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  1. Marcus P. Adams (2013). Explaining the Theory of Mind Deficit in Autism Spectrum Disorder. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):233-249.
    The theory of mind (ToM) deficit associated with autism has been a central topic in the debate about the modularity of the mind. Most involved in the debate about the explanation of the ToM deficit have failed to notice that autism’s status as a spectrum disorder has implications about which explanation is more plausible. In this paper, I argue that the shift from viewing autism as a unified syndrome to a spectrum disorder increases the plausibility of the explanation of the (...)
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  2. Colin Allen, Macaque Mirror Neurons.
    Primatologists generally agree that monkeys lack higher-order intentional capacities related to theory of mind. Yet the discovery of the so-called “mirror neurons” in monkeys suggests to many neuroscientists that they have the rudiments of intentional understanding. Given a standard philosophical view about intentional understanding, which requires higher-order intentionality, a paradox arises. Different ways of resolving the paradox are assessed, using evidence from neural, cognitive, and behavioral studies of humans and monkeys. A decisive resolution to the paradox requires substantial additional empirical (...)
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  3. Kristin Andrews, The Need to Explain Behavior: Predicting, Explaining, and the Social Function of Mental State Attribution.
    According to both the traditional model of folk psychology and the social intelligence hypothesis, our folk psychological notions of belief and desire developed in order to make better predictions of behavior, and the fundamental role for our folk psychological notions of belief and desire are for making more accurate predictions of behavior (than predictions made without appeal to folk psychological notions). My strategy in this paper is to show that these claims are false. I argue that we need not appeal (...)
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  4. Kristin Andrews (2003). Knowing Mental States: The Asymmetry of Psychological Prediction and Explanation. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
    Perhaps because both explanation and prediction are key components to understanding, philosophers and psychologists often portray these two abilities as though they arise from the same competence, and sometimes they are taken to be the same competence. When explanation and prediction are associated in this way, they are taken to be two expressions of a single cognitive capacity that differ from one another only pragmatically. If the difference between prediction and explanation of human behavior is merely pragmatic, then anytime I (...)
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  5. Adam Arico (2010). Folk Psychology, Consciousness, and Context Effects. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):371-393.
    Traditionally, the philosophical study of Folk Psychology has focused on how ordinary people (i.e., those without formal training in academic fields like Psychology, Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Mind, etc.) go about attributing mental states. Those working in this tradition have tended to focus primarily on intentional states, like beliefs and desires . Recently, though a body of work has emerged in the growing field of Experimental Philosophy that focuses on folk attributions of mental states that are not paradigmatically considered intentional. (...)
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  6. Angela Arkway (2000). The Simulation Theory, the Theory Theory and Folk Psychological Explanation. Philosophical Studies 98 (2):115-137.
  7. Angela Arkway, Folk Psychological Explanation, and Causal Laws.
  8. Angela Arkway, The Simulation Theory and Explanations That 'Make Sense of Behavior'.
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  9. Theodore Bach (forthcoming). Psychological Concept Acquisition. In N. Payette (ed.), Connected Minds: Cognition and Interaction in the Social World. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
    This essay adjudicates between theoretical models of psychological concept acquisition. I provide new reasons to be skeptical about both simulationist and modularist models. I then defend the scientific-theory-theory account against familiar objections. I conclude by arguing that the scientific-theory-theory account must be supplemented by an account of hypothesis discovery.
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  10. Theodore Bach (2011). Structure-Mapping: Directions From Simulation to Theory. Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):23-51.
    The theory of mind debate has reached a “hybrid consensus” concerning the status of theory-theory and simulation-theory. Extant hybrid models either specify co-dependency and implementation relations, or distribute mentalizing tasks according to folk-psychological categories. By relying on a non-developmental framework these models fail to capture the central connection between simulation and theory. I propose a “dynamic” hybrid that is informed by recent work on the nature of similarity cognition. I claim that Gentner’s model of structure-mapping allows us to understand simulation (...)
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  11. Marcus Vinícius C. Baldo & Anouk Barberousse (2010). Person as Moralist and Scientist. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):331.
