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  1. Maria Magoula Adamos (2007). The Unity of Emotion: An Unlikely Aristotelian Solution. Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (2):101-114.
    Most researchers of emotions agree that although cognitive evaluations such as beliefs, thoughts, etc. are essential for emotion, bodily feelings and their behavioral expressions are also required. Yet, only a few explain how all these diverse aspects of emotion are related to form the unity or oneness of emotion. The most prevalent account of unity is the causal view, which, however, has been shown to be inadequate because it sees the relations between the different parts of emotion as external and (...)
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  2. Maria Magoula Adamos (2006). Emotions as Unities of Form and Matter. The Emotion Researcher 22 (1-2):09-10.
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  3. Maria Magoula Adamos (2002). How Are the Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Aspects of Emotion Related? Consciousness and Emotion 3 (2):183-195.
    Most scholars of emotions concede that although cognitive evaluations are essential for emotion, they are not sufficient for it, and that other elements, such as bodily feelings, physiological sensations and behavioral expressions are also required. However, only a few discuss how these diverse aspects of emotion are related in order to form the unity of emotion. In this essay I examine the co-presence and the causal views, and I argue that neither view can account for the unity of emotions. In (...)
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  4. Ralph Adolphs (2004). 'Edison' & 'Russel': Definitions Versus Inventions in the Analysis of Emotion. In J. Fellous (ed.), Who Needs Emotions. Oxford University Press
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  5. Guenther Stern Anders (1950). Emotion and Reality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 10 (4):553-562.
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  6. Claire Armon-jones (1985). Prescription, Explication and the Social Construction of Emotion. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 15 (1):1–22.
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  7. Stephen Asma (2014). "Monsters on the Brain: An Evolutionary Epistemology of Horror". Social Research: An International Quarterly (N.4).
    The article discusses the evolutionary development of horror and fear in animals and humans, including in regard to cognition and physiological aspects of the brain. An overview of the social aspects of emotions, including the role that emotions play in interpersonal relations and the role that empathy plays in humans' ethics, is provided. An overview of the psychological aspects of monsters, including humans' simultaneous repulsion and interest in horror films that depict monsters, is also provided.
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  8. James R. Auerill (1974). An Analysis of Psychophysiological Symbolism and its Influence on Theories of Emotion. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 4 (2):147–190.
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  9. James R. Averill (2012). The Future of Social Constructionism: Introduction to a Special Section of Emotion Review. Emotion Review 4 (3):215-220.
    It is easy to envision marked progress in biological and physiological approaches to emotion, due to technological advances in imaging and other recording techniques. The future of social-constructionism appears more hazy: Progress will likely depend as much on new ideas as on new empirical discoveries. The most fruitful breeding ground for new ideas is where disciplines meet. Hence, the contributors to this special section represent diverse disciplines: biology, computer science, and the arts, as well as areas more traditionally associated with (...)
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  10. Gary Bartlett (2016). Review of "The Feeling Body: Affective Science Meets the Enactive Mind" and "Feeling Extended: Sociality as Extended Body-Becoming-Mind". [REVIEW] Essays in Philosophy 17 (1):164-188.
  11. Debra A. Bekerian & Susan J. Goodrich (1999). Forensic Applications of Theories of Cognition and Emotion. In Tim Dalgleish & M. J. Powers (eds.), Handbook of Cognition and Emotion. Wiley 783--798.
  12. A. Ben-ze'ev (2004). Emotion as a Subtle Mental Mode. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press
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  13. A. Ben-Ze'ev (2000). What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories. By Paul E. Griffiths. The European Legacy 5 (2):267-268.
  14. A. Ben-ze'ev (1987). The Nature of Emotions. Philosophical Studies 52 (November):393-409.
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  15. Aaron Ben-Ze'ev (2001). The Subtlety of Emotions. A Bradford Book.
    Aaron Ben-Ze'ev carries out what he calls "a careful search for general patterns in the primeval jungle of emotions.".
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  16. Vincent Bergeron & Mohan Matthen (2008). Assembling the Emotions. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press 185-212.
    In this article, we discuss the modularity of the emotions. In a general methodological section, we discuss the empirical basis for the postulation of modularity. Then we discuss how certain modules -- the emotions in particular -- decompose into distinct anatomical and functional parts.
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  17. Margaret A. Boden (1996). Commentary on Towards a Design-Based Analysis of Emotional Episodes. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (2):135-136.
  18. Maria Borges (2004). What Can Kant Teach Us About Emotions. Journal of Philosophy 101 (3):140-158.
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  19. Matt Bower & Shaun Gallagher (2013). Bodily Affects as Prenoetic Elements in Enactive Perception. Phenomenology and Mind 4 (1):78-93.
