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  1. Ken Akiba (2002). A Deflationist Approach to Indeterminacy and Vagueness. Philosophical Studies 107 (1):69 - 86.
    Deflationists cannot make sense ofthe notion of referential indeterminacybecause they deny the existence of substantivereference. One way for them to make sense ofthe objective existence of linguisticindeterminacy is by embracing theworldly (or objectual) view ofindeterminacy, the view that indeterminacyexists not in reference relations but in the(non-linguistic) world itself. On this view,the entire world is divided into precisified worlds, just as it is dividedinto temporal slices and (arguably) alethicpossible worlds. Supervaluationism proves tobe neutral with respect to the debate betweenthe worldly view (...)
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  2. Thomas T. Ballmer & Manfred Pinkal (eds.) (1983). Approaching Vagueness. Sole Distributors for the U.S.A. And Canada, Elsevier Science Pub. Co..
  3. Chris Barker (2002). The Dynamics of Vagueness. Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (1):1-36.
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  4. D. Barnett (2011). Does Vagueness Exclude Knowledge? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):22-45.
    On two standard views of vagueness, vagueness as to whether Harry is bald entails that nobody knows whether Harry is bald—either because vagueness is a type of missing truth, and so there is nothing to know, or because vagueness is a type of ignorance, and so even though there is a truth of the matter, nobody can know what that truth is. Vagueness as to whether Harry is bald does entail that nobody clearly knows that Harry is bald and that (...)
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  5. David Barnett (2011). Does Vagueness Exclude Knowledge? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):22-45.
    On two standard views of vagueness, vagueness as to whether Harry is bald entails that nobody knows whether Harry is bald—either because vagueness is a type of missing truth, and so there is nothing to know, or because vagueness is a type of ignorance, and so even though there is a truth of the matter, nobody can know what that truth is. Vagueness as to whether Harry is bald does entail that nobody clearly knows that Harry is bald and that (...)
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  6. David Barnett (2009). Is Vagueness Sui Generis ? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):5 – 34.
    On the dominant view of vagueness, if it is vague whether Harry is bald, then it is unsettled, not merely epistemically, but metaphysically, whether Harry is bald. In other words, vagueness is a type of indeterminacy. On the standard alternative, vagueness is a type of ignorance: if it is vague whether Harry is bald, then, even though it is metaphysically settled whether Harry is bald, we cannot know whether Harry is bald. On my view, vagueness is neither a type of (...)
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  7. Bert Baumgaertner (2012). Vagueness Intuitions and the Mobility of Cognitive Sortals. Minds and Machines 22 (3):213-234.
    One feature of vague predicates is that, as far as appearances go, they lack sharp application boundaries. I argue that we would not be able to locate boundaries even if vague predicates had sharp boundaries. I do so by developing an idealized cognitive model of a categorization faculty which has mobile and dynamic sortals (`classes', `concepts' or `categories') and formally prove that the degree of precision with which boundaries of such sortals can be located is inversely constrained by their flexibility. (...)
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  8. Max Black (1963). Reasoning with Loose Concepts. Dialogue 2 (01):1-12.
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  9. Susanne Bobzien (2013). Higher‐Order Vagueness and Borderline Nestings: A Persistent Confusion. Analytic Philosophy 54 (1):1-43.
    ABSTRACT: This paper shows that authors who have recently argued that higher-order vagueness is incoherent, paradoxical, illusory or non-existent confound elements of higher-order vagueness with elements of a different paradigm of borderline borderline cases; and that, once the elements of that other paradigm are removed from the description of higher-order vagueness, the basis for the claims of paradoxicality, etc., disappears. The paper sets out the two paradigms (higher-order vagueness vs borderline nestings) and their logics (iterated modalities vs. mixed-order non-empty predicates), (...)
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  10. David Braun & Theodore Sider (2007). Vague, So Untrue. Noûs 41 (2):133 - 156.
    According to an old and attractive view, vagueness must be eliminated before semantic notions — truth, implication, and so on — may be applied. This view was accepted by Frege, but is rarely defended nowadays.1 This..
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  11. Linda Burns (1995). Something to Do With Vagueness. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):23-47.
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  12. Ross P. Cameron (2010). Vagueness and Naturalness. Erkenntnis 72 (2):281 - 293.
    I attempt to accommodate the phenomenon of vagueness with classical logic and bivalence. I hold that for any vague predicate there is a sharp cut-off between the things that satisfy it and the things that do not; I claim that this is due to the greater naturalness of one of the candidate meanings of that predicate. I extend the thought to the problem of the many and Benacerraf cases. I go on to explore the idea that (...)