    Scientific inquiry possibly shares with people's ordinary understanding the same evolutionary determinants, and affect-laden intuitions that shape moral judgments also play a decisive role in decision-making, planning, and scientific reasoning. Therefore, if ordinary understanding does differ from scientific inquiry, the reason does not reside in the fact that the former (but not the latter) is endowed with moral considerations.
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  12. Luca Barlassina (2011). After All, It’s Still Replication: A Reply to Jacob on Simulation and Mirror Neurons. Res Cogitans 8 (1):92-111.
    Mindreading is the ability to attribute mental states to other individuals. According to the simulation theory (ST), mindreading is based on the ability the mind has of replicating others' mental states and processes. Mirror neurons (MNs) are a class of neurons that fire both when an agent performs a goal-directed action and when she observes the same type of action performed by another individual. Since MNs appear to form a replicative mechanism in which a portion of the observer's brain replicates (...)
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  13. Allison Barnes & Paul R. Thagard (1997). Empathy and Analogy. Dialogue 36 (4):705-720.
    We contend that empathy is best viewed as a kind of analogical thinking of the sort described in the multiconstraint theory of analogy proposed by Keith Holyoak and Paul Thagard (1995). Our account of empathy reveals the Theory-theory/Simulation theory debate to be based on a false assumption and formulated in terms too simple to capture the nature of mental state ascription. Empathy is always simulation, but may simultaneously include theory-application. By properly specifying the analogical processes of empathy and their constraints, (...)
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  14. John Barresi (2008). The Neuroscience of Social Understanding. The Shared Mind 1:39–66.
    In J. Zlatev, T. Racine, C. Sinha and E. Itkonen (Eds.) The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity, Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins, in press.
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  15. Karen Bartsch & Tess Young (2010). Reasoning Asymmetries Do Not Invalidate Theory-Theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):331-332.
    In this commentary we suggest that asymmetries in reasoning associated with moral judgment do not necessarily invalidate a theory-theory account of naïve psychological reasoning. The asymmetries may reflect a core knowledge assumption that human nature is prosocial, an assumption that heightens vigilance for antisocial dispositions, which in turn leads to differing assumptions about what is the presumed topic of conversation.
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  16. Lorraine Besser-Jones (2011). The Motivational State of the Virtuous Agent. Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):93 - 108.
    Julia Annas argues that Aristotle's understanding of the phenomenological experience of the virtuous agent corresponds to psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi's concept of the ?flow,? which is a form of intrinsic motivation. In this paper, I explore whether or not Annas? understanding of virtuous agency is a plausible one. After a thorough analysis of psychological accounts of intrinsic and extrinsic states of motivation, I argue that despite the attractiveness of Annas? understanding of virtuous agency, it is subject to a serious problem: all (...)
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  17. Mark Bevir & Karsten Stueber (2011). Empathy, Rationality, and Explanation. Journal of the Philosophy of History 5 (2):147-162.
    This paper describes the historical background to contemporary discussions of empathy and rationality. It looks at the philosophy of mind and its implications for action explanation and the philosophy of history. In the nineteenth century, the concept of empathy became prominent within philosophical aesthetics, from where it was extended to describe the way we grasp other minds. This idea of empathy as a way of understanding others echoed through later accounts of historical understanding as involving re-enactment, noticeably that of R. (...)
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  18. Michael Billig (1988). Rhetorical and Historical Aspects of Attitudes: The Case of the British Monarchy. Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):83 – 103.
    This paper seeks to develop the rhetorical approach to the study of social psychology, by looking at the rhetorical aspects of British attitudes towards the monarchy. The rhetorical approach stresses that attitudes are stances in public controversy and, as such, must be understood in their wider historical and argumentative context. Changes in this context can lead to changes in attitudinal expression, such as the phenomenon of Taking the Side of the Other, which should be distinguished from the sort of attitudinal (...)
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  19. Paul Bloom (2006). My Brain Made Me Do It. Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1): 1567-7095.
    Shaun Nichols (this issue) correctly points out that current theories of the development of mindreading say nothing about children's intuitions concerning indeterminist choice. That is, there are numerous theories of how children make sense of belief, desire, and action, but none that appeal to any notion of free will. Nichols suggests two alternatives for why this is the case. It could either be (a) an --outrageous oversight-- on the part of developmental psychologists or (b) a principled omission, reflecting a consensus (...)
