This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Subcategories:
998 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 998
Material to categorize
  1. S. C. A. (1971). An Anatomy of Values: Problems of Personal and Social Choice. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 25 (2):352-352.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Ali E. Abbas (2011). Risk-Adjusted Martingales and the Design of “Indifference” Gambles. Theory and Decision 71 (4):643-668.
    In the probability literature, a martingale is often referred to as a “fair game.” A martingale investment is a stochastic sequence of wealth levels, whose expected value at any future stage is equal to the investor’s current wealth. In decision theory, a risk neutral investor would therefore be indifferent between holding on to a martingale investment, and receiving its payoff at any future stage, or giving it up and maintaining his current wealth. But a risk-averse decision maker would not be (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. F. Ben Abdelaziz, P. Lang & R. Nadeau (1999). Dominance and Efficiency in Multicriteria Decision Under Uncertainty. Theory and Decision 47 (3):191-211.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Mohammed Abdellaoui, Olivier L'Haridon & Corina Paraschiv (2013). Individual Vs. Couple Behavior: An Experimental Investigation of Risk Preferences. [REVIEW] Theory and Decision 75 (2):175-191.
    In this article, we elicit both individuals’ and couples’ preferences assuming prospect theory (PT) as a general theoretical framework for decision under risk. Our experimental method, based on certainty equivalents, allows to infer measurements of utility and probability weighting at the individual level and at the couple level. Our main results are twofold. First, risk attitude for couples is compatible with PT and incorporates deviations from expected utility similar to those found in individual decision making. Second, couples’ attitudes towards risk (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Mohammed Abdellaoui & Peter P. Wakker (2005). The Likelihood Method for Decision Under Uncertainty. Theory and Decision 58 (1):3-76.
    This paper introduces the likelihood method for decision under uncertainty. The method allows the quantitative determination of subjective beliefs or decision weights without invoking additional separability conditions, and generalizes the Savage–de Finetti betting method. It is applied to a number of popular models for decision under uncertainty. In each case, preference foundations result from the requirement that no inconsistencies are to be revealed by the version of the likelihood method appropriate for the model considered. A unified treatment of subjective decision (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. T. P. Abeles (1994). The Economics of Collective Choice, by Joe B. Stevens. Agriculture and Human Values 11:57-57.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Robert J. Ackermann (1967). Conflict and Decision. Philosophy of Science 34 (2):188-193.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Daniel Acuna & Paul Schrater (2008). Bayesian Modeling of Human Sequential Decision-Making on the Multi-Armed Bandit Problem. In B. C. Love, K. McRae & V. M. Sloutsky (eds.), Proceedings of the 30th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. 100--200.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Matthew D. Adler, Claire Finkelstein & Peter Huang, Introduction to, Preferences and Rational Choice: New Perspectives and Legal Implications.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Alpaslan Akay, Peter Martinsson, Haileselassie Medhin & Stefan T. Trautmann (2012). Attitudes Toward Uncertainty Among the Poor: An Experiment in Rural Ethiopia. Theory and Decision 73 (3):453-464.
    We investigate risk and ambiguity attitudes among Ethiopian farmers in one of the poorest regions of the world. Strong risk aversion and ambiguity aversion were found with the Ethiopian farmers. We compared their attitudes to those of a Western university student sample elicited by the same decision task. Ambiguity aversion was similar for farmers and students, but farmers were more risk averse. Our results show that ambiguity aversion is not restricted to Western student populations, and that studies of agricultural decisions (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. José C. R. Alcantud & Ritxar Arlegi (2008). Ranking Sets Additively in Decisional Contexts: An Axiomatic Characterization. Theory and Decision 64 (2-3):147-171.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. José Carlos Rodríguez Alcantud, Gianni Bosi, M. J. Campión, J. C. Candeal, E. Induráin & C. Rodríguez-Palmero (2008). Continuous Utility Functions Through Scales. Theory and Decision 64 (4):479-494.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Jonathan Aldred (2007). Intransitivity and Vague Preferences. Journal of Ethics 11 (4):377 - 403.
