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  1. Alessandro Bertinetto (2012). Bild. Fichte Und der "Iconic Turn". Fichte-Studien 36:269-284.
  2. Robert E. Brennan (1941). The Thomistic Concept of Imagination. New Scholasticism 15 (2):149-161.
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  3. Robert Briscoe (2011). Mental Imagery and the Varieties of Amodal Perception. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):153-173.
    The problem of amodal perception is the problem of how we represent features of perceived objects that are occluded or otherwise hidden from us. Bence Nanay (2010) has recently proposed that we amodally perceive an object's occluded features by imaginatively projecting them into the relevant regions of visual egocentric space. In this paper, I argue that amodal perception is not a single, unitary capacity. Drawing appropriate distinctions reveals amodal perception to be characterized not only by mental imagery, as Nanay suggests, (...)
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  4. Thomas Busch (1996). Sartre and Ricoeur on Imagination. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 70 (4):507-518.
  5. David Carrier (1973). Three Kinds of Imagination. Journal of Philosophy 70 (22):819-831.
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  6. Edward S. Casey (1992). The World of the Imagination. Review of Metaphysics 46 (1):145-146.
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  7. Edward S. Casey (1976). Imagining: A Phenomenological Study. Indiana University Press.
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  8. Cam Clayton (2012). The Psychical Analogon in Sartre's Theory of the Imagination. Sartre Studies International 17 (2):16-27.
    Sartre's theory of the imagination is important both as an alternative to the idea that the imagination consists of images contained somehow in the mind - the "illusion of immanence" — and as an early formulation of Sartre's conception of consciousness. In this paper I defend Sartre's theory of imaginative consciousness against some of its critics. I show how difficulties with his theory parallel a perennial problem in Sartre-interpretation, that of understanding how consciousness can negate its past and posit possibilities (...)
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  9. Frederick C. Copleston (1950). The Psychology of Imagination. By Jean-Paul Sartre. Philosophical Library. (New York. 1948. Pp. 285. Price $3.75.). Philosophy 25 (92):89-.
  10. Luca Corti (2012). Crossing the Line: Sellars on Kant on Imagination. Verifiche: Rivista Trimestrale di Scienze Umane 41 (1-3):41-71.
    After Science and Metaphysics, Sellars’ encounter with Kant was characterized by acknowledging and working out the role played by imagination in perceptual experience. The mediating imaginative function provided him with a somewhat new and more Kantian account of the relationship between concepts and intuitions. After stressing the peculiar theoretical and exegetical background of Sellars’ approach to Kant – his project of “translating” his own ideas in the lingua franca of Kantianism – which has been influential in current normative interpretations of (...)
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  11. Tyler Doggett (2012). Some Questions for Tamar Szabo Gendler. [REVIEW] Analysis 72 (4):764-774.
    Contribution to a symposium on Gendler's Intuition, Imagination, and Philosophical Methodology.
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  12. Tyler Doggett (2011). Review of Tamar Szabo Gendler's Intuition, Imagination, and Philosophical Methodology. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  13. Fabian Dorsch (forthcoming). Focused Daydreaming and Mind-Wandering. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-23.
    In this paper, I describe and discuss two mental phenomena which are somewhat neglected in the philosophy of mind: focused daydreaming and mind-wandering. My aim is to show that their natures are rather distinct, despite the fact that we tend to classify both as instances of daydreaming. The first difference between the two, I argue, is that, while focused daydreaming is an instance of imaginative mental agency , mind-wandering is not—though this does not mean that mind-wandering cannot involve mental agency (...)
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  14. Fabian Dorsch (2012). The Unity of Imagining. Ontos.
    In this highly ambitious, wide ranging, immensely impressive and ground-breaking work Fabian Dorsch surveys just about every account of the imagination that has ever been proposed. He identifies five central types of imagining that any unifying theory must accommodate and sets himself the task of determining whether any theory of what imagining consists in covers these five paradigms. Focussing on what he takes to be the three main theories, and giving them each equal consideration, he faults the first two and (...)
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  15. Mark P. Drost (1990). The Primacy of Perception in Husserl's Theory of Imagining. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (3):569-582.
  16. Arthur D. Fearon (1940). The Imagination. New Scholasticism 14 (2):181-195.
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  17. Steven Fesmire (2010). Ecological Imagination. Environmental Ethics 32 (2):183-203.
