This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Subcategories:
869 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 869
Material to categorize
  1. Richard Almind & Henning Bergenholtz (1990). Klæder Skaber Folk: Ordbøgers Lay-Out. Hermes 4:31-47.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Daniel R. Ames, Eric D. Knowles, Michael W. Morris, Charles W. Kalish, Andrea D. Rosati & Alison Gopnik (2001). The Social Folk Theorist: Insights From Social and Cultural Psychology on The. In Bertram Malle, L. J. Moses & Dare Baldwin (eds.), Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition. Mit Press.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Kristin Andrews (2007). Critter Psychology: On the Possibility of Nonhuman Animal Folk Psychology. In Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. Kluwer/Springer Press. 191--209.
  4. Kristin Andrews (2005). Chimpanzee Theory of Mind: Looking in All the Wrong Places? Mind and Language 20 (5):521-536.
    I respond to an argument presented by Daniel Povinelli and Jennifer Vonk that the current generation of experiments on chimpanzee theory of mind cannot decide whether chimpanzees have the ability to reason about mental states. I argue that Povinelli and Vonk’s proposed experiment is subject to their own criticisms and that there should be a more radical shift away from experiments that ask subjects to predict behavior. Further, I argue that Povinelli and Vonk’s theoretical commitments should lead them to accept (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Kristin Andrews (2004). How to Learn From Our Mistakes. Philosophical Explorations 7 (3):247 – 263.
    A new approach to developing models of folk psychology is suggested, namely that different models exist for different folk psychological practices. This point is made through an example: the explanation and justification of morally heinous actions. Human folk psychology in this area is prone to a specific error of conflating an explanation for behaviour with a justification of it. An analysis of the error leads me to conclude that simulation is used to generate both explanations and justifications of heinous acts. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Ian Apperly (2013). Can Theory of Mind Grow Up? Mindreading in Adults, and its Implications for the Development and Neuroscience of Mindreading. In Simon Baron-Cohen, Michael Lombardo & Helen Tager-Flusberg (eds.), Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives From Developmental Social Neuroscience. Oup Oxford. 72.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Konstantine Arkoudas & Selmer Bringsjord (2008). Toward Formalizing Common-Sense Psychology: An Analysis of the False-Belief Task. In Tu-Bao Ho & Zhi-Hua Zhou (eds.), Pricai 2008: Trends in Artificial Intelligence. Springer. 17--29.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Harald Atmanspacher & Thomas Filk (2013). The Necker–Zeno Model for Bistable Perception. Topics in Cognitive Science 5 (4):800-817.
    A novel conceptual framework for theoretical psychology is presented and illustrated for the example of bistable perception. A basic formal feature of this framework is the non-commutativity of operations acting on mental states. A corresponding model for the bistable perception of ambiguous stimuli, the Necker–Zeno model, is sketched and some empirical evidence for it so far is described. It is discussed how a temporal non-locality of mental states, predicted by the model, can be understood and tested.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Robert N. Audi (1994). Dispositional Beliefs and Dispositions to Believe. Noûs 28 (4):419-34.
  10. Benjamin Bayer, From Folk Psychology to Folk Epistemology: The Status of Radical Simulation.
    In this paper I consider one of the leading philosophic-psychological theories of “folk psychology,” the simulation theory of Robert Gordon. According to Gordon, we attribute mental states to others not by representing those states or by applying the generalizations of theory, but by imagining ourselves in the position of a target to be interpreted and exploiting our own decision-making skills to make assertions which we then attribute to others as ‘beliefs’. I describe a leading objections to Gordon’s theory—the problem of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Matthew Belmonte (2009). Whats the Story Behind Theory of Mind and Autism? Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (6-8):6-8.
    Complex, mature cognition is the endpoint of a develop-mental process in which elementary capacities interact with the environment and with each other in predictable ways that depend on appropriate inputs. 'Theory of mind', the capacity to attribute thoughts and beliefs to other persons, is characterised by the Narrative Practice Hypothesis as emerging from the interactive experience of stories about people acting for reasons. The case of autism has been cited in support of the contrary view, that 'theory of mind' is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. R. Berger & R. Scott Walker (1989). Re-Enactment and Simulation: Toward a Synthesis of What Type? Diogenes 37 (147):1-22.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. José Luis Bermúdez (2009). Mindreading in the Animal Kingdom. In Robert W. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds. Cambridge University Press.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Mark Bevir (2000). Historical Explanation, Folk Psychology, and Narrative. Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):152 – 168.
