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  1. Samuel A. Alexander (2014). A Machine That Knows Its Own Code. Studia Logica 102 (3):567-576.
    We construct a machine that knows its own code, at the price of not knowing its own factivity.
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  2. Luis M. Augusto (2006). A Little Idealism Is Idealism Enough. Idealistic Studies 36 (1):61-73.
    Given the evidence available today, we know that the later Middle Ages knew strong forms of idealism. However, Plato alone will not do to explain some of its features. Aristotle was the most important philosophical authority in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, but until now no one dared explore in his thought the roots of this idealism because of the dogma of realism surrounding him. I challenge this dogma, showing that the Stagirite contained in his thought the roots of idealist (...)
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  3. Guy Axtell (2012). Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity. By John Greco. (Cambridge UP, 2010. Pp. X + 205. Price £17.99/US$29.99.). [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):208-211.
    A Review of John Greco's book Acheiving Knowledge. The critical points I make involve three claims Greco makes that represent common ground between the reliabilists (including agent reliabilists like himself) and the character epistemologists (which would include myself): I. Such virtues are often needed to make our cognitive abilities reliable (to turn mere faculties into excellences); II. Such virtues might be essentially involved in goods other than knowledge; III. Such virtues might be valuable in themselves.
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  4. Murat Bac & Nurbay Irmak (2011). Knowing Wrongly: An Obvious Oxymoron, or a Threat for the Alleged Universality of Epistemological Analyses? Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):305-321.
    The traditional tripartite and tetrapartite analyses describe the conceptual components of propositional knowledge from a universal epistemic point of view. According to the classical analysis, since truth is a necessary condition of knowledge, it does not make sense to talk about “false knowledge” or “knowing wrongly.” There are nonetheless some natural languages in which speakers ordinarily make statements about a person’s knowing a given subject matter wrongly. In this paper, we first provide a brief analysis of “knowing wrongly” in Turkish. (...)
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  5. Nathan Ballantyne (2011). Anti-Luck Epistemology, Pragmatic Encroachment, and True Belief. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):485-503.
  6. Peter Baumann (2015). Safety, Virtue, Scepticism: Remarks on Sosa. Croatian Journal of Philosophy (45):295-306.
    Ernest Sosa has made and continues to make major contributions to a wide variety of topics in epistemology. In this paper I discuss some of his core ideas about the nature of knowledge and scepticism. I start with a discussion of the safety account of knowledge – a view he has championed and further developed over the years. I continue with some questions concerning the role of the concept of an epistemic virtue for our understanding of knowledge. Safety and virtue (...)
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  7. Kelly Becker (2007). Epistemology Modalized. Routledge.
    Introduction: externalism and modalism -- Externalism -- Modalism -- What should the theory do? -- What's missing? -- Process reliabilism -- Goldman's causal theory -- Goldman's discrimination requirement and relevant alternatives -- Process reliabilism and why it is not enough -- Implications for skepticism -- Sensitivity -- Nozick's subjunctive conditional theory of knowledge -- Methods : an important refinement -- Objections to nozicks theory -- Safety -- Motivating safety -- Weak and strong safety : luck and induction -- Is safety (...)
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  8. Carolyn Black (1971). Knowledge Without Belief. Analysis 31 (5):152-158.
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  9. Patrick Bondy & Dustin Olson (2015). Getting Off the Wheel. Metaphilosophy 46 (4-5):620-637.
    Roderick Chisholm argues that in giving an account of knowledge, we must either begin with an account of what knowledge is, and proceed on that basis to identify the particular things that we know, or else start with instances of knowledge, and proceed on that basis to formulate a definition of knowledge. Either approach begs the question against the other. This is the epistemic wheel. This article responds to Chisholm's challenge. It begins with cases of knowledge attribution and builds its (...)
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  10. Kenny Boyce & Andrew Moon (forthcoming). In Defense of Proper Functionalism: Cognitive Science Takes on Swampman. Synthese:1-15.
    According to proper functionalist theories of warrant, a belief is warranted only if it is formed by cognitive faculties that are properly functioning according to a good, truth-aimed design plan, one that is often thought to be specified either by intentional design or by natural selection. A formidable challenge to proper functionalist theories is the Swampman objection, according to which there are scenarios involving creatures who have warranted beliefs but whose cognitive faculties are not properly functioning, or are poorly designed, (...)
