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  1. Barbara Abbott, Reference and Quantification: The Partee Effect.
    Partee (1973) discussed quotation from the perspective of the then relatively new theory of transformational grammar.2 As she pointed out, the phenomenon presents many curious puzzles. In some ways quotes seem quite separate from their surrounding text; they may be in a different dialect, as in her example in (1), (1) ‘I talk better English than the both of youse!’ shouted Charles, thereby convincing me that he didn’t. [Partee (1973):ex. 20] or even in a different language, as in (2): (2) (...)
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  2. Barbara Abbott (2011). Support for Individual Concepts. Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 10:23-44.
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  3. Juan José Acero (2011). Reference and Description. Theoria 26 (2):258-261.
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  4. Kelly Alberts (1987). Intentionality and First Person Reference. Philosophy Research Archives 13:613-636.
    Roderick Chisholm contrasts semantic theories that presuppose “the primacy of the intentional” with those that presuppose “the primacy of the linguistic”. In The First Person he attempts to develop an analysis of first person singular reference that presupposes the primacy of the intentional. In this paper I attempt to develop a semantics of first person singular reference (what I call ‘I-reference’) that presupposes the primacy of the linguistic. I do three things in the paper. First, I criticize Chisholm’s (and Frege’s) (...)
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  5. Philip Atkins & Tim Lewis (2012). Unanswerable Questions for Everyone: Reply to Inan. Philosophical Studies 161 (2):263-271.
    Millianism is the familiar view that some expressions, such as proper names, contribute only their referent to the semantic content of sentences in which they occur. Inan (Philosophical Studies 2010) has recently argued that the Millian is committed to the following odd conclusion: There may be questions that he is able to grasp but that he cannot answer, either affirmatively, negatively, or with a simple I don’t know . The Millian is indeed committed to this conclusion. But we intend to (...)
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  6. Robin Attfield (1983). Miller, Kripke, Bach and the Meaning of Proper Names. Southern Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):153-158.
    Examples are presented which raise problems for theories of proper names which deny their equivalence either with descriptions (miller, Kripke) or with non-Trivial descriptions (bach). These examples of names equivalent to the same descriptions for all the possible worlds in which their bearers exist require the theories to be abandoned or at least modified as to their scope.
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  7. Jody Azzouni (2011). Singular Thoughts (Objects-Directed Thoughts). Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):45-61.
    Tim Crane (2011) characterizes the cognitive role of singular thought via singular mental files: the application of such files to more than one object is senseless. As many do, he thus stresses the contrast between ‘singular’ and ‘general’. I give a counterexample, plurally-directed singular thought, and I offer alternative characterizations of singular thought—better described as ‘objects-directed thought’—initially in terms of the defeasibility of the descriptions associated with one's thinking of an object, and then more broadly in terms of whether descriptions (...)
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  8. Kent Bach, On Referring and Not Referring.
    Even though it’s based on a bad argument, there’s something to Strawson’s dictum. He might have likened ‘referring expression’ to phrases like ‘eating utensil’ and ‘dining room’: just as utensils don’t eat and dining rooms don’t dine, so, he might have argued, expressions don’t refer. Actually, that wasn’t his argument, though it does make you wonder. Rather, Strawson exploited the fact that almost any referring expression, whether an indexical, demonstrative, proper name, or definite description, can be used to refer to (...)
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  9. Johanna Maria Bantjes (1979). Kripke's Interpretation of Wittgenstein's Theory of Proper Names. Dissertation, Georgetown University
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  10. Alex Barber (2000). A Pragmatic Treatment of Simple Sentences. Analysis 60 (4):300–308.
    Semanticists face substitution challenges even outside of contexts commonly recognized as opaque. Jennifer M. Saul has drawn attention to pairs of simple sentences - her term for sentences lacking a that-clause operator - of which the following are typical: -/- (1) Clark Kent went into the phone booth, and Superman came out. (1*) Clark Kent went into the phone booth, and Clark Kent came out. -/- (2) Superman is more successful with women than Clark Kent. (2*) Superman is more successful (...)
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  11. Steven James Bartlett (1982). Referential Consistency as a a Criterion of Meaning. Synthese 52 (2):267 - 282.