    This paper argues that history differs from natural science in relying on folk psychology and so narrative explanations. In narratives, actions, beliefs, and pro-attitudes are joined by conditional and volitional connections. Conditional connections exist when beliefs and pro-attitudes pick up themes from one another Volitional connections exist when agents command themselves to do something having decided to do it because of a pro-attitude they hold. The paper defends the epistemic legitimacy of narratives by arguing we have legitimate grounds for postulating (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Christian Beyer (2006). Mentale Simulation Und Radikale Interpretation. Grazer Philosophische Studien 70 (1):25-45.
    The notion of empathy has more recently seen a considerable revival—notably (first) in connection with Quine's empathy model of radical interpretation, in contrast to which Davidson has developed his triangulation model, and (secondly) in the context of the debate between simulation theory vs. theory theory about propositional attitude ascription. So far, these debates have been carried on fairly independently of each other. This paper is an attempt to utilize the interpretation-theoretical discussion in order to argue for a moderate version of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Paul K. Blunt (1992). A Defense of Folk Psychology. International Philosophical Quarterly 32 (4):487-498.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Radu J. Bogdan, Common Sense Naturalized.
    Almost everybody believes, but nobody has conclusively shown, that common sense psychology is a descriptive body of knowledge about the mind, the way physics is about elementary particles or medicine about bodily conditions. Of course, common sense psychology helps itself to many notions about the mind. This does not show that common sense psychology is about the mind. Physics also helps itself to plenty of mathematical notions, without being about mathematical entities and relations. Employment of notions about the mind does (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Radu J. Bogdan (1991). The Folklore of the Mind. In R. Bogdan (ed.), Mind and Common Sense. Cambridge University Press.
    A distinguished wise man, Emil Cioran, with whom I share a country of birth and the thought that follows, said once that the two most interesting things in life are gossip and metaphysics. I can hardly think of a more self evident and enjoyable truth, if wisely construed. This volume combines the two pleasures, for it is an exercise in the metaphysics of wise gossip, of how we make sense of each other, and how, as a result we interpret, explain, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Vivian Bohl & Nivedita Gangopadhyay (2013). Theory of Mind and the Unobservability of Other Minds. Philosophical Explorations (2):1-20.
    The theory of mind (ToM) framework has been criticised by emerging alternative accounts. Each alternative begins with the accusation that ToM's validity as a research paradigm rests on the assumption of the ‘unobservability’ of other minds. We argue that the critics' discussion of the unobservability assumption (UA) targets a straw man. We discuss metaphysical, phenomenological, epistemological, and psychological readings of UA and demonstrate that it is not the case that ToM assumes the metaphysical, phenomenological, or epistemological claims. However, ToM supports (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Sarah Borden (2008). Rediscovering Empathy: Agency, Folk Psychology, and the Human Sciences. International Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1):118-120.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. George Botterill (1994). Review: Recent Work in Folk Psychology. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 44 (175):246 - 251.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Pascal Boyer (2011). Intuitive Expectations and the Detection of Mental Disorder: A Cognitive Background to Folk-Psychiatries. Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):95-118.
    How do people detect mental dysfunction? What is the influence of cultural models of dysfunction on this detection process? The detection process as such is not usually researched as it falls between the domains of cross-cultural psychiatry and anthropological ethno-psychiatry . I provide a general model for this “missing link” between behavior and cultural models, grounded in empirical evidence for intuitive psychology. Normal adult minds entertain specific intuitive expectations about mental function and behavior, and by implication they infer that specific (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Jane Braaten (1988). Elimination, Enlightenment and the Normative Content of Folk Psychology. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 18 (3):251–268.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Donald Brook (1989). How Did We Get From Simulation to Symbol? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (4):452 – 468.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Leon Bruin, Derek Strijbos & Marc Slors (2011). Early Social Cognition: Alternatives to Implicit Mindreading. [REVIEW] Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):499-517.
    According to the BD-model of mindreading, we primarily understand others in terms of beliefs and desires. In this article we review a number of objections against explicit versions of the BD-model, and discuss the prospects of using its implicit counterpart as an explanatory model of early emerging socio-cognitive abilities. Focusing on recent findings on so-called ‘implicit’ false belief understanding, we put forward a number of considerations against the adoption of an implicit BD-model. Finally, we explore a different way to make (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Cameron Buckner (2014). The Semantic Problem(s) with Research on Animal Mind‐Reading. Mind and Language 29 (5):566-589.
    Philosophers and cognitive scientists have worried that research on animal mind-reading faces a ‘logical problem’: the difficulty of experimentally determining whether animals represent mental states (e.g. seeing) or merely the observable evidence (e.g. line-of-gaze) for those mental states. The most impressive attempt to confront this problem has been mounted recently by Robert Lurz. However, Lurz' approach faces its own logical problem, revealing this challenge to be a special case of the more general problem of distal content. Moreover, participants in this (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Keith Campbell (1986). Can Intuitive Psychology Survive the Growth of Neuroscience? Inquiry 29 (June):143-152.