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  11. Joel Buenting (2010). An Epistemic Reduction of Contrastive Knowledge Claims. Social Epistemology 24 (2):99-104.
    Contrastive epistemologists say knowledge displays the ternary relation “S knows p rather than q”. I argue that “S knows p rather than q” is often equivalent to “S knows p rather than not-p” and hence equivalent to “S knows p”. The result is that contrastive knowledge is often binary knowledge disguised.
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  12. Andrew Chignell (2003). Accidentally True Belief and Warrant. Synthese 137 (3):445 - 458.
    The Proper Functionist account of warrant – like many otherexternalist accounts – is vulnerable to certain Gettier-style counterexamples involving accidentally true beliefs. In this paper, I briefly survey the development of the account, noting the way it was altered in response to such counterexamples. I then argue that Alvin Plantinga's latest amendment to the account is flawed insofar as it rules out cases of true beliefs which do intuitively strike us as knowledge, and that a conjecture recently put forward by (...)
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  13. Matthew Chrisman (2012). The Normative Evaluation of Belief and the Aspectual Classification of Belief and Knowledge Attributions'. Journal of Philosophy 109 (10):588–612.
    It is a piece of philosophical commonsense that belief and knowledge are states. Some epistemologists reject this claim in hope of answering certain difficult questions about the normative evaluation of belief. I shall argue, however, that this move offends not only against philosophical commonsense but also against ordinary common sense, at least as far as this is manifested in the semantic content of the words we use to talk about belief and knowledge. I think it is relatively easily to show (...)
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  14. Elijah Chudnoff (2011). What Should a Theory of Knowledge Do? Dialectica 65 (4):561-579.
    The Gettier Problem is the problem of revising the view that knowledge is justified true belief in a way that is immune to Gettier counter-examples. The “Gettier Problem problem”, according to Lycan, is the problem of saying what is misguided about trying to solve the Gettier Problem. In this paper I take up the Gettier Problem problem. I distinguish giving conditions that are necessary and sufficient for knowledge from giving conditions that explain why one knows when one does know. I (...)
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  15. Christian Coseru (2009). Buddhist 'Foundationalism' and the Phenomenology of Perception. Philosophy East and West 59 (4):409-439.
    In this essay, which draws on a set of interrelated issues in the phenomenology of perception, I call into question the assumption that Buddhist philosophers of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti tradition pursue a kind of epistemic foundationalism. I argue that the embodied cognition paradigm, which informs recent efforts within the Western philosophical tradition to overcome the Cartesian legacy, can be also found– albeit in a modified form–in the Buddhist epistemological tradition. In seeking to ground epistemology in the phenomenology of cognition, the Buddhist (...)
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  16. Ron C. de Weijze, Constructive Recollection Philosophy Application.
    Constructive recollection is a systematic retake of philosophical Modernism, which is mainly characterized by "duality of origin" (Bergson 1932) as is central to Christianity in the separation of body and mind, which was studied scientifically for the first time in the 17th century (Descartes 1644) and articulated best in the 18th century (Kant 1781-1793). The two sources are presumed to be what-is-sensed (Kant: sensibility) and knowing (Kant: understanding) and both sources are presumed to coordinately reflect themselves, as sensing by what-is-sensed (...)
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  17. Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic (2008). Knowledge Generation as Natural Computation. Journal of Systemics, Cybernetics and Informatics 6 (2).
    Knowledge generation can be naturalized by adopting computational model of cognition and evolutionary approach. In this framework knowledge is seen as a result of the structuring of input data (data → information → knowledge) by an interactive computational process going on in the agent during the adaptive interplay with the environment, which clearly presents developmental advantage by increasing agent’s ability to cope with the situation dynamics. This paper addresses the mechanism of knowledge generation, a process that may be modeled as (...)
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  18. Stephen Downes (2008). An Introduction to Connective Knowledge. In Theo Hug (ed.), Media, Knowledge & Education - Exploring new Spaces, Relations and Dynamics in Digital Media Ecologies. Innsbruck University Press
    This paper provides an overview of connective knowledge. It is intended to be an introduction, expressed as non-technically as possible.
