Related categories
Siblings:
91 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 91
  1. Ken Akiba (2002). A Deflationist Approach to Indeterminacy and Vagueness. Philosophical Studies 107 (1):69 - 86.
    Deflationists cannot make sense ofthe notion of referential indeterminacybecause they deny the existence of substantivereference. One way for them to make sense ofthe objective existence of linguisticindeterminacy is by embracing theworldly (or objectual) view ofindeterminacy, the view that indeterminacyexists not in reference relations but in the(non-linguistic) world itself. On this view,the entire world is divided into precisified worlds, just as it is dividedinto temporal slices and (arguably) alethicpossible worlds. Supervaluationism proves tobe neutral with respect to the debate betweenthe worldly view (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Thomas T. Ballmer & Manfred Pinkal (eds.) (1983). Approaching Vagueness. Sole Distributors for the U.S.A. And Canada, Elsevier Science Pub. Co..
  3. Chris Barker (2002). The Dynamics of Vagueness. Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (1):1-36.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. D. Barnett (2011). Does Vagueness Exclude Knowledge? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):22 - 45.
    On two standard views of vagueness, vagueness as to whether Harry is bald entails that nobody knows whether Harry is bald—either because vagueness is a type of missing truth, and so there is nothing to know, or because vagueness is a type of ignorance, and so even though there is a truth of the matter, nobody can know what that truth is. Vagueness as to whether Harry is bald does entail that nobody clearly knows that Harry is bald and that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. David Barnett (2011). Does Vagueness Exclude Knowledge? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):22 - 45.
    On two standard views of vagueness, vagueness as to whether Harry is bald entails that nobody knows whether Harry is bald—either because vagueness is a type of missing truth, and so there is nothing to know, or because vagueness is a type of ignorance, and so even though there is a truth of the matter, nobody can know what that truth is. Vagueness as to whether Harry is bald does entail that nobody clearly knows that Harry is bald and that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. David Barnett (2009). Is Vagueness Sui Generis ? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):5 – 34.
    On the dominant view of vagueness, if it is vague whether Harry is bald, then it is unsettled, not merely epistemically, but metaphysically, whether Harry is bald. In other words, vagueness is a type of indeterminacy. On the standard alternative, vagueness is a type of ignorance: if it is vague whether Harry is bald, then, even though it is metaphysically settled whether Harry is bald, we cannot know whether Harry is bald. On my view, vagueness is neither a type of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Bert Baumgaertner (2012). Vagueness Intuitions and the Mobility of Cognitive Sortals. Minds and Machines 22 (3):213-234.
    One feature of vague predicates is that, as far as appearances go, they lack sharp application boundaries. I argue that we would not be able to locate boundaries even if vague predicates had sharp boundaries. I do so by developing an idealized cognitive model of a categorization faculty which has mobile and dynamic sortals (`classes', `concepts' or `categories') and formally prove that the degree of precision with which boundaries of such sortals can be located is inversely constrained by their flexibility. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Jiri Benovsky (2014). Vague Objects with Sharp Boundaries. Ratio 27 (1).
    In this article I shall consider two seemingly contradictory claims: first, the claim that everybody who thinks that there are ordinary objects has to accept that they are vague, and second, the claim that everybody has to accept the existence of sharp boundaries to ordinary objects. The purpose of this article is of course not to defend a contradiction. Indeed, there is no contradiction because the two claims do not concern the same ‘everybody’. The first claim, that all ordinary objects (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Max Black (1963). Reasoning with Loose Concepts. Dialogue 2 (01):1-12.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Susanne Bobzien (2014). Higher-Order Vagueness and Numbers of Distinct Modalities. Disputatio (39):131-137.
    This paper shows that the following common assumption is false: that in modal-logical representations of higher-order vagueness, for there to be borderline cases to borderline cases ad infinitum, the number of possible distinct modalities in a modal system must be infinite. (Open access journal).
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Susanne Bobzien (2013). Higher-Order Vagueness and Borderline Nestings: A Persistent Confusion. Analytic Philosophy 54 (1):1-43.
    ABSTRACT: This paper argues that the so-called paradoxes of higher-order vagueness are the result of a confusion between higher-order vagueness and the distribution of the objects of a Sorites series into extensionally non-overlapping non-empty classes.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Andrea Borghini & Achille C. Varzi (2006). Event Location and Vagueness. Philosophical Studies 128 (2):313-336.