    Environmental thinkers recognize that ecological thinking has a vital role to play in many wise choices and policies; yet, little theoretical attention has been given to developing an adequate philosophical psychology of the imaginative nature of such thinking. Ecological imagination is an outgrowth of our more general deliberative capacity to perceive, in light of possibilities for thinking and acting, the relationships that constitute any object. Such imagination is of a specifically ecological sort when key metaphors, images, symbols, and the like (...)
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  18. Steven Fesmire (2005). Cultivating EcologicaI Imagination. Symposium: The Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy 9 (2):339-352.
  19. Véronique M. Fóti (1986). The Cartesian Imagination. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (4):631-642.
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  20. Christoph Hoerl (2005). Review: Recreative Minds: Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology, by Gregory Currie and Ian Ravenscroft. Mind and Language 20 (5):559-564.
  21. Robert Hopkins (forthcoming). Sartre. In Amy Kind (ed.), Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Imagination. Routledge.
    In The Imaginary Sartre offers a systematic, insightful and heterodox account of imagining in many forms. Beginning with four ‘characteristics’ he takes to capture the phenomenology of imagining, he draws on considerations both philosophical and psychological to describe the deeper nature of the state that has those features. The result is a view that remains the most potent challenge to the Humean orthodoxy that to this day dominates both philosophical and psychological thinking on the topic.
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  22. Eliot D. Hutchinson (1927). The “ Faculty “ of Imagination: An Enquiry Concerning the Existence of a General “ Faculty,” or Group Factor of Imagination. By H. L. Hargreaves . British Journal of Psychology. Monograph Supplements, X. (London: Cambridge University Press. 1927. Pp. 74. Price 7s. Net.). [REVIEW] Philosophy 2 (08):574-.
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  23. David Jager, A. Martinez & C. Thiboutot (1999). Gaston Bachelard and Phenomenology: Outline of a Theory of the Imagination. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 30 (1):1-17.
    Gaston Bachelard's thought remains a continual source of inspiration for a phenomenological psychology that takes human habitation as a fundamental given and as an abiding mystery of the human condition. the following essay explores the ideas Bachelard developed in the course of his study of poetry. It examines in particular his vision of imagination as a unique passage way by means of which we reach an inhabitable, intersubjective and fully human world. Within that perspective, our lives are constantly renewed by (...)
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  24. Julia Jansen (2005). On the Development of Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology of Imagination and its Use for Interdisciplinary Research. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2):121-132.
    In this paper I trace Husserl’s transformation of his notion of phantasy from its strong leanings towards empiricism into a transcendental phenomenology of imagination. Rejecting the view that this account is only more incompatible with contemporary neuroscientific research, I instead claim that the transcendental suspension of naturalistic (or scientific) pretensions precisely enables cooperation between the two distinct realms of phenomenology and science. In particular, a transcendental account of phantasy can disclose the specific accomplishments of imagination without prematurely deciding upon a (...)
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  25. Mostyn W. Jones (1994). The Roots of Imagination. Dissertation, The University of Manchester
    This work presents a new theory of imagination which tries to overcome the overly narrow perpectives that current theories take upon this enigmatic, multi-faceted phenomenon. Current theories are narrowly preoccupied with images and imagery. This creates problems in explaining (1) what imagination is, (2) how it works, and (3) what its strengths and limitations are. (1) Ordinary language identifies imagination with both imaging (image-making) and creativity, but most current theories identify imagination narrowly with imaging while neglecting creativity. Yet imaging is (...)
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  26. Amy Kind (ed.) (forthcoming). The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination. Routledge.
  27. Amy Kind (2013). The Heterogeneity of the Imagination. Erkenntnis 78 (1):141-159.
    Imagination has been assigned an important explanatory role in a multitude of philosophical contexts. This paper examines four such contexts: mindreading, pretense, our engagement with fiction, and modal epistemology. Close attention to each of these contexts suggests that the mental activity of imagining is considerably more heterogeneous than previously realized. In short, no single mental activity can do all the explanatory work that has been assigned to imagining.
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  28. Amy Kind & Peter Kung (eds.) (forthcoming). Knowledge Through Imagination. Oxford University Press.
  29. Jürgen Klein, Vera Damm & Angelika Giebeler (1983). An Outline of a Theory of Imagination. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 14 (1):15-23.