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  19. Jacques Dubucs & Sandra Lapointe (2006). On Bolzano’s Alleged Explicativism. Synthese 150 (2):229-246.
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  20. Julien Dutant (2010). Qu’est-ce que la connaissance? Vrin.
    Dans cet ouvrage, l’auteur discute d’abord un un ensemble d’idées de sens commun qui permettent de mieux cerner la notion de connaissance : nous savons beaucoup de choses, ce que nous savons ne vient pas toujours des sciences, tout ce que nous savons est vrai, la connaissance est le but de l’enquête, on ne doit croire et affirmer que ce que l’on sait, on ne doit agir que sur la base de ce que l’on sait, la connaissance a de la (...)
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  21. Chad Engelland (2013). History of Epistemology. In R. L. Fastiggi (ed.), New Catholic Encyclopedia 2012-2013: Ethics and Philosophy. Gale (2013).
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  22. Hector Ferreiro (2010). La Relación Entre Lenguaje y Pensamiento En El Sistema Hegeliano. In Carlos Oliva Mendoza (ed.), Hegel: Ciencia, experiencia y fenomenología. Ediciones de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
    Además de la percepción sensible y del conocimiento por medio de conceptos abstractos, Hegel distingue una tercera forma específica de conocer de la inteligencia humana, a saber: el “pensar”. Hegel define el pensar como la unidad del objeto y el sujeto. Ahora bien, ¿no es el objeto exterior dado a la percepción sensible después de todo siempre diferente del contenido de la representación abstracta del sujeto? Si con la categoría “pensar” Hegel no se refiere en realidad a una forma más (...)
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  23. Mikkel Gerken (forthcoming). Against Knowledge-First Epistemology. In Gordon and Jarvis Carter (ed.), Knowledge-First Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press
    I begin by criticizing reductionist knowledge-first epistemology according to which knowledge can be used to reductively analyze other epistemic phenomena. My central concern is that proponents of such an approach commit a similar mistake to the one that they charge their opponents with. This is the mistake of seeking to reductively analyze basic epistemic phenomena in terms of other allegedly more fundamental phenomena. I then turn to non-reductionist brands of knowledge-first epistemology. Specifically, I consider the knowledge (...)
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  24. Edmund L. Gettier & Paulo Vélez León (2013). ¿Una creencia verdadera justificada es conocimiento? [Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?]. Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 2 (3):185-193.
    [ES] En este breve trabajo, se presenta una edición bilingüe de Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? (1963), de Edmund L. Gettier, donde se presentan contraejemplos a la definición de «conocimiento» como «creencia verdadera justificada». [ES] In this brief text, a bilingual edition of Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, (1963) by Edmund L. Gettier, some counterexamples are presented to the definition of «knowledge» as «justified true belief».
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  25. Azam Golam (2006). Some Reflections on Gettier's Problem. The Dhaka University Studies,June 2006 (1):83-97.
  26. Yoji K. Gondor (ed.) (2013). The Delude. Sintesi Point Publishing.
    The amount of data to which a human is exposed has increased over time. The Delude is defined here as an individual that is overwhelmed by various incoherent and false assertions that data contains. This writing is a philosophical study that reflects on the epistemic conditions in which knowledge is accumulated. It is obvious that large amounts of falsehood, when regarded as truth, can induce heavy damage to anyone's intellect. -/- Frequently, a faulty mental state is induced by corrupt knowledge. (...)
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  27. Rowan Grigg, The Lattice Milieu.
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  28. Michael Hannon (2015). The Importance of Knowledge Ascriptions. Philosophy Compass 10 (12):856-866.
    Knowledge ascriptions of the form ‘S knows that p’ are a central area of research in philosophy. But why do humans think and talk about knowledge? What are knowledge ascriptions for? This article surveys a variety of proposals about the role of knowledge ascriptions and attempts to provide a unified account of these seemingly distinct views.
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  29. Michael Hannon (2015). The Universal Core of Knowledge. Synthese 192 (3):769-786.
    Many epistemologists think we can derive important theoretical insights by investigating the English word ‘know’ or the concept it expresses. However, fewer than six percent of the world’s population are native English speakers, and some empirical evidence suggests that the concept of knowledge is culturally relative. So why should we think that facts about the word ‘know’ or the concept it expresses have important ramifications for epistemology? This paper argues that the concept of knowledge is universal: it is expressed by (...)