    This paper describes a logically compelling criterion of meaning — that is, a necessary condition of meaning, one which is non-arbitrary and compelling. One cannot _not_ accept the proposed criterion without self-referential inconsistency. This “metalogical” variety of self-referential inconsistency is new, opening a third category beyond semantical and pragmatical forms of self-referential inconsistency. -/- It is argued that such a criterion of meaning can serve as an instrument of internal criticism for any theoretical framework that permits reference to a class (...)
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  12. Ermanno Bencivenga (1983). An Epistemic Theory of Reference. Journal of Philosophy 80 (12):785-805.
    THIS ARTICLE PRESENTS A THEORY OF REFERENCE AS AN INTENTIONAL ACT, INDEPENDENT OF THE METAPHYSICAL ASSUMPTION OF THE EXISTENCE OF A REAL (AND COMMON) WORLD. ACCORDING TO THE THEORY, SPEAKERS REFER TO ENTITIES IN THEIR COGNITIVE SPACES. DIFFERENT SPEAKERS HAVE DIFFERENT SPACES, WHICH AT ANY GIVEN TIME MIRROR THEIR BELIEF-SYSTEMS AT THAT TIME. OBJECTS IN COGNITIVE SPACES ARE DISTINGUISHED FROM IDEAS, "SINNE", AND MEINONGIAN NON-EXISTENTS, AND SEVERAL DIFFICULTIES OF THE THEORY ARE DISCUSSED: AMONG THEM, HOW TO HANDLE COMMUNICATION AND TRUTH.
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  13. Alan Berger (ed.) (2011). Saul Kripke. Cambridge University Press.
    Machine generated contents note: Introduction Alan Berger; Part I. Naming, Necessity, Identity, and A Priority: 1. Kripke on proper and general names Bernard Linsky; 2. Kripke on vacuous names and names in fiction Nathan Salmon; 3. Kripke on epistemic and modal possibility: two routes to the necessary a posteriori Scott Soames; 4. Possible world semantics and its philosophic foundations Robert Stalnaker; Part II. Formal Semantics, Truth, Philosophy of Math, and Philosophy of Logic: 5. Kripke models for modal logic and intuitionism (...)
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  14. José Luis Bermúdez (ed.) (2005). Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans. Clarendon Press.
    Gareth Evans was arguably the finest philosopher of his generation; he died tragically young, but the work he completed has had a seismic impact on the philosophies of language and mind. In this volume an outstanding international team of contributors offer illuminating perspectives on Evans's groundbreaking work, paying tribute to his achievements and leading his ideas in new directions. Contributors Josi Luis Bermzdez, John Campbell, Quassim Cassam, E. J. Lowe, John McDowell, Christopher Peacocke, Ian Rumfitt, Ken Safir, Mark Sainsbury.
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  15. Rod Bertholet (1986). Referring, Demonstrating, and Intending. Philosophy Research Archives 12:251-260.
    Demonstratives have been thought to provide counterexamples to theories which analyze the notion of speaker reference in terms of the intentions of the speaker. This paper is a response to three attempts to undermine my efforts to defend such theories against these putative counterexamples. It is argued that the efforts of Howard Wettstein, M. J. More and John L. Biro to show that my own attempt to defuse the putative counterexamples offered by David Kaplan fails, are themselves unsuccessful. The competing (...)
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  16. Andrea Bianchi & Alessandro Bonanini (2014). Is There Room for Reference Borrowing in Donnellan’s Historical Explanation Theory? Linguistics and Philosophy 37 (3):175-203.
    Famously, both Saul Kripke and Keith Donnellan opposed description theories and insisted on the role of history in determining the reference of a proper name token. No wonder, then, that their views on proper names have often been assimilated. By focusing on reference borrowing—an alleged phenomenon that Kripke takes to be fundamental—we argue that they should not be. In particular, we claim that according to Donnellan a proper name token never borrows its reference from preceding tokens which it is historically (...)
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  17. Ewa Bińczyk (2007). Obraz, Który Nas Zniewala: Współczesne Ujęcia Języka Wobec Esencjalizmu I Problemu Referencji. Universitas.
