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  1. Ken Akiba (2004). Conceptions of Truth. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):525 – 527.
    Book Information Conceptions of Truth. Conceptions of Truth Wolfgang Künne , Oxford : Clarendon Press , 2003 , xiii + 493 , £50.00 ( cloth ) By Wolfgang Künne. Clarendon Press. Oxford. Pp. xiii + 493. £50.00 (cloth:).
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  2. Barry Allen (1993). Truth in Philosophy. Harvard University Press.
    " Barry Allen shows what truth has come to mean in the philosophical tradition, what is wrong with many of the ways of conceiving truth, and why philosophers ...
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  3. Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge (2013). Semantic Defectiveness and the Liar. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):845-863.
    In this paper, we do two things. First, we provide some support for adopting a version of the meaningless strategy with respect to the liar paradox, and, second, we extend that strategy, by providing, albeit tentatively, a solution to that paradox—one that is semantic, rather than logical.
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  4. Arvid Båve (2013). Formulating Deflationism. Synthese 190 (15):3287-3305.
    I here argue for a particular formulation of truth-deflationism, namely, the propositionally quantified formula, (Q) “For all p, ${\langle \text{p}\rangle}$ is true iff p”. The main argument consists of an enumeration of the other (five) possible formulations and criticisms thereof. Notably, Horwich’s Minimal Theory is found objectionable in that it cannot be accepted by finite beings. Other formulations err in not providing non-questionbegging, sufficiently direct derivations of the T-schema instances. I end by defending (Q) against various objections. In particular, I (...)
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  5. Arvid Båve (2010). Deflationism and the Primary Truth Bearer. Synthese 173 (3):281 - 297.
    The paper discusses what kind of truth bearer, or truth-ascription, a deflationist should take as primary. I first present number of arguments against a sententialist view. I then present a deflationary theory which takes propositions as primary, and try to show that it deals neatly with a wide range of linguistic data. Next, I consider both the view that there is no primary truth bearer, and the most common account of sentence truth given by deflationists who take propositions as primary, (...)
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  6. Arvid Båve (2009). Why is a Truth-Predicate Like a Pronoun? Philosophical Studies 145 (2):297 - 310.
    I begin with an exposition of the two main variants of the Prosentential Theory of Truth (PT), those of Dorothy Grover et al. and Robert Brandom. Three main types of criticisms are then put forward: (1) material criticisms to the effect that (PT) does not adequately explain the linguistic data, (2) an objection to the effect that no variant of (PT) gives a properly unified account of the various occurrences of "true" in English, and, most importantly, (3) a charge that (...)
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  7. J. C. Beal & B. Armour-Garb (eds.) (2006). Deflationism and Paradox. Clarendon.
    Deflationist accounts of truth are widely held in contemporary philosophy: they seek to show that truth is a dispensable concept with no metaphysical depth. However, logical paradoxes present problems for deflationists that their work has struggled to overcome. In this volume of fourteen original essays, a distinguished team of contributors explore the extent to which, if at all, deflationism can accommodate paradox. The volume will be of interest to philosophers of logic, philosophers of language, and anyone working on truth. Contributors (...)
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  8. JC Beall (2000). On the Identity Theory of Truth. Philosophy 75 (1):127-130.
    According to the so-called identity theory of truth. A proposition is true if the given proposition is identical to some fact. But with which fact must a proposition be identical if it is to be true? This question, according to some philosophers (notably Stewart Candlish), raises serious problems for the identity theory of truth. The worry is that the identity must specify the "right fact" if it is to be an acceptable theory. The current paper aims to help the identity (...)
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  9. James R. Beebe, Prosentential Theory of Truth. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Prosentential theorists claim that sentences such as “That’s true” are prosentences that function analogously to their better known cousins–pronouns. For example, just as we might use the pronoun ‘he’ in place of ‘James’ to transform “James went to the supermarket” into “He went to the supermarket,” so we might use the prosentenceforming operator ‘is true’ to transform “Snow is white” into “‘Snow is white’ is true.” According to the prosentential theory of truth, whenever a referring expression (for example, a definite (...)
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  10. Nuel D. Belnap (1982). Gupta's Rule of Revision Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):103-116.
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  11. Simon Blackburn (2005). Truth: A Guide. Oxford University Press.