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  13. James Cargile (1993). Vagueness. An Investigation Into Natural Languages and the Sorites Paradox. Philosophical Books 34 (1):22-24.
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  14. Mark A. Changizi (2003). The Brain From 25000 Feet: High Level Explorations of Brain Complexity, Perception, Innateness and Vagueness. Kluwer.
    This book is a must-read for researchers interested in taking a high-level, non-mechanistic approach to answering age-old fundamental questions in the brain ...
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  15. Pablo Cobreros (2010). Review of Richard Dietz, Sebastiano Moruzzi (Eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, its Nature, and its Logic. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (12).
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  16. J. Collins (2012). Cuts and Clouds. Analysis 72 (1):138-145.
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  17. Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.) (2010). Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, its Nature, and its Logic. Oxford University Press.
    Vagueness is a familiar but deeply puzzling aspect of the relation between language and the world. It is highly controversial what the nature of vagueness is -- a feature of the way we represent reality in language, or rather a feature of reality itself? May even relations like identity or parthood be affected by vagueness? Sorites arguments suggest that vague terms are either inconsistent or have a sharp boundary. The account we give of such paradoxes plays a pivotal role for (...)
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  18. Cian Dorr (2003). Vagueness Without Ignorance. Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):83–113.
    I motivate and briefly sketch a linguistic theory of vagueness, on which the notion of indeterminacy is understood in terms of the conventions of language: a sentence is indeterminate iff the conventions of language either forbid asserting it and forbid asserting its negation, under the circumstances, or permit asserting either. I then consider an objection that purports to show that if this theory (or, as far as I can see, any other theory of vagueness that deserved the label "linguistic" were (...)
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  19. Paul Égré & Nathan Klinedinst (eds.) (2010). Vagueness and Language Use. Palgrave Macmillan.
    This volume brings together twelve papers by linguists and philosophers contributing novel empirical and formal considerations to theorizing about vagueness. Three main issues are addressed: gradable expressions and comparison, the semantics of degree adverbs and intensifiers (such as 'clearly'), and ways of evading the sorites paradox.
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  20. Paul Egré & Klinedinst Nathan (eds.) (forthcoming). Vagueness and Language Use, Palgrave Studies in Pragmatics, Language and Cognition. Palgrave Macmillan.
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  21. Matti Eklund (2011). Recent Work on Vagueness. Analysis 71 (2):352-363.
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  22. Matti Eklund (2006). Schiffer on Vagueness. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):12–23.
    I go through, and criticize, Stephen Schiffer's account of vagueness and the sorites paradox. I discuss his notion of a happy-face solution to a paradox, his appeal to vagueness-related partial belief, his claim that indeterminacy is a psychological notion, and his view that the sorites premise and the inference rule of modus ponens are indeterminate.
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  23. Matti Eklund (2005). What Vagueness Consists In. Philosophical Studies 125 (1):27-60.
    The main question of the paper is that ofwhat vagueness consists in. This question must be distinguished from other questions about vagueness discussed in the literature. It is argued that familiar accounts of vagueness for general reasons failto answer the question ofwhat vagueness consists in. A positive view is defended, according to which, roughly, the vagueness of an expression consists in it being part ofsemantic competence to accept a tolerance principle for the expression. Since tolerance principles are inconsistent, this is (...)
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  24. Hartry Field, The Semantic Paradoxes and the Paradoxes of Vagueness.
    Both in dealing with the semantic paradoxes and in dealing with vagueness and indeterminacy, there is some temptation to weaken classical logic: in particular, to restrict the law of excluded middle. The reasons for doing this are somewhat different in the two cases. In the case of the semantic paradoxes, a weakening of classical logic (presumably involving a restriction of excluded middle) is required if we are to preserve the naive theory of truth without inconsistency. In the case of vagueness (...)
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  25. Hartry Field, Vagueness, Partial Belief, and Logic.
    Discussion of Chapter 5 of Stephen Schiffer's "The Things We Mean' in which Stephen Schiffer advances two novel theses: 1. Vagueness (and indeterminacy more generally) is a psychological phenomenon; 2. It is indeterminate whether classical logic applies in situations where vagueness matters.
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  26. Steven French & Décio Krause (2003). Quantum Vagueness. Erkenntnis 59 (1):97 - 124.