    Imagination can be seen 1) as a mental faculty common to all people to some degree and 2) as an important principle in literary theory. We must think of imagination not as a simple power but a complex series of processes, involving the impression-idea-relationship and memory. The data derived thus are still bound to their epistemological context, and only imagination provides the possibility to transcend the space-time-determination and the cause-effect-relationship, so that it allows a freer display of the sense-data. This (...)
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  30. Peter Langland-Hassan (forthcoming). On Choosing What to Imagine. In P. Kung (ed.), Knowledge Through Imagination. Oxford University Press.
    If imagination is subject to the will, in the sense that people choose the content of their own imaginings, how is it that one nevertheless can learn from what one imagines? This chapter argues for a way forward in addressing this perennial puzzle, both with respect to propositional imagination and sensory imagination. Making progress requires looking carefully at the interplay between one’s intentions and various kinds of constraints that may be operative in the generation of imaginings. Lessons are drawn from (...)
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  31. Peter Langland-Hassan (2012). Pretense, Imagination, and Belief: The Single Attitude Theory. Philosophical Studies 159 (2):155-179.
    A popular view has it that the mental representations underlying human pretense are not beliefs, but are “belief-like” in important ways. This view typically posits a distinctive cognitive attitude (a “DCA”) called “imagination” that is taken toward the propositions entertained during pretense, along with correspondingly distinct elements of cognitive architecture. This paper argues that the characteristics of pretense motivating such views of imagination can be explained without positing a DCA, or other cognitive architectural features beyond those regulating normal belief and (...)
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  32. Peter Langland‐Hassan (2014). Imaginative Attitudes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):664-686.
    The point of this paper is to reveal a dogma in the ordinary conception of sensory imagination, and to suggest another way forward. The dogma springs from two main sources: a too close comparison of mental imagery to perceptual experience, and a too strong division between mental imagery and the traditional propositional attitudes (such as belief and desire). The result is an unworkable conception of the correctness conditions of sensory imaginings—one lacking any link between the conditions under which an imagining (...)
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  33. Peter Langland‐Hassan (2014). What It Is to Pretend. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (1):397-420.
    Pretense is a topic of keen interest to philosophers and psychologists. But what is it, really, to pretend? What features qualify an act as pretense? Surprisingly little has been said on this foundational question. Here I defend an account of what it is to pretend, distinguishing pretense from a variety of related but distinct phenomena, such as (mere) copying and practicing. I show how we can distinguish pretense from sincerity by sole appeal to a person's beliefs, desires, and intentions – (...)
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  34. Shen-yi Liao & Tyler Doggett (2014). The Imagination Box. Journal of Philosophy 111 (5):259-275.
    Imaginative immersion refers to a phenomenon in which one loses oneself in make-believe. Susanna Schellenberg says that the best explanation of imaginative immersion involves a radical revision to cognitive architecture. Instead of there being an attitude of belief and a distinct attitude of imagination, there should only be one attitude that represents a continuum between belief and imagination. -/- We argue otherwise. Although imaginative immersion is a crucial data point for theorizing about the imagination, positing a continuum between belief and (...)
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  35. Lorne Loxterkamp (1977). Imagination. By Mary Warnock. London: Faber and Faber, 1976. Pp. 213. $25.50. Dialogue 16 (03):547-548.
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  36. Patricia M. Matthews (1996). Kant's Theory of Imagination. Review of Metaphysics 49 (4):923-925.
  37. Kengo Miyazono & Shen-yi Liao (forthcoming). The Cognitive Architecture of Imaginative Resistance. In Amy Kind (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination.
    Where is imagination in imaginative resistance? -/- We seek to answer this question by connecting two ongoing lines of inquiry in different subfields of philosophy. In philosophy of mind, philosophers have been trying to understand imaginative attitudes’ place in cognitive architecture. In aesthetics, philosophers have been trying to understand the phenomenon of imaginative resistance. By connecting these two lines of inquiry, we hope to find mutual illumination of an attitude (or cluster of attitudes) and a phenomenon that have vexed philosophers. (...)
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  38. Dermot Moran (1989). The Wake of Imagination. Irish Philosophical Journal 6 (2):311-314.
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  39. Bence Nanay (forthcoming). The Role of Imagination in Decision-Making. Mind and Language.
