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  1. Samuel A. Alexander (2014). A Machine That Knows Its Own Code. Studia Logica 102 (3):567-576.
    We construct a machine that knows its own code, at the price of not knowing its own factivity.
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  2. Luis M. Augusto (2006). A Little Idealism Is Idealism Enough. Idealistic Studies 36 (1):61-73.
    Given the evidence available today, we know that the later Middle Ages knew strong forms of idealism. However, Plato alone will not do to explain some of its features. Aristotle was the most important philosophical authority in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, but until now no one dared explore in his thought the roots of this idealism because of the dogma of realism surrounding him. I challenge this dogma, showing that the Stagirite contained in his thought the roots of idealist (...)
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  3. Murat Bac & Nurbay Irmak (2011). Knowing Wrongly: An Obvious Oxymoron, or a Threat for the Alleged Universality of Epistemological Analyses? Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):305-321.
    The traditional tripartite and tetrapartite analyses describe the conceptual components of propositional knowledge from a universal epistemic point of view. According to the classical analysis, since truth is a necessary condition of knowledge, it does not make sense to talk about “false knowledge” or “knowing wrongly.” There are nonetheless some natural languages in which speakers ordinarily make statements about a person’s knowing a given subject matter wrongly. In this paper, we first provide a brief analysis of “knowing wrongly” in Turkish. (...)
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  4. Nathan Ballantyne (2011). Anti-Luck Epistemology, Pragmatic Encroachment, and True Belief. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):485-503.
  5. Kelly Becker (2007). Epistemology Modalized. Routledge.
    Introduction: externalism and modalism -- Externalism -- Modalism -- What should the theory do? -- What's missing? -- Process reliabilism -- Goldman's causal theory -- Goldman's discrimination requirement and relevant alternatives -- Process reliabilism and why it is not enough -- Implications for skepticism -- Sensitivity -- Nozick's subjunctive conditional theory of knowledge -- Methods : an important refinement -- Objections to nozicks theory -- Safety -- Motivating safety -- Weak and strong safety : luck and induction -- Is safety (...)
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  6. Carolyn Black (1971). Knowledge Without Belief. Analysis 31 (5):152-158.
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  7. Joel Buenting (2010). An Epistemic Reduction of Contrastive Knowledge Claims. Social Epistemology 24 (2):99-104.
    Contrastive epistemologists say knowledge displays the ternary relation “ S knows p rather than q ”. I argue that “ S knows p rather than q ” is often equivalent to “ S knows p rather than not- p ” and hence equivalent to “ S knows p ”. The result is that contrastive knowledge is often binary knowledge disguised.
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  8. Andrew Chignell (2003). Accidentally True Belief and Warrant. Synthese 137 (3):445 - 458.
    The Proper Functionist account of warrant – like many otherexternalist accounts – is vulnerable to certain Gettier-style counterexamples involving accidentally true beliefs. In this paper, I briefly survey the development of the account, noting the way it was altered in response to such counterexamples. I then argue that Alvin Plantinga's latest amendment to the account is flawed insofar as it rules out cases of true beliefs which do intuitively strike us as knowledge, and that a conjecture recently put forward by (...)
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  9. Matthew Chrisman (2012). The Normative Evaluation of Belief and the Aspectual Classification of Belief and Knowledge Attributions'. Journal of Philosophy 109 (10):588–612.
    It is a piece of philosophical commonsense that belief and knowledge are states. Some epistemologists reject this claim in hope of answering certain difficult questions about the normative evaluation of belief. I shall argue, however, that this move offends not only against philosophical commonsense but also against ordinary common sense, at least as far as this is manifested in the semantic content of the words we use to talk about belief and knowledge. I think it is relatively easily to show (...)
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  10. Elijah Chudnoff (2011). What Should a Theory of Knowledge Do? Dialectica 65 (4):561-579.