    It has been suggested that quantum particles are genuinelyvague objects (Lowe 1994a). The present work explores thissuggestion in terms of the various metaphysical packages that areavailable for describing such particles. The formal frameworksunderpinning such packages are outlined and issues of identityand reference are considered from this overall perspective. Indoing so we hope to illuminate the diverse ways in whichvagueness can arise in the quantum context.
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  27. André Fuhrmann (1999). Keefe, Rosanna and Peter Smith (Eds.), Vagueness: A Reader. Erkenntnis 50 (1).
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  28. Mario Gómez-Torrente (2002). Vagueness and Margin for Error Principles. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):107-125.
    Timothy Williamson’s potentially most important contribution to epistemicism about vagueness lies in his arguments for the basic epistemicist claim that the alleged cut-off points of vague predicates are not knowable. His arguments for this are based on so-called ‘margin for error principles’. This paper argues that these principles fail to provide a good argument for the basic claim. Williamson has offered at least two kinds of margin for error principles applicable to vague predicates. A certain fallacy of equivocation (on the (...)
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  29. Delia Graff Fara, Vagueness, Adjectives, and Interests (II).
    • Suppose we try to “solve” the sorites paradox (i.e., say either why the premises aren’t both true or why the reasoning isn’t valid reasoning) by denying the sorites premise: by saying that it’s *not* the case that any man 1mm shorter than a tall man is tall (for a man).
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  30. Delia Graff Fara & Timothy Williamson, (The International Research Library of Philosophy).
    If you’ve read the first five hundred pages of this book, you’ve read most of it (we assume that ‘most’ requires more than ‘more than half’). The set of natural numbers n such that the first n pages are most of this book is nonempty. Therefore, by the least number principle, it has a least member k. What is k? We do not know. We have no idea how to find out. The obstacle is something about the term ‘most’. It (...)
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  31. Patrick Greenough (2009). On What It is to Be in a Quandary. Synthese 171 (3).
    A number of serious problems are raised against Crispin Wright’s quandary conception of vagueness. Two alternative conceptions of the quandary view are proposed instead. The first conception retains Wright’s thesis that, for all one knows, a verdict concerning a borderline case constitutes knowledge. However a further problem is seen to beset this conception. The second conception, in response to this further problem, does not enjoin the thesis that, for all one knows, a verdict concerning a borderline case constitutes knowledge. The (...)
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  32. Patrick Greenough (2008). Indeterminate Truth. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):213-241.
    In §2-4, I survey three extant ways of making sense of indeterminate truth and find each of them wanting. All the later sections of the paper are concerned with showing that the most promising way of making sense of indeterminate truth is via either a theory of truthmaker gaps or via a theory of truthmaking gaps. The first intimations of a truthmaker–truthmaking gap theory of indeterminacy are to be found in Quine (1981). In §5, we see how Quine proposes to (...)
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  33. Patrick Greenough (2003). Vagueness: A Minimal Theory. Mind 112 (446):235-281.
    Vagueness is given a philosophically neutral definition in terms of an epistemic notion of tolerance. Such a notion is intended to capture the thesis that vague terms draw no known boundary across their range of signification and contrasts sharply with the semantic notion of tolerance given by Wright (1975, 1976). This allows us to distinguish vagueness from superficially similar but distinct phenomena such as semantic incompleteness. Two proofs are given which show that vagueness qua epistemic tolerance and vagueness qua borderline (...)
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  34. Patrick Grim (2005). The Buried Quantifier: An Account of Vagueness and the Sorites. Analysis 65 (286):95–104.
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  35. Paul Horwich (2000). Stephen Schiffer's Theory of Vagueness. Noûs 34 (s1):271 - 281.
  36. Paul Horwich (2000). The Sharpness of Vague Terms. Philosophical Topics 28 (1):83--92.
  37. Gerald Hull, Vagueness Without Indefiniteness.
    Contemporary discussions do not always clearly distinguish two different forms of vagueness. Sometimes focus is on the imprecision of predicates, and sometimes the indefiniteness of statements. The two are intimately related, of course. A predicate is imprecise if there are instances to which it neither definitely applies nor definitely does not apply, instances of which it is neither definitely true nor definitely false. However, indefinite statements will occur in everyday discourse only if speakers in fact apply imprecise predicates to such (...)
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  38. D. Hyde (1997). From Heaps and Gaps to Heaps of Gluts. Mind 106 (424):641-660.
