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  1. Carla Bagnoli (2011). “Moral Perception and Knowledge by Principles”. In Jill Hernandez (ed.), New Intuitionism. Continuum 84.
  2. Kevin Behrens (2010). Exploring African Holism with Respect to the Environment. Environmental Values 19 (4):465-484.
    Contrary to a pervasive presumption of anthropocentricism in African thought, I identify an emphasis on the interrelatedness or interconnectedness of everything in nature, and argue that this is best construed as a rejection of anthropocentrism, and as something similar in conception to, and yet distinct from, holist perspectives. I propose that this strand of African thought, suitably reconstructed, should be construed as providing the basis for a promising non-anthropocentric African environmentalism. I name this position 'African Relational Environmentalism', and suggest that (...)
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  3. John G. Bennett (1986). Leading a Rational Life. Theory and Decision 20 (3):321-333.
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  4. Michael Brady (ed.) (2011). New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Metaethics occupies a central place in analytical philosophy, and the last forty years has seen an upsurge of interest in questions about the nature and practice of morality. This collection presents original and ground-breaking research on metaethical issues from some of the very best of a new generation of philosophers working in this field.
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  5. John Broome & Adam Morton (1994). The Value of a Person. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 68:167 - 198.
    (for Adam Morton's half) I argue that if we take the values of persons to be ordered in a way that allows incomparability, then the problems Broome raises have easy solutions. In particular we can maintain that creating people is morally neutral while killing them has a negative value.
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  6. Timothy Chappell (2001). J. J. Kupperman, Value … And What Follows, New York, OUP, 1999, Pp. Vi + 168. Utilitas 13 (3):373.
  7. Robert Cowan (2016). Epistemic Perceptualism and Neo-Sentimentalist Objections. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):59-81.
    Epistemic Perceptualists claim that emotions are sources of immediate defeasible justification for evaluative propositions that can sometimes ground undefeated immediately justified evaluative beliefs. For example, fear can constitute the justificatory ground for a belief that some object or event is dangerous. Despite its attractiveness, the view is apparently vulnerable to several objections. In this paper, I provide a limited defence of Epistemic Perceptualism by responding to a family of objections which all take as a premise a popular and attractive view (...)
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  8. Caleb Dewey, Transhumanist Utilitarianism.
    Ordinary utilitarianism is incapable of prescribing moral obligations with respect to cognitive change, the voluntary, regulatory action that changes a moral agent's utility function. To resolve this incompleteness, I propose a general revision, called ``transhumanization'', to all variants of utilitarianism that renders the utility function an argument in the optimization function. Transhumanization is important because it increases the complexity and sophistication of utilitarianism's theory of value. At first, this new theory of value seems to threaten utilitarianism on the whole. Upon (...)
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  9. Andrzej Elzanowski (2010). The Ethical Significance of Evolution. In Soniewicka Stelmach (ed.), Stelmach, J., Soniewicka M., Załuski W. (red.) Legal Philosophy and the Challenges of Biosciences (Studies in the Philosophy of Law 4). Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego 65-76.
    DARWIN’s (1859, 1871) discoveries have profound ethical implications that continue to be misrepresented and/or ignored. In contrast to socialdarwinistic misuses of his theory, Darwin was a great humanitarian who paved the way for an integrated scientific and ethical world view. As an ethical doctrine, socialdarwinism is long dead ever since its defeat by E. G. Moore although the socialdarwinistic thought is a hard-die in the biological community. The accusations of sociobiology for being socialdarwinistic are unfounded and stem from the moralistic (...)
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  10. Neil Feit (2001). The Structure of Higher Goods. Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):47-57.
  11. Anca Gheaus (2013). The Feasibility Constraint on The Concept of Justice. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):445-464.
    There is a widespread belief that, conceptually, justice cannot require what we cannot achieve. This belief is sometimes used by defenders of so-called ‘non-ideal theories of justice’ to criticise so-called ‘ideal theories of justice’. I refer to this claim as ‘the feasibility constraint on the concept of justice’ and argue against it. I point to its various implausible implications and contend that a willingness to apply the label ‘unjust’ to some regrettable situations that we cannot fix is going to enhance (...)
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  12. Irwin Goldstein (2003). Malicious Pleasure Evaluated: Is Pleasure an Unconditional Good? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1):24–31.
