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  1. Ian Apperly (2013). Can Theory of Mind Grow Up? Mindreading in Adults, and its Implications for the Development and Neuroscience of Mindreading. In Simon Baron-Cohen, Michael Lombardo & Helen Tager-Flusberg (eds.), Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives From Developmental Social Neuroscience. Oup Oxford. 72.
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  2. Konstantine Arkoudas & Selmer Bringsjord (2008). Toward Formalizing Common-Sense Psychology: An Analysis of the False-Belief Task. In Tu-Bao Ho & Zhi-Hua Zhou (eds.), Pricai 2008: Trends in Artificial Intelligence. Springer. 17--29.
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  3. Maria Brincker (1014). Navigating Beyond “Here & Now” Affordances—on Sensorimotor Maturation and “False Belief” Performance. Frontiers in Psychology 5.
    How and when do we learn to understand other people's perspectives and possibly divergent beliefs? This question has elicited much theoretical and empirical research. A puzzling finding has been that toddlers perform well on so-called implicit false belief (FB) tasks but do not show such capacities on traditional explicit FB tasks. I propose a navigational approach, which offers a hitherto ignored way of making sense of the seemingly contradictory results. The proposal involves a distinction between how we navigate FBs as (...)
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  4. Leon Bruin, Derek Strijbos & Marc Slors (2011). Early Social Cognition: Alternatives to Implicit Mindreading. [REVIEW] Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):499-517.
    According to the BD-model of mindreading, we primarily understand others in terms of beliefs and desires. In this article we review a number of objections against explicit versions of the BD-model, and discuss the prospects of using its implicit counterpart as an explanatory model of early emerging socio-cognitive abilities. Focusing on recent findings on so-called ‘implicit’ false belief understanding, we put forward a number of considerations against the adoption of an implicit BD-model. Finally, we explore a different way to make (...)
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  5. Susan Carey & Elizabeth Spelke (1996). Science and Core Knowledge. Philosophy of Science 63 (4):515 - 533.
    While endorsing Gopnik's proposal that studies of the emergence and modification of scientific theories and studies of cognitive development in children are mutually illuminating, we offer a different picture of the beginning points of cognitive development from Gopnik's picture of "theories all the way down." Human infants are endowed with several distinct core systems of knowledge which are theory-like in some, but not all, important ways. The existence of these core systems of knowledge has implications for the joint research program (...)
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  6. Leyre Castro & Edward A. Wasserman (2009). Rats and Infants as Propositional Reasoners: A Plausible Possibility? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):203-204.
    Mitchell et al. contemplate the possibility of rats being capable of propositional reasoning. We suggest that this is an unlikely and unsubstantiated possibility. Nonhuman animals and human infants do learn about the contingencies in the world; however, such learning seems not to be based on propositional reasoning, but on more elementary associative processes.
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  7. John Collins (2011). Innateness, Canalization, and the Modality-Independence of Language: A Reply to Griffiths and Machery. Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):195-206.
    Griffiths and Machery (2008) argue that innateness is a ?folk biological? notion, which, as such, has no useful reconstruction in contemporary biology. If this is so, not only is it wrong to identify the vernacular notion with the precise theoretical concept of canalization, but worse, it would appear that many of the putative scientific claims for particular competences and capacities being innate are simply misplaced. The present paper challenges the core substantive claim of Griffiths and Machery's position, namely, that innateness (...)
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  8. John Collins (2007). Meta-Scientific Eliminativism: A Reconsideration of Chomsky's Review of Skinner's Verbal Behavior. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (4):625 - 658.
    The paper considers our ordinary mentalistic discourse in relation to what we should expect from any genuine science of the mind. A meta-scientific eliminativism is commended and distinguished from the more familiar eliminativism of Skinner and the Churchlands. Meta-scientific eliminativism views folk psychology qua folksy as unsuited to offer insight into the structure of cognition, although it might otherwise be indispensable for our social commerce and self-understanding. This position flows from a general thesis that scientific advance is marked by an (...)
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  9. Matteo Colombo (2012). Constitutive Relevance and the Personal/Subpersonal Distinction. Philosophical Psychology (ahead-of-print):1–24.
    Can facts about subpersonal states and events be constitutively relevant to personal-level phenomena? And can knowledge of these facts inform explanations of personal-level phenomena? Some philosophers, like Jennifer Hornsby and John McDowell, argue for two negative answers whereby questions about persons and their behavior cannot be answered by using information from subpersonal psychology. Knowledge of subpersonal states and events cannot inform personal-level explanation such that they cast light on what constitutes persons? behaviors. In this paper I argue against this position. (...)
