W. Browning (1959). Broad's Theory of Emotion. In P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of C. D. Broad. Tudor.
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  12. Georg Brun & Dominique Kuenzle (2008). A New Role for Emotions in Epistemology. In Georg Brun, Ulvi Dogluoglu & Dominique Kuenzle (eds.), Epistemology and Emotions. Ashgate Publishing Company. 1--31.
    This chapter provides an overview of the issues involved in recent debates about the epistemological relevance of emotions. We first survey some key issues in epistemology and the theory of emotions that inform various assessments of emotions’ potential significance in epistemology. We then distinguish five epistemic functions that have been claimed for emotions: motivational force, salience and relevance, access to facts and beliefs, non-propositional contributions to knowledge and understanding, and epistemic efficiency. We identify two core issues in the discussions about (...)
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  13. Sylvia Burrow (2005). The Political Structure of Emotion: From Dismissal to Dialogue. Hypatia 20 (4):27-43.
    : How much power does emotional dismissal have over the oppressed's ability to trust outlaw emotions, or to stand for such emotions before others? I discuss Sue Campbell's view of the interpretation of emotion in light of the political significance of emotional dismissal. In response, I suggest that feminist conventions of interpretation developed within dialogical communities are best suited to providing resources for expressing, interpreting, defining, and reflecting on our emotions.
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  14. J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & S. Orestis Palermos (forthcoming). Extended Emotion. Philosophical Psychology.
    Recent thinking within philosophy of mind about the ways cognition can extend (e.g. Clark 2011; Clark & Chalmers 1998; Wilson 2000, 2004; Menary 2006) has yet to be integrated with philosophical theories of emotion, which give cognition a central role. We carve out new ground at the intersection of these areas, and in doing so, defend what we call the extended emotion thesis: i.e., the claim that some emotions can extend beyond skin and skull to parts of the external world.
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  15. Cristiano Castelfranchi & Maria Miceli (1996). Commentary on Towards a Design-Based Analysis of Emotional Episodes. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (2):129-133.
  16. Louis Charland (2005). The Heat of Emotion: Valence and the Demarcation Problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):8-10.
    Philosophical discussions regarding the status of emotion as a scientific domain usually get framed in terms of the question whether emotion is a natural kind. That approach to the issues is wrongheaded for two reasons. First, it has led to an intractable philosophical impasse that ultimately misconstrues the character of the relevant debate in emotion science. Second, and most important, it entirely ignores valence, a central feature of emotion experience, and probably the most promising criterion for demarcating emotion from cognition (...)
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  17. Louis C. Charland (2008). Cognitive Modularity of Emotion. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press. 213-228.
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  18. Louis C. Charland (2002). The Natural Kind Status of Emotion. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (4):511-37.
    It has been argued recently that some basic emotions should be considered natural kinds. This is different from the question whether as a class emotions form a natural kind; that is, whether emotion is a natural kind. The consensus on that issue appears to be negative. I argue that this pessimism is unwarranted and that there are in fact good reasons for entertaining the hypothesis that emotion is a natural kind. I interpret this to mean that there exists a distinct (...)
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  19. Louis C. Charland (2001). In Defence of Emotion: Critical Notice of Paul E. Griffiths's What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):133-154.
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  20. Louis C. Charland (1995). Emotion as a Natural Kind: Towards a Computational Foundation for Emotion Theory. Philosophical Psychology 8 (1):59-84.
    In this paper I link two hitherto disconnected sets of results in the philosophy of emotions and explore their implications for the computational theory of mind. The argument of the paper is that, for just the same reasons that some computationalists have thought that cognition may be a natural kind, so the same can plausibly be argued of emotion. The core of the argument is that emotions are a representation-governed phenomenon and that the explanation of how they figure in behaviour (...)
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  21. Stanley G. Clarke (1986). Emotions: Rationality Without Cognitivism. Dialogue 25 (04):663-674.
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  22. Tom Cochrane (2009). Eight Dimensions for the Emotions. Social Science Information 48 (3):379-420.
