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Agent Causation
- Robert F. Allen, Agent Causation and Ultimate Responsibility.
- Mark Balaguer (2002). A Coherent, Naturalistic, and Plausible Formulation of Libertarian Free Will. Noûs 36 (3):379-406.
- S. Bassford (1974). Enigmas of Agency: Studies in the Philosophy of Human Action. By Irving Thalberg. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.; New York: Humanities Press Inc., 1972. Pp. 229. $14.75. [REVIEW] Dialogue 13 (03):619-621.
- Michael Bergmann (2003). Agent Causation and Responsibility. Faith and Philosophy 20 (2):229-235.
- John D. Bishop (2003). Prospects for a Naturalist Libertarianism: O'Connor's Persons and Causes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):228-243.
- John D. Bishop (1986). Is Agent-Causality a Conceptal Primitive? Synthese 67 (May):225-47.
- John D. Bishop (1983). Agent-Causation. Mind 92 (January):61-79.
- Laurence BonJour (1976). Deeterminism, Libertarianism, and Agent Causation. Southern Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):145-56.
- Michael Brent (2012). The Power of Agency. Dissertation, Columbia University
- Jerome V. Brown (1994). Quodlibetal Questions on Free Will. [REVIEW] The Review of Metaphysics 48 (1):140-141.
- Brian J. Bruya (2010). The Rehabilitation of Spontaneity: A New Approach in Philosophy of Action. Philosophy East and West 60 (2):pp. 207-250.
- Andrei A. Buckareff (2011). How Does Agent-‐Causal Power Work? The Modern Schoolman 88 (1/2):105-121.
- Todd Buras & Rebecca Copenhaver (eds.) (forthcoming). Mind, Knowledge and Action: Essays in Honor of Reid’s Tercentenary.
- C. A. Campbell (1967). In Defence of Free Will. London, Allen & Unwin.
- Erik Carlson (2004). Review of Randolph Clarke, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (10).
- Roderick Chisholm (1976). The Agent as Cause. In M. Brand & D. Walton (eds.), Action Theory. Reidel.
- Roderick Chisholm (1966). Freedom and Action. In Keith Lehrer (ed.), Freedom and Determinism. Random House.
- Roderick M. Chisholm (1976). Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study. Open Court.
- Roderick M. Chisholm (1971). Reflections on Human Agency. Idealistic Studies 1 (1):33-46.
- John Ross Churchill (2004). Reasons Explanation and Agent Control. Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):241-253.
- Randolph Clarke (2010). Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action, by E. J. Lowe. Mind 119 (475):820-823.
- Randolph Clarke (2005). Agent Causation and the Problem of Luck. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):408-421.
- Randolph Clarke (1996). Agent Causation and Event Causation in the Production of Free Action. Philosophical Topics 24 (2):19-48.
- Randolph Clarke (1993). Toward a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free Will. Noûs 27 (2):191-203.
- Samuel Clarke (1998). A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God and Other Writings. Cambridge University Press.
- Aaron D. Cobb (2010). Natural Philosophy and the Use of Causal Terminology: A Puzzle in Reid's Account of Natural Philosophy. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 8 (2):101-114.
- Ralph Cudworth (1838/1992). A Treatise of Freewill and an Introduction to Cudworth's Treatise. Routledge/Thoemmes Press.
- Lara Denis (2010). Review: McCarty, Kant's Theory of Action. [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (4):533-535.
- John Dilworth (2008). Free Action as Two Level Voluntary Control. Philosophical Frontiers 3 (1):29-45.
- Alan Donagan (1977). Chisholm's Theory of Agency. Journal of Philosophy 74 (11):692-703.
- Ralph D. Ellis (1983). Agent Causation, Chance, and Determinism. Philosophical Inquiry 5 (1):29-42.
- Richard H. Feldman & Andrei A. Buckareff (2003). Reasons Explanations and Pure Agency. Philosophical Studies 112 (2):135-145.
- John Martin Fischer (ed.) (2005). Free Will: Critical Concepts in Philosophy. Routledge.
- John Martin Fischer (2001). Book Review. Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will Timothy O'Connor. [REVIEW] Mind 110 (438):526-531.
- Meghan Griffith (2007). Freedom and Trying: Understanding Agent-Causal Exertions. Acta Analytica 22 (1):16-28.
- Meghan E. Griffith (2005). Does Free Will Remain a Mystery? A Response to Van Inwagen. Philosophical Studies 124 (3):261-269.
- Jarosław Gryz (1988). Eseje o działaniach i zdarzeniach Donalda Davidsona (Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events). [REVIEW] Etyka 23:177-181.
- Ishtiyaque Haji (2004). Active Control, Agent-Causation and Free Action. Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):131-148.
- Noel Hendrickson (2002). Against an Agent-Causal Theory of Action. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):41-58.
- Eric Hiddleston, Critical Study: Timothy O'Connor, Persons and Causes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) (Forthcoming in Nous).
- Monte Ransome Johnson (2009). Spontaneity, Democritean Causality and Freedom. Elenchos 30:5-52.
- Robert H. Kane (ed.) (2002). The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
- Robert H. Kane (ed.) (2001). Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press.
- Eric LaRock (Forthcoming). Aristotle and Agent-Directed Neuroplasticity. International Philosophical Quarterly.
- Jos Lehmann, Joost Breuker & Bob Brouwer (2004). Causation in AI and Law. Artificial Intelligence and Law 12 (4):279-315.
- Arnold B. Levison (1978). Chisholm and the Metaphysical Problem of Human Freedom. Philosophia 7 (July):537-554.
- Chris Lindsay (2005). Reid on Scepticism About Agency and the Self. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 3 (1):19-33.
- Christian List (2013). Free Will, Determinism, and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise. Noûs 47 (2).
- N. O. Losskiĭ (1932). Freedom of Will. London, Williams & Norgate.
- E. J. Lowe (2003). Rational Action, Freedom, and Choice. Progress in Complexity, Information, and Design 2:http://www.iscid.org/papers/Lowe.
- E. J. Lowe (2001). Event Causation and Agent Causation. Grazer Philosophische Studien 61:1-20.
- E. J. Lowe (1996). Subjects of Experience. Cambridge University Press.
- Kevin Magill (1997). Freedom and Experience: Self-Determination Without Illusions. St. Martin's Press/Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ned Markosian (2012). Agent Causation as the Solution to All the Compatibilist's Problems. Philosophical Studies 157 (3):383-398.
- Ned Markosian (1999). A Compatibilist Version of the Theory of Agent Causation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (3):257-277.
- Storrs McCall (1985). An Essay on Free Will. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (4):663-680.
- Uwe Meixner (2004). Causation in a New Old Key. Studia Logica 76 (3):343 - 383.
- María G. Navarro (2012). Review of 'New Waves in Philosophy of Action' Edited by Jesús H. Aguilar, Andrei A. Buckareff and Keith Frankish. [REVIEW] Metapsychology Online Reviews.
- María G. Navarro (2010). Intelligent Environments and the Challenge of Inferential Processes. Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 72 (2):309-326.
- Shaun Nichols (2008). Great Philosophical Debates. Teaching Co..
- Timothy O'Connor, Agent-Causal Theories of Freedom.
- Timothy O'Connor (2009). Agent-Causal Power. In Toby Handfield (ed.), Dispositions and Causes. Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press ;.
- Timothy O'Connor (2007). Is It All Just a Matter of Luck? Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):157 – 161.
- Timothy O'Connor (2005). Freedom With a Human Face. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):207-227.
- Timothy O'Connor (2002). Libertarian Views: Dualist and Agent-Causal Theories. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
- Timothy O'Connor (2001). Dualist and Agent-Causal Theories. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oup.
- Timothy O'Connor (2000). Causality, Mind, and Free Will. Noûs 34 (s14):105-117.
- Timothy O'Connor (2000). Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
- Timothy O'Connor (1996). Why Agent Causation? Philosophical Topics 24:143-58.
- Timothy O'Connor (1995). Agent Causation. In Timothy O'Connor (ed.), Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will. Oxford University Press.
- Timothy O'Connor (1993). Indeterminism and Free Agency: Three Recent Views. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):499-26.
- Timothy O'Connor & John Churchill (2006). Reasons Explanation And Agent Control: In Search Of An Integrated Account. Philosophical Topics 32:241-256.
- Timothy O.’Connor (1996). Why Agent Causation? Philosophical Topics 24 (2):143-158.
- Timothy O.’Connor (2005). Freedom with a Human Face. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):207-227.
- Kenneth L. Pearce (2012). Thomas Reid on Character and Freedom. History of Philosophy Quarterly 29 (2):159-176.
- Derk Pereboom (2007). Book Review. Libertarian Accounts of Free Will. Randolph Clarke. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74:269-72.
- Derk Pereboom (2007). On Alfred Mele's Free Will and Luck. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):163 – 172.
- Derk Pereboom (2004). Is Our Conception of Agent-Causation Coherent? Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):275-286.
- K. Petrus (ed.) (2003). On Human Persons. Heusenstamm Nr Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
- E. A. R. (1966). Action and Purpose. The Review of Metaphysics 20 (1):161-162.
- Paul Raymont (2003). O'Connor, Timothy. Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will. The Review of Metaphysics 57 (1):170-172.
- Thomas Reid (1863/1975). Thomas Reid's Inquiry and Essays. Bobbs-Merrill.
- Nicholas Rescher (2006). Causal Necessitation and Free Will. Process Studies 35 (2):193-206.
- Lee C. Rice (1968). In Defense of Free Will. By C. A . Campbell. [REVIEW] The Modern Schoolman 46 (1):79-80.
- Rebekah Rice (2011). Agent Causation and Acting for Reasons. American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (4):333-346.
- William L. Rowe (2006). Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and the Problem of OOMPH. Journal of Ethics 10 (3):295-313.
- William L. Rowe (1991). Responsibility, Agent-Causation, and Freedom: An Eighteenth-Century View. Ethics 101 (2):237-257.
- William L. Rowe (1982). Two Criticisms of the Agency Theory. Philosophical Studies 42 (3):363 - 378.
- Edmund Runggaldier, Christian Kanzian & Josef Quitterer (eds.) (2003). Persons: An Interdisciplinary Approach. öbvhpt.
- Markus E. Schlosser (2008). Agent-Causation and Agential Control. Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):3-21.
- Stuart Silvers (2003). Agent Causation, Functional Explanation, and Epiphenomenal Engines: Can Conscious Mental Events Be Causally Efficacious? Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (2):197-228.
- J. C. Skewes & C. A. Hooker (2009). Bio-Agency and the Problem of Action. Biology and Philosophy 24 (3):283 - 300.
- Helen Steward (2012). A Metaphysics for Freedom. OUP Oxford.
- Helen Steward (2011). Agency, Properties and Causation. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):390-401.
- Jim Stone (1998). Free Will as a Gift From God: A New Compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 92 (3):257-81.
- James Swindal (2012). Action and Existence: A Case for Agent Causation. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Thomas Talbott (2009). God, Freedom, and Human Agency. Faith and Philosophy 26 (4):378-397.
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