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  10. Leon C. de Bruin (2008). A New Story About Folk Psychology. Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):263 – 271.
    I discuss the Narrative Practice Hypothesis (NPH) as a new approach to folk psychology, by highlighting some of the main differences between the NPH and so-called 'principled approaches' and elaborating on the importance of the distinction between intentional and propositional attitudes. Furthermore, I address the question whether reason explanations as understood by the NPH constitute a distinctive and autonomous kind of explanation.
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  11. Leon de Bruin, Derek Strijbos & Marc Slors (2011). Early Social Cognition: Alternatives to Implicit Mindreading. [REVIEW] Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):499-517.
    According to the BD-model of mindreading, we primarily understand others in terms of beliefs and desires. In this article we review a number of objections against explicit versions of the BD-model, and discuss the prospects of using its implicit counterpart as an explanatory model of early emerging socio-cognitive abilities. Focusing on recent findings on so-called ‘implicit’ false belief understanding, we put forward a number of considerations against the adoption of an implicit BD-model. Finally, we explore a different way to make (...)
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  12. Ronald de Sousa (2004). Review: The Importance of Being Understood: Folk Psychology as Ethics. [REVIEW] Mind 113 (449):198-201.
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  13. Elizabeth Manley Delacruz (2000). Outside In: Deliberations on American Contemporary Folk Art. Journal of Aesthetic Education 34 (1):77-86.
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  14. Daniel C. Dennett, Two Contrasts.
    Let us begin with what all of us here agree on: folk psychology is not immune to revision. It has a certain vulnerability in principle. Any particular part of it might be overthrown and replaced by some other doctrine. Yet we disagree about how likely it is that that vulnerability in principle will turn into the actual demise of large portions--or all--of folk psychology. I am of the view that folk psychology is here for the long haul, and for some (...)
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  15. Hans Van Ditmarsch & Willem Labuschagne (2007). My Beliefs About Your Beliefs: A Case Study in Theory of Mind and Epistemic Logic. Synthese 155 (2):191 - 209.
    We model three examples of beliefs that agents may have about other agents' beliefs, and provide motivation for this conceptualization from the theory of mind literature. We assume a modal logical framework for modelling degrees of belief by partially ordered preference relations. In this setting, we describe that agents believe that other agents do not distinguish among their beliefs ('no preferences'), that agents believe that the beliefs of other agents are in part as their own ('my preferences'), and the special (...)
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  16. W. H. Dittrich & S. E. G. Lea (1993). Intentionality, Mind and Folk Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.
    The comment addresses central issues of a "theory theory" approach as exemplified in Gopnik' and Goldman's BBS-articles. Gopnik, on the one hand, tries to demonstrate that empirical evidence from developmental psychology supports the view of a "theory theory" in which common sense beliefs are constructed to explain ourselves and others. Focusing the informational processing routes possibly involved we would like to argue that his main thesis (e.g. idea of intentionality as a cognitive construct) lacks support at least for two reasons: (...)
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  17. Nevia Dolcini (2010). Minding the Developmental Gap: A Theoretical Analysis of the Theory of Mind Data. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (7-8):7-8.
    In contemporary philosophy and psychology there is an ongoing debate about Theory of Mind , which mainly concerns our ability to understand other people. For almost two decades, authors have argued in favour of a crucial relationship between language and children's development of ToM. Studies based on verbal tasks suggest that children possess a ToM not earlier than about the age of four. Nevertheless, in recent years, this paradigm has been almost replaced by a 'new' nativist paradigm conceiving of mental (...)
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  18. Fred Dretske (1992). What Isn't Wrong with Folk Psychology. Metaphilosophy 23 (1-2):1-13.
  19. Hervé Duclohier (1986). Les recherches de Vulpian sur les propriétés des fibres nerveuses sensitives et motrices. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 8 (1):27 - 40.
    When Vulpian submitted his medical thesis in 1853, it was already currently accepted that sensory pathways in the peripheral nervous system were distinct from motor pathways. But it was unclear whether such a distinction in the function necessarily implied specific properties. Between 1855-1860 Vulpian, together with his colleague Philipeaux, addressed the question whether it was possible in a nervous chain to replace the elements of one type with those of the another without losing normal functioning. Their first set of experiments (...)
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  20. Thomas Duddy (1997). Science, Folk Theory, and Popular Ignorance: The Case Against Eliminativism. The European Legacy 2 (7):1177-1184.
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  21. Céline Duval, Pascale Piolino, Alexandre Bejanin, Francis Eustache & Béatrice Desgranges (2011). Age Effects on Different Components of Theory of Mind. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):627-642.