    The author proposes a dimensional model of our emotion concepts that is intended to be largely independent of one’s theory of emotions and applicable to the different ways in which emotions are measured. He outlines some conditions for selecting the dimensions based on these motivations and general conceptual grounds. Given these conditions he then advances an 8-dimensional model that is shown to effectively differentiate emotion labels both within and across cultures, as well as more obscure expressive language. The 8 dimensions (...)
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  23. David Cockburn (2009). Emotion, Expression and Conversation. In Ylva Gustafsson, Camilla Kronqvist & Michael McEachrane (eds.), Emotions and Understanding: Wittgensteinian Perspectives. Palgrave Macmillan. 126.
  24. John M. Cogan (1995). Emotion and Sartre's Two Worlds. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 26 (2):21-34.
  25. F. C. Copleston (1949). The Emotions. Outline of a Theory. By Jean-Paul Sartre. Translated From the French by Bernard Frechtman. (Philosophical Library, New York. 1948. Pp. 97. Price $2.75.). [REVIEW] Philosophy 24 (91):356-.
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  26. Christian Coseru (2004). A Review Essay of Destructive Emotions: How Can We Overcome Them? A Scientific Dialogue with the Dalai Lama. [REVIEW] Journal of Buddhist Ethics 11 (1):98-102.
    Destructive Emotions is part of a new wave of works seeking to enlarge the scope of cognitive science by joining together scientific and contemplative approaches to the study of consciousness and cognition. While some still regard this rapprochement with suspicion, a growing number of scholars and researchers in the sciences of the mind are persuaded that contemplative practices such as we find, for instance, in Buddhism resemble a vast and potentially useful introspective laboratory.
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  27. John Cottingham (1999). Susan James, Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth‐Century Philosophy:Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth‐Century Philosophy. Ethics 110 (1):205-207.
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  28. Florian Cova & Julien Deonna (2013). Being Moved. Philosophical Studies (3):1-20.
    In this paper, we argue that, barring a few important exceptions, the phenomenon we refer to using the expression “being moved” is a distinct type of emotion. In this paper’s first section, we motivate this hypothesis by reflecting on our linguistic use of this expression. In section two, pursuing a methodology that is both conceptual and empirical, we try to show that the phenomenon satisfies the five most commonly used criteria in philosophy and psychology for thinking that some affective episode (...)
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  29. Richard J. Davidson & C. van Reekum (2005). Emotion is Not One Thing. Psychological Inquiry 16:16-18.
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  30. Ronald de Sousa (2008). Against Emotional Modularity. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press. 29-50.
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  31. Ronald de Sousa, Emotion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  32. Ronald de Sousa (1999). What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories Paul E. Griffiths Science and Its Conceptual Foundations Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press 1997, Xi + 286 Pp., $27.50. [REVIEW] Dialogue 38 (04):908-.
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  33. Ronald B. de Sousa (2004). Emotions: What I Know, What I'd Like to Think I Know, and What I'd Like to Think. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.
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  34. Craig DeLancey (1997). Emotion and the Computational Theory of Mind. In S. O'Nuillain, Paul McKevitt & E. MacAogain (eds.), Two Sciences of Mind. John Benjamins.
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  35. J. A. Deonna (2006). Emotion, Perception and Perspective. Dialectica 60 (1):29-46.
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  36. Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (2009). Taking Affective Explanations to Heart. Social Science Information 48 (3):359-377.
    In this article, the authors examine and debate the categories of emotions, moods, temperaments, character traits and sentiments. They define them and offer an account of the relations that exist among the phenomena they cover. They argue that, whereas ascribing character traits and sentiments (dispositions) is to ascribe a specific coherence and stability to the emotions (episodes) the subject is likely to feel, ascribing temperaments (dispositions) is to ascribe a certain stability to the subject's moods (episodes). The rationale for this (...)
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  37. John Dewey, Theory of Emotions, The: Emotional Attitudes.
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  38. John Dewey, The Theory of Emotions: The Significance of Emotions.
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  39. Thomas Dixon (2003). From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category. Cambridge University Press.