    This paper considers the impact which developments in neuroscience seem likely to have on our inherited, intuitive psychology ? the system of beliefs called ?folk psychology? by enthusiasts for its elimination. The paper argues that while closer relations between a developing genuinely scientific cognitive psychology and a burgeoning neurological understanding are to be welcomed, physiology will not reduce psychology, and the concepts belonging to intuitive psychology will be transformed and enriched, but not discredited or discarded, when psychology, in its cognitive (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. John V. Canfield (1999). Folk Psychology Versus Philosophical Anthropology. Idealistic Studies 29 (3):153-171.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Susan Carey & Elizabeth Spelke (1996). Science and Core Knowledge. Philosophy of Science 63 (4):515 - 533.
    While endorsing Gopnik's proposal that studies of the emergence and modification of scientific theories and studies of cognitive development in children are mutually illuminating, we offer a different picture of the beginning points of cognitive development from Gopnik's picture of "theories all the way down." Human infants are endowed with several distinct core systems of knowledge which are theory-like in some, but not all, important ways. The existence of these core systems of knowledge has implications for the joint research program (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Peter Carruthers (2009). Banishing" I" and" We" From Accounts of Metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):148.
    SHORT ABSTRACT: A number of accounts of the relationship between third-person mindreading and first-person metacognition are compared and evaluated. While three of these accounts endorse the existence of introspection for propositional attitudes, the fourth (defended here) claims that our knowledge of our own attitudes results from turning our mindreading capacities upon ourselves. The different types of theory are developed and evaluated, and multiple lines of evidence are reviewed, including evolutionary and comparative data, evidence of confabulation when self-attributing attitudes, phenomenological evidence (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Leyre Castro & Edward A. Wasserman (2009). Rats and Infants as Propositional Reasoners: A Plausible Possibility? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):203-204.
    Mitchell et al. contemplate the possibility of rats being capable of propositional reasoning. We suggest that this is an unlikely and unsubstantiated possibility. Nonhuman animals and human infants do learn about the contingencies in the world; however, such learning seems not to be based on propositional reasoning, but on more elementary associative processes.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Nick Chater & Martin Pickering (1997). Two Projects for Understanding the Mind: A Response to Morris and Richardson. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 7 (4):553-569.
    We respond to Morris and Richardson's (1995) claim that Pickering and Chater's (1995) arguments about the lack of a relation between cognitive science and folk psychology are flawed. We note that possible controversies about the appropriate uses for the two terms do not affect our arguments. We then address their claim that computational explanation of knowledge-rich processes has proved possible in the domains of problem solving, scientific discovery, and reasoning. We argue that, in all cases, computational explanation is only (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. N. Chomsky (2003). Reply to Gopnik. In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Chomsky and His Critics. Malden Ma: Blackwell Publishing. 316--325.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Scott M. Christensen & Dale R. Turner (eds.) (1993). Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind. L. Erlbaum.
    Within the past ten years, the discussion of the nature of folk psychology and its role in explaining behavior and thought has become central to the philosophy of mind. However, no comprehensive account of the contemporary debate or collection of the works that make up this debate has yet been available. Intending to fill this gap, this volume begins with the crucial background for the contemporary debate and proceeds with a broad range of responses to and developments of these works (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. P. M. Churchland & P. S. Churchland (1996). Clark's Connectionist Defense of Folk Psychology. In Robert N. McCauley (ed.), The Churchlands and Their Critics. Blackwell Publishers. 250--5.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Paul M. Churchland (1989). Folk Psychology and the Explanation of Human Behavior. Philosophical Perspectives 3:225-241.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Andy Clark (1989). Beyond Eliminativism. Mind and Language 4 (4):251-79.
  38. Andy Clark & Peter Millican (eds.) (1999). Connectionism, Concepts, and Folk Psychology: The Legacy of Alan Turing, Volume Ii. Clarendon Press.
    This is the second of two volumes of essays on the ideas of Alan Turing, whose pioneering work in artificial intelligence and computer science made him one of the seminal thinkers of the century. A distinguished international cast of contributors offer original investigations of key issues in contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science, celebrating Turing's intellectual legacy in these fields. 'fascinating . . .we can all learn by reading these essays because they encourage us to explore issues beyond our (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Austen Clark (1994). Beliefs and Desires Incorporated. Journal of Philosophy 91 (8):404-25.
    Suppose we admit for the sake of argument that "folk" explanations of human behavior--explanations in terms of beliefs and desires--sometimes succeed. They sometimes enable us to understand and predict patterns of motion that otherwise would remain unintelligible and unanticipated. Is the only explanation for such success that folk psychology is a viable proto-scientific theory of human psychology? I shall describe an analysis which yields a negative answer to that question. It was suggested by an observation and an analogy, both of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. John Collins (2011). Innateness, Canalization, and the Modality-Independence of Language: A Reply to Griffiths and Machery. Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):195-206.
