This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Subcategories:
277 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
1 — 50 / 277
Material to categorize
  1. D. Z. Andriopoulos (2008). Comments on Plato's Causal Explanation. Philosophical Inquiry 30 (3-4):115-143.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Ruth Berger (1998). Understanding Science: Why Causes Are Not Enough. Philosophy of Science 65 (2):306-332.
    This paper is an empirical critique of causal accounts of scientific explanation. Drawing on explanations which rely on nonlinear dynamical modeling, I argue that the requirement of causal relevance is both too strong and too weak to be constitutive of scientific explanation. In addition, causal accounts obscure how the process of mathematical modeling produces explanatory information. I advance three arguments for the inadequacy of causal accounts. First, I argue that explanatorily relevant information is not always information about causes, even in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  3. George Botterill (2010). Two Kinds of Causal Explanation. Theoria 76 (4):287-313.
    To give a causal explanation is to give information about causal history. But a vast amount of causal history lies behind anything that happens, far too much to be included in any intelligible explanation. This is the Problem of Limitation for explanatory information. To cope with this problem, explanations must select for what is relevant to and adequate for answering particular inquiries. In the present paper this idea is used in order to distinguish two kinds of causal explanation, on the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  4. Ingo Brigandt (2015). Evolutionary Developmental Biology and the Limits of Philosophical Accounts of Mechanistic Explanation. In P.-A. Braillard & C. Malaterre (eds.), Explanation in Biology: An Enquiry into the Diversity of Explanatory Patterns in the Life Sciences. Springer 135–173.
    Evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo) is considered a ‘mechanistic science,’ in that it causally explains morphological evolution in terms of changes in developmental mechanisms. Evo-devo is also an interdisciplinary and integrative approach, as its explanations use contributions from many fields and pertain to different levels of organismal organization. Philosophical accounts of mechanistic explanation are currently highly prominent, and have been particularly able to capture the integrative nature of multifield and multilevel explanations. However, I argue that evo-devo demonstrates the need for a (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  5. B. A. Brody (1972). Towards an Aristotelean Theory of Scientific Explanation. Philosophy of Science 39 (1):20-31.
    In this paper, I consider a variety of objections against the covering-law model of scientific explanation, show that Aristotle was already aware of them and had solutions for them, and argue that these solutions are correct. These solutions involve the notions of nonHumean causality and of essential properties. There are a great many familiar objections, both methodological and epistemological, to introducing these concepts into the methodology of science, but I show that these objections are based upon misunderstandings of these concepts.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  6. Daniel Cohnitz, Explanations Are Like Salted Peanuts. Why You Can't Cut the Route Toward Further Reduction.
    This paper is a defense of an elaborated ideal explanatory text conception against criticism as put forward by Bob Batterman. It is argued that Batterman's critique of "philosophical" accounts of scientific explanation is inadequate.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Christopher Dicarlo, What is Philosophy? A Causal Explanation. Eidos: The Canadian Graduate Journal of Philosophy 6.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Haskell Fain (1963). Some Problems of Causal Explanation. Mind 72 (288):519-532.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. John Forge (1993). Errors of Measurement and Explanation-as-Unification. Philosophia 22 (1-2):41-61.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. John Forge (1980). The Structure of Physical Explanation. Philosophy of Science 47 (2):203-226.
    Some features of physical science relevant for a discussion of physical explanation are mentioned. The D-N account of physical explanation is discussed, and it is seen to restrict the scope of explanation in physical science because it imposes the requirement that the explanandum must be deducible from the explanans. Analysis shows that an alternative view of scientific explanation, called the instance view, allows a wider range of physical explanations. The view is seen to be free from a certain class of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  11. Eugenie Gatens-Robinson (1983). The Relationship of Scientific Explanation to Models of Rationality. Dissertation, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale
    This work contrasts the formalist approach to defining explanation in science, exemplified in the Deductive-Nomenological Model of Carl G. Hempel, with the contextualist approach of Thomas Kuhn. It is argued that both of these attempts to define the explanatory processes of science are inadequate. A connection is made between the view of rationality upon which each view is based and the way that it defines explanation. It is argued that a process of thought, which scientific explanation represents, is considered rational (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Victor Gijsbers (2007). Why Unification is Neither Necessary nor Sufficient for Explanation. Philosophy of Science 74 (4):481-500.