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  20. Simon Boag (2011). Explanation in Personality Psychology: “Verbal Magic” and the Five-Factor Model. Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):223-243.
    Scientific psychology involves both identifying and classifying phenomena of interest (description) and revealing the causes and mechanisms that contribute towards these phenomena arising (explanation). Within personality psychology, some propose that aspects of behavior and cognition can be explained with reference to personality traits. However, certain conceptual and logical issues cast doubt upon the adequacy of traits as coherent explanatory constructs. This paper discusses ?explanation? in psychology and the problems of circularity and reification. An analysis of relations and intrinsic properties is (...)
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  21. Radu J. Bogdan (2007). Inside Loops: Developmental Premises of Self-Ascriptions. Synthese 159 (2):235-252.
    Self-ascriptions of thoughts and attitudes depend on a sense of the intentionality of one’s own mental states, which develops later than, and independently of, the sense of the intentionality of the thoughts and attitudes of others. This sense of the self-intentionality of one’s own mental states grows initially out of executive developments that enable one to simulate one’s own actions and perceptions, as genuine off-line thoughts, and to regulate such simulations.
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  22. Radu J. Bogdan (2005). Why Self-Ascriptions Are Difficult and Develop Late. In B. Malle & S. Hodges. (eds.), Other Minds. Guilford Press. 190--206.
    Many philosophers and a few psychologists think that we understand our own minds before we understand those of others. Most developmental psychologists think that children understand their own minds at about the same time they understand other minds, by using the same cognitive abilities. I disagree with both views. I think that children understand other minds before they understand their own. Their self-understanding depends on some cognitive abilities that develop later than, and independently of, the abilities involved in understanding other (...)
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  23. Radu J. Bogdan (2003). Minding Minds: Evolving a Reflexive Mind by Interpreting Others. MIT Press.
    In this book, Radu Bogdan proposes that humans think reflexively because they interpret each other's minds in social contexts of cooperation, communication, ...
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  24. Radu J. Bogdan (2003). Watch Your Metastep: The First-Order Limits of Early Intentional Attributions. In C. Kanzian, J. Quitterer & L. Runggaldier (eds.), Persons: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Holder-Pichler-Tempsky.
    There is a wide and puzzleful gap between the child’s mastery of first- and recursive or higher-order attributions of attitudes, measured not only in years but also in the cognitive resources involved. Some accounts explain the gap in terms of the maturation of the competencies involved, others invoke the slow development of enabling resources, such as short-term memory, the syntax of sentence embedding or sequential reasoning. All these accounts assume a continuity of competence between first- and higher-order attributions. I disagree (...)
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  25. Radu J. Bogdan (2001). Developing Mental Abilities by Representing Intentionality. Synthese 129 (2):233-258.
    Communication by shared meaning, themastery of word semantics,metarepresentation and metamentation aremental abilities, uniquely human, that share a sense ofintentionality or reference. The latteris developed by a naive psychology or interpretation – acompetence dedicated to representingintentional relations between conspecifics and the world. Theidea that interpretation builds new mentalabilities around a sense of reference is based on three linesof analysis – conceptual, psychological andevolutionary. The conceptual analysis reveals that a senseof reference is at the heart of the abilitiesin question. Psychological data track (...)
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  26. Maarten Boudry & Johan Braeckman (2012). How Convenient! The Epistemic Rationale of Self-Validating Belief Systems. Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):341-364.
    This paper offers an epistemological discussion of self-validating belief systems and the recurrence of ?epistemic defense mechanisms? and ?immunizing strategies? across widely different domains of knowledge. We challenge the idea that typical ?weird? belief systems are inherently fragile, and we argue that, instead, they exhibit a surprising degree of resilience in the face of adverse evidence and criticism. Borrowing from the psychological research on belief perseverance, rationalization and motivated reasoning, we argue that the human mind is particularly susceptible to belief (...)
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  27. Myles Brand (1983). The Human Output System. Grazer Philosophische Studien 20:241-264.
    This paper recommends a framework for explaining largescale, complex actions. Philosophers have concentrated on simple actions — on hand raisings — far too long. Large-scale actions are the normal objects of legal and moral responsibility, as well as the kmd of activity for which the question of freedom is most pertinent. I focus on that part of the causal sequence constituting an action that begins after the decision and continues through the bodily movements: I call this part of the sequence (...)