    Most event-referring expressions are vague; it is utterly difficult, if not impossible, to specify the exact spatiotemporal location of an event from the words that we use to refer to it. We argue that in spite of certain prima facie obstacles, such vagueness can be given a purely semantic (broadly supervaluational) account.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. David Braun & Theodore Sider (2007). Vague, So Untrue. Noûs 41 (2):133 - 156.
    According to an old and attractive view, vagueness must be eliminated before semantic notions — truth, implication, and so on — may be applied. This view was accepted by Frege, but is rarely defended nowadays.1 This..
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Linda Burns (1995). Something to Do With Vagueness. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):23-47.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Ross P. Cameron (2010). Vagueness and Naturalness. Erkenntnis 72 (2):281 - 293.
    I attempt to accommodate the phenomenon of vagueness with classical logic and bivalence. I hold that for any vague predicate there is a sharp cut-off between the things that satisfy it and the things that do not; I claim that this is due to the greater naturalness of one of the candidate meanings of that predicate. I extend the thought to the problem of the many and Benacerraf cases. I go on to explore the idea that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. James Cargile (1993). Vagueness. An Investigation Into Natural Languages and the Sorites Paradox. Philosophical Books 34 (1):22-24.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Mark A. Changizi (2003). The Brain From 25000 Feet: High Level Explorations of Brain Complexity, Perception, Innateness and Vagueness. Kluwer.
    This book is a must-read for researchers interested in taking a high-level, non-mechanistic approach to answering age-old fundamental questions in the brain ...
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Pablo Cobreros (2010). Review of Richard Dietz, Sebastiano Moruzzi (Eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, its Nature, and its Logic. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (12).
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. J. Collins (2012). Cuts and Clouds. Analysis 72 (1):138-145.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (13 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. John D. Collins & Achille C. Varzi (2000). Unsharpenable Vagueness. Philosophical Topics 28 (1):1-10.
    A plausible thought about vagueness is that it involves semantic incompleteness. To say that a predicate is vague is to say (at the very least) that its extension is incompletely specified. Where there is incomplete specification of extension there is indeterminacy, an indeterminacy between various ways in which the specification of the predicate might be completed or sharpened. In this paper we show that this idea is bound to founder by presenting an argument to the effect that there are vague (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Lieven Decock, Richard Dietz & Igor Douven (2013). Modelling Comparative Concepts in Conceptual Spaces. In Y. Motomura, Y. Butler & D. Bekki (eds.), New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence, LNAI 7856. Springer. 69-86.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.) (2010). Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, its Nature, and its Logic. Oxford University Press.
    Vagueness is a familiar but deeply puzzling aspect of the relation between language and the world. It is highly controversial what the nature of vagueness is -- a feature of the way we represent reality in language, or rather a feature of reality itself? May even relations like identity or parthood be affected by vagueness? Sorites arguments suggest that vague terms are either inconsistent or have a sharp boundary. The account we give of such paradoxes plays a pivotal role for (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Cian Dorr (2003). Vagueness Without Ignorance. Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):83–113.
    I motivate and briefly sketch a linguistic theory of vagueness, on which the notion of indeterminacy is understood in terms of the conventions of language: a sentence is indeterminate iff the conventions of language either forbid asserting it and forbid asserting its negation, under the circumstances, or permit asserting either. I then consider an objection that purports to show that if this theory (or, as far as I can see, any other theory of vagueness that deserved the label "linguistic" were (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Cian Dorr & John Hawthorne (2014). Semantic Plasticity and Speech Reports. Philosophical Review 123 (3):281-338.
    Most meanings we express belong to large families of variant meanings, among which it would be implausible to suppose that some are much more apt for being expressed than others. This abundance of candidate meanings creates pressure to think that the proposition attributing any particular meaning to an expression is modally plastic: its truth depends very sensitively on the exact microphysical state of the world. However, such plasticity seems to threaten ordinary counterfactuals whose consequents contain speech reports, since it is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Paul Égré & Nathan Klinedinst (eds.) (2010). Vagueness and Language Use. Palgrave Macmillan.