    In this paper, I argue that unification is neither necessary nor sufficient for explanation. Focusing on the versions of the unificationist theory of explanation of Kitcher and of Schurz and Lambert, I establish three theses. First, Kitcher’s criterion of unification is vitiated by the fact that it entails that every proposition can be explained by itself, a flaw that it is unable to overcome. Second, because neither Kitcher’s theory nor that of Schurz and Lambert can solve the problems of asymmetry (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  13. Olav Gjelsvik (2007). Causal Explanation Provides Knowledge Why. In Johannes Persson & Petri Ylikoski (eds.), Rethinking Explanation. Springer 69--92.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Carl Gustav Hempel (1965). Aspects of Scientific Explanation. In Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Free Press 504.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   367 citations  
  15. Christopher Read Hitchcock (1996). The Mechanist and the Snail. Philosophical Studies 84 (1):91 - 105.
    Introduction: One of the most influential theories of scientific explanation to have emerged in the past two decades is Salmon's causal/mechanical theory (Salmon 1984). According to this account, scientific explanations describe a network of causal processes and interactions. In this paper, I will use an example from evolutionary biology to argue that the causal nexus, as characterized by Salmon, is not rich enough to account for many causal explanations in the sciences.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  16. Ronald C. Hopson (1972). The Objects of Acceptance: Competing Scientific Explanations. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1972:349 - 363.
    Important revisions and additions to the contemporary objectives of acceptance rules result from construing a theory of warranted inductive inference to presuppose an account of adequate scientific explanations. We conceive the objects of acceptance rules to be the best of competing scientific explanations. Our primary interest is to show how to construct an analysis of competing explanations. Hence our specific investigation concerns the interrelations between the criteria of adequacy for scientific explanations and the definitions of the modes of competition between (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. R. I. G. Hughes (1993). Theoretical Explanation. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 18 (1):132-153.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  18. David Kaplan (1961). Explanation Revisited. Philosophy of Science 28 (4):429-436.
    In 'Hempel and Oppenheim on Explanation', (see preceding article) Eberle, Kaplan, and Montague criticize the analysis of explanation offered by Hempel and Oppenheim in their 'Studies in the Logic of Explanation'. These criticisms are shown to be related to the fact that Hempel and Oppenheim's analysis fails to satisfy simultaneously three newly proposed criteria of adequacy for any analysis of explanation. A new analysis is proposed which satisfies these criteria and thus is immune to the criticisms brought against the earlier (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  19. David Michael Kaplan & Carl F. Craver (2011). The Explanatory Force of Dynamical and Mathematical Models in Neuroscience: A Mechanistic Perspective. Philosophy of Science 78 (4):601-627.
    We argue that dynamical and mathematical models in systems and cognitive neuro- science explain (rather than redescribe) a phenomenon only if there is a plausible mapping between elements in the model and elements in the mechanism for the phe- nomenon. We demonstrate how this model-to-mechanism-mapping constraint, when satisfied, endows a model with explanatory force with respect to the phenomenon to be explained. Several paradigmatic models including the Haken-Kelso-Bunz model of bimanual coordination and the difference-of-Gaussians model of visual receptive fields are (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   45 citations  
  20. Martin King, Idealization and Structural Explanation in Physics.
  21. Barbara V. E. Klein (1980). What Should We Expect of a Theory of Explanation? PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:319 - 328.
    The purpose of this paper is to provide a meta-theoretic characterization of what ought to be expected of a general theory of explanation, a theory of scientific explanation, and a theory of a kind of explanation. The view presented, called "the logico-normative view", is taken to be implicit in the work of a number of influential writers on the subject, including Hempel. The paper falls into three parts. First, a number of pre-theoretic assumptions are articulated. Second, the two concerns of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  22. Sheldon Krimsky (1976). On Deductive Non-Nomological Explanation. Philosophia 6 (2):303-308.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. Michael Küttner (1985). Zur Verteidigung Einiger Hempelscher Thesen Gegen Kritiken Stegmüllers. Erkenntnis 22 (1-3):475 - 484.
