Three- and Four-Dimensionalism Edited by Cody Gilmore (University of California, Davis)

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  • Liliana Albertazzi (1994). Thepsychological Whole. I: The Temporal Parts of Presentation. Axiomathes 5 (1).
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  • István Aranyosi, Hesperus is Phosphorus, Indeed.
    Tobias Hansson Wahlberg argues in a recent article (2009) that the truth of “Hesperus is Phosphorus” depends on the assumption that the endurance theory of persistence is true. The statