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Agent Causation
- Mark Balaguer (2002). A Coherent, Naturalistic, and Plausible Formulation of Libertarian Free Will. Noûs 36 (3):379-406.
- Michael Bergmann (2003). Agent Causation and Responsibility. Faith and Philosophy 20 (2):229-235.
- John D. Bishop (2003). Prospects for a Naturalist Libertarianism: O'Connor's Persons and Causes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):228-243.
- John D. Bishop (1986). Is Agent-Causality a Conceptal Primitive? Synthese 67 (May):225-47.
- John D. Bishop (1983). Agent-Causation. Mind 92 (January):61-79.
- Laurence A. BonJour (1976). Deeterminism, Libertarianism, and Agent Causation. Southern Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):145-56.
- Brian J. Bruya (2010). The Rehabilitation of Spontaneity: A New Approach in Philosophy of Action. Philosophy East and West 60 (2):pp. 207-250.
- Roderick M. Chisholm (1976). Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study. Open Court.
- Randolph Clarke (2005). Agent Causation and the Problem of Luck. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):408-421.
- Randolph Clarke (1996). Agent Causation and Event Causation in the Production of Free Action. Philosophical Topics 24 (2):19-48.
- Randolph Clarke (1993). Toward a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free Will. Noûs 27 (2):191-203.
- Aaron D. Cobb (2010). Natural Philosophy and the Use of Causal Terminology: A Puzzle in Reid's Account of Natural Philosophy. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 8 (2):101-114.
- Lara Denis (2010). Review: McCarty, Kant's Theory of Action. [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (4):533-535.
- John Dilworth (2008). Free Action as Two Level Voluntary Control. Philosophical Frontiers 3 (1):29-45.
- Alan Donagan (1977). Chisholm's Theory of Agency. Journal of Philosophy 74 (11):692-703.
- Richard H. Feldman & Andrei A. Buckareff (2003). Reasons Explanations and Pure Agency. Philosophical Studies 112 (2):135-145.
- John Martin Fischer (2001). Book Review. Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will Timothy O'Connor. Mind 110 (438):526-531.
- Meghan Griffith (2007). Freedom and Trying: Understanding Agent-Causal Exertions. Acta Analytica 22 (1):16-28.
- Meghan E. Griffith (2005). Does Free Will Remain a Mystery? A Response to Van Inwagen. Philosophical Studies 124 (3):261-269.
- Ishtiyaque Haji (2004). Active Control, Agent-Causation and Free Action. Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):131-148.
- Monte Ransome Johnson (2009). Spontaneity, Democritean Causality and Freedom. Elenchos 30:5-52.
- Robert H. Kane (2002). The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
- Jos Lehmann, Joost Breuker & Bob Brouwer (2004). Causation in AI and Law. Artificial Intelligence and Law 12 (4).
- Arnold B. Levison (1978). Chisholm and the Metaphysical Problem of Human Freedom. Philosophia 7 (July):537-554.
- Christian List, Free Will, Determinism and the Possibility to Do Otherwise.
- E. J. Lowe (1996). Subjects of Experience. Cambridge University Press.
- Ned Markosian (2012). Agent Causation as the Solution to All the Compatibilist's Problems. Philosophical Studies 157 (3):383-398.
- Ned Markosian (1999). A Compatibilist Version of the Theory of Agent Causation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (3):257-277.
- Uwe Meixner (2004). Causation in a New Old Key. Studia Logica 76 (3):343 - 383.
- Timothy O'Connor (2007). Is It All Just a Matter of Luck? Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):157 – 161.
- Timothy O'Connor (2005). Freedom With a Human Face. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):207-227.
- Timothy O'Connor (2002). Libertarian Views: Dualist and Agent-Causal Theories. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
- Timothy O'Connor (2001). Dualist and Agent-Causal Theories. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oup.
- Timothy O'Connor (2000). Causality, Mind, and Free Will. Noûs 34 (s14):105-117.
- Timothy O'Connor (2000). Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
- Timothy O'Connor (1996). Why Agent Causation? Philosophical Topics 24:143-58.
- Timothy O'Connor (1995). Agent Causation. In Timothy O'Connor (ed.), Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will. Oxford University Press.
- Timothy O'Connor (1993). Indeterminism and Free Agency: Three Recent Views. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):499-26.
- Timothy O'Connor & John Churchill (2006). Reasons Explanation And Agent Control: In Search Of An Integrated Account. Philosophical Topics 32:241-256.
- Timothy O.’Connor (1996). Why Agent Causation? Philosophical Topics 24 (2):143-158.
- Timothy O.’Connor (2005). Freedom with a Human Face. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):207-227.
- Derk Pereboom (2007). On Alfred Mele's Free Will and Luck. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):163 – 172.
- Derk Pereboom (2004). Is Our Conception of Agent-Causation Coherent? Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):275-286.
- K. Petrus (2003). On Human Persons. Heusenstamm Nr Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
- William L. Rowe (2006). Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and the Problem of OOMPH. Journal of Ethics 10 (3):295-313.
- William L. Rowe (1991). Responsibility, Agent-Causation, and Freedom: An Eighteenth-Century View. Ethics 101 (2):237-257.
- William L. Rowe (1982). Two Criticisms of the Agency Theory. Philosophical Studies 42 (3):363 - 378.
- Markus E. Schlosser (2008). Agent-Causation and Agential Control. Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):3-21.
- J. C. Skewes & C. A. Hooker (2009). Bio-Agency and the Problem of Action. Biology and Philosophy 24 (3):283 - 300.
- Jim Stone (1998). Free Will as a Gift From God: A New Compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 92 (3):257-81.
- Thomas Talbott (2009). GOD, FREEDOM, AND HUMAN AGENCY. Faith and Philosophy 26 (4):378-397.
- Chris Tucker (2007). Agent Causation and the Alleged Impossibility of Rational Free Action. Erkenntnis 67 (1):17 - 27.
- Jason Turner & Eddy A. Nahmias (2006). Are the Folk Agent-Causationists? Mind and Language 21 (5):597-609.
- Daniel von Wachter (2003). Agent Causation Before and After the Ontological Turn. In Edmund Runggaldier, Christian Kanzian & Josef Quitterer (eds.), Persons: An Interdisciplinary Approach. öbvhpt.
- Daniel von Wachter (2003). Free Agents as Cause. In K. Petrus (ed.), On Human Persons. Heusenstamm Nr Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
- David Widerker (2005). Agent-Causation and Control. Faith and Philosophy 22 (1):87-98.
- David Widerker (2005). Agent-Causation and Control. Faith and Philosophy 22 (1):87-98.
- G. E. Zuriff (2004). Conscious Will and Agent Causation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):678-679.
Compatibilism
- John Abbruzzese (2000). Garrett on the Theological Objection to Hume's Compatibilism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 8 (2):345 – 352.
- Kristin Andrews (2003). Neurophilosophy of Free Will by Henrik Walter. Philo: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):166-175.
- Bruce Aune (1970). Free Will, 'Can', and Ethics: A Reply to Lehrer. Analysis 30 (January):77-83.
- Bruce Aune (1963). Abilities, Modalities, and Free Will. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 23 (March):397-413.
- A. J. Ayer (1954). Freedom and Necessity. In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Philosophical Essays. St.
- A. Bain (1880). Dr. Ward on Free-Will. Mind 5 (17):116-124.
- Lynne Rudder Baker, What is Human Freedom?
- Lynne Rudder Baker (2006). Moral Responsibility Without Libertarianism. Noûs 40 (2):307-330.
- Mark Balaguer (2009). The Metaphysical Irrelevance of the Compatibilism Debate (and, More Generally, of Conceptual Analysis). Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):1-24.
- D. Balsillie (1911). Prof. Bergson on Time and Free Will. Mind 20 (79):357-378.
- Roy F. Baumeister, A. William Crescioni & Jessica L. Alquist (2011). Further Thoughts on Counterfactuals, Compatibilism, Conceptual Mismatches, and Choices: Response to Commentaries. Neuroethics 4 (1):31-34.
- Donald L. M. Baxter (1989). Free Choice. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (March):12-24.
- Ansgar Beckermann, Would Biological Determinism Rule Outthe Possibility of Freedom?
- Ansgar Beckermann (2005). Free Will in a Natural Order of the World. In Christian Nimtz & Ansgar Beckermann (eds.), Philosophie Und/Als Wissenschaft. Mentis.
- Helen Beebee (2008). Smilansky's Alleged Refutation of Compatibilism. Analysis 68 (299):258–260.
- Helen Beebee (2003). Local Miracle Compatibilism. Noûs 37 (2):258-277.
- Helen Beebee & Alfred R. Mele (2002). Humean Compatibilism. Mind 111 (442):201-223.
- Yemima Ben-Menahem (1986). Newcomb's Paradox and Compatibilism. Erkenntnis 25 (2):197 - 220.
- Jonathan Bennett, Accountability.
- S. Benson (1994). Free Agency and Self-Worth. Journal of Philosophy 91 (12):650-58.
- S. Benson (1987). Freedom and Value. Journal of Philosophy 84 (September):465-87.
- Sven Bernecker (2006). Prospects for Epistemic Compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 130 (1):81-104.
- Mark H. Bernstein (2005). Can We Ever Be Really, Truly, Ultimately, Free? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):1-12.
- Bernard Berofsky (2010). Free Will and the Mind–Body Problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):1 – 19.
- Bernard Berofsky (2006). Global Control and Freedom. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):419-445.
- Bernard Berofsky (1995). Liberation From Self: A Theory of Personal Autonomy. Cambridge University Press.
- Preben Bertelsen (1999). Free Will in Psychology—In Search of a Geniuin Compatibilism. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 19 (1):41-77.
- John D. Bishop (1993). Compatibilism and the Free Will Defense. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2):104-20.
- Robert C. Bishop (2003). Free Will in Absentia: Dennett on Free Will and Determinism. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 23 (2):168-183.
- David C. Blumenfeld (1988). Freedom and Mind Control. American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (July):215-27.
- Susanne Bobzien (1998). Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
- Hilary Bok (1998). Freedom and Responsibility. Princeton University Press.
- Anthony Robert Booth (2009). Compatibilism and Free Belief. Philosophical Papers 38 (1):1-12.
- Thomas Boysen (2004). Death of a Compatibilistic Intuition. Sats 5 (2):92-104.
- Raymond Bradley, The Meaning of Life Reflections on God, Immortality, and Free Will.
- M. Brand & Douglas N. Walton (1976). Action Theory. Reidel.
- Janez Bregant (2003). The Problem of Causal Exclusion and Horgan's Causal Compatibilism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (9):305-320.
- S. S. S. Browne (1942). Paralogisms of the Free-Will Problem. Journal of Philosophy 39 (19):513-520.
- Andrei A. Buckareff (2006). Compatibilism and Doxastic Control. Philosophia 34 (2):143-152.
- Sarah Buss, Personal Autonomy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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