    One of the few points of agreement to be found in mainstream responses to the logical and semantic problems generated by vagueness is the view that if any modification of classical logic and semantics is required at all then it will only be such as to admit underdetermined reference and truth-value gaps. Logics of vagueness including many valued logics, fuzzy logics, and supervaluation logics all provide responses in accord with this view. The thought that an adequate response might require the (...)
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  39. Henry Jackman (2006). Temporal Externalism, Constitutive Norms, and Theories of Vagueness. In Tomas Marvan (ed.), What Determines Content? The Internalism/Externalism Dispute. Cambridge Scholars Press.
    Our concept of truth is governed by two principles. The.
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  40. Rosanna Keefe & Peter Smith (eds.) (1997). Vagueness: A Reader. MIT Press.
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  41. KenAkiba (2000). Vagueness as a Modality. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):359–370.
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  42. Christopher Kennedy (2007). Vagueness and Grammar: The Semantics of Relative and Absolute Gradable Adjectives. Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (1):1 - 45.
    This paper investigates the way that linguistic expressions influence vagueness, focusing on the interpretation of the positive (unmarked) form of gradable adjectives. I begin by developing a semantic analysis of the positive form of ‘relative’ gradable adjectives, expanding on previous proposals by further motivating a semantic basis for vagueness and by precisely identifying and characterizing the division of labor between the compositional and contextual aspects of its interpretation. I then introduce a challenge to the analysis from the class of ‘absolute’ (...)
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  43. Marvin Kohl (1969). Bertrand Russell on Vagueness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):31 – 41.
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  44. Shalom Lappin (2000). An Intensional Parametric Semantics for Vague Quantifiers. Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (6):599-620.
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  45. Trenton Merricks (2001). Varieties of Vagueness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):145-157.
    According to one account, vagueness is "metaphysical." The friend of metaphysical vagueness believes that, for some object and some property, there can be no determinate fact of the matter whether that object exemplifies that property. A second account maintains that vagueness is due only to ignorance. According to the epistemic account, vagueness is explained completely by and is nothing over and above our not knowing some relevant fact or facts. These are the minority views. The dominant position maintains that there (...)
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  46. Adam Morton (1999). Where Demonstratives Meet Vagueness: Possible Languages. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1):1–18.
    I argue that both demonstratives and vague predicates are instances of some more general linguistic phenomena, which could take quite different forms. My argument consists in constructing three natural-like langauges, and using their intelligibility to argue for conclusions about languages such as English.
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  47. Rick Nouwen, Robert van Rooij, Uli Sauerland & Hans-Christian Schmitz (eds.) (forthcoming). Vagueness in Communication. Springer.
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  48. Sergi Oms (2010). Truth-Functional and Penumbral Intuitions. Theoria 25 (2):137-147.
    Two of the main intuitions that underlie the phenomenon of vagueness are the truth-functional and the penumbral intuitions. After presenting and contrasting them, I will put forward Tappenden's gappy approach to vagueness (which takes into account the truth-functional intuition). I will contrast Tappenden'sview with another of the theories of vagueness that see it as a semantic phenomenon: Supervaluationism (which takes into account the penumbral intuition). Then I will analyze some objections to Tappenden's approach and some objections to Supervaluationism. Finally, I (...)
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  49. Peter Pagin, Vagueness and Central Gaps.
    Ordinary intuitions that vague predicates are tolerant, or cannot have sharp boundaries, can be formalized in first-order logic in at least two non-equivalent ways, a stronger and a weaker. The stronger turns out to be false in domains that have a significant central gap for the predicate in question, i.e. where a sufficiently large middle segment of the ordering relation (such as taller for ‘tall’) is uninstantiated. The weaker principle is true in such domains, but does not in those domains (...)
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  50. Francis Jeffry Pelletier, Vagueness.
    Vagueness: an expression is vague if and only if it is possible that it give rise to a “borderline case.” A borderline case is a situation in which the application of a particular expression to a (name of) a particular object does not generate an expression with a definite TRUTH-VALUE. That is, the piece of language in question neither applies to the object nor fails to apply. Although such a formulation leaves it open what the pieces of language might be (...)
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  51. Matjaž Potrč (2002). Transvaluationism, Common Sense and Indirect Correspondence. Acta Analytica 17 (1):101-119.
    The problem of reconciling the philosophical denial of ontological vagueness with common-sense beliefs positing vague objects, properties and relations is addressed. This project arises for any view denying ontological vagueness but is especially pressing for transvaluationism, which claims that ontological vagueness is impossible. The idea that truth, for vague discourse and vague thought-content, is an indirect form of language-thought correspondence is invoked and applied. It is pointed out that supervaluationism provides one way, but not necessarily the only way, of implementing (...)
