Related categories
Siblings:
311 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 311
  1. Sönke Ahrens (2011). Experiment Und Exploration: Bildung Als Experimentelle Form der Welterschliessung. Transcript.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. George Ainslie (2007). Can Thought Experiments Prove Anything About the Will. In Don Ross, David Spurrett, Harold Kincaid & G. Lynn Stephens (eds.), Distributed Cognition and the Will: Individual Volition and Social Context. MIT Press
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Maria Alvarez (2009). Actions, Thought-Experiments and the 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):61 – 81.
    In 1969 Harry Frankfurt published his hugely influential paper 'Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility' in which he claimed to present a counterexample to the so-called 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities' ('a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise'). The success of Frankfurt-style cases as counterexamples to the Principle has been much debated since. I present an objection to these cases that, in questioning their conceptual cogency, undercuts many of those debates. Such cases (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. D. A. Anapolitanos (1991). Thought Experiments and Conceivability Conditions. In Tamara Horowitz (ed.), Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy. Rowman and Littlefield
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. H. Andersen (2008). Experiments and Concepts. In U. Feest & G. Hon (eds.), Generating Experimental Knowledge. Max Planck Institute for the History of Science 340--27.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Daniel Andler (2003). The Advantages of Theft Over Honest Toil. A Comment on David Atkinson. In M. C. Galavotti (ed.), Observation and Experiment in the Natural and Social Sciences.
    David Atkinson asks whether nonempirical constructions can lead to genuine knowledge in science, and answers in the negative. Thought experiments, in his view, are to be commended only insofar as they eventually lead to real experiments. The claim does not rely on a general study, conceptual or historical, of thought experiments as such: the range of the paper is at once narrower and broader. Atkinson views thought experiments as commonly understood as just one kind of episode in the development of (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Brennan Andrew (1990). Wilkes, Kathleen V., "Real People: Personal Idenity Without Thought Experiments". [REVIEW] Mind 99:305.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Margherita Arcangeli (2010). Imagination in Thought Experimentation: Sketching a Cognitive Approach to Thought Experiments. In W. Carnielli L. Magnani (ed.), Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology. 571--587.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Andre Archie (2008). The Anatomy Of Three Thought Experiments In Plato. Existentia 18 (3-4):275-292.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Andre M. Archie (2010). The Anatomy of Three Thought Experiments in Plato's Republic, Apology, and Alcibiades Minor. Journal of Philosophical Research 35:305-321.
    I argue that Plato’s use of thought experiments anticipate many of the themes discussed by Thomas S. Kuhn’s classic essay, “A Function for Thought Experiments.” Kuhn’s concern is that thought experiments satisfy the condition of verisimilitude. That is, thought experiments must not be conducted merely to alter the conceptual apparatus of the scientist regarding the phenomenon explored, but rather to alter the scientist’s conceptual apparatus for the sake of altering his actions (i.e., practical rationality). Plato, too, is quite concerned with (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Richard Arthur (1999). On Thought Experiments as a Priori Science. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13 (3):215 – 229.
    Against Norton's claim that all thought experiments can be reduced to explicit arguments, I defend Brown's position that certain thought experiments yield a priori knowledge. They do this, I argue, not by allowing us to perceive “Platonic universals” (Brown), even though they may contain non-propositional components that are epistemically indispensable, but by helping to identify certain tacit presuppositions or “natural interpretations” (Feyerabend's term) that lead to a contradiction when the phenomenon is described in terms of them, and by suggesting a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Mervi A. Asikainen & Pekka E. Hirvonen (2014). Thought Experiments in Science and in Science Education. In Michael R. Matthews (ed.), International Handbook of Research in History, Philosophy and Science Teaching. Springer 1235-1256.
    This chapter will discuss the role of thought experiments in science and in science teaching. The constructive and destructive roles played by thought experiments in the construction of scientific theories can be used in science teaching to help students to understand the processes of science. In addition, they have potential to be used as a teaching tool for developing students’ conceptual understanding. The use of thought experiments can also increase students’ interest in science and help them in understanding situations beyond (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. David Atkinson (2007). On Poor and Not so Poor Thought Experiments. A Reply to Daniel Cohnitz. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 38 (1):159 - 161.