    In this paper we attempt to advance the enactive discourse on perception by highlighting the role of bodily affects as prenoetic constraints on perceptual experience. Enactivists argue for an essential connection between perception and action, where action primarily means skillful bodily intervention in one’s surroundings. Analyses of sensory-motor contingencies (as in Noë 2004) are important contributions to the enactive account. Yet this is an incomplete story since sensory-motor contingencies are of no avail to the perceiving agent without motivational pull in (...)
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  20. Robert W. Browning (1959). Broad's Theory of Emotion. In P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of C. D. Broad. Tudor
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  21. Georg Brun & Dominique Kuenzle (2008). A New Role for Emotions in Epistemology. In Georg Brun, Ulvi Dogluoglu & Dominique Kuenzle (eds.), Epistemology and Emotions. Ashgate Publishing Company 1--31.
    This chapter provides an overview of the issues involved in recent debates about the epistemological relevance of emotions. We first survey some key issues in epistemology and the theory of emotions that inform various assessments of emotions’ potential significance in epistemology. We then distinguish five epistemic functions that have been claimed for emotions: motivational force, salience and relevance, access to facts and beliefs, non-propositional contributions to knowledge and understanding, and epistemic efficiency. We identify two core issues in the discussions about (...)
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  22. Sylvia Burrow (2005). The Political Structure of Emotion: From Dismissal to Dialogue. Hypatia 20 (4):27-43.
    : How much power does emotional dismissal have over the oppressed's ability to trust outlaw emotions, or to stand for such emotions before others? I discuss Sue Campbell 's view of the interpretation of emotion in light of the political significance of emotional dismissal. In response, I suggest that feminist conventions of interpretation developed within dialogical communities are best suited to providing resources for expressing, interpreting, defining, and reflecting on our emotions.
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  23. J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & S. Orestis Palermos (2015). Extended Emotion. Philosophical Psychology 29 (2):198-217.
    Recent thinking within philosophy of mind about the ways cognition can extend has yet to be integrated with philosophical theories of emotion, which give cognition a central role. We carve out new ground at the intersection of these areas and, in doing so, defend what we call the extended emotion thesis: the claim that some emotions can extend beyond skin and skull to parts of the external world.
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  24. Cristiano Castelfranchi & Maria Miceli (1996). Commentary on Towards a Design-Based Analysis of Emotional Episodes. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (2):129-133.
  25. Louis Charland (2005). The Heat of Emotion: Valence and the Demarcation Problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):8-10.
    Philosophical discussions regarding the status of emotion as a scientific domain usually get framed in terms of the question whether emotion is a natural kind. That approach to the issues is wrongheaded for two reasons. First, it has led to an intractable philosophical impasse that ultimately misconstrues the character of the relevant debate in emotion science. Second, and most important, it entirely ignores valence, a central feature of emotion experience, and probably the most promising criterion for demarcating emotion from cognition (...)
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  26. Louis C. Charland (2008). Cognitive Modularity of Emotion. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press 213-228.
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  27. Louis C. Charland (2002). Review of 'What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories', by Paul E. Griffiths. [REVIEW] Mind and Language 17 (3):318-324.
  28. Louis C. Charland (2002). The Natural Kind Status of Emotion. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (4):511-37.
    It has been argued recently that some basic emotions should be considered natural kinds. This is different from the question whether as a class emotions form a natural kind; that is, whether emotion is a natural kind. The consensus on that issue appears to be negative. I argue that this pessimism is unwarranted and that there are in fact good reasons for entertaining the hypothesis that emotion is a natural kind. I interpret this to mean that there exists a distinct (...)
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  29. Louis C. Charland (2001). In Defence of Emotion: Critical Notice of Paul E. Griffiths's What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):133-154.
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  30. Louis C. Charland (1995). Emotion as a Natural Kind: Towards a Computational Foundation for Emotion Theory. Philosophical Psychology 8 (1):59-84.
    In this paper I link two hitherto disconnected sets of results in the philosophy of emotions and explore their implications for the computational theory of mind. The argument of the paper is that, for just the same reasons that some computationalists have thought that cognition may be a natural kind, so the same can plausibly be argued of emotion. The core of the argument is that emotions are a representation-governed phenomenon and that the explanation of how they figure in behaviour (...)
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  31. Stanley G. Clarke (1986). Emotions: Rationality Without Cognitivism. Dialogue 25 (4):663-674.
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  32. Tom Cochrane (forthcoming). The Difference Between Emotion and Affect. Physics of Life Reviews.
    In this brief comment on a target article by Koelsch et al., I argue that emotions are more sensitive to context than other affective states.
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  33. Tom Cochrane (2009). Eight Dimensions for the Emotions. Social Science Information 48 (3):379-420.