    The effects of aging on the cognitive and affective dimensions of theory of mind , and on the latter’s links with other cognitive processes, such as information processing speed, executive functions and episodic memory, are still unclear. We therefore investigated these effects in young , middle-aged and older adults , using separate subjective and objective assessment tasks. Furthermore, a novel composite task probed participants’ abilities to infer both cognitive and affective mental states in an interpersonal context. Although age affected the (...)
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  22. Kevan Edwards (2011). Higher-Level Concepts and Their Heterogeneous Implementations: A Polemical Review of Edouard Machery's Doing Without Concepts. Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):119-133.
    Doing Without Concepts Edouard Machery New York: Oxford University Press, 2009 296 pages, ISBN: 0195306880 (hbk); $65.00 This paper offers a critical review of Edouard Machery's Doing Without Concepts, with a particular emphasis on an approach to concept individuation that is consistent with many of Machery's arguments but has the potential to avoid his eliminativist conclusion. The approach agrees with Machery's claims to the effect that prototypes, exemplars, theories (and so on) form a heterogeneous class, but construes these theoretical entities (...)
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  23. Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely (2011). Individual Differences in Theory-of-Mind Judgments: Order Effects and Side Effects. Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):343 - 355.
    We explore and provide an account for a recently identified judgment anomaly, i.e., an order effect that changes the strength of intentionality ascriptions for some side effects (e.g., when a chairman's pursuit of profits has the foreseen but unintended consequence of harming the environment). Experiment 1 replicated the previously unanticipated order effect anomaly controlling for general individual differences. Experiment 2 revealed that the order effect was multiply determined and influenced by factors such as beliefs (i.e., that the same actor was (...)
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  24. Marco Fenici (2013). Il test della falsa credenza. Analytical and Philosophical Explanation 8:1-56.
    La ricerca empirica nelle scienze cognitive può essere di supporto all’indagine filosofica sullo statuto ontologico e epistemologico dei concetti mentali, ed in particolare del concetto di credenza. Da oltre trent’anni gli psicologi utilizzano il test della falsa credenza per valutare la capacità dei bambini di attribuire stati mentali a se stessi e a agli altri. Tuttavia non è stato ancora pienamente compreso né quali requisiti cognitivi siano necessari per passare il test né quale sia il loro sviluppo. In questo articolo (...)
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  25. Marco Fenici (2012). Embodied Social Cognition and Embedded Theory of Mind. Biolinguistics 6 (3--47):276--307.
    Embodiment and embeddedness define an attractive framework to the study of cognition. I discuss whether theory of mind, i.e. the ability to attribute mental states to others to predict and explain their behaviour, fits these two principles. In agreement with available evidence, embodied cognitive processes may underlie the earliest manifestations of social cognitive abilities such as infants’ selective behaviour in spontaneous-response false belief tasks. Instead, late theory-of-mind abilities, such as the capacity to pass the (elicited-response) false belief test at age (...)
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  26. H. Fleure (1939). Folk-Lore And Culture Contacts. Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 23 (2):403-416.
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  27. Malcolm Forster & Eric Saidel (1994). Connectionism and the Fate of Folk Psychology: A Reply to Ramsey, Stich and Garon. Philosophical Psychology 7 (4):437 – 452.
    Ramsey, Stick and Garon (1991) argue that if the correct theory of mind is some parallel distributed processing theory, then folk psychology must be false. Their idea is that if the nodes and connections that encode one representation are causally active then all representations encoded by the same set of nodes and connections are also causally active. We present a clear, and concrete, counterexample to RSG's argument. In conclusion, we suggest that folk psychology and connectionism are best understood as complementary (...)
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  28. Juliet L. H. Foster (2014). What Can Social Psychologists Learn From Architecture? The Asylum as Example. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 44 (2):131-147.
    In this paper I argue for a stronger consideration of the possible relationship between social psychology and architecture and architectural history. After a brief review of some of the ways in which other social psychologists have sought to develop links between social psychology and history, I consider the utility of architecture in more depth, especially to the social psychologist interested in the development of knowledge and understanding. I argue that, especially when knowledge is institutionalised, the design and use of buildings (...)
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  29. Keith Frankish (2004). Mind and Supermind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Mind and Supermind offers a new perspective on the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. Keith Frankish argues that the folk-psychological term 'belief' refers to two distinct types of mental state, which have different properties and support different kinds of mental explanation. Building on this claim, he develops a picture of the human mind as a two-level structure, consisting of a basic mind and a supermind, and shows how the resulting account sheds light on a number (...)