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  18. Alexander Bird (2012). Referring to Natural Kind Thingamajigs, and What They Are: A Reply to Needham. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 26 (1):103 - 109.
    Natural kind terms appear to behave like singular terms. If they were genuine singular terms, appearing in true sentences, that would be some reason to believe that there are entities to which the terms refer, the natural kinds. Paul Needham has attacked my arguments that natural kind terms are singular, referring expressions. While conceding the correctness of some of his criticisms, I defend and expand on the underlying view in this paper. I also briefly sketch an account of what natural (...)
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  19. Steven E. Boër (1972). On Searle's Analysis of Reference. Analysis 32 (5):154 - 159.
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  20. Bill Brewer, Reference and Subjectivity.
    In ‘Fregean Reference Defended’ (1995), Sosa presents a sophisticated descriptive theory of reference, which he calls ‘fregean’, and which he argues avoids standard counterexamples to more basic variants of this approach. What is characteristic of a fregean theory, in his sense, is the idea that what makes a person’s thought about some object, a, a thought about that particular thing, is the fact that a uniquely satisfies an appropriate individuator which is suitably operative in her thinking.1 On his version, (FT), (...)
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  21. Joan Bryans (1992). Substitution and the Explanation of Action. Erkenntnis 37 (3):365 - 376.
    This paper examines a potential problem area for theories of direct reference: that of the substitution of co-referential names within the belief context of a belief attribution used to explain an action. Of particular interest are action explanations which involve cases of repetition — wherein beliefs are held which, though about one (other) individual, are mistakenly thought to concern two different people. It is argued that, despite the commonly held view to the contrary, no problem is posed by substitution in (...)
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  22. Ross Cameron (2005). A Note on Kripke's Footnote 56 Argument for the Essentiality of Origin. Ratio 18 (3):262-275.
    In footnote 56 of his Naming and Necessity, Kripke offers a ‘proof’ of the essentiality of origin. On its most literal reading the argument is clearly flawed, as was made clear by Nathan Salmon. Salmon attempts to save the literal reading of the argument, but I argue that the new argument is flawed as well, and that it can’t be what Kripke intended. I offer an alternative reconstruction of Kripke’s argument, but I show that this suffers from a more subtle (...)
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  23. J. Campbell (2004). Reference as Attention. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):265-76.
  24. Mihnea D. I. Capraru (2013). A New Source of Data About Singular Thought. Philosophia 41 (4):1159-1172.
    Philosophers have justified extant theories of singular thought in at least three ways: they have invoked wide-ranging theories motivated by data from other philosophical areas, they have elicited direct intuitions about which thoughts are singular, and they have subjected propositional attitude reports to tests such as Russellian substitution and Quinean exportation. In these ways, however, we haven’t yet been able to tell what it takes to have singular thoughts, nor have we been able to tell which of our thoughts they (...)
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  25. Richard Coates (2009). A Strictly Millian Approach to the Definition of the Proper Name. Mind and Language 24 (4):433-444.
    A strictly Millian approach to proper names is defended, i.e. one in which expressions when used properly ('onymically') refer directly, i.e. without the semantic intermediaryship of the words that appear to comprise them. The approach may appear self-evident for names which appear to have no component parts (in current English) but less so for others. Two modes of reference are distinguished for potentially ambiguous expressions such as The Long Island . A consequence of this distinction is to allow a speculative (...)
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  26. L. Jonathan Cohen (1991). Stephen P. Stich, The Fragmentation of Reason. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1):185 - 188.
  27. Daniel Cohnitz & Jussi Haukioja (2013). Meta-Externalism Vs Meta-Internalism in the Study of Reference. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):475-500.
    We distinguish and discuss two different accounts of the subject matter of theories of reference, meta-externalism and meta-internalism. We argue that a form of the meta- internalist view, “moderate meta-internalism”, is the most plausible account of the subject matter of theories of reference. In the second part of the paper we explain how this account also helps to answer the questions of what kind of concept reference is, and what role intuitions have in the study of the reference relation.
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  28. Monte Cook (1979). Singular Terms and Rigid Designators. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 10 (1):157-162.