    The psychological mechanism of decision-making has traditionally been modeled with the help of belief-desire psychology: the agent has some desires (or other pro-attitudes) and some background beliefs and deciding between two possible actions is a matter of comparing the probability of the satisfaction of these desires given the background beliefs in the case of the performance of each action. There is a wealth of recent empirical findings about how we actually make decisions that seems to be in conflict with this (...)
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  40. Shaun Nichols (2006). Just the Imagination: Why Imagining Doesn't Behave Like Believing. Mind and Language 21 (4):459–474.
    According to recent accounts of the imagination, mental mechanisms that can take input from both imagining and from believing will process imagination-based inputs (pretense representations) and isomorphic beliefs in much the same way. That is, such a mechanism should produce similar outputs whether its input is the belief that p or the pretense representation that p. Unfortunately, there seem to be clear counterexamples to this hypothesis, for in many cases, imagining that p and believing that p have quite different psychological (...)
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  41. Dmitri Nikulin (2008). Imagination and Mathematics in Proclus. Ancient Philosophy 28 (1):153-172.
  42. Kieron P. O'Connor & Frederick Aardema (2005). The Imagination: Cognitive, Pre-Cognitive, and Meta-Cognitive Aspects. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2):233-256.
    This article is an attempt to situate imagination within consciousness complete with its own pre-cognitive, cognitive, and meta-cognitive domains. In the first sections we briefly review traditional philosophical and psychological conceptions of the imagination. The majority have viewed perception and imagination as separate faculties, performing distinct functions. A return to a phenomenological account of the imagination suggests that divisions between perception and imagination are transcended by precognitive factors of sense of reality and non-reality where perception and imagination play an indivisible (...)
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  43. J. Douglas Rabb (1975). Prolegomenon to a Phenomenology of Imagination. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (September):74-81.
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  44. Gillian Robinson & John F. Rundell (eds.) (1994). Rethinking Imagination: Culture and Creativity. Routledge.
    Discusses the different ways in which the concept of imagination has been construed, and provides fascinating glimpses of the role of imagination in the creation and management of Modernity.
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  45. Lilly-Marlene Russow (1980). Towards a Theory of Imagination. Southern Journal of Philosophy 18 (3):353-370.
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  46. Lilly-Marlene Russow (1978). Some Recent Work on Imagination. American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (January):57-66.
    This article tries to provide an overview of work on imagination in the last twenty years. The discussion section examines such areas as arguments for and against mental images, The problem of reference in imagination, And theories of imagination such as those formulated by dennett, Hannay, Scruton, And others; I also outline some related questions (e.G., Imaginability) which seem closely tied to questions about imagination itself. There is also an extensive bibliography concentrating on works which appeared between 1957 and 1977.
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  47. Fiora Salis, Imagination. Online Companion to Problems in Analytic Philosophy.
    In this entry I will offer a systematic novel taxonomy of our imaginative abilities coherent with standard treatments in cognitive science, philosophy of mind and aesthetics. In particular, I will distinguish between the non-propositional imagination and the propositional imagination, which include several further sub-varieties such as the objectual imagination, imagery, experiential imagination, supposition, make-believe and more.
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  48. Susanna Schellenberg (2013). Belief and Desire in Imagination and Immersion. Journal of Philosophy 110 (9):497-517.
    I argue that any account of imagination should satisfy the following three desiderata. First, imaginations induce actions only in conjunction with beliefs about the environment of the imagining subject. Second, there is a continuum between imaginations and beliefs. Recognizing this continuum is crucial to explain the phenomenon of imaginative immersion. Third, the mental states that relate to imaginations in the way that desires relate to beliefs are a special kind of desire, namely desires to make true in fiction. These desires (...)
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  49. J. M. Shorter (1952). Imagination. Mind 61 (October):528-542.
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  50. Neil Sinhababu (2013). Distinguishing Belief and Imagination. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):152-165.
    Some philosophers (including Urmson, Humberstone, Shah, and Velleman) hold that believing that p distinctively involves applying a norm according to which the truth of p is a criterion for the success or correctness of the attitude. On this view, imagining and assuming differ from believing in that no such norm is applied. I argue against this view with counterexamples showing that applying the norm of truth is neither necessary nor sufficient for distinguishing believing from imagining and assuming. Then I argue (...)
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