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  30. Bradley Franks (1992). Realism and Folk Psychology in the Ascription of Concepts. Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):369-390.
    This paper discusses some requirements on a folk-psychological, computational account of concepts. Although most psychological views take the folk-psychological stance that concept-possession requires capacities of both representation and classification, such views lack a philosophical context. In contrast, philosophically motivated views stress one of these capacities at the expense of the other. This paper seeks to provide some philosophical motivation for the (folk-) psychological stance. Philosophical and psychological constraints on a computational level account provide the context for evaluating two theses. The (...)
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  31. Tom Froese & Shaun Gallagher (2012). Getting Interaction Theory (IT) Together: Integrating Developmental, Phenomenological, Enactive, and Dynamical Approaches to Social Interaction. Interaction Studies 13 (3):436-468.
    We argue that progress in our scientific understanding of the `social mind' is hampered by a number of unfounded assumptions. We single out the widely shared assumption that social behavior depends solely on the capacities of an individual agent. In contrast, both developmental and phenomenological studies suggest that the personal-level capacity for detached `social cognition' (conceived as a process of theorizing about and/or simulating another mind) is a secondary achievement that is dependent on more immediate processes of embodied social interaction. (...)
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  32. Thomas Fuchs (2013). The Phenomenology and Development of Social Perspectives. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):655-683.
    The paper first gives a conceptual distinction of the first, second and third person perspectives in social cognition research and connects them to the major present theories of understanding others (simulation, interaction and theory theory). It then argues for a foundational role of second person interactions for the development of social perspectives. To support this thesis, the paper analyzes in detail how infants, in particular through triangular interactions with persons and objects, expand their understanding of perspectives and arrive at a (...)
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  33. Gary Fuller, Mental Simulation: The Old-Fashioned Dispute.
    We attribute psychological states and intentional actions to others. We also predict such states and actions and explain them. I attribute to Fred the belief that that mountain in the distance is the Schneeberg as well as the thought that it would be pleasant to climb it. I predict that later in the week when there is some free time Fred will form the intention to climb the mountain that very afternoon. And when one morning later in the week Fred (...)
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  34. Norman R. Gall (2000). John D. Greenwood, Ed., the Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science; Scott M. Christensen and Dale R. Turner, Eds., Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 10 (3):416-423.
  35. Shaun Gallagher (2008). Inference or Interaction: Social Cognition Without Precursors. Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):163 – 174.
    In this paper I defend interaction theory (IT) as an alternative to both theory theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST). IT opposes the basic suppositions that both TT and ST depend upon. I argue that the various capacities for primary and secondary intersubjectivity found in infancy and early childhood should not be thought of as precursors to later developing capacities for using folk psychology or simulation routines. They are not replaced or displaced by such capacities in adulthood, but rather continue (...)
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  36. Shaun Gallagher & Daniel D. Hutto (2008). Understanding Others Through Primary Interaction and Narrative Practice. In J. Zlatev, T. Racine, C. Sinha & E. Itkonen (eds.), The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity. John Benjamins. 17–38.
    We argue that theory-of-mind (ToM) approaches, such as “theory theory” and “simulation theory”, are both problematic and not needed. They account for neither our primary and pervasive way of engaging with others nor the true basis of our folk psychological understanding, even when narrowly construed. Developmental evidence shows that young infants are capable of grasping the purposeful intentions of others through the perception of bodily movements, gestures, facial expressions etc. Trevarthen’s notion of primary intersubjectivity can provide a theoretical framework for (...)
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  37. Lucy M. J. Garnett (1896). Greek Folk Poesy. The Monist 7:624.
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  38. Philip Gerrans (1998). How to Be a Conformist, Part II. Simulation and Rule Following. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):566 – 586.
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  39. Brie Gertler (2004). Simulation Theory on Conceptual Grounds. Protosociology 20:261-284.
    I will present a conceptual argument for a simulationist answer to (2). Given that our conception of mental states is employed in attributing mental states to others, a simulationist answer to (2) supports a simulationist answer to (1). I will not address question (3). Answers to (1) and (2) do not yield an answer to (3), since (1) and (2) concern only our actual practices and concepts. For instance, an error theory about (1) and (2) would say that our practices (...)
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  40. Fernand Gobet & Philippe Chassy (2009). Expertise and Intuition: A Tale of Three Theories. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 19 (2):151-180.
    Several authors have hailed intuition as one of the defining features of expertise. In particular, while disagreeing on almost anything that touches on human cognition and artificial intelligence, Hubert Dreyfus and Herbert Simon agreed on this point. However, the highly influential theories of intuition they proposed differed in major ways, especially with respect to the role given to search and as to whether intuition is holistic or analytic. Both theories suffer from empirical weaknesses. In this paper, we show how, with (...)