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  28. Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri, In the Thick of Moral Motivation.
    We accomplish three things in this paper. First, we expose the motivational internalism/externalism debate in moral psychology as a false dichotomy born of ambiguity. Second, we provide further evidence for a crucial distinction between two different categories of belief in folk psychology: thick belief and thin belief. Third, we demonstrate how careful attention to deep features of folk psychology can help diagnose and defuse seemingly intractable philosophical disagreement in metaethics.
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  29. John Campbell (2005). Joint Attention and Common Knowledge. In Naomi M. Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 287--297.
    This chapter makes the case for a relational version of an experientialist view of joint attention. On an experientialist view of joint attention, shifting from solitary attention to joint attention involves a shift in the nature of your perceptual experience of the object attended to. A relational analysis of such a view explains the latter shift in terms of the idea that, in joint attention, it is a constituent of your experience that the other person is, with you, jointly attending (...)
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  30. Martin Capstick (2013). On-Line False Belief Understanding Qua Folk Psychology? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):27-40.
    In this paper, I address Mitchell Herschbach’s arguments against the phenomenological critics of folk psychology. Central to Herschbach’s arguments is the introduction of Michael Wheeler’s distinction between ‘on-line’ and ‘off-line’ intelligence to the debate on social understanding. Herschbach uses this distinction to describe two arguments made by the phenomenological critics. The first is that folk psychology is exclusively off-line and mentalistic. The second is that social understanding is on-line and non-mentalistic. To counter the phenomenological critics, Herschbach argues for the existence (...)
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  31. Peter Carruthers (1996). Autism as Mindblindness: An Elaboration and Partial Defence. In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press. 257.
    In this chapter I defend the mind-blindness theory of autism, by showing how it can accommodate data which might otherwise appear problematic for it. Specifically, I show how it can explain the fact that autistic children rarely engage in spontaneous pretend-play, and also how it can explain the executive-function deficits which are characteristic of the syndrome. I do this by emphasising what I take to be an entailment of the mind-blindness theory, that autistic subjects have difficulties of access to their (...)
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  32. Peter Carruthers (1996). Simulation and Self-Knowledge: A Defence of the Theory-Theory. In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press. 22--38.
    In this chapter I attempt to curb the pretensions of simulationism. I argue that it is, at best, an epistemological doctrine of limited scope. It may explain how we go about attributing beliefs and desires to others, and perhaps to ourselves, in some cases. But simulation cannot provide the fundamental basis of our conception of, or knowledge of, minded agency.
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  33. Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.) (1996). Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
    Theories of Theories of Mind brings together contributions by a distinguished international team of philosophers, psychologists, and primatologists, who between them address such questions as: what is it to understand the thoughts, feelings, and intentions of other people? How does such an understanding develop in the normal child? Why, unusually, does it fail to develop? And is any such mentalistic understanding shared by members of other species? The volume's four parts together offer a state of the art survey of the (...)
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  34. Joseph L. H. Cruz (1998). Mindreading: Mental State Ascription and Cognitive Architecture. Mind and Language 13 (3):323-340.
    The debate between the theory-theory and simulation has largely ignored issues of cognitive architecture. In the philosophy of psychology, cognition as symbol manipulation is the orthodoxy. The challenge from connectionism, however, has attracted vigorous and renewed interest. In this paper I adopt connectionism as the antecedent of a conditional: If connectionism is the correct account of cognitive architecture, then the simulation theory should be preferred over the theory-theory. I use both developmental evidence and constraints on explanation in psychology to support (...)
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  35. Gregory Currie (1998). Pretence, Pretending, and Metarepresenting. Mind and Language 13 (1):35-55.
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  36. Martin Davies & Tony Stone (2003). Psychological Understanding and Social Skills. In B. Repacholi & V. Slaughter (eds.), Individual Differences in Theory of Mind: Implications for Typical and Atypical Development. Hove, E. Sussex: Psychology Press.
    In B. Repacholi and V. Slaughter (eds), _Individual Differences in Theory of Mind: Implications for Typical and Atypical_ _Development_. Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive Science. Hove, E. Sussex: Psychology Press, 2003..