    The aim of this paper is to defend some of C. G. Hempel's basic theses concerning the logic of explanation and prediction against criticisms recently made by W. Stegmüller. It is argued (very concisely) thatthese is no need for essentially pragmatic conditions in DN-arguments;only the structural identity sub-thesis “Every adequate prediction is ... an adequate explanation” can be held instead of the one Hempel has in mind;the notion of the ambiguity of probabilistic explanations should be reformulated;there is no need for (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  24. Paul Langham (1972). Discussion:Rational Explanation and Covering Laws. Southern Journal of Philosophy 10 (4):471-479.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. Paul Langham (1972). Rational Explanation and Covering Laws. Southern Journal of Philosophy 10 (4):471-479.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. Antoine Lavoisier (2009). The Nature of Scientific Explanation. In Timothy J. McGrew, Marc Alspector-Kelly & Fritz Allhoff (eds.), The Philosophy of Science: An Historical Anthology. Wiley-Blackwell 245.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Michael Martin (1987). The Nature of Explanation. International Studies in Philosophy 19 (3):59-59.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Michael Martin (1968). Situational Logic and Covering Law Explanations in History. Inquiry 11 (1-4):388 – 399.
    Donagan has argued (a) that the covering law model of explanation does not apply in certain cases in historical explanations; (b) that situational logic explanations do apply, and (c) that situational logic explanations are fundamentally different from covering law explanations. It is argued that (b) is false as Donagan construes situational logic explanations. Once situational logic explanations are correctly construed they are similar to Hempel's rational explanations in covering law forms — hence (c) is false if situational logic explanations are (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Walter T. Marvin (1907). The Nature of Explanation. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 4 (5):113-118.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Seppo K. Miettinen (1972). On Omer's Model of Scientific Explanation. Philosophy of Science 39 (2):249-251.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  31. Charles G. Morgan (1976). Tuomela on Deductive Explanation. Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (4):511 - 525.
    Almost every formal model of explanation thus far proposed has been demonstrated to be faulty. In this paper, a new model, proposed by Raimo Tuomela, is also demonstrated to be faulty. In particular, one condition of the model is shown to be too restrictive, and another condition of the model is shown to be too permissive.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  32. Charles G. Morgan (1972). On Two Proposed Models of Explanation. Philosophy of Science 39 (1):74-81.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  33. Charles G. Morgan (1970). Kim on Deductive Explanation. Philosophy of Science 37 (3):434-439.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  34. Bernhard Nickel (2010). How General Do Theories of Explanation Need To Be? Noûs 44 (2):305 - 328.
    Theories of explanation seek to tell us what distinctively explanatory information is. The most ambitious ones, such as the DN-account, seek to tell us what an explanation is, tout court. Less ambitious ones, such as causal theories, restrict themselves to a particular domain of inquiry. The least ambitious theories constitute outright skepticism, holding that there is no reasonably unified phenomenon to give an account of. On these views, it is impossible to give any theories of explanation at all. I argue (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  35. Thomas Nickles (1976). Reply to Krimsky on D-N Explanation. Philosophia 6 (2):309-315.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. T. Percy Nunn (1906). On Causal Explanation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 7:50 - 80.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. I. A. Omer (1970). On the D-N Model of Scientific Explanation. Philosophy of Science 37 (3):417-433.
    This paper discusses the D-N model of scientific explanation. It is suggested that explanation is a part of assertive discourse where certain principles must be observed. Then use is made of the relation between the informative content and logical content of a sentence (as shown, for instance, by Popper) to draw some of the conditions necessary for a sound model. It is claimed that the conditions of the model proposed in the present paper exhaust the insights of the papers in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  38. Judea Pearl, Causes and Explanations: A Structural-Model Approach.
    We propose a new definition of actual causes, using structural equations to model counterfactuals. We show that the definition yields a plausible and elegant account of causation that handles well examples which have caused problems for other definitions and resolves major difficultiesn in the traditional account.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Nicholas Rescher (1970). Scientific Explanation. New York,Free Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   30 citations  
  40. Fritz Rohrlich (1994). Scientific Explanation: From Covering Law to Covering Theory. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:69 - 77.
    A new model of scientific explanation is proposed: the covering theory model. Its goal is understanding. One chooses the appropriate scientific theory and a model within it. From these follows the functioning of the explanandum, i.e. the way in which the model portrays it on one particular cognitive level. It requires an ontology and knowledge of the causal processes, probabilities, or potentialities (propensities) according to which it functions. This knowledge yields understanding. Explanations across cognitive levels demand pluralistic ontologies. An explanation (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. David-Hillel Ruben (ed.) (1993). Explanation. Oxford University Press.