    The author of the highly popular book Think, which Time magazine hailed as "the one book every smart person should read to understand, and even enjoy, the key questions of philosophy," Simon Blackburn is that rara avis--an eminent thinker who is able to explain philosophy to the general reader. Now Blackburn offers a tour de force exploration of what he calls "the most exciting and engaging issue in the whole of philosophy"--the age-old war over truth. The front lines of this (...)
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  12. Simon Blackburn & Keith Simmons (eds.) (1999). Truth. Oxford University Press.
    This volume is designed to set out some of the central issues in the theory of truth. It draws together, for the first time, the debates between philosophers who favor 'robust' or 'substantive' theories of truth, and those other, 'deflationist' or minimalists, who deny that such theories can be given. The editors provide a substantial introduction, in which they look at how the debates relate to further issues, such as the Liar paradox and formal truth theories.
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  13. Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno, Fitch's Paradox of Knowability. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The paradox of knowability is a logical result suggesting that, necessarily, if all truths are knowable in principle then all truths are in fact known. The contrapositive of the result says, necessarily, if in fact there is an unknown truth, then there is a truth that couldn't possibly be known. More specifically, if p is a truth that is never known then it is unknowable that p is a truth that is never known. The proof has been used to argue (...)
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  14. Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno (2006). Knowability and a Modal Closure Principle. American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (3):261-270.
    Does a factive conception of knowability figure in ordinary use? There is some reason to think so. ‘Knowable’ and related terms such as ‘discoverable’, ‘observable’, and ‘verifiable’ all seem to operate factively in ordinary discourse. Consider the following example, a dialog between colleagues A and B: A: We could be discovered. B: Discovered doing what? A: Someone might discover that we're having an affair. B: But we are not having an affair! A: I didn’t say that we were. A’s remarks (...)
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  15. Tyler Burge (1986). Frege on Truth. In L. Haaparanta & J. Hintikka (eds.), Frege Synthesized. D. Reidel Publishing Co.. 97--154.
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  16. Richard James Campbell (2011). The Concept of Truth. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Machine generated contents note: -- Preface -- Introduction: Truth in Trouble -- The Linguistic Conception of Truth -- The Functions Truth Serves -- Truth in Action -- Acting Truly -- The Genesis of Representations -- Acts of Assertion -- The Truth of Statements -- The Challenge of Sceptical Relativism -- Truth as Faithfulness -- Bibliography -- Index.
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  17. Stewart Candlish, The Identity Theory of Truth. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    is true, there is a truth-maker (e.g., a fact) with which it is identical and the truth of the former consists in its identity with the latter. The theory is best understood as a reaction to the correspondence theory, according to which the relation of truth-bearer to truth-maker is correspondence. A correspondence theory is vulnerable to the nagging suspicion that if the best we can do is make statements that merely correspond to the truth, then we inevitably fail to capture (...)
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  18. Rudolf Carnap (1948). Rudolf Carnap's Analysis of `Truth': Reply. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 9 (2):300-304.
  19. Richard Cartwright (1987). A Neglected Theory of Truth. In , Philosophical Essays. The Mit Press.
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  20. Pedro José Chamizo Domínguez (2009). Genus dicendi y verdad. A propósito de Ortega. Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 34 (1):5-25.
    El objetivo de este artículo es el de explorar las principales características del ensayo como genus dicendi filosófico y cómo se cumplen en las obras de Ortega. En consecuencia, analizo en primer lugar las cuatro características principales del búsqueda de la verdad, valor cognitivo de las opiniones, rechazo del argumento de autoridad y tolerancia intelectual. Y, en segundo lugar, demuestro cómo se han tenido en cuenta en los escritos filosóficos de Ortega. ENGLISH: The aim of this paper is to explore (...)
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  21. André Chapuis (1996). Alternative Revision Theories of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (4):399 - 423.
    The Revision Theory of Truth (Gupta/Belnap 93) has been challenged in A. M. Yaqūb's recent book The Liar Speaks the Truth. Yaqūb suggests some non-trivial changes in the original theory - changing the limit rule - to avoid certain artifacts. In this paper it is shown that the proposed changes are not sufficient, i.e., Yaqūb's system also produces artifacts. An alternative solution is proposed and the relation between it and Yaqūb's solution is explored.
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  22. André Chapuis & Anil Gupta (eds.) (2000). Circularity, Definition, and Truth. Sole Distributor, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers.
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  23. D. R. Cousin (1950). Carnap's Theories of Truth. Mind 59 (233):1-22.