    We have never entirely agreed with Daniel Cohnitz on the status and rôle of thought experiments. Several years ago, enjoying a splendid lunch together in the city of Ghent, we cheerfully agreed to disagree on the matter; and now that Cohnitz has published his considered opinion of our views, we are glad that we have the opportunity to write a rejoinder and to explicate some of our disagreements. We choose not to deal here with all the issues that Cohnitz raises, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. David Atkinson (2003). Experiments and Thought Experiments in Natural Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 232:209-226.
    My theme is thought experiment in natural science, and its relation to real experiment. I shall defend the thesis that thought experiments that do not lead to theorizing and to a real experiment are generally of much less value that those that do so. To illustrate this thesis I refer to three examples, from three very different periods, and with three very different kinds of status. The first is the classic thought experiment in which Galileo imagined that he had, by (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. David Atkinson (2003). When Are Thought Experiments Poor Ones? Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 34 (2):305 - 322.
    A characteristic of contemporary analytic philosophy is its ample use of thought experiments. We formulate two features that can lead one to suspect that a given thought experiment is a poor one. Although these features are especially in evidence within the philosophy of mind, they can, surprisingly enough, also be discerned in some celebrated scientific thought experiments. Yet in the latter case the consequences appear to be less disastrous. We conclude that the use of thought experiments is more successful in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Neera Badhwar (2006). Experiments in Living. The Philosophers' Magazine 35 (35):58-61.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Julian Baggini (2008). The Duck That Won the Lottery: 100 New Experiments for the Armchair Philosopher. Plume.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Julian Baggini (2006). The Pig That Wants to Be Eaten: 100 Experiments for the Armchair Philosopher. Plume.
    Both entertaining and startling, The Pig That Wants to Be Eaten offers one hundred philosophical puzzles that stimulate thought on a host of moral, social, and personal dilemmas. Taking examples from sources as diverse as Plato and Steven Spielberg, author Julian Baggini presents abstract philosophical issues in concrete terms, suggesting possible solutions while encouraging readers to draw their own conclusions: Lively, clever, and thought-provoking, The Pig That Wants to Be Eaten is a portable feast for the mind that is sure (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Julian Baggini (2005). The Pig That Wants to Be Eaten: And Ninety-Nine Other Thought Experiments. Granta.
    This book includes experiments that cover identity, religion, art, ethics, language, knowledge and more.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Lynne Rudder Baker (1985). Just What Do We Have in Mind? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):25-48.
    Nevertheless, I believe that, as it has been construed recently, the assumption is false. At the very least, it does not deserve the largely unquestioned status it enjoys, as I hope to show by a graduated series of thought experiments. I present the thought experiments as a series to expose a shared inadequacy in a variety of individualistic views, from type-type physicalism to the most sophisticated methodological solipsism; and I present them as graduated to suggest that having accepted the first (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Magdalena Balcerak Jackson (2013). Conceptual Analysis and Epistemic Progress. Synthese 190 (15):3053-3074.
    This essay concerns the question of how we make genuine epistemic progress through conceptual analysis. Our way into this issue will be through consideration of the paradox of analysis. The paradox challenges us to explain how a given statement can make a substantive contribution to our knowledge, even while it purports merely to make explicit what one’s grasp of the concept under scrutiny consists in. The paradox is often treated primarily as a semantic puzzle. However, in “Sect. 1” I argue (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Simon Beck (2011). Can Parables Work? Philosophy and Theology 23 (1):149-165.
    While theories about interpreting biblical and other parables have long realised the importance of readers’ responses to the topic, recent results in social psychology concerning systematic self-deception raise unforeseen problems. In this paper I first set out some of the problems these results pose for the authority of fictional thought-experiments in moral philosophy. I then consider the suggestion that biblical parables face the same problems and as a result cannot work as devices for moral or religious instruction in the way (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Simon Beck (2006). These Bizarre Fictions: Thought-Experiments, Our Psychology and Our Selves. Philosophical Papers 35 (1):29-54.
    Philosophers have traditionally used thought-experiments in their endeavours to find a satisfactory account of the self and personal identity. Yet there are considerations from empirical psychology as well as related ones from philosophy itself that appear to completely undermine the method of thought-experiment. This paper focuses on both sets of considerations and attempts a defence of the method.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Simon Beck (1992). The Method of Possible Worlds. Metaphilosophy 23 (1-2):119-131.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Simon Beck (1989). Parfit and the Russians (Personal Identity and Moral Concepts). Analysis 49 (4):205-209.