    The Gettier Problem is the problem of revising the view that knowledge is justified true belief in a way that is immune to Gettier counter-examples. The “Gettier Problem problem”, according to Lycan, is the problem of saying what is misguided about trying to solve the Gettier Problem. In this paper I take up the Gettier Problem problem. I distinguish giving conditions that are necessary and sufficient for knowledge from giving conditions that explain why one knows when one does know. I (...)
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  11. Christian Coseru (2009). Buddhist 'Foundationalism' and the Phenomenology of Perception. Philosophy East and West 59 (4):409-439.
    In this essay, which draws on a set of interrelated issues in the phenomenology of perception, I call into question the assumption that Buddhist philosophers of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti tradition pursue a kind of epistemic foundationalism. I argue that the embodied cognition paradigm, which informs recent efforts within the Western philosophical tradition to overcome the Cartesian legacy, can be also found– albeit in a modified form–in the Buddhist epistemological tradition. In seeking to ground epistemology in the phenomenology of cognition, the Buddhist (...)
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  12. Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic (2008). Knowledge Generation as Natural Computation. Journal of Systemics, Cybernetics and Informatics 6 (2).
    Knowledge generation can be naturalized by adopting computational model of cognition and evolutionary approach. In this framework knowledge is seen as a result of the structuring of input data (data → information → knowledge) by an interactive computational process going on in the agent during the adaptive interplay with the environment, which clearly presents developmental advantage by increasing agent’s ability to cope with the situation dynamics. This paper addresses the mechanism of knowledge generation, a process that may be modeled as (...)
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  13. Stephen Downes (2008). An Introduction to Connective Knowledge. In Theo Hug (ed.), Media, Knowledge & Education - Exploring new Spaces, Relations and Dynamics in Digital Media Ecologies. Innsbruck University Press.
    This paper provides an overview of connective knowledge. It is intended to be an introduction, expressed as non-technically as possible.
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  14. Chad Engelland (2013). History of Epistemology. In R. L. Fastiggi (ed.), New Catholic Encyclopedia 2012-2013: Ethics and Philosophy. Gale (2013).
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  15. Hector Ferreiro (2010). La Relación Entre Lenguaje y Pensamiento En El Sistema Hegeliano. In Carlos Oliva Mendoza (ed.), Hegel: Ciencia, experiencia y fenomenología. Ediciones de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.
    Además de la percepción sensible y del conocimiento por medio de conceptos abstractos, Hegel distingue una tercera forma específica de conocer de la inteligencia humana, a saber: el “pensar”. Hegel define el pensar como la unidad del objeto y el sujeto. Ahora bien, ¿no es el objeto exterior dado a la percepción sensible después de todo siempre diferente del contenido de la representación abstracta del sujeto? Si con la categoría “pensar” Hegel no se refiere en realidad a una forma más (...)
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  16. Michael Hannon (forthcoming). The Universal Core of Knowledge. Synthese.
    Many epistemologists think we can derive important theoretical insights by investigating the English word ‘know’ or the concept it expresses. However, fewer than six percent of the world’s population are native English speakers, and some empirical evidence suggests that the concept of knowledge is culturally relative. So why should we think that facts about the word ‘know’ or the concept it expresses have important ramifications for epistemology? In this paper, I argue that the concept of knowledge is universal (expressed by (...)
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  17. Michael Hannon (2013). Is Knowledge True Belief Plus Adequate Information? Erkenntnis (5):1-8.
    In When is True Belief Knowledge? (2012) Richard Foley proposes an original and strikingly simple theory of knowledge: a subject S knows some proposition p if and only if S truly believes that p and does not lack any important information. If this view is correct, Foley allegedly solves a wide variety of epistemological problems, such as the Gettier problem, the lottery paradox, the so-called ‘value problem’, and the problem of skepticism. However, a central component of his view is that (...)
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  18. Devin Henry (2012). A Sharp Eye for Kinds: Plato on Collection and Division. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 41 (January):229-55.