    This paper is concerned with intransitivity in normative rational choice. It focuses on a class of intransitivities which have received little attention, those involving vague preferences. “Vague preferences” are defined in terms of vague predicates such as “red” or “bald.” Such preferences appear common, and intransitive indifference is argued to be an unavoidable feature of them. Such preferences are argued to undermine intransitive strict preference also. Various formal theories of vagueness are applied to an example of vague preferences, but none (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. J. McKenzie Alexander (2012). Why the Angels Cannot Choose. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):619 - 640.
    Decision theory faces a number of problematic gambles which challenge it to say what value an ideal rational agent should assign to the gamble, and why. Yet little attention has been devoted to the question of what an ideal rational agent is, and in what sense decision theory may be said to apply to one. I show that, given one arguably natural set of constraints on the preferences of an idealized rational agent, such an agent is forced to be indifferent (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Jason Mckenzie Alexander (2000). The Evolution of Distributive Justice. Dissertation, University of California, Irvine
    Traditional contractarian theories based upon the theory of rational choice suffer from a number of well-known problems. For example, in positing the initial choice problem, the outcome selected by rational agents depends upon the specification of the choice situation, the range of alternatives the agents may choose from, and the nature of the rational agents themselves. Modifying any one of these three parameters likely alters the choice outcome, creating difficulties for social contract theorists who attempt to base a theory of (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. E. Algaba, J. M. Bilbao, J. R. Fernández & A. Jiménez (2004). The Lovász Extension of Market Games. Theory and Decision 56 (1-2):229-238.
    The multilinear extension of a cooperative game was introduced by Owen in 1972. In this contribution we study the Lovász extension for cooperative games by using the marginal worth vectors and the dividends. First, we prove a formula for the marginal worth vectors with respect to compatible orderings. Next, we consider the direct market generated by a game. This model of utility function, proposed by Shapley and Shubik in 1969, is the concave biconjugate extension of the game. Then we obtain (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibull (2008). Family Ties, Incentives and Development: A Model of Coerced Altruism. In Kaushik Basu & Ravi Kanbur (eds.), Arguments for a Better World: Essays in Honor of Amartya Sen: Volume I: Ethics, Welfare, and Measurement and Volume Ii: Society, Institutions, and Development. Oup Oxford.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Syed Mubashir Ali (1989). Does Son Preference Matter? Journal of Biosocial Science 21 (4):399-408.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Loránd Ambrus-Lakatos (2001). On Rational Choice of Final Ends. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):117-133.
    This paper is a non-technical paper on the kinematics of rational decision-making. lt focuses upon Williams’s Regret argument. The Argument is directed against injunction implicit in standard decision theory and formulated by Rawls: a rational agent is always ready to act so that she need never blame herself “no matter how things finally transpire”. The purpose of this paper is to offer new insights into theweaknesses of the Argument, introducing new considerations regarding coherence of the self of the would-be repentant. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Rafael Amer & José Miguel Giménez (2003). Modification of Semivalues for Games with Coalition Structures. Theory and Decision 54 (3):185-205.
    Consideration of reference systems for semivalues leads us to a global representation of the action of a semivalue on a game. Using this representation, we show how to modify semivalues to take account of coalition structures on the player set. The players' allocations according to a semivalue, including a modified semivalue, can be computed by means of products of matrices obtained from the multilinear extension of the game.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Paul Anand (1987). Are the Preference Axioms Really Rational? Theory and Decision 23 (2):189-214.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik & Clemens Puppe (eds.) (2009). Handbook of Rational and Social Choice. Oxford University Press.
    This volume provides an overview of issues arising in work on the foundations of decision theory and social choice. The collection will be of particular value to researchers in economics with interests in utility or welfare, but also to any social scientist or philosopher interested in theories of rationality or group decision-making.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Christopher M. Anderson (2012). Ambiguity Aversion in Multi-Armed Bandit Problems. Theory and Decision 72 (1):15-33.