    The aim of this series is to bring together important recent writings in major areas of philosophical inquiry, selected from a variety of sources, mostly periodicals, which may not be conveniently available to the university student or the general reader. The editor of each volume contributes an introductory essay on the items chosen and on the questions with which they deal. A selective bibliography is appended as a guide to further reading. This volume presents a selection of the most important (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  42. David-Hillel Ruben (1990). Explaining Explanation. Routledge.
    Getting our Bearings The series in which this book is appearing is called 'The Problems of Philosophy: Their Past and Present'; this volume, ...
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   29 citations  
  43. Juha Saatsi & Mark Pexton (2013). Reassessing Woodward’s Account of Explanation: Regularities, Counterfactuals, and Noncausal Explanations. Philosophy of Science 80 (5):613-624.
    We reassess Woodward’s counterfactual account of explanation in relation to regularity explananda. Woodward presents an account of causal explanation. We argue, by using an explanation of Kleiber’s law to illustrate, that the account can also cover some noncausal explanations. This leads to a tension between the two key aspects of Woodward’s account: the counterfactual aspect and the causal aspect. We explore this tension and make a case for jettisoning the causal aspect as constitutive of explanatory power in connection with regularity (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  44. Rebecca Schweder (1999). Causal Explanation and Explanatory Selection. Synthese 120 (1):115-124.
    It is observed that in ordinary everyday causal explanations often just one causal factor is mentioned. One causal factor carries the explanatory burden, even if there are several causal factors that are responsible for the event to be explained. This paper deals with the question of how to account for this explanatory selection. I argue for a pragmatic stance towards explanation, that we must attend to the question–answer situation as a whole and the context of the explanation. The context of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  45. Daniel Steel (1998). Warfare and Western Manufactures: A Case Study of Explanation in Anthropology. Philosophy of Science 65 (4):649-671.
    I use an explanation of Yanomami warfare given by the anthropologist Brian Ferguson as a case study to compare the merits of the causal and unification approaches to explanation. I argue that Ferguson's insistence on explaining actual occurrences and patterns of Yanomami warfare together with his claim that all of his generalizations are statistical raises difficulties for the unification approach, because of its commitment to "deductive chauvinism." Moreover, I show that there are serious difficulties involved in comparing the "unifying power" (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. Kari L. Theurer (2014). Seventeenth-Century Mechanism: An Alternative Framework for Reductionism. Philosophy of Science 80 (5):907-918.
    The current antireductionist consensus rests in part on the indefensibility of the deductive-nomological model of explanation, on which classical reductionism depends. I argue that the DN model is inessential to the reductionist program and that mechanism provides a better framework for thinking about reductionism. This runs counter to the contemporary mechanists’ claim that mechanism is an alternative to reductionism. I demonstrate that mechanists are committed to reductionism, as evidenced by the historical roots of the contemporary mechanist program. This view shares (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  47. Jeroen van Bouwel, Erik Weber & Leen de Vreese (2011). Indispensability Arguments in Favour of Reductive Explanations. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42 (1):33-46.
    Instances of explanatory reduction are often advocated on metaphysical grounds; given that the only real things in the world are subatomic particles and their interaction, we have to try to explain everything in terms of the laws of physics. In this paper, we show that explanatory reduction cannot be defended on metaphysical grounds. Nevertheless, indispensability arguments for reductive explanations can be developed, taking into account actual scientific practice and the role of epistemic interests. Reductive explanations might be indispensable to address (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. Erik Weber (1996). How to Construct a Deductive-Nomological Explanation? Dialectica 50 (3):183-203.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. Erik Weber, Jeroen Van Bouwel & Leen De Vreese (2013). Scientific Explanation. Springer.
    When scientist investigate why things happen, they aim at giving an explanation. But what does a scientific explanation look like? In the first chapter (Theories of Scientific Explanation) of this book, the milestones in the debate on how to characterize scientific explanations are exposed. The second chapter (How to Study Scientific Explanation?) scrutinizes the working-method of three important philosophers of explanation, Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon and shows what went wrong. Next, it is the responsibility of current philosophers (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. Erik Weber, Jeroen Van Bouwel & Robrecht Vanderbeeken (2005). Forms of Causal Explanation. Foundations of Science 10 (4):437-454.
    In the literature on scientific explanation two types of pluralism are very common. The first concerns the distinction between explanations of singular facts and explanations of laws: there is a consensus that they have a different structure. The second concerns the distinction between causal explanations and uni.cation explanations: most people agree that both are useful and that their structure is different. In this article we argue for pluralism within the area of causal explanations: we claim that the structure of a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
1 — 50 / 277