    Pleasure is one of the strongest candidates for an occurrence that might be good, in some respect, unconditionally. Malicious pleasure is one of the most often cited alleged counter-examples to pleasure’s being an unconditional good. Correctly evaluating malicious pleasure is more complex than people realize. I defend pleasure’s unconditionally good status from critics of malicious pleasure.
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  13. Christopher Grau (2010). Moral Status, Speciesism, and Liao’s Genetic Account. Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (3):387-96.
    This paper offers several criticisms of the account of rightholding laid out in S. Matthew Liao’s recent paper “The Basis of Human Moral Status.” I argue that Liao’s account both does too much and too little: it grants rightholder status to those who may not deserve it, and it does not provide grounds for offering such status to those who arguably do deserve it. Given these troubling aspects of his approach, I encourage Liao to abandon his “physical basis of (...)
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  14. Karen Green (2015). A Moral Philosophy of Their Own? The Moral and Political Thought of Eighteenth-Century British Women. The Monist 98 (1):89-101.
    Despite the fact that the High-Church Tory, Mary Astell, held political views diametrically opposed to the Whiggish Catharine Trotter Cockburn and Catharine Macaulay, it is here argued that their metaethical views were surprisingly similar. All were influenced by a blend of Christian universalism and Aristotelian eudaimonism, which accepted the existence of a law of nature, that we strive for happiness, and that happiness results from living in accord with our God-given nature. They differed with regard to epistemological issues; the means (...)
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  15. Gerald K. Harrison (2012). Antinatalism, Asymmetry, and an Ethic of Prima Facie Duties. South African Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):94-103.
    Benatar’s central argument for antinatalism develops an asymmetry between the pain and pleasure in a potential life. I am going to present an alternative route to the antinatalist conclusion. I argue that duties require victims and that as a result there is no duty to create the pleasures contained within a prospective life but a duty not to create any of its sufferings. My argument can supplement Benatar’s, but it also enjoys some advantages: it achieves a better fit with our (...)
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  16. Gerald K. Harrison & Julia Tanner (2011). Better Not to Have Children. Think, 10(27), 113-121 (27):113-121.
    Most people take it for granted that it's morally permissible to have children. They may raise questions about the number of children it's responsible to have or whether it's permissible to reproduce when there's a strong risk of serious disability. But in general, having children is considered a good thing to do, something that's morally permissible in most cases (perhaps even obligatory).
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  17. Ulrike Heuer (2010). Beyond Wrong Reasons: The Buck-Passing Account of Value. In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave Macmillan
  18. Ulrike Heuer (2004). Raz on Values and Reasons. In R. Jay Wallace, Philipp Pettit, Samuel Scheffler & Michael Smith (eds.), Reason and Value. Oxford University Press
  19. Mark Kalderon (2008). Respecting Value. European Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):341-365.
    This conference is, in part, an expression of respect for Joseph Raz and his work from which we have all learned much. I thought it apt, then, to talk about Raz's (2001) views about respect as developed in chapter four of Value, Respect, and Attachment. Raz describes his views as having a Kantian origin. This might raise the eyebrow of some neo-Kantians or anyone inclined to interpret Kant as a formalist or as a constructivist. Nevertheless, I believe that Raz's views (...)
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  20. Teresa Marques (2015). Disagreeing in Context. Frontiers in Psychology 6 (257):1-12.
    This paper argues for contextualism about predicates of personal taste and evaluative predicates in general, and offers a proposal of how apparently resilient disagreements are to be explained. The present proposal is complementary to others that have been made in the recent literature. Several authors, for instance (López de Sa, 2008; Sundell, 2011; Huvenes, 2012; Marques and García-Carpintero, 2014; Marques, 2014a), have recently defended semantic contextualism for those kinds of predicates from the accusation that it faces the problem of lost (...)
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  21. Motsamai Molefe, A Critique of Kwasi Wiredu's Moral Theory.
    This article critically engages with Kwasi Wiredu’s moral theory. I observe that major criticisms of this moral theory have not sufficiently addressed two aspects of it. Firstly, they have not exhaustively problematized Wiredu’s ‘welfarism’ – the claim that morality is definable purely in terms of welfare. In this regard, it is not clear what Wiredu and much of the African literature might mean by ‘welfare’, I give some account of this. Secondly, Wiredu’s ethical principle of sympathetic impartiality (golden rule) appears (...)