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  24. M. David (2001). Truth as Identity and Truth as Corespondence. In Michael P. Lynch (ed.), The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives. Mit Press.
  25. Martin K. Davies (1978). Weak Necessity and Truth Theories. Journal of Philosophical Logic 7 (1):415 - 439.
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  26. Josh Dever, The Disunity of Truth.
    §§3-4 of the Begriffsschrift present Frege’s objections to a dominant if murky nineteenth-century semantic picture. I sketch a minimalist variant of the pre-Fregean picture which escapes Frege’s criticisms by positing a thin notion of semantic content which then interacts with a multiplicity of kinds of truth to account for phenomena such as modality. After exploring several ways in which we can understand the existence of multiple truth properties, I discuss the roles of pointwise and setwise truth properties in modal logic. (...)
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  27. Michael Devitt (1991). Realism and Truth. B. Blackwell.
  28. Julian Dodd (1995). McDowell and Identity Theories of Truth. Analysis 55 (3):160 - 165.
    The main thesis of this paper is that John McDowell (in his Mind and World) tries to occupy a position that is not coherently statable; namely, that facts have objects and properties as constituents and are yet identical with true (Fregean) Thoughts. This position is contrasted with two other identity theories of truth: the robust theory, in which true propositions are identified with facts (which are understood to have objects and properties as constituents); and the modest theory, in which facts (...)
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  29. Dale Dorsey (2010). Truth and Error in Morality. In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave Macmillan. 235--248.
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  30. Kenny Easwaran (2008). Tracking Reason: Proof, Consequence, and Truth. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 117 (2):296-299.
  31. Douglas Edwards (2011). Simplifying Alethic Pluralism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):28-48.
    What is truth? What precisely is it that truths have that falsehoods lack? Pluralists about truth (or “alethic pluralists”) tend to answer these questions by saying that there is more than one way for a proposition, sentence, belief—or any chosen truth-bearer—to be true. In this paper, I argue that two of the most influential formations of alethic pluralism, those of Wright (1992, 2003a) and Lynch (2009), are subject to serious problems. I outline a new formulation, which I call “simple determination (...)
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  32. Douglas Edwards (2008). How to Solve the Problem of Mixed Conjunctions. Analysis 68 (298):143–149.
    The problem of mixed conjunctions, due to Tappolet (2000), threatens to undermine alethic pluralism by showing that it cannot account for the truth of conjunctions in which the conjuncts spring from different domains of discourse. In this paper I argue, firstly, that the problem is not just a problem for alethic pluralism and, secondly, that the problem can be solved.
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  33. B. D. Ellis (1990). Truth and Objectivity. Basil Blackwell.
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  34. Felipe Fernández-Armesto (1997/1999). Truth: A History and a Guide for the Perplexed. St. Martin's Press.
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  35. Felipe Fernández-Armesto (1997). Truth: A History. Bantam Press.
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  36. William Fish & Cynthia Macdonald (2009). The Identity Theory of Truth and the Realm of Reference: Where Dodd Goes Wrong. Analysis 69 (2):297-304.
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  37. William Fish & Cynthia Macdonald (2007). On McDowell's Identity Conception of Truth. Analysis 67 (293):36-41.
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  38. Paul D. Forster (1996). The Unity of Peirce's Theories of Truth. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 4 (1):119 – 147.
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  39. Harry G. Frankfurt (2006). On Truth. Knopf.
    Having outlined a theory of bullshit and falsehood, Harry G. Frankfurt turns to what lies beyond them: the truth, a concept not as obvious as some might expect. Our culture's devotion to bullshit may seem much stronger than our apparently halfhearted attachment to truth. Some people (professional thinkers) won't even acknowledge "true" and "false" as meaningful categories, and even those who claim to love truth cause the rest of us to wonder whether they, too, aren't simply full of it. (...)
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  40. Manuel García-Carpintero, Truth-Bearers and Modesty.
    In this paper I discuss Künne’s Modest Theory of truth, and develop a variation on a worry that Field expresses with respect to Horwich’s related view. The worry is not that deflationary accounts are false, but rather that, because they take propositions as truth-bearers, they are not philosophically interesting. Compatibly with the intuitions of ordinary speakers, we can understand proposition so that the proposals do account for a property that such truth-bearers have. Nevertheless, we saliently apply the truth-concept also to (...)