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  30. Michael Hannon (2014). Fallibilism and the Value of Knowledge. Synthese 191 (6):1119-1146.
    This paper defends the epistemological doctrine of fallibilism from recent objections. In “The Myth of Knowledge” Laurence BonJour argues that we should reject fallibilism for two main reasons: first, there is no adequate way to specify what level of justification is required for fallible knowledge; second, we cannot explain why any level of justification that is less than fully conclusive should have the significance that makes knowledge valuable. I will reply to these challenges in a way that allows me to (...)
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  31. Michael Hannon (2014). Is Knowledge True Belief Plus Adequate Information? Erkenntnis 79 (5):1069-1076.
    In When is True Belief Knowledge? (2012) Richard Foley proposes an original and strikingly simple theory of knowledge: a subject S knows some proposition p if and only if S truly believes that p and does not lack any important information. If this view is correct, Foley allegedly solves a wide variety of epistemological problems, such as the Gettier problem, the lottery paradox, the so-called ‘value problem’, and the problem of skepticism. However, a central component of his view is that (...)
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  32. Donna Haraway (1988). Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective. Feminist Studies 14 (3):575-599.
  33. Peter Hawke (forthcoming). Questions, Topics and Restricted Closure. Philosophical Studies:1-26.
    Single-premise epistemic closure is the principle that: if one is in an evidential position to know that P where P entails Q, then one is in an evidential position to know that Q. In this paper, I defend the viability of opposition to closure. A key task for such an opponent is to precisely formulate a restricted closure principle that remains true to the motivations for abandoning unrestricted closure but does not endorse particularly (...)
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  34. Tristan Haze (2015). Two New Counterexamples to the Truth-Tracking Theory of Knowledge. Logos and Episteme (3):309-311.
    I present two counterexamples to the recently back-in-favour truth-tracking account of knowledge: one involving a true belief resting on a counterfactually robust delusion, one involving a true belief acquired alongside a bunch of false beliefs. These counterexamples carry over to a recent modification of the theory due to Briggs and Nolan (2012), and seem invulnerable to a recent defence of the theory against known counterexamples, by Adams and Clarke (2005).
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  35. Devin Henry (2012). A Sharp Eye for Kinds: Plato on Collection and Division. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 41 (January):229-55.
    This paper focuses on two methodological questions that arise from Plato’s account of collection and division. First, what place does the method of collection and division occupy in Plato’s account of philosophical inquiry? Second, do collection and division in fact constitute a formal “method” (as most scholars assume) or are they simply informal techniques that the philosopher has in her toolkit for accomplishing different philosophical tasks? I argue that Plato sees collection and division as useful tools for achieving two distinct (...)
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  36. Kay Herrmann (forthcoming). Klaus Hentschel and Dieter Hoffmann (Eds.), Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker: Physics – Philosophy – Peace Research. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie:1-5.
    <span class='Hi'>Klaus</span> Hentschel and Dieter Hoffmann (Eds.) Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker: Physics – Philosophy – Peace Research -/- Review by Kay Herrmann.
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  37. Kay Herrmann (1994). Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843): Eine Philosophie der Exakten Wissenschaften. Tabula Rasa. Jenenser Zeitschrift Für Kritisches Denken (6).
    Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843): A Philosophy of the Exact Sciences -/- Shortened version of the article of the same name in: Tabula Rasa. Jenenser magazine for critical thinking. 6th of November 1994 edition -/- 1. Biography -/- Jakob Friedrich Fries was born on the 23rd of August, 1773 in Barby on the Elbe. Because Fries' father had little time, on account of his journeying, he gave up both his sons, of whom Jakob Friedrich was the elder, to the Herrnhut Teaching (...)
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  38. Avram Hiller (2013). Knowledge Essentially Based Upon False Belief. Logos and Episteme 4 (1):7-19.
    Richard Feldman and William Lycan have defended a view according to which a necessary condition for a doxastic agent to have knowledge is that the agent’s belief is not essentially based on any false assumptions. I call this the no-essential-false-assumption account, or NEFA. Peter Klein considers examples of what he calls “useful false beliefs” and alters his own account of knowledge in a way which can be seen as a refinement of NEFA. This paper shows that NEFA, even given Klein’s (...)