    This paper focuses on two methodological questions that arise from Plato’s account of collection and division. First, what place does the method of collection and division occupy in Plato’s account of philosophical inquiry? Second, do collection and division in fact constitute a formal “method” (as most scholars assume) or are they simply informal techniques that the philosopher has in her toolkit for accomplishing different philosophical tasks? I argue that Plato sees collection and division as useful tools for achieving two distinct (...)
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  19. Avram Hiller (2013). Knowledge Essentially Based Upon False Belief. Logos and Episteme 4 (1):7-19.
    Richard Feldman and William Lycan have defended a view according to which a necessary condition for a doxastic agent to have knowledge is that the agent’s belief is not essentially based on any false assumptions. I call this the no-essential-false-assumption account, or NEFA. Peter Klein considers examples of what he calls “useful false beliefs” and alters his own account of knowledge in a way which can be seen as a refinement of NEFA. This paper shows that NEFA, even given Klein’s (...)
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  20. Joachim Horvath (forthcoming). Taking the Metaphysics of Knowledge Seriously: A Response to Sven Bernecker’s “On the Metaphysics of Knowledge”. In Markus Gabriel, Wolfram Hogrebe & Andreas Speer (eds.), Das neue Bedürfnis nach Metaphysik – The New Desire for Metaphysics. Akademie Verlag.
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  21. Joachim Horvath (2008). Testimony, Transmission, and Safety. Abstracta 4 (1):27-43.
    Most philosophers believe that testimony is not a fundamental source of knowledge, but merely a way to transmit already existing knowledge. However, Jennifer Lackey has presented some counterexamples which show that one can actually come to know something through testimony that no one ever knew before. Yet, the intuitive idea can be preserved by the weaker claim that someone in a knowledge-constituting testimonial chain has to have access to some non-testimonial source of knowledge with regard to what is testified. But (...)
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  22. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2003). Infallibilism and Gettier's Legacy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):304 - 327.
    Infallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we assess three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism, arguments that do not depend on a prior commitment to some substantive theory of warrant. Three premises, one from each argument, are most significant: (1) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then the Gettier Problem cannot be solved; (2) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then its warrant can (...)
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  23. Richard Hull, Almeder's Unknowable Defeater Defeated.
    Robert Almeder has argued1 that three “fourth conditions” for nondefectiveness of knowledge justification claims, proposed in the recent literature,2 are essentially similar, require modification in order to eliminate the possibility of an unknowable defeater, and, so modified, render attainment of non-basic factual knowledge impossible. Although I believe there are objections to be raised against his exposition and reduction of the three proposed fourth conditions, I wish only to raise some doubts about the supposed necessity of the modifications and then to (...)
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  24. Benjamin Jarvis (2013). Knowledge, Cognitive Achievement, and Environmental Luck. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):529-551.
    This article defends the view that knowledge is type-identical to cognitive achievement. I argue, pace Duncan Pritchard, that not only knowledge, but also cognitive achievement is incompatible with environmental luck. I show that the performance of cognitive abilities in environmental luck cases does not distinguish them from non-abilities per se. For this reason, although the cognitive abilities of the subject are exercised in environmental luck cases, they are not manifested in any relevant sense. I conclude by showing that this explanation (...)
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  25. C. S. Jenkins (2006). Knowledge and Explanation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):137-163.
    I propose a necessary and sufficient condition on knowledge in terms of explanation.
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  26. Lu Jiang (2013). Das Schematismuskapitel in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Akademische Verlagsgemeinschaft München.
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  27. Albert A. Johnstone (1991). The Need for Warrant. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (3):541-556.
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  28. Eric T. Kerr & Duncan Pritchard (2012). Skepticism and Information. In Hilmi Demir (ed.), Philosophy of Engineering and Technology Volume 8. Springer.