    In multi-armed bandit problems, information acquired from experimentation is valuable because it tells the agent whether to select a particular option again in the future. This article tests whether people undervalue this information because they are ambiguity averse, or have a distaste for uncertainty about the average quality of each alternative. It is shown that ambiguity averse agents have lower than optimal Gittins indexes, appearing to undervalue information from experimentation, but are willing to pay more than ambiguity neutral agents to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Chrisoula Andreou (2002). Joseph Heath, Communicative Action and Rational Choice Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 22 (1):41-43.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Chrisoula Andreou (2002). Joseph Heath, Communicative Action and Rational Choice. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 22:41-43.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Daniel G. Arce M. (1997). Correlated Strategies as Institutions. Theory and Decision 42 (3):271-285.
    Two institutions that are often implicit or overlooked in noncooperative games are the assumption of Nash behavior to solve a game, and the ability to correlate strategies. We consider two behavioral paradoxes; one in which maximin behavior rules out all Nash equilibria (‘Chicken’), and another in which minimax supergame behavior leads to an ‘inefficient’ outcome in comparison to the unique stage game equilibrium (asymmetric ‘Deadlock’). Nash outcomes are achieved in both paradoxes by allowing for correlated strategies, even when individual behavior (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Daniel G. M. Arce (1997). Correlated Strategies as Institutions. Theory and Decision 42 (3):271-285.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Amos Arieli & Ariel Rubinstein, Tracking Decision Makers Under Uncertainty.
    Eye tracking is used to investigate human choice procedures. We infer from eye movement patterns in choice problems where the deliberation process is clear to deliberations in problems of choice between two lotteries. The results indicate that participants tend to compare prizes and probabilities separately. The data provide little support for the hypothesis that decision makers use an expected utility type of calculation exclusively. This is particularly true when the calculations involved in comparing the lotteries are complicated.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Slinko Arkadii (2002). On Asymptotic Strategy-Proofness of Classical Social Choice Rules. Theory and Decision 52 (4).
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. C. Armand Maurer (1954). Comment on Paper of Fr. Peter Nash. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 28:75-77.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Brad Armendt (2013). On Risk and Rationality. Erkenntnis:1-9.
    It is widely held that the influence of risk on rational decisions is not entirely explained by the shape of an agent’s utility curve. Buchak (Erkenntnis, 2013, Risk and rationality, Oxford University Press, Oxford, in press) presents an axiomatic decision theory, risk-weighted expected utility theory (REU), in which decision weights are the agent’s subjective probabilities modified by his risk-function r. REU is briefly described, and the global applicability of r is discussed. Rabin’s (Econometrica 68:1281–1292, 2000) calibration theorem strongly suggests that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Roger A. Arnold (1982). Efficiency Vs. Ethics: Which Is the Proper Decision Criterion in Law Cases? Journal of Libertarian Studies 6 (1):49-57.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Kenneth J. Arrow (1966). Exposition of the Theory of Choice Under Uncertainty. Synthese 16 (3-4):253 - 269.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Richard C. Atkinson & Patrick Suppes (1958). An Analysis of Two-Person Game Situations in Terms of Statistical Learning Theory. Journal of Experimental Psychology 55 (4):369.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Gilbert Atnip & David Hothersall (1973). The Preference of Albino Rats for Free or Response-Produced Food. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 2 (3):153-154.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Giuseppe Attanasi & Aldo Montesano (2012). The Price for Information About Probabilities and its Relation with Risk and Ambiguity. Theory and Decision 73 (1):125-160.