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  29. David E. Cooper (1972). Searle on Intentions and Reference. Analysis 32 (5):159 - 163.
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  30. Tim Crane (2011). The Singularity of Singular Thought. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):21-43.
    A singular thought can be characterized as a thought which is directed at just one object. The term ‘thought’ can apply to episodes of thinking, or to the content of the episode (what is thought). This paper argues that episodes of thinking can be just as singular, in the above sense, when they are directed at things that do not exist as when they are directed at things that do exist. In this sense, then, singular thoughts are not object-dependent.
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  31. Adrian Cussins (1999). Subjectivity, Objectivity, and Theories of Reference in Evans' Theory of Thought. Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy.
    This paper explores some problems with Gareth Evans’s theory of the fundamental and non-fundamental levels of thought [1]. I suggest a way to reconceive the levels of thought that overcomes these problems. But, first, why might anyone who was not already struck by Evans’s remarkable theory care about these issues? What’s at stake here?
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  32. Steven Davis (ed.) (1983). Causal Theories Of Mind: Action, Knowledge, Memory, Perception, And Reference. Ny: De Gruyter.
    INTRODUCTION SECTION I In the last 20 years or so philosophers in the analytic tradition have taken an increasing interest in causal theories of a wide ...
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  33. Richard Jeffrey De Rose (1980). Belief and the Reference of Proper Names. Dissertation, Brown University
    Part II begins by sketching a pragmatic interpretation of the attributive/referential distinction based on the extent and nature of a person's beliefs. The crux of the distinction is seen to be the presence of a relation termed "epistemic privity." The discussion proceeds to extend the pragmatic distinction to propositions and reference across possible worlds. The apparatus thus developed will then be applied to the difficulties of contexts of propositional attitudes. ;A variation on the Single Description Theory is the "Cluster Theory." (...)
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  34. Max Deutsch (2006). The One and Only Argument for Radical Millianism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (3):427-445.
    Radical Millianism agrees with less radical varieties in claiming that ordinary proper names lack “descriptive senses” and that the semantic content of such a name is just its referent but differs from less radical varieties of Millianism in claiming that any pair of sentences differing only in the exchange of coreferential names cannot differ in truth-value. This is what makes Radical Millianism radical. The view is surprisingly popular these days, and it is popular despite the fact that, until very recently, (...)
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  35. Keith S. Donnellan (1970). Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions. Synthese 21 (3-4):335 - 358.
  36. Gareth Evans (1982). Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press.
    The discussion in this book range over all the main kinds of referring expressions, starting with the work of Frege and Russell on singular reference.
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  37. Delia Graff Fara (2015). Names Are Predicates. Philosophical Review 124 (1):59-117.
    One reason to think that names have a predicate-type semantic value is that they naturally occur in count-noun positions: ‘The Michaels in my building both lost their keys’; ‘I know one incredibly sharp Cecil and one that's incredibly dull’. Predicativism is the view that names uniformly occur as predicates. Predicativism flies in the face of the widely accepted view that names in argument position are referential, whether that be Millian Referentialism, direct-reference theories, or even Fregean Descriptivism. But names are predicates (...)
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  38. Luis Fernández Moreno (2007). La Crítica de Donnellan a la Teoría Descriptiva de la Referencia. Análisis Filosófico 27 (1):47-73.
    El objetivo de este artículo es examinar los contraejemplos más importantes formulados por Keith Donnellan frente a la teoría descriptiva de la referencia de los nombres propios, así como presentar una réplica a los mismos. La versión de la teoría descriptiva de la referencia que tomamos en consideración es la propuesta por Searle y Strawson, y en nuestra réplica a los contraejemplos más importantes de Donnellan hacemos hincapié en dos de los tipos de descripciones o propiedades a las que estos (...)
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  39. Brian Flanagan (2014). Rereading the Kripkean Intuition on Reference. Metaphilosophy 45 (1):87-95.
