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  1. Manuel García -Carpintero (1996). What is a Tarskian Definition of Truth? Philosophical Studies 82 (2):113-144.
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  2. Peter Achinstein (1960). From Success to Truth. Analysis 21 (1):6 - 9.
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  3. H. B. Acton (1938). Man-Made Truth. Mind 47 (186):145-158.
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  4. H. B. Acton (1934). The Correspondence Theory of Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 35:177 - 194.
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  5. Mortimer J. Adler (1976). The Bodyguards of Truth. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 50:125-133.
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  6. H. G. Alexander (1957). Necessary Truth. Mind 66 (264):507-521.
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  7. Hartley B. Alexander (1910). Truth and Nature. The Monist 20 (4):585-602.
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  8. Peter Alward, The Backdoor and Other Stories.
               Much has been written of late concerning the relative virtues and vices of correspondence and deflationary theories of Truth. One might go so far as to say the issue is currently “hotâ€. What is troubling, however, is that it is not always entirely clear exactly what distinguishes the different conceptions of truth. Characterizations of the distinction are often vague and sometimes vary from writer to writer. Let me give a (...)
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  9. Amer Ameri (2008). On Truth, In Theory. American Journal of Semiotics 10 (1/2):155-176.
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  10. Leslie Armour (1969). The Concept of Truth. Assen, Van Gorcum.
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  11. Bradley Armour-Garb (2012). Challenges to Deflationary Theories of Truth. Philosophy Compass 7 (4):256-266.
    In this paper, I address some of the chief challenges, or problems, for Deflationary Theories of Truth, viz., the Generalization Problem, the Conservativeness Argument, and the Success Argument.
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  12. Margaret Atherton (2003). How Berkeley Can Maintain That Snow is White. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):101–113.
    Berkeley has made the bold claim on behalf of his theory that it is uniquely able to justify the claim that snow is white. But this claim, made most strikingly in the Third of his "Three Dialogues," has been held, most forcefully by Margaret Wilson, to conflict with Berkeley's argument in the First Dialogue that, because of various facts to do with perceptual variation, colors are merely apparent and hence, mind-dependent. This paper develops an alternative reading of the First Dialogue (...)
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  13. Jody Azzouni (2001). Truth Via Anaphorically Unrestricted Quantifiers. Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (4):329-354.
    A new approach to truth is offered which dispenses with the truth predicate, and replaces it with a special kind of quantifier which simultaneously binds variables in sentential and nominal positions. The resulting theory of truth for a (first-order) language is shown to be able to handle blind truth ascriptions, and is shown to be compatible with a characterization of the semantic and syntactic principles governing that language. Comparisons with other approaches to truth are drawn. An axiomatization of AU-quantifiers and (...)
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  14. Charles M. Bakewell (1908). On the Meaning of Truth. Philosophical Review 17 (6):579-591.
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  15. J. Mark Baldwin (1907). On Truth. Philosophical Review 16:665.
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  16. George Barany (1976). The Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing but the Truth: Variations on a Theme: The 1976 University Lecture. University of Denver.
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  17. John Barker (2009). Disquotation, Conditionals, and the Liar. Polish Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):5-21.
    In this paper I respond to Jacquette’s criticisms, in (Jacquette, 2008), of my (Barker, 2008). In so doing, I argue that the Liar paradox is in fact a problem about the disquotational schema, and that nothing in Jacquette’s paper undermines this diagnosis.
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  18. Robert Barnard & Terence Horgan (2006). Truth as Mediated Correspondence. The Monist 89 (1):28-49.
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  19. Darin Barney (forthcoming). The Truth of le Printemps Érables. Theory and Event 15 (3).
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  20. A. H. Basson (1960). The Way of Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61:73 - 86.
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  21. J. D. Bastable (1956). The Truth That Frees. Philosophical Studies 6:245-245.
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  22. J. D. Bastable (1956). The Truth That Frees. Philosophical Studies 6:245-245.
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  23. J. C. Beall (2000). Minimalism, Gaps, and the Holton Conditional. Analysis 60 (268):340–351.
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  24. Jc Beall (2011). Dialetheists Against Pinocchio. Analysis 71 (4):689-691.
    This paper argues that, contrary to P. Eldridge-Smith, the so-called Pinocchio paradox affords no argument against ‘simply semantic dialetheism’.
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  25. Martin A. Bertman (1983). Being and Meaning: Paul Tillich's Theory of Meaning, Truth and Logic. By Ian E. Thompson. Modern Schoolman 61 (1):66-67.
  26. Simon Blackburn (1998). Wittgenstein, Wright, Rorty and Minimalism. Mind 107 (425):157-181.
  27. Simon Blackburn (1987). What is Truth? Cogito 1 (3):11-13.
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  28. Daniel R. Boisvert (1999). The Trouble with Harrison's 'the Trouble with Tarski'. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (196):376-383.
    In ‘The Trouble with Tarski’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 48 (1998), pp. 1–22, Jonathan Harrison attacks ‘Tarski‐style’ truth theories for both formalized and natural languages, on the grounds that (1) truth cannot be a property of sentences; (2) if it could be, T‐sentences would have to be necessary truths, which they are not; and (3) T‐sentences are not necessarily true and can even can be false. I reply that (1) cannot be an objection to Tarskian truth theories, since these can be (...)