    Philosophers of information, according to Luciano Floridi (The philosophy of information. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, p 32), study how information should be “adequately created, processed, managed, and used.” A small number of epistemologists have employed the concept of information as a cornerstone of their theoretical framework. How this concept can be used to make sense of seemingly intractable epistemological problems, however, has not been widely explored. This paper examines Fred Dretske’s information-based epistemology, in particular his response to radical epistemological (...)
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  29. David Kirsh (2009). Knowledge, Implicit Vs Explicit. In T. Bayne, A. Cleeremans & P. Wilken (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Cambridge. 397--402.
    In the scientific study of mind a distinction is drawn between explicit knowledge–knowledge that can be elicited from a subject by suitable inquiry or prompting, can be brought to consciousness, and externally expressed in words–and implicit knowledge–knowledge that cannot be elicited, cannot be made directly conscious, and cannot be articulated. Michael Polanyi (1967) argued that we usually ‘know more than we can say’. The part we can articulate is explicitly known; the part we cannot is implicit.
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  30. Peter D. Klein (2003). Knowledge is True, Non-Defeated Justified Belief. In Luper Steven (ed.), Essential Knowledge. :ongman.
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  31. Hilary Kornblith (2008). Knowledge Needs No Justification. In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press. 5--23.
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  32. Jonathan Kvanvig (2008). ``Critical Notice of Pritchard's E Pistemic Luck &Quot. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77:272-281.
    Duncan Pritchard’s book (Epistemic Luck, Oxford University Press, 2005) concerns the interplay between two disturbing kinds of epistemic luck, termed “reflective” and “veritic,” and two types of arguments for skepticism, one based on a closure principle for knowledge and the other on an underdetermination thesis about the quality of our evidence for the everyday propositions we believe. Pritchard defends the view that a safety-based account of knowledge can answer the closure argument and provide an account of how veritic epistemic luck (...)
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  33. Cathy Legg (1994). Alan Musgrave, Common Sense, Science and Scepticism: A Historical Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 14 (5):336-339.
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  34. Franck Lihoreau (2008). Relevant Alternatives Contextualism and Ordinary Contingent Knowledge. Disputatio 2 (24):281-294.
    According to David Lewis’s contextualist analysis of knowledge, there can be contexts in which a subject counts as knowing a proposition just because every possibility that this proposition might be false is irrelevant in those contexts. In this paper I argue that, in some cases at least, Lewis’ analysis results in granting people non-evidentially based knowledge of ordinary contingent truths which, intuitively, cannot be known but on the basis of appropriate evidence.
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  35. Nicholas Maxwell (1992). What Kind of Inquiry Can Best Help Us Create a Good World?,. Science, Technology and Human Values 17:205-227.
    In order to create a good world, we need to learn how to do it - how to resolve our appalling problems and conflicts in more cooperative ways than at present. And in order to do this, we need traditions and institutions of learning rationally devoted to this end. When viewed from this standpoint, what we have at present - academic inquiry devoted to the pursuit of knowledge and technological know-how - is an intellectual and human disaster. We urgently need (...)
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  36. Francisco Miró Quesada (1983). Ortega y el conocimiento absoluto. Ideas Y Valores 63:31-46.
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  37. Ricardo Restrepo (2013). Realismo científico, computacionalismo y la máxima pragmática. In Douglas Anderson, Ricardo Restrepo, Victor Hugo Chica & Diana Patricia Carmona (eds.), El pragmatismo norteamericano. IAEN.
    Se identifica el argumento de que la teoría de que hay propiedades computacionales suficientes para propiedades mentales es una teoría o falsa o vacía, ya que las propiedades computacionales no son empíricamente descubriles, intrínsecas ni causales, como sí lo son las propiedades mentales. Es un argumento que se puede destilar de los problemas que John Searle imputa a la ciencia cognitiva computacional, pero encuentra su correlato antecedente en el argumento que Max Newman utilizó para refutar el estructuralismo físico de Bertrand (...)
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  38. Ricardo Restrepo (2013). Realismo científico, computacionalismo y la máxima pragmática. In Douglas Anderson, Ricardo Restrepo, Victor Hugo Chica & Diana Patricia Carmona (eds.), El pragmatismo norteamericano.