    This volume brings together twelve papers by linguists and philosophers contributing novel empirical and formal considerations to theorizing about vagueness. Three main issues are addressed: gradable expressions and comparison, the semantics of degree adverbs and intensifiers (such as 'clearly'), and ways of evading the sorites paradox.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Paul Egré & Klinedinst Nathan (eds.) (forthcoming). Vagueness and Language Use, Palgrave Studies in Pragmatics, Language and Cognition. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Matti Eklund (2011). Recent Work on Vagueness. Analysis 71 (2):352-363.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Matti Eklund (2006). Schiffer on Vagueness. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):12–23.
    I go through, and criticize, Stephen Schiffer's account of vagueness and the sorites paradox. I discuss his notion of a happy-face solution to a paradox, his appeal to vagueness-related partial belief, his claim that indeterminacy is a psychological notion, and his view that the sorites premise and the inference rule of modus ponens are indeterminate.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Matti Eklund (2005). What Vagueness Consists In. Philosophical Studies 125 (1):27-60.
    The main question of the paper is that ofwhat vagueness consists in. This question must be distinguished from other questions about vagueness discussed in the literature. It is argued that familiar accounts of vagueness for general reasons failto answer the question ofwhat vagueness consists in. A positive view is defended, according to which, roughly, the vagueness of an expression consists in it being part ofsemantic competence to accept a tolerance principle for the expression. Since tolerance principles are inconsistent, this is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Hartry Field, Vagueness, Partial Belief, and Logic.
    Discussion of Chapter 5 of Stephen Schiffer's "The Things We Mean' in which Stephen Schiffer advances two novel theses: 1. Vagueness (and indeterminacy more generally) is a psychological phenomenon; 2. It is indeterminate whether classical logic applies in situations where vagueness matters.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Hartry Field (2004). The Semantic Paradoxes and the Paradoxes of Vagueness. In J. C. Beall (ed.), Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox. Clarendon Press.
    Both in dealing with the semantic paradoxes and in dealing with vagueness and indeterminacy, there is some temptation to weaken classical logic: in particular, to restrict the law of excluded middle. The reasons for doing this are somewhat different in the two cases. In the case of the semantic paradoxes, a weakening of classical logic (presumably involving a restriction of excluded middle) is required if we are to preserve the naive theory of truth without inconsistency. In the case of vagueness (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Steven French & Décio Krause (2003). Quantum Vagueness. Erkenntnis 59 (1):97 - 124.
    It has been suggested that quantum particles are genuinelyvague objects (Lowe 1994a). The present work explores thissuggestion in terms of the various metaphysical packages that areavailable for describing such particles. The formal frameworksunderpinning such packages are outlined and issues of identityand reference are considered from this overall perspective. Indoing so we hope to illuminate the diverse ways in whichvagueness can arise in the quantum context.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. André Fuhrmann (1999). Keefe, Rosanna and Peter Smith (Eds.), Vagueness: A Reader. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 50 (1):133-136.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Mario Gomez-Torrente (2010). The Sorites, Linguistic Preconceptions, and the Dual Picture of Vagueness. In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Vagueness, its Nature and its Logic. Oxford University Press. 228-253.
    I postulate that the extension of a degree adjective is fixed by implicitly accepted non-analytic reference-fixing principles (“preconceptions”) that combine appeals to paradigmatic cases with generic principles designed to expand the extension of the adjective beyond the paradigmatic range. In regular occasions of use, the paradigm and generic preconceptions are jointly satisfied and determine the existence of an extension/anti-extension pair dividing the adjective’s comparison class into two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive subclasses. Sorites paradoxical occasions of use are irregular occasions (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Mario Gómez-Torrente (2002). Vagueness and Margin for Error Principles. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):107-125.
  36. Delia Graff Fara, Vagueness, Adjectives, and Interests (II).
    • Suppose we try to “solve” the sorites paradox (i.e., say either why the premises aren’t both true or why the reasoning isn’t valid reasoning) by denying the sorites premise: by saying that it’s *not* the case that any man 1mm shorter than a tall man is tall (for a man).
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Delia Graff Fara & Timothy Williamson, (The International Research Library of Philosophy).