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  37. Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.) (1995). Folk Psychology: The Theory of Mind Debate. Blackwell.
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  38. Marc Egeth (2009). Representing Metarepresentations: Is There Theory of Mind-Specific Cognition? Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):244-254.
    What cognitive mechanisms do people use to represent other people's mental states? Do children who have difficulty processing other people's higher-level mental states such as beliefs also have difficulty processing higher-level non-mental representations such as meta-photographs? See the preprint here or find the final version in print or on the journal website.
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  39. Naomi M. Eilan (2005). Joint Attention, Communication, and Mind. In N. Elian, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Oxford University Press. 1.
    This chapter argues that a central division among accounts of joint attention, both in philosophy and developmental psychology, turns on how they address two questions: What, if any, is the connection between the capacity to engage in joint attention triangles and the capacity to grasp the idea of objective truth? How do we explain the kind of openness or sharing of minds that occurs in joint attention? The chapter explores the connections between answers to both questions, and argues that theories (...)
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  40. Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.) (2005). Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    Sometime around their first birthday most infants begin to engage in relatively sustained bouts of attending together with their caretakers to objects in their environment. By the age of 18 months, on most accounts, they are engaging in full-blown episodes of joint attention. As developmental psychologists (usually) use the term, for such joint attention to be in play, it is not sufficient that the infant and the adult are in fact attending to the same object, nor that the one’s attention (...)
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  41. Luc Faucher, Ron Mallon, Daniel Nazer, Shaun Nichols, Aaron Ruby, Stephen Stich & Jonathan Weinberg (2002). 18 The Baby in the Lab-Coat: Why Child Development is Not an Adequate Model for Understanding the Development of Science. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen P. Stich & Michael Siegal (eds.), The Cognitive Basis of Science. Cambridge University Press.
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  42. Marco Fenici (2011). What Does the False Belief Test Test? Phenomenology and Mind 1:197-207.
    The age at which children acquire the concept of belief is a subject of debate. Many scholars claim that children master beliefs when they are able to pass the false belief test, around their fourth year of life. However, recent experiments show that children implicitly attribute beliefs even earlier. The dispute does not only concern the empirical issue of discovering children’s early cognitive abilities. It also depends on the kind of capacities that we associate to the very concept. I claim (...)
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  43. Simon Fitzpatrick (2009). The Primate Mindreading Controversy : A Case Study in Simplicity and Methodology in Animal Psychology. In Robert W. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds. Cambridge University Press. 224--246.
  44. Norman H. Freeman (1995). Theories of Mind in Collision: Plausibility and Authority. In Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.), Mental Simulation. Blackwell.
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  45. Shaun Gallagher (2006). The Narrative Alternative to Theory of Mind. In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.
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  46. Shaun Gallagher (2004). Understanding Interpersonal Problems in Autism: Interaction Theory as an Alternative to Theory of Mind. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (3):199-217.
  47. Mattia Gallotti & Chris Frith (2013). Social Cognition in the We-Mode. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):160-165.
  48. Mattia Gallotti & John Michael (eds.) (forthcoming). Perspectives on Social Ontology and Social Cognition. Springer.
  49. Michael S. Gazzaniga & Shaun Gallagher (1998). The Neuronal Platonist. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6):706-717.
    Psychology is dead. The self is a fiction invented by the brain. Brain plasticity isn?t all it?s cracked up to be. Our conscious learning is an observation post factum, a recollection of something already accomplished by the brain. We don?t learn to speak; speech is generated when the brain is ready to say something. False memories are more prevalent than one might think, and they aren?t all that bad. We think we?re in charge of our lives, but actually we are (...)
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  50. Tamar Szabó Gendler (2003). On the Relation Between Pretense and Belief. In Matthew Kieran & Dominic McIver Lopes (eds.), Imagination Philosophy and the Arts. Routledge. 125--141.
    By the age of two, children are able to engage in highly elaborate games of symbolic pretense, in which objects and actions in the actual world are taken to stand for objects and actions in a realm of make-believe. These games of pretense are marked by the presence of two central features, which I will call quarantining and mirroring (see also Leslie 1987; Perner 1991). Quarantining is manifest to the extent that events within the pretense-episode are taken to have effects (...)
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