    The author proposes a dimensional model of our emotion concepts that is intended to be largely independent of one’s theory of emotions and applicable to the different ways in which emotions are measured. He outlines some conditions for selecting the dimensions based on these motivations and general conceptual grounds. Given these conditions he then advances an 8-dimensional model that is shown to effectively differentiate emotion labels both within and across cultures, as well as more obscure expressive language. The 8 dimensions (...)
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  34. David Cockburn (2009). Emotion, Expression and Conversation. In Ylva Gustafsson, Camilla Kronqvist & Michael McEachrane (eds.), Emotions and Understanding: Wittgensteinian Perspectives. Palgrave Macmillan 126.
  35. John M. Cogan (1995). Emotion and Sartre's Two Worlds. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 26 (2):21-34.
    On Sartre's own admission, his account of the emotions discloses them as functional. As such, the emotions aim to serve a particular purpose for which he provides the phenomenology. Sartre's phenomenology discloses consciousness as being-in-the-world in two ways, actually as having two worlds. One is a deterministic world, the other magical. Emotion is the drop from the deterministic world to the magical. In order for emotion to perform the function Sartre has in mind it performs, it is crucial there be (...)
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  36. Giovanna Colombetti (2013). The Feeling Body: Affective Science Meets the Enactive Mind. The MIT Press.
    A proposal that extends the enactive approach developed in cognitive science and philosophy of mind to issues in affective science.
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  37. Giovanna Colombetti (2009). Reply to Barrett, Gendron & Huang. Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):439 – 442.
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  38. Giovanna Colombetti & Tom Roberts (2015). Extending the Extended Mind: The Case for Extended Affectivity. Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1243-1263.
    The thesis of the extended mind (ExM) holds that the material underpinnings of an individual’s mental states and processes need not be restricted to those contained within biological boundaries: when conditions are right, material artefacts can be incorporated by the thinking subject in such a way as to become a component of her extended mind. Up to this point, the focus of this approach has been on phenomena of a distinctively cognitive nature, such as states of dispositional belief, and processes (...)
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  39. F. C. Copleston (1949). The Emotions. Outline of a Theory. By Jean-Paul Sartre. Translated From the French by Bernard Frechtman. (Philosophical Library, New York. 1948. Pp. 97. Price $2.75.). [REVIEW] Philosophy 24 (91):356-.
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  40. Christian Coseru (2004). A Review Essay of Destructive Emotions: How Can We Overcome Them? A Scientific Dialogue with the Dalai Lama. [REVIEW] Journal of Buddhist Ethics 11 (1):98-102.
    Destructive Emotions is part of a new wave of works seeking to enlarge the scope of cognitive science by joining together scientific and contemplative approaches to the study of consciousness and cognition. While some still regard this rapprochement with suspicion, a growing number of scholars and researchers in the sciences of the mind are persuaded that contemplative practices such as we find, for instance, in Buddhism resemble a vast and potentially useful introspective laboratory.
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  41. John Cottingham (1999). Susan James, Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth‐Century Philosophy:Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth‐Century Philosophy. Ethics 110 (1):205-207.
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  42. Florian Cova & Julien Deonna (2013). Being Moved. Philosophical Studies (3):1-20.
    In this paper, we argue that, barring a few important exceptions, the phenomenon we refer to using the expression “being moved” is a distinct type of emotion. In this paper’s first section, we motivate this hypothesis by reflecting on our linguistic use of this expression. In section two, pursuing a methodology that is both conceptual and empirical, we try to show that the phenomenon satisfies the five most commonly used criteria in philosophy and psychology for thinking that some affective episode (...)
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  43. Richard J. Davidson & C. van Reekum (2005). Emotion is Not One Thing. Psychological Inquiry 16:16-18.
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  44. R. De Sousa (1999). PAUL E. GRIFFITHS, What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories. Dialogue 38:908-910.
  45. Ronald de Sousa (2008). Against Emotional Modularity. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press 29-50.
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  46. Ronald de Sousa (2007). Emotion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  47. Ronald de Sousa (1999). What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories Paul E. Griffiths Science and Its Conceptual Foundations Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press 1997, Xi + 286 Pp., $27.50. [REVIEW] Dialogue 38 (04):908-.
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  48. Ronald B. de Sousa (2004). Emotions: What I Know, What I'd Like to Think I Know, and What I'd Like to Think. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press
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  49. Ronald B. de Sousa (1979). Critical Notice of Robert C. Solomon, The Passions: The Myth and Nature of Human Emotions. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):335-350.
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  50. Craig DeLancey (1997). Emotion and the Computational Theory of Mind. In S. O'Nuillain, Paul McKevitt & E. MacAogain (eds.), Two Sciences of Mind. John Benjamins
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