    If you’ve read the first five hundred pages of this book, you’ve read most of it (we assume that ‘most’ requires more than ‘more than half’). The set of natural numbers n such that the first n pages are most of this book is nonempty. Therefore, by the least number principle, it has a least member k. What is k? We do not know. We have no idea how to find out. The obstacle is something about the term ‘most’. It (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Patrick Greenough (2009). On What It is to Be in a Quandary. Synthese 171 (3):399 - 408.
    A number of serious problems are raised against Crispin Wright’s quandary conception of vagueness. Two alternative conceptions of the quandary view are proposed instead. The first conception retains Wright’s thesis that, for all one knows, a verdict concerning a borderline case constitutes knowledge. However a further problem is seen to beset this conception. The second conception, in response to this further problem, does not enjoin the thesis that, for all one knows, a verdict concerning a borderline case constitutes knowledge. The (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Patrick Greenough (2008). Indeterminate Truth. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):213-241.
    In §2-4, I survey three extant ways of making sense of indeterminate truth and find each of them wanting. All the later sections of the paper are concerned with showing that the most promising way of making sense of indeterminate truth is via either a theory of truthmaker gaps or via a theory of truthmaking gaps. The first intimations of a truthmaker–truthmaking gap theory of indeterminacy are to be found in Quine (1981). In §5, we see how Quine proposes to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Patrick Greenough (2003). Vagueness: A Minimal Theory. Mind 112 (446):235-281.
    Vagueness is given a philosophically neutral definition in terms of an epistemic notion of tolerance. Such a notion is intended to capture the thesis that vague terms draw no known boundary across their range of signification and contrasts sharply with the semantic notion of tolerance given by Wright (1975, 1976). This allows us to distinguish vagueness from superficially similar but distinct phenomena such as semantic incompleteness. Two proofs are given which show that vagueness qua epistemic tolerance and vagueness qua borderline (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Patrick Grim (2005). The Buried Quantifier: An Account of Vagueness and the Sorites. Analysis 65 (286):95–104.
  42. Paul Horwich (2000). Stephen Schiffer's Theory of Vagueness. Noûs 34 (s1):271 - 281.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Paul Horwich (2000). The Sharpness of Vague Terms. Philosophical Topics 28 (1):83--92.
  44. Gerald Hull, Vagueness Without Indefiniteness.
    Contemporary discussions do not always clearly distinguish two different forms of vagueness. Sometimes focus is on the imprecision of predicates, and sometimes the indefiniteness of statements. The two are intimately related, of course. A predicate is imprecise if there are instances to which it neither definitely applies nor definitely does not apply, instances of which it is neither definitely true nor definitely false. However, indefinite statements will occur in everyday discourse only if speakers in fact apply imprecise predicates to such (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. D. Hyde (1997). From Heaps and Gaps to Heaps of Gluts. Mind 106 (424):641-660.
    One of the few points of agreement to be found in mainstream responses to the logical and semantic problems generated by vagueness is the view that if any modification of classical logic and semantics is required at all then it will only be such as to admit underdetermined reference and truth-value gaps. Logics of vagueness including many valued logics, fuzzy logics, and supervaluation logics all provide responses in accord with this view. The thought that an adequate response might require the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Henry Jackman (2006). Temporal Externalism, Constitutive Norms, and Theories of Vagueness. In Tomas Marvan (ed.), What Determines Content? The Internalism/Externalism Dispute. Cambridge Scholars Press.
    Our concept of truth is governed by two principles. The.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Hans Kamp (1981). The Paradox of the Heap. In U. Mönnich (ed.), Aspects of Philosophical Logic. Dordrecht. 225--277.
  48. Rosanna Keefe & Peter Smith (eds.) (1997). Vagueness: A Reader. MIT Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. KenAkiba (2000). Vagueness as a Modality. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):359–370.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Christopher Kennedy (2007). Vagueness and Grammar: The Semantics of Relative and Absolute Gradable Adjectives. [REVIEW] Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (1):1 - 45.
    This paper investigates the way that linguistic expressions influence vagueness, focusing on the interpretation of the positive (unmarked) form of gradable adjectives. I begin by developing a semantic analysis of the positive form of ‘relative’ gradable adjectives, expanding on previous proposals by further motivating a semantic basis for vagueness and by precisely identifying and characterizing the division of labor between the compositional and contextual aspects of its interpretation. I then introduce a challenge to the analysis from the class of ‘absolute’ (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 91