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  52. Mozaffar Qizilbash (2005). Transitivity and Vagueness. Economics and Philosophy 21 (1):109-131.
    Axiomatic utility theory plays a foundational role in some accounts of normative principles. In this context, it is sometimes argued that transitivity of “better than” is a logical truth. Larry Temkin and Stuart Rachels use various examples to argue that “better than” is non–transitive, and that transitivity is not a logical truth. These examples typically involve some sort of “discontinuity.” In his discussion of one of these examples, John Broome suggests that we should reject the claim which involves “discontinuity.” We (...)
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  53. W. V. Quine (1981). What Price Bivalence? Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):90-95.
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  54. Diana Raffman (1995). Transvaluationism: Comments on Horgan. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):127-132.
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  55. Agustín Rayo (2008). Vague Representation. Mind 117 (466):329-373.
    The goal of this paper is to develop a theory of content for vague language. My proposal is based on the following three theses: (1) language-mastery is not rulebased— it involves a certain kind of decision-making; (2) a theory of content is to be thought of instrumentally—it is a tool for making sense of our linguistic practice; and (3) linguistic contents are only locally defined—they are only defined relative to suitably constrained sets of possibilities. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?
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  56. Agustin Rayo, A Metasemantic Account of Vagueness.
    I argue for an account of vagueness according to which the root of vagueness lies not in the type of semantic-value that is best associated with an expression, but in the type of linguistic practice that renders the expression meaningful. I suggest, in particular, that conventions about how to use sentences involving attributions of vague predicates to borderline cases prevail to a lesser degree than conventions about how to use sentences involving attributions of vague predicates to clear cases.
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  57. David Ripley (forthcoming). Contradictions at the Borders. In Rick Nouwen, Robert van Rooij, Uli Sauerland & Hans-Christian Schmitz (eds.), Vagueness in Communication. Springer.
    The purpose of this essay is to shed some light on a certain type of sentence, which I call a borderline contradiction. A borderline contradiction is a sentence of the form F a ∧ ¬F a, for some vague predicate F and some borderline case a of F , or a sentence equivalent to such a sentence. For example, if Jackie is a borderline case of ‘rich’, then ‘Jackie is rich and Jackie isn’t rich’ is a borderline contradiction. Many theories (...)
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  58. David Ripley (2013). Revising Up: Strengthening Classical Logic in the Face of Paradox. Philosophers' Imprint 13 (5).
    This paper provides a defense of the full strength of classical logic, in a certain form, against those who would appeal to semantic paradox or vagueness in an argument for a weaker logic. I will not argue that these paradoxes are based on mistaken principles; the approach I recommend will extend a familiar formulation of classical logic by including a fully transparent truth predicate and fully tolerant vague predicates. It has been claimed that these principles are not compatible with classical (...)
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  59. Bertil Rolf (1980). A Theory of Vagueness. Journal of Philosophical Logic 9 (3):315 - 325.
  60. Sven Rosenkranz (2009). Liberalism, Entitlement, and Verdict Exclusion. Synthese 171 (3).
    In a series of recent papers, Crispin Wright has developed and defended an epistemic account of borderline cases which he calls ‘Liberalism’. If Verdict Exclusion is the claim that no polar verdict on borderline cases is knowledgeable, then Liberalism implies the view that Verdict Exclusion is itself nothing we are in a position to know. It is a matter of ongoing discussion what more Liberalism implies. In any case, Wright argues that Liberalism affords the means to account for the intuition (...)
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  61. Sven Rosenkranz (2003). Wright on Vagueness and Agnosticism. Mind 112 (447):449-464.
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  62. Bertrand Russell (1923). Vagueness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):84 – 92.
  63. Israel Scheffler (1979). Beyond the Letter: A Philosophical Inquiry Into Ambiguity, Vagueness, and Metaphor in Language. Routledge & Kegan Paul.
  64. Stephen Schiffer, Quandary and Intuitionism: Crispin Wright on Vagueness.
    SI is a paradox because it presents four appearances that cannot all be veridical: first, it appears to be valid—after all, it’s both classically and intuitionistically valid; second, its sorites premiss, (2), seems merely to state the obvious fact that in the sorites march from 2¢ to 5,000,000,000¢ there is no precise point that marks the cutoff between not being rich and being rich; third, premiss (1), which asserts that a person with only 2¢ isn’t rich, is surely true; and (...)