  26. Radim Bělohrad (2012). Epistemic Ping-Pong: A Critical Review of Marek Picha's Thought Experiments. Human Affairs 22 (3):448-453.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. A. Benejam (2003). Thought Experiments and Semantic Competence. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. Csli
  28. Michael A. Bishop (1999). Why Thought Experiments Are Not Arguments. Philosophy of Science 66 (4):534-541.
    Are thought experiments nothing but arguments? I argue that it is not possible to make sense of the historical trajectory of certain thought experiments if one takes them to be arguments. Einstein and Bohr disagreed about the outcome of the clock-in-the-box thought experiment, and so they reconstructed it using different arguments. This is to be expected whenever scientists disagree about a thought experiment's outcome. Since any such episode consists of two arguments but just one thought experiment, the thought experiment cannot (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. William Bogard (forthcoming). Intuition Pumps and the Proper Use of Thought Experiments. Dialectica.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Alisa Bokulich (2001). Rethinking Thought Experiments. Perspectives on Science 9 (3):285-307.
    : An examination of two thought experiments in contemporary physics reveals that the same thought experiment can be reanalyzed from the perspective of different and incompatible theories. This fact undermines those accounts of thought experiments that claim their justificatory power comes from their ability to reveal the laws of nature. While thought experiments do play a genuine evaluative role in science, they do so by testing the nonempirical virtues of a theory, such as consistency and explanatory power. I conclude that, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Giovanni Boniolo (1997). On a Unified Theory of Models and Thought Experiments in Natural Sciences. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 11 (2):121 – 142.
    In this paper a unified theory of models and thought experiments is proposed by considering them as fictions, la Vaihinger. In order to reach this aim, the Hertzian and Botzmannian interpretation of theories as Bilder is reconsidered.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Denny Borsboom, Gideon J. Mellenbergh & Jaap Van Heerden (2002). Functional Thought Experiments. Synthese 130 (3):379 - 387.
    The literature on thought experiments has been mainly concerned with thought experiments that are directed at a theory, be it in a constructive or a destructive manner. This has led some philosophers to argue that all thought experiments can be formulated as arguments. The aim of this paper is to draw attention to a type of thought experiment that is not directed at a theory, but fulfills a specific function within a theory. Such thought experiments are referred to as functional (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Denny Borsboom, Gideon J. Mellenbergh & Jaap van Heerden (2002). Functional Thought Experiments. Synthese 130 (3):379 - 387.
    The literature on thought experiments has been mainly concernedwith thought experiments that are directed at a theory, be it in aconstructive or a destructive manner. This has led somephilosophers to argue that all thought experiments can beformulated as arguments. The aim of this paper is to drawattention to a type of thought experiment that is not directed ata theory, but fulfills a specific function within a theory. Suchthought experiments are referred to as functional thoughtexperiments, and they are routinely used in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Elke Brendel (2004). Intuition Pumps and the Proper Use of Thought Experiments. Dialectica 58 (1):89–108.
    I begin with an explication of "thought experiment". I then clarify the role that intuitions play in thought experiments by addressing two important issues: (1) the informativeness of thought experiments and (2) the legitimacy of the method of thought experiments in philosophy and the natural sciences. I defend a naturalistic account of intuitions that provides a plausible explanation of the informativeness of thought experiments, which, in turn, allows thought experiments to be reconstructed as arguments. I also specify criteria for distinguishing (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. D. H. M. Brooks (1994). The Method of Thought Experiment. Metaphilosophy 25 (1):71-83.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. James Robert Brown (2014). Explaining, Seeing, and Understanding in Thought Experiments. Perspectives on Science 22 (3):357-376.
    Theories often run into paradoxes. Some of these are outright contradictions, sending the would-be champions of the theory back to the drawing board. Others are paradoxical in the sense of being bizarre and unexpected. The latter are sometimes mistakenly thought to be instances of the former. That is, they are thought to be more than merely weird; they are mistakenly thought to be self-refuting. Showing that they are not self-contradictory but merely a surprise is often a challenge. Notions of explanation (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. James Robert Brown (2007). Counter Thought Experiments. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82 (61):155-177.