    In this article, ambiguity attitude is measured through the maximum price a decision maker is willing to pay to know the probability of an event. Two problems are examined in which the decision maker faces an act: in one case, buying information implies playing a lottery, while, in the other case, buying information gives also the option to avoid playing the lottery. In both decision settings, relying on the Choquet expected utility model, we study how the decision maker’s risk and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Ludwig Von Auer (2004). Revealed Preferences in Intertemporal Decision Making. Theory and Decision 56 (3):269-290.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Robert U. Ayres & Manalur S. Sandilya (1986). Catastrophe Avoidance and Risk Aversion: Implications of Formal Utility Maximization. [REVIEW] Theory and Decision 20 (1):63-78.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Mehmet Bac & Parimal Kanti Bag (2002). Committee Decisions with Partisans and Side-Transfers. Theory and Decision 52 (3):267-286.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Mehmet Bac & Parimal Kanti Bag (2002). Committee Decisions with Partisans and Side-Transfers. Theory and Decision 52 (3):267-286.
    A dichotomous decision-making context in committees is considered where potential partisan members with predetermined votes can generate inefficient decisions and buy neutral votes. The optimal voting rule minimizing the expected costs of inefficient decisions for the case of a three-member committee is analyzed. It is shown that the optimal voting rule can be non-monotonic with respect to side-transfers: in the symmetric case, majority voting is optimal under either zero, mild or full side-transfer possibilities, whereas unanimity voting may be optimal under (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. C. W. Bach, Interactive Epistemology and Reasoning: On the Foundations of Game Theory.
    Game theory describes and analyzes strategic interaction. It is usually distinguished between static games, which are strategic situations in which the players choose only once as well as simultaneously, and dynamic games, which are strategic situations involving sequential choices. In addition, dynamic games can be further classified according to perfect and imperfect information. Indeed, a dynamic game is said to exhibit perfect information, whenever at any point of the game every player has full informational access to all choices that have (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Christian W. Bach & Conrad Heilmann, Agent Connectedness and Backward Induction.
    We analyze the sequential structure of dynamic games with perfect information. A three-stage account is proposed, that species setup, reasoning and play stages. Accordingly, we define a player as a set of agents corresponding to these three stages. The notion of agent connectedness is introduced into a type-based epistemic model. Agent connectedness measures the extent to which agents' choices are sequentially stable. Thus describing dynamic games allows to more fully understand strategic interaction over time. In particular, we provide suffcient conditions (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. M. Bacharach (1987). Elster, J. And Hylland, A. , "Foundations of Social Choice Theory". [REVIEW] Mind 96:423.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Michael Bacharach (1987). A Theory of Rational Decision in Games. Erkenntnis 27 (1):17 - 55.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Michael Bacharach & Susan Hurley (eds.) (1991). Essays in the Foundations of Decision Theory. Basil Blackwell, Inc..
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Pietro Badia & John Harsh (1977). Further Comments Concerning Preference for Signaled Shock Conditions. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 10 (1):17-20.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Pietro Badia & John Harsh (1977). Preference for Signaled Over Unsignaled Shock Schedules: A Reply to Furedy and Biederman. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 10 (1):13-16.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Eyal Baharad & Doron Kliger (2013). Market Failure in Light of Non-Expected Utility. Theory and Decision 75 (4):599-619.
    This paper merges the non-expected utility approach (Tversky and Kahneman, J Risk Uncertain 5:297–323, 1992 and Quiggin, J Econ Behav Organ 3:323–343, 1982) into Akerlof’s (Quart J Econ 84:488–500, 1970) model of Market for Lemons. We derive the results for different probability weighting functions and analyze the phenomenon of market failure in light of non-expected utility maximization. Our main finding suggests that when the proportion of traded lemons is high (low), the problem of market failure is mitigated (enhanced). In addition, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. N. Baigent (2007). Choice, Norms and Revealed Preference. Analyse and Kritik 29 (2):139-145.
    This paper considers lexical combinations of choice functions where at least one is interpreted as arising from a norm. It is shown that in for all possibilities in which a norm is present, in general final choice may be consistent with preference optimization, but that it need not be so. It is concluded therefore that a fruitful approach to understanding the effect of norms on choice is to consider particular classes of norms rather than norms in general as in the (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Kyung Hwan Baik, Todd L. Cherry, Stephan Kroll & Jason F. Shogren (1999). Endogenous Timing in a Gaming Tournament. Theory and Decision 47 (1):1-21.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 998