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  41. Richard Gaskin (2008). The Unity of the Proposition. Oxford University Press.
    Truth, falsity, and unity -- Sentences, lists, and collections -- Declarative and other kinds of sentence -- Declarative sentences and propositions -- Sentences, propositions, and truth-values -- Sentences, propositions, and unity -- Unity and complexity -- Reference and supposition -- Reference and signification -- Linguistic idealism and empirical realism -- Russell on truth, falsity, and unity (I) : 1903 -- Russell on truth, falsity, and unity (II) : 1910-13 -- Russell on truth, falsity, and unity (III) : 1918 -- Sense, (...)
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  42. Christopher Gauker, Kripke's Theory of Truth.
    This is not a research paper. It is just a handout that I prepared for a course some years ago. It is a presentation of Kripke's theory of truth that I intend to be understandable even to people who have had only a first course in logic. Although elementary, it is completely precise. All the terms are defined and all the proofs (except one trivial induction) are given in detail. I am putting this on the web because I think there (...)
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  43. Michael Glanzberg, Truth. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Truth is one of the central subjects in philosophy. It is also one of the largest. Truth has been a topic of discussion in its own right for thousands of years. Moreover, a huge variety of issues in philosophy relate to truth, either by relying on theses about truth, or implying theses about truth.
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  44. Michael Glanzberg (2004). Discussion – Truth, Disquotation, and Expression: On McGinn's Theory of Truth. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 118 (3):413-423.
    In Logical Properties, Colin McGinn offers a new theory of truth, which he describes as “thick disquotationalism.” In keeping with wider theme of the book, truth emerges as conceptually primitive. Echoing Moore, it is simple and unanalyzable. Though truth cannot be analyzed, in the sense of giving a conceptual decomposition, McGinn argues that truth can be defined. A non-circular statement of its application conditions can be given. This makes truth a singularly remarkable property. Indeed, by McGinn’s lights, it is the (...)
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  45. Michael Glanzberg (2003). Against Truth-Value Gaps. In J. C. Beall (ed.), Liars and Heaps. Oxford University Press. 151--94.
    ∗Thanks to J. C. Beall, Alex Byrne, Jason Decker, Tyler Doggett, Paul Elbourne, Adam Elga, Warren Goldfarb, Delia Graff, Richard Heck, Charles Parsons, Mark Richard, Susanna Siegel, Jason Stanley, Judith Thomson, Carol Voeller, Brian Weatherson, Ralph Wedgwood, Steve Yablo, Cheryl Zoll, and an anonymous referee for valuable comments and discussions. Versions of this material were presented in my seminar at MIT in the Fall of 2000, and at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County. Parts of this paper also derive from (...)
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  46. Michael Gorr & Mark Timmons (1989). Subjective Truth, Objective Truth, and Moral Indifference. Philosophical Studies 55 (1):111 - 116.
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  47. A. C. Grayling (2007). Truth, Meaning and Realism. Continuum.
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  48. Patrick Greenough (2010). Deflationism and Truth-Value Gaps. In Nikolaj Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), New Waves inTruth. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Central to any form of Deflationism concerning truth (hereafter ‘DT’) is the claim that truth has no substantial theoretical role to play. For this reason, DT faces the following immediate challenge: if truth can play no substantial theoretical role then how can we model various prevalent kinds of indeterminacy—such as the indeterminacy exhibited by vague predicates, future contingents, liar sentences, truth-teller sentences, incomplete stipulations, cases of presupposition failure, and such-like? It is too hasty to assume that these phenomena are all (...)
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  49. Patrick Greenough (2008). Indeterminate Truth. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):213-241.
    In §2-4, I survey three extant ways of making sense of indeterminate truth and find each of them wanting. All the later sections of the paper are concerned with showing that the most promising way of making sense of indeterminate truth is via either a theory of truthmaker gaps or via a theory of truthmaking gaps. The first intimations of a truthmaker–truthmaking gap theory of indeterminacy are to be found in Quine (1981). In §5, we see how Quine proposes to (...)
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  50. Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.) (2006). Truth and Realism. Oxford University Press.
    Is truth objective or relative? What exists independently of our minds? The essays in this book debate these two questions, which are among the oldest of philosophical issues and have vexed almost every major philosopher, from Plato, to Kant, to Wittgenstein. Fifteen eminent contributors bring fresh perspectives, renewed energy, and original answers to debates of great interest both within philosophy and in the culture at large.
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