    Saul Kripke's thought experiments on the reference of proper names target the theory that the properties which identify a term's referent are the subject of an implicit agreement. Recently, survey versions of the experiments have been thought to show that intuitions about reference are culturally contingent. Proposing a revisionary interpretation, this article argues, first, that Kripke's Cicero/Feynman experiment reveals that every name user knows enough to be capable of identifying the same individual as the name's most informed users. Second, the (...)
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  40. Richard Gaskin (2011). Reference and the Permutation Argument. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (2pt2):295-309.
    I argue that fidelity to the context principle requires us to construe reference as a theoretical relation. This point helps us understand the bearing of Putnam's permutation argument on the idea of a systematic theory of meaning. Notwithstanding objections that have been made against Putnam's deployment of that argument, it shows the reference relation to be indeterminate. But since the indeterminacy of reference arises from a metalinguistic perspective, our ability, as object-language speakers, to talk about the ordinary features of our (...)
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  41. P. T. Geach (1962). Reference and Generality. Ithaca, N.Y.,Cornell University Press.
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  42. Heimir Geirsson (2005). Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity, by Scott Soames. Disputatio.
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  43. Stavroula Glezakos (forthcoming). Truth and Reference in Fiction. In Gillian Russell & Delia Graff Fara (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Routledge
    Fiction is often characterized by way of a contrast with truth, as, for example, in the familiar couplet “Truth is always strange/ Stranger than fiction" (Byron 1824). And yet, those who would maintain that “we will always learn more about human life and human personality from novels than from scientific psychology” (Chomsky 1988: 159) hold that some truth is best encountered via fiction. The scrupulous novelist points out that her work depicts no actual person, either living or dead; nonetheless, we (...)
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  44. Philip A. Glotzbach (1983). Referential Inscrutablility, Perception, and the Empirical Foundation of Meaning. Philosophy Research Archives 9:535-569.
    W.V.O.Quine’s doctrine of referential inscrutability (RI) is the thesis that, first, linguistic reference must always be determined relative to an interpretation of the discourse and, second, that the empirical evidence always underdetermines our choice of interpretation--at least in principle. Although this thesis is a central result of Quine’s theory of language, it was long unclear just how much force RI actually carried. At best, Quine’s discussions provided localized examples of RI (e.g., ‘gavagai’), supplemented merely by arguments for the (in principle) (...)
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  45. Alvin I. Goldman (1991). Stephen P. Stich: The Fragmentation of Reason. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1):189 - 193.
  46. M. Gomez-Torrente (2006). Rigidity and Essentiality. Mind 115 (1):227--59.
    Is there a theoretically interesting notion that is a natural extension of the concept of rigidity to general terms? Such a notion ought to satisfy two Kripkean conditions. First, it must apply to typical general terms for natural kinds, stuffs, and phenomena, and fail to apply to most other general terms. Second, true 'identification sentences' (such as 'Cats are animals') containing general terms that the notion applies to must be necessary. I explore a natural extension of the notion of rigidity (...)
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  47. Peter C. Gordon (1999). Naming Versus Referring in the Selection of Words. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):44-44.
    The theory of lexical selection presented by Levelt, Roelofs & Meyer addresses the mechanisms of semantic activation that lead to the selection of isolated words. The theory does not appear to extend naturally to the referential use of words in coherent discourse. A more complete theory of lexical selection has to consider the semantics of discourse as well as lexical semantics.
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  48. Nicholas Griffin & Dale Jacquette (eds.) (2008). Russell Vs. Meinong: The Legacy of "on Denoting". Routledge.
    Meinong The Legacy of "On Denoting" Edited by Nicholas Griffin and Dale Jacquette Routledge TaylorkFrancisGroup New York London ...
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  49. Jonathan Harrison (1987). The Confusions of Kripke. Erkenntnis 27 (2):283 - 290.
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  50. Jussi Haukioja (2012). Rigidity and Actuality-Dependence. Philosophical Studies 157 (3):399-410.
    It is generally assumed that rigidity plays a key role in explaining the necessary a posteriori status of identity statements, both between proper names and between natural kind terms. However, while the notion of rigid designation is well defined for singular terms, there is no generally accepted definition of what it is for a general term to be rigid. In this paper I argue that the most common view, according to which rigid general terms are the ones which designate the (...)
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