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  1. Michael J. Cholbi (2003). Contingency and Divine Knowledge in Ockham. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 77 (1):81-91.
    Ockham appeared to maintain that God necessarily knows all true propositions, including future contingent propositions, despite the fact that such propositions have determinate truth values. While some commentators believe that Ockham’s attempt to reconcile divine omniscience with the contingency of true future propositions amounts to little more than a simple-minded assertion of Ockham’s Christian faith, I argue that Ockham’s position is more sophisticated than this and rests on attributing to God a dual knowledge property: God not only knows every true (...)
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  2. Daniel Diederich Farmer (2010). Defining Omniscience. Faith and Philosophy 27 (3):306-320.
    In contemporary philosophy of religion, the doctrine of omniscience is typically rendered propositionally, as the claim that God knows all true propositions (and believes none that are false). But feminist work makes clear what even the analytic tradition sometimes confesses, namely, that propositional knowledge is quite limited in scope. The adequacy of propositional conceptions of omniscience is therefore in question. This paper draws on the work of feminist epistemologists to articulate alternative renderings of omniscience which remedy the deficiencies of the (...)
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  3. Matthew Frise (2013). What God Only Knows: A Reply to Rob Lovering. Religious Studies:1-10.
    Rob Lovering has recently argued that God is not omniscient on the grounds that (1) in order to be omniscient a subject must not only know all truths always but also know what it's like not to know a truth, and (2) God cannot fulfil both of these requirements. I show that Lovering's argument is unsuccessful since he inadequately supports (1) and (2), and since there are several serious doubts about (2). I also show that Lovering does not otherwise indicate (...)
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  4. Paul Helm (2010). Eternal God: A Study of God Without Time. OUP Oxford.
    Paul Helm presents a new, expanded edition of his much praised 1988 book Eternal God , which defends the view that God exists in timeless eternity. This is the classical Christian view of God, but it is claimed by many theologians and philosophers of religion to be incoherent. Paul Helm rebuts the charge of incoherence, arguing that divine timelessness is grounded in the idea of God as creator, and that this alone makes possible a proper account of divine omniscience. He (...)
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  5. Daniel Howard-Snyder, Joshua Rasmussen & Andrew Cullison (2013). On Whitcomb's Grounding Argument for Atheism. Faith and Philosophy 30 (2):198-204.
    Dennis Whitcomb argues that there is no God on the grounds that (i) God is supposed to be omniscient, yet (ii) nothing could be omniscient due to the nature of grounding. We give a formally identical argument that concludes that one of the present co-authors does not exist. Since he does exist, Whitcomb’s argument is unsound. But why is it unsound? That is a difficult question. We venture two answers. First, one of the grounding principles that the argument relies on (...)
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  6. Bonnie Kent (1986). Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy. Review of Metaphysics 39 (4):783-784.
  7. Aaron Martin (2004). Reckoning with Ross. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 78:193-208.
    In this paper, I discuss St. Thomas’s explanation of how God knows the possibles—things He could create but never does create. Thomas’s full explanationincludes a discussion of the nature of possibility, the reality of the possibles, and whether there are divine ideas of the possibles. In this paper, I critique someof James Ross’s positions as he best represents the self-proclaimed “voluntarist” school. I believe that Ross gives Thomas’s texts an incomplete reading on this issue and I seek to provide what (...)
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  8. Peter Milne (2007). Omniscient Beings Are Dialetheists. Analysis 67 (295):250–251.
  9. Daniel von Wachter (2011). Belief, Knowledge, and Omniscience. Review Of: Paul Weingartner: Omniscience. Grazer Philosophische Studien 83:267--279.
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