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  65. Stephen Schiffer (2000). Vagueness and Partial Belief. Noûs 34 (s1):220 - 257.
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  66. Stephen Schiffer (1998). Two Issues of Vagueness. The Monist 81 (2):193--214.
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  67. Stephen P. Schwartz (1989). Vagueness and Incoherence: A Reply to Burns. Synthese 80 (3):395 - 406.
  68. Stewart Shapiro (2003). Theories of Vagueness. Philosophical Review 112 (2):259-262.
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  69. Roy A. Sorensen (1994). Symposium: Vagueness and Sharp Boundaries. Mind 103 (409):47-54.
  70. Jamie Tappenden (1995). Some Remarks on Vagueness and a Dynamic Conception of Language. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):193-201.
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  71. Loretta Torrago (1998). Vagueness. Philosophical Review 107 (4):637-641.
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  72. Bart Van Kerkhove & Guido Vanackere (2003). Vagueness-Adaptive Logic: A Pragmatical Approach to Sorites Paradoxes. Studia Logica 75 (3):383-411.
    This paper defends a pragmatical approach to vagueness. The vagueness-adaptive logic VAL is a good reconstruction of and an excellent, instrument for human reasoning processes in which vague predicates are involved. Apart from its proof-theory and semantics, a Sorites-treating model based on it is presented, disarming the paradox. The paper opens perspectives with respect to the construction of theories by means of vague predicates.
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  73. Achille Varzi, Vagueness [Encyclopedia Entry].
    A critical survey of the main theories about vagueness, organized in four main sections: (i) What is vagueness? (ii) Problems and paradoxes; (iii) Theories of vagueness; (iv) Vagueness and cognitive science.
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  74. Achille Varzi, Vagueness.
    Standardly, one says that vagueness arises whenever a concept or linguistic expression admits of borderline cases of application. A predicate such as ‘bald’, for example, is vague because there can be situations in which it is indeterminate whether or not it applies to (a name of) a certain object. Some people are clearly bald (Picasso), some are clearly not bald (the count of Montecristo), and some are borderline cases—our concept of baldness and our linguistic practices do not specify any exact (...)
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  75. Achille Varzi (1995). Vagueness, Indiscernibility, and Pragmatics: Comments on Burns. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):49-62.
    In ‘Something to Do with Vagueness ...’, Linda Burns defends an analogy between the informational and the borderline-case variety of vagueness. She argues that the latter is in fact less extraordinary and less disastrous than people in the tradition of Michael Dummett and Crispin Wright have told us. However, her account involves presuppositions that cannot be taken for granted. Here is to take a closer look at some of these presuppositions and argue hat they may--when left unguarded--undermine much of Burns’ (...)
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  76. Brian Weatherson, Vagueness as Indeterminacy.
    Vagueness as Indeterminacy. I defend the traditional view that a vague term is one with an indeterminate denotation from a bevy of recent challenges.
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  77. Crispin Wright, On the Characterisation of Borderline Cases.
    It is a great pleasure to have the opportunity to contribute to this volume dedicated to the critical celebration of Stephen Schiffer’s very considerable philosophical achievements. My focus will be on his recent work on vagueness.1 The broad direction of Schiffer’s researches in this area has been to give priority to what we may call the characterisation problem: the problem of saying what the vagueness of expressions of natural language consists in or, more specifically – since Schiffer takes it as (...)
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  78. Elia Zardini (2008). A Model of Tolerance. Studia Logica 90 (3):337 - 368.
    According to the naive theory of vagueness, the vagueness of an expression consists in the existence of both positive and negative cases of application of the expression and in the non-existence of a sharp cut-off point between them. The sorites paradox shows the naive theory to be inconsistent in most logics proposed for a vague language. The paper explores the prospects of saving the naive theory by revising the logic in a novel way, placing principled restrictions on the transitivity of (...)
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  79. Elia Zardini (2008). Living on the Slippery Slope : The Nature, Sources and Logic of Vagueness. Dissertation, University of St Andrews
    According to the dominant approach in the theory of vagueness, the nature of the vagueness of an expression ‘F’ consists in its presenting borderline cases in an appropriately ordered series: objects which are neither definitely F nor definitely not F (where the notion of definiteness can be semantic, ontic, epistemic, psychological or primitive). In view of the various problems faced by theories of vagueness adopting the dominant approach, the thesis proposes to reconsider the naive theory of vagueness, according to which (...)
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