    Se identifica el argumento de que la teoría de que hay propiedades computacionales suficientes para propiedades mentales es una teoría o falsa o vacía, ya que las propiedades computacionales no son empíricamente descubriles, intrínsecas ni causales, como sí lo son las propiedades mentales. Es un argumento que se puede destilar de los problemas que John Searle imputa a la ciencia cognitiva computacional, pero encuentra su correlato antecedente en el argumento que Max Newman utilizó para refutar el estructuralismo físico de Bertrand (...)
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  39. Aaron Rizzieri (2011). Pragmatic Encroachment, Stakes, and Religious Knowledge. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (3):217-229.
    It is commonly held that epistemic standards for S ’s knowledge that p are affected by practical considerations, such as what is at stake in decisions that are guided by that p . I defend a particular view as to why this is, that is referred to as “pragmatic encroachment.” I then discuss a “new argument against miracles” that uses stakes considerations in order to explore the conditions under which stakes affect the level of epistemic support that is required for (...)
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  40. Mark Schroeder, Knowledge is Belief for Sufficient (Objective and Subjective) Reason.
    This paper defends a simple thesis: that knowledge is belief for reasons that are both objectively and subjectively sufficient. I take a dogmatic approach, devoting the bulk of the paper to an explanation of what this means, and of why it explains both what knowledge is like, and why it is important; the theory is justified by its fruits. I go on to illustrate, by appeal to my main thesis, how knowledge comes to play some of the key roles that (...)
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  41. Jonah N. Schupbach (2010). Review of Ernest Sosa, Reflective Knowledge: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume II. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 63 (3):722-724.
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  42. Ernest Sosa (1986). Presuppositions of Empirical Knowledge. Philosophical Papers 15 (2-3):75-87.
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  43. Ernest Sosa (1970). Two Conceptions of Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 67 (3):59-66.
    Knowledge of the nature of knowledge is deplorably scarce. Fortunately, the reason is not lack of interest. On the contrary, the bewildering variety of competing theories is part of the problem. It is to, be hoped, however, that intensive discussion of such theories will help reduce the scarcity. In what follows I want to contribute to this end by briefly discussing two of the theories.
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  44. Mark Textor (2011). Knowing the Facts. Dialectica 65 (1):75-86.
    Keith Hossack argues in his The Metaphysics of Knowledge(2007) that knowledge is a simple and metaphysically fundamental relation between a thinker and a fact: knowledge is uptake of fact. Facts are conceived as combinations of particulars and universals, distinct from true propositions. Hossacks's general argument is, roughly, that one can define central philosophical concepts (belief, content, justification, etc.) if one assumes that knowledge is primitive, but that knowledge cannot be defined in terms of such concepts. In this paper, I will (...)
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  45. Nicla Vassallo (2003). Teoria della conoscenza. Laterza.
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  46. Nicla Vassallo (2003). Teoria Della Conoscenza. Laterza.
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  47. Jonathan Vogel (1999). The New Relevant Alternatives Theory. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):155-180.
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  48. Lisa Warenski (2014). When Is True Belief Knowledge? By Richard Foley. [REVIEW] Mind 123 (491):894-98.
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  49. Anderson Weekes (1996). Between Positivism and Phenomenology: Brentano's Philosophy of Science. Dissertation, State University Of New York at Stony Brook
  50. Jonathan Weisberg (2012). The Bootstrapping Problem. Philosophy Compass 7 (9):597-610.
    Bootstrapping is a suspicious form of reasoning that verifies a source's reliability by checking it against itself. Theories that endorse such reasoning face the bootstrapping problem. This article considers which theories face the problem, and surveys potential solutions. The initial focus is on theories like reliabilism and dogmatism, which allow one to gain knowledge from a source without knowing that it is reliable. But the discussion quickly turns to a more general version of the problem that does not depend on (...)
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