    Griffiths and Machery (2008) argue that innateness is a ?folk biological? notion, which, as such, has no useful reconstruction in contemporary biology. If this is so, not only is it wrong to identify the vernacular notion with the precise theoretical concept of canalization, but worse, it would appear that many of the putative scientific claims for particular competences and capacities being innate are simply misplaced. The present paper challenges the core substantive claim of Griffiths and Machery's position, namely, that innateness (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. John Collins (2007). Meta-Scientific Eliminativism: A Reconsideration of Chomsky's Review of Skinner's Verbal Behavior. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (4):625 - 658.
    The paper considers our ordinary mentalistic discourse in relation to what we should expect from any genuine science of the mind. A meta-scientific eliminativism is commended and distinguished from the more familiar eliminativism of Skinner and the Churchlands. Meta-scientific eliminativism views folk psychology qua folksy as unsuited to offer insight into the structure of cognition, although it might otherwise be indispensable for our social commerce and self-understanding. This position flows from a general thesis that scientific advance is marked by an (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Matteo Colombo (2012). Constitutive Relevance and the Personal/Subpersonal Distinction. Philosophical Psychology (ahead-of-print):1–24.
    Can facts about subpersonal states and events be constitutively relevant to personal-level phenomena? And can knowledge of these facts inform explanations of personal-level phenomena? Some philosophers, like Jennifer Hornsby and John McDowell, argue for two negative answers whereby questions about persons and their behavior cannot be answered by using information from subpersonal psychology. Knowledge of subpersonal states and events cannot inform personal-level explanation such that they cast light on what constitutes persons? behaviors. In this paper I argue against this position. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. John M. Connolly (1993). Anomaly and Folk Psychology. Inquiry 36 (1 & 2):179 – 198.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Kevin Connolly, Craig French, David M. Gray & Adrienne Prettyman, The Unity of Consciousness and Sensory Integration: Conference Report.
    This report highlights and explores five questions which arose from The Unity of Consciousness and Sensory Integration conference at Brown University in November of 2011: 1. What is the relationship between the unity of consciousness and sensory integration? 2. Are some of the basic units of consciousness multimodal? 3. How should we model the unity of consciousness? 4. Is the mechanism of sensory integration spatio-temporal? 5. How Should We Study Experience, Given Unity Relations?
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Nancy J. Cooke, Jamie C. Gorman, Christopher W. Myers & Jasmine L. Duran (2013). Interactive Team Cognition. Cognitive Science 37 (2):255-285.
    Cognition in work teams has been predominantly understood and explained in terms of shared cognition with a focus on the similarity of static knowledge structures across individual team members. Inspired by the current zeitgeist in cognitive science, as well as by empirical data and pragmatic concerns, we offer an alternative theory of team cognition. Interactive Team Cognition (ITC) theory posits that (1) team cognition is an activity, not a property or a product; (2) team cognition should be measured and studied (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Joe Cruz (1997). Simulation and the Psychology of Sociopathy. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (3):525-527.
    Mealey's (1995a) psychological explanation of the sociopath's antisocial activity appeals to an incomplete or nonstandard theory of mind. This is not the only possible mechanism of mental state attribution. The simulation theory of mental state ascription offers a better hope of explaining the diverse elements of sociopathy reported by Mealey.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Joe Cruz & Robert M. Gordon (2003). Simulation Theory. In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Adrian Cussins (1993). Nonconceptual Content and the Elimination of Misonceived Composites. Mind and Language 8 (2):234-52.
  49. Elizabeth A. S. Dawes (1898). Garnett and Stuart-Glennie's Greek Folk Poesy Greek Folk Poesy : Annotated Translations From the Whole Cycle of Romaic Folkverse and Folk-Prose, by L. M. J. Garnett. Edited with Essays on the Science of Folklore, Greek Folk-Speech, and the Survival of Paganism, by J. S. Stuart-Glennie, M.A. London, David Nutt: 1896. 2 Vols. Demy 8vo. Pp. Xlv. + 541. Nett £1 1s. [REVIEW] The Classical Review 12 (05):266-269.
  50. Leon C. de Bruin (2008). A New Story About Folk Psychology. Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):263 – 271.
    I discuss the Narrative Practice Hypothesis (NPH) as a new approach to folk psychology, by highlighting some of the main differences between the NPH and so-called 'principled approaches' and elaborating on the importance of the distinction between intentional and propositional attitudes. Furthermore, I address the question whether reason explanations as understood by the NPH constitute a distinctive and autonomous kind of explanation.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 869