    Today there is a thriving 'emotions industry' to which philosophers, psychologists and neuroscientists are contributing. Yet until two centuries ago 'the emotions' did not exist. In this path-breaking study Thomas Dixon shows how, during the nineteenth century, the emotions came into being as a distinct psychological category, replacing existing categories such as appetites, passions, sentiments and affections. By examining medieval and eighteenth-century theological psychologies and placing Charles Darwin and William James within a broader and more complex nineteenth-century setting, Thomas Dixon (...)
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  40. Willis Doney (1959). Book Review:Three Theories of Emotion; Some Views on Philosophical Method Erik Gotlind. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 26 (4):375-.
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  41. John M. Doris (2000). Paul E. Griffiths, What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories:What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories. Ethics 110 (3):617-619.
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  42. Jamie Dow (2011). Aristotle's Theory of the Emotions : Emotions as Pleasures and Pains. In Michael Pakaluk & Giles Pearson (eds.), Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle. Oxford University Press.
  43. Blake Dutton (2006). Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. Review of Metaphysics 60 (1):162-163.
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  44. C. Z. Elgin (2008). Emotion and Understanding. In G. Brun, U. Dogluoglu & D. Kuenzle (eds.), Epistemology and Emotions.
  45. Andreas Elpidorou (2013). Moods and Appraisals: How the Phenomenology and Science of Emotions Can Come Together. Human Studies (4):1-27.
    In this paper, I articulate Heidegger’s notion of Befindlichkeit and show that his phenomenological account of affective existence can be understood in terms of contemporary work on emotions. By examining Heidegger’s account alongside contemporary accounts of emotions, I not only demonstrate the ways in which key aspects of the former are present in the latter; I also explicate in detail the ways in which our understanding of Befindlichkeit and its relationship to moods and emotions can benefit from an empirically-informed study (...)
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  46. Eva-Maria Engelen (2014). Vom Leben Zur Bedeutung: Philosophische Studien zum Verhältnis von Gefühl, Bewusstsein und Sprache. De Gruyter.
    Wie entwickelt sich ein ich-loses Selbstgefühl? Wie vollzieht sich der Schritt zum Selbstbewusstsein? Und wie wird aus einer emotionalen Reaktion ein Werturteil? „Vom Leben zur Bedeutung“ beschreibt die Übergänge zwischen verschiedenen Erscheinungsformen des Geistigen. Die Rolle der Sprache wird dabei ebenso reflektiert wie das Konzept des Intentionalen als Element der Theorie der Emotionen, der Theorie sprachlicher Bedeutung und der Philosophie des Geistes. -/- 1. Die wichtigsten aktuellen Debatten in Kognitions- und Kulturwissenschaften werden aufgegriffen: Einbezug der Tiere, Emotionsforschung, Leiblichkeit. 2. Bislang (...)
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  47. Eva-Maria Engelen (2012). Meaning and Emotion. In Paul A. Wilson (ed.), Dynamicity in Emotion Concepts. Peter Lang.
    Two aspects about meaning and emotion are discussed in this paper. The first, which is the main focus of this paper, addresses the semantic shaping of emotions (semanticization). It will be shown how language acquisition leads to the semantic shaping of emotions. For this purpose I will first introduce the theory of language acquisition that has been developed mainly by Michael Tomasello and also by Donald Davidson. Then I will take basic emotions into account in order to show that language (...)
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  48. Eva-Maria Engelen (2012). Meaning and Emotion. In Paul A. Wilson (ed.), Dynamicity in Emotion Concepts. Peter Lang. 61-72.
  49. Eva-Maria Engelen (2009). Anger, Shame and Justice: The Regulative Function of Emotions in the Ancient and Modern World. In Birgitt Röttger-Rössler & Hans Markowitsch (eds.), Emotions as Bio-cultural Processes. Springer. 395-413.
    Analyzing the ancient Greek point of view concerning anger, shame and justice and a very modern one, one can see, that anger has a regulative function, but shame does as well. Anger puts the other in his place, thereby regulating hierarchies. Shame regulates the social relations of recognition. And both emotions also have an evaluative function, because anger evaluates a situation with regard to a humiliation; shame, with regard to a misdemeanor. In addition, attention has to be paid to the (...)
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  50. Eva-Maria Engelen (2007). Gefühle. Reclam.
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