    Let's begin with an old example. In De Rerum Naturua , Lucretius presented a thought experiment to show that space is infinite. We imagine ourselves near the alleged edge of space; we throw a spear; we see it either sail through the ‘edge’ or we see it bounce back. In the former case the ‘edge’ isn't the edge, after all. In the latter case, there must be something beyond the ‘edge’ that repelled the spear. Either way, the ‘edge’ isn't really (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. James Robert Brown (2007). Thought Experiments in Science, Philosophy, and Mathematics. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):3-27.
    Most disciplines make use of thought experiments, but physics and philosophy lead the pack with heavy dependence upon them. Often this is for conceptual clarification, but occasionally they provide real theoretical advances. In spite of their importance, however, thought experiments have received rather little attention as a topic in their own right until recently. The situation has improved in the past few years, but a mere generation ago the entire published literature on thought experiments could have been mastered in a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. James Robert Brown (2004). Why Thought Experiments Transcend Experience. In Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science. Blackwell 23-43.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. James Robert Brown (2004). Peeking Into Plato's Heaven. Philosophy of Science 71 (5):1126-1138.
    Examples of classic thought experiments are presented and some morals drawn. The views of my fellow symposiasts, Tamar Gendler, John Norton, and James McAllister, are evaluated. An account of thought experiments along a priori and Platonistic lines is given. I also cite the related example of proving theorems in mathematics with pictures and diagrams. To illustrate the power of these methods, a possible refutation of the continuum hypothesis using a thought experiment is sketched.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. James Robert Brown (1995). Critical Notice of Roy Sorensen Thought Experiments. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (1).
    This book adds to the growing literature on thought experiments. There are numerous examples drawn from the sciences and philosophy. The principle claim is that thought experiments are a limiting case of real experiments. It is a moderate empiricist view, in contrast to, e.g., the Platonism of Brown or the strict empiricism of Norton. Highly recommended.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. James Robert Brown (1992). Why Empiricism Won't Work. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:271 - 279.
    Thought experiments provide us with scientific understanding and theoretical advances which are sometimes quite significant, yet they do this without new empirical input, and possibly without any empirical input at all. How is this possible? The challenge to empiricism is to give an account which is compatible with the traditional empiricist principle that all knowledge is based on sensory experience. Thought experiments present an enormous challenge to empiricist views of knowledge; so much so that some of us have (cheerfully) thrown (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. James Robert Brown (1991). The Laboratory of the Mind: Thought Experiments in the Natural Sciences. Routledge.
    The book concludes with chapters on the nature of Einstein's work and on the interpretation of quantum mechanics which stand as a test of the author's central ...
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. James Robert Brown (1986). Thought Experiments Since the Scientific Revolution. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1 (1):1 – 15.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. James Robert Brown & Yiftach J. H. Fehige, Thought Experiments. Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. James Robert Brown & Michael T. Stuart (2013). Katerina Ierodiakonou and Sophie Roux , Eds. Thought Experiments in Methodological and Historical Contexts . Leiden: Brill, 2011. Pp. Vii+233. €99.00 (Cloth). [REVIEW] Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 3 (1):154-157.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Jessica Brown (2011). Thought Experiments, Intuitions and Philosophical Evidence. Dialectica 65 (4):493-516.
    What is the nature of the evidence provided by thought experiments in philosophy? For instance, what evidence is provided by the Gettier thought experiment against the JTB theory of knowledge? According to one view, it provides as evidence only a certain psychological proposition, e.g. that it seems to one that the subject in the Gettier case lacks knowledge. On an alternative, nonpsychological view, the Gettier thought experiment provides as evidence the nonpsychological proposition that the subject in the Gettier case lacks (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. William H. Bruening (1983). Beyond Philosophy: A Thought Experiment in Ontoc Subjectivity. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 10 (April):365.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Martin Bunzl (1996). The Logic of Thought Experiments. Synthese 106 (2):227 - 240.
    In this paper I argue that (at least many) philosophical thought experiments are unreliable. But I argue that this notion of unreliability has to be understood relative to the goal of thought experiments as knowledge producing. And relative to that goal many thought experiments in science are just as unreliable. But in fact thought experiments in science play a varied role and I will suggest that knowledge production is a goal only under quite limited circumstances. I defend the view that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Taylor Burge (2003). Thought Experiments: Reply to Donnellan. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 311