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  29. Ron Bombardi (2013). On the Neurobiology of Truth. Biosemiotics 6 (3):537-546.
    The concept of truth arises from puzzling over distinctions between the real and the apparent, while the origin of these distinctions lies in the neurobiology of mammalian cerebral lateralization, that is, in the evolution of brains that can address the world both indicatively and subjunctively; brains that represent the world both categorically and hypothetically. After some 2,500 years of thinking about it, the Western philosophical tradition has come up with three major theories of truth: correspondence, coherence, and pragmatist. Traditional (...)
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  30. John E. Boodin (1911). The Nature of Truth: A Reply. Philosophical Review 20 (1):59-63.
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  31. John E. Boodin (1910). The Nature of Truth. Philosophical Review 19 (4):395-417.
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  32. Kenneth Ewart Boulding (1970). The Prospering of Truth. London,Friends Home Service Committee.
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  33. F. H. Bradley (1909). On Truth and Coherence. Mind 18 (71):329-342.
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  34. Manuel Bremer, In Coherence with the Data.
    Coherence theories are regularly confronted with the objection that there can be many coherent systems, so that mere coherence is said to be insufficient as either the defining element of truth or even as a working criterion of truth. This objection has been called the “master objection”. If someone is taking coherence not only as a criterion supporting the truth of a theory, but as an ingredient to a definition of “true” she has to attack the master objection straight on.
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  35. S. Breslauer (1979). The War of Truth. [REVIEW] Speculum 54 (2):391-392.
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  36. Robert Greville Brooke (1640/1969). The Nature of Truth. Farnborough, Gregg.
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  37. James F. Brown (1972). Quattlebaum's Truth. New Scholasticism 46 (4):536-540.
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  38. James M. Brown (1976). The Correspondence Theory of Truth. Philosophical Studies 25:338-340.
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  39. Anthony Brueckner (1998). Is "Superassertible" a Truth Predicate? Noûs 32 (1):76-81.
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  40. Otávio Bueno (1999). Empiricism, Conservativeness, and Quasi-Truth. Philosophy of Science 66 (3):485.
    A first step is taken towards articulating a constructive empiricist philosophy of mathematics, thus extending van Fraassen's account to this domain. In order to do so, I adapt Field's nominalization program, making it compatible with an empiricist stance. Two changes are introduced: (a) Instead of taking conservativeness as the norm of mathematics, the empiricist countenances the weaker notion of quasi-truth (as formulated by da Costa and French), from which the formal properties of conservativeness are derived; (b) Instead of quantifying over (...)
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  41. John P. Burgess, Friedman and the Axiomatization of Kripke's Theory of Truth.
    What is the simplest and most natural axiomatic replacement for the set-theoretic definition of the minimal fixed point on the Kleene scheme in Kripke’s theory of truth? What is the simplest and most natural set of axioms and rules for truth whose adoption by a subject who had never heard the word "true" before would give that subject an understanding of truth for which the minimal fixed point on the Kleene scheme would be a good model? Several axiomatic systems, old (...)
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  42. Stephen A. Butterfill (1999). Truth Theories and Action Explanation.
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  43. Alex Byrne (2005). Is Snow White? Boston Review.
    CURRENT ISSUE table of contents FEATURES new democracy forum new fiction forum poetry fiction film archives ABOUT US masthead mission rave reviews contests writers? guidelines internships advertising SERVICES bookstore locator literary links subscribe.
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  44. George Douglas Campbell (1889). What is Truth?
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  45. John Campbell, If Truth is Dethroned, What Role is Left for It?
    in Randall E. Auxier and Lewis Edwin Hahn (eds.), Library of Living Philosophers: The Philosophy of Michael Dummett.
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  46. S. Candlish (forthcoming). Truth, Identity Theory Of. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  47. Mihnea D. I. Capraru (forthcoming). Objective Truth in Matters of Taste. Philosophical Studies.
    In matters of personal taste, faultless disagreement occurs between people who disagree over what is tasty, fun, etc., in those cases when each of these people seems equally far from the objective truth. Faultless disagreement is often taken as evidence that truth is relative. This article aims to help us avoid the truth-relativist conclusion. The article, however, does not argue directly against relativism; instead, the article defends non-relative truth constructively, aiming to explain faultless disagreement with the resources of semantic contextualism. (...)
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  48. Edward S. Casey (1971). Man, Self, and Truth. The Monist 55 (2):218-254.
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  49. Clive Cazeaux (1998). Is There Truth in Art? [REVIEW] Radical Philosophy 90.
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  50. Arindam Chakrabarti (2001). Truth, Recognition of Truth, and Thoughtless Realism. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2001:41-59.
    Witnessing the fate of the various definitions of truth, Donald Davidson has recently called the very drive to define truth a “folly.” Before him, Kant and Frege had given independent arguments why a general definition of truth is impossible. After a quick summary of their arguments, I recount several reasons that Gangeśa gave for not counting truth as a genuine natural universal. I argue that in spite of defining truth as a feature of personal and ephemeral awareness episodes, the Nyāya (...)
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