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  41. Peter Godfrey-Smith, Representation and Integration in Animal Minds.
    I will sketch, but not argue for here, a hypothesis about its origins and structure. What philosophers think of as folk psychology has dual origins. One is a genuine "intuitive psychology." This is an evolved predictive tool seen also in some nonhuman animals and very young children. It is "peripheral" in what it recognizes and describes. Primarily, it recognizes seeing and acting (including trying) as activities of others. This is common element in how human and non-human animals deal with each (...)
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  42. Peter Godfrey-Smith (2003). Folk Psychology Under Stress: Comments on Susan Hurley's Animal Action in the Space of Reasons. Mind and Language 18 (3):266-272.
    My commentary on Hurley is concerned with foundational issues. Hurley's investigation of animal cognition is cast within a particular framework—basically, a philosophically refined version of folk psychology. Her discussion has a complicated relationship to unresolved debates about the nature and status of folk psychology, especially debates about the extent to which folk psychological categories are aimed at picking out features of the causal organization of the mind.
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  43. Alvin I. Goldman, Jacob on Mirroring, Simulating and Mindreading.
    Jacob (2008) raises several problems for the alleged link between mirroring and mindreading. This response argues that the best mirroring-mindreading thesis would claim that mirror processes cause, rather than constitute, selected acts of mindreading. Second, the best current evidence for mirror-based mindreading is not found in the motoric domain but in the domains of emotion and sensation, where the evidence (ignored by Jacob) is substantial. Finally, simulation theory should distinguish low-level simulation (mirroring) and high-level simulation (involving pretense or imagination). Jacob (...)
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  44. Alvin I. Goldman (2009). Mirroring, Simulating and Mindreading. Mind and Language 24 (2):235-252.
    Abstract: Pierre Jacob (2008) raises several problems for the alleged link between mirroring and mindreading. This response argues that the best mirroring-mindreading thesis would claim that mirror processes cause, rather than constitute, selected acts of mindreading. Second, the best current evidence for mirror-based mindreading is not found in the motoric domain but in the domains of emotion and sensation, where the evidence (ignored by Jacob) is substantial. Finally, simulation theory should distinguish low-level simulation (mirroring) and high-level simulation (involving pretense or (...)
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  45. Robert Gordon, Autism and the "Theory of Mind" Debate Robert M. Gordon and John A. Barker.
    With this understanding, children are better able to anticipate the behavior of others and to attune their own behavior accordingly. In mentally retarded children with Down's syndrome, attainment of such competence is delayed, but it is generally acquired by the time they reach the mental age of 4, as measured by tests of nonverbal intelligence. Thus from a developmental perspective, attainment of the mental age of 4 appears to be of profound significance for acquisition of what we shall call psychological (...)
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  46. Robert M. Gordon (2008). Beyond Mindreading. Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):219 – 222.
    I argue that there is no conflict between the simulation theory, once it is freed from certain constraints carried over from theory theory, and Gallagher's view that our primary and pervasive way of engaging with others rests on 'direct', non-mentalizing perception of the 'meanings' of others' facial expressions, gestures, and intentional actions.
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  47. Robert M. Gordon, Folk Psychology As Mental Simulation. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    by, or is otherwise relevant to the seminar "Folk Psychology vs. Mental Simulation: How Minds Understand Minds," a National.
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  48. Simone Gozzano (1994). Rationality, Folk Psychology, and the Belief-Opinion Distinction. Acta Analytica 12 (12):113-123.
    The aim of this paper is to clarify the role of the distinction between belief and opinion in the light of Dennett's intentional stance. In particular, I consider whether the distinction could be used for a defence of the stance from various criticisms. I will then apply the distinction to the so-called `paradoxes of irrationality'. In this context I will propose that we should avoid the postulation of `boundaries' or `gaps' within the mind, and will attempt to show that a (...)
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  49. Richard E. Grandy (1996). No Simulation Without (Some) Theory (Somewhere, Some Kind): Comments on Henderson. Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (S1):95-98.
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  50. Adam Green, Mapping Others: Representation and Mindreading.
    Thinking about the representational qualities of maps and models allows one to offer a new perspective on the nature of mindreading. The recent critiques of our dominant paradigms for mindreading, theory theory and simulation theory by enactivists such as Daniel Hutto reveal a flaw in the standard options for thinking about how we think about others. Views that rely on theorizing or simulation to account for the way in which we understand others often appear to over-intellectualize social interaction. In contrast, (...)
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