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  39. Wesley H. Holliday (2013). Response to Egré and Xu. In Johan van Benthem Fenrong Liu (ed.), Logic Across the University: Foundations and Applications. College Publications 39-46.
    In this note, I respond to comments by Paul Egré and Xu Zhaoqing on my “Epistemic Closure and Epistemic Logic I: Relevant Alternatives and Subjunctivism” (Journal of Philosophical Logic).
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  40. Joachim Horvath (2015). Taking the Metaphysics of Knowledge Seriously: A Response to the Paper of Sven Bernecker. In Andreas Speer, Wolfram Hogrebe & Markus Gabriel (eds.), Das Neue Bedürfnis Nach Metaphysik / the New Desire for Metaphysics. De Gruyter 181-188.
    Response to Sven Bernecker's "On the Metaphysics of Knowledge" in the same volume.
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  41. Joachim Horvath (2008). Testimony, Transmission, and Safety. Abstracta 4 (1):27-43.
    Most philosophers believe that testimony is not a fundamental source of knowledge, but merely a way to transmit already existing knowledge. However, Jennifer Lackey has presented some counterexamples which show that one can actually come to know something through testimony that no one ever knew before. Yet, the intuitive idea can be preserved by the weaker claim that someone in a knowledge-constituting testimonial chain has to have access to some non-testimonial source of knowledge with regard to what is testified. But (...)
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  42. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2003). Infallibilism and Gettier's Legacy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):304 - 327.
    Infallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we assess three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism, arguments that do not depend on a prior commitment to some substantive theory of warrant. Three premises, one from each argument, are most significant: (1) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then the Gettier Problem cannot be solved; (2) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then its warrant can (...)
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  43. Theo Hug (ed.) (2008). Media, Knowledge & Education - Exploring New Spaces, Relations and Dynamics in Digital Media Ecologies. Innsbruck University Press.
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  44. Richard Hull, Almeder's Unknowable Defeater Defeated.
    Robert Almeder has argued1 that three “fourth conditions” for nondefectiveness of knowledge justification claims, proposed in the recent literature,2 are essentially similar, require modification in order to eliminate the possibility of an unknowable defeater, and, so modified, render attainment of non-basic factual knowledge impossible. Although I believe there are objections to be raised against his exposition and reduction of the three proposed fourth conditions, I wish only to raise some doubts about the supposed necessity of the modifications and then to (...)
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  45. Benjamin Jarvis (2013). Knowledge, Cognitive Achievement, and Environmental Luck. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):529-551.
    This article defends the view that knowledge is type-identical to cognitive achievement. I argue, pace Duncan Pritchard, that not only knowledge, but also cognitive achievement is incompatible with environmental luck. I show that the performance of cognitive abilities in environmental luck cases does not distinguish them from non-abilities per se. For this reason, although the cognitive abilities of the subject are exercised in environmental luck cases, they are not manifested in any relevant sense. I conclude by showing that this explanation (...)
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  46. C. S. Jenkins (2006). Knowledge and Explanation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):137-163.
    I propose a necessary and sufficient condition on knowledge in terms of explanation.
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  47. Lu Jiang (2013). Das Schematismuskapitel in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Akademische Verlagsgemeinschaft München.
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  48. Albert A. Johnstone (1991). The Need for Warrant. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (3):541-556.
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  49. Mehmet Karabela (2015). Philosophy Versus Poetry. [REVIEW] The Classical Review 65 (1):58-59.
  50. Eric T. Kerr & Duncan Pritchard (2012). Skepticism and Information. In Hilmi Demir (ed.), Philosophy of Engineering and Technology Volume 8. Springer
    Philosophers of information, according to Luciano Floridi (The philosophy of information. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, p 32), study how information should be “adequately created, processed, managed, and used.” A small number of epistemologists have employed the concept of information as a cornerstone of their theoretical framework. How this concept can be used to make sense of seemingly intractable epistemological problems, however, has not been widely explored. This paper examines Fred Dretske’s information-based epistemology, in particular his response to radical epistemological (...)
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