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  22. Motsamai Molefe (ed.) (2013). Critical Reflections on Gyekye's Humanism: Defending Supernaturalism. Lexington Books.
    This chapter evaluates Kwame Gyekye's argument for rejecting ethical supernaturalism in the African moral tradition (Gyekye, 2010). In this chapter, I reject Gyekye's argument for two major reasons. Firstly, I observe that Gyekye's argument is incompatible with much of African thought which is holistic, where the spiritual and physical are part of the same reality. Secondly, I criticise Gyekye for rejecting an African spiritual meta-ethics. I observe that his treatment of African meta-ethics leans heavily on Western moral theory of the (...)
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  23. Thomas S. Petersen (2009). What is It for a Life to Go Well (or Badly)?: Some Critical Comment of Waynes Sumner's Theory of Welfare. Journal of Happiness Studies 10:449-458.
    In an effort to construct a plausible theory of experience-based welfare, Wayne Sumner imposes two requirements on the relevant kind of experience: the information requirement and the autonomy requirement. I argue that both requirements are problematic.First, I argue (very briefly) that a well-know case like ‘the deceived businessman’ need not support the information requirement as Sumner believes. Second, I introduce a case designed to cast further doubt on the information requirement. Third, I attend to a shortcoming in Sumner’s theory of (...)
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  24. Erich Rast (2016). Harming Yourself and Others: A Note on the Asymmetry of Agency in Action Evaluations. Polish Journal of Philosophy, Vol. VIII, No. 2 (2014) (2):65-74.
    Principles are investigated that allow one to establish a preference ordering between possible actions based on the question of whether the acting agent himself or other agents will benefit or be harmed by the consequences of an action. It is shown that a combination of utility maximization, an altruist principle, and weak negative utilitarianism yields an ordering that seems to be intuitively appealing, although it does not necessarily reflect common everyday evaluations of actions.
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  25. Andrew Reisner (2015). Fittingness, Value and Trans-World Attitudes. Philosophical Quarterly (260):1-22.
    Philosophers interested in the fitting attitude analysis of final value have devoted a great deal of attention to the wrong kind of reasons problem. This paper offers an example of the reverse difficulty, the wrong kind of value problem. This problem creates deeper challenges for the fitting attitude analysis and provides independent grounds for rejecting it, or at least for doubting seriously its correctness.
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  26. David Sobel (2010). The Limits of the Explanatory Power of Developmentalism. Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (4):517-527.
    Richard Kraut's neo-Aristotelian account of well-being, Developmentalism, aspires to explain not only which things are good for us but why those things are good for us. The key move in attempting to make good on this second aspiration involves his claim that our ordinary intuitions about what is good for a person can be successfully explained and systematized by the idea that what benefi ts a living thing develops properly that living thing's potentialities, capacities, and faculties. I argue that Kraut's (...)
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  27. David Sobel (2003). Reply to Robertson. Philosophical Papers 32 (2):185-191.
    Philosophical Papers Vol.32(2) 2003: 185-191.
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  28. David Sobel (2002). The Moral Importance of the Capability to Achieve Elementary Functionings. Apeiron (4):163-82.
  29. Julie Tannenbaum (2010). Categorizing Goods. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Vol 5. Oxford University Press
    Historically the terms “final,” “unconditional,” and “intrinsic” have played a foundational role in ethical theory. I argue that final/instrumental distinction is best understood in terms of the for-sake-of relation and involves a tri-part division of goods. I show that this first way of categorizing goods is more closely aligned with a second way of categorizing goods in terms of intrinsic/extrinsic goods than has thus far been acknowledged. Lastly, I distinguish yet a third way of categorizing goods: unconditional/conditional goods. While the (...)
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  30. Arnold Zuboff (2001). Why Should I Care About Morality? Philosophy Now 31:24-27.
    For a while in this article it seems impossible to articulate a compelling reason for refraining from killing an innocent stranger with the press of a button when this would earn one a small prize and would be done with absolutely guaranteed immunity from any punishment or other harm (including even an instantaneous elimination of any chance of a guilty memory, achieved through hypnosis, and an ironclad commitment from God not to condemn the killing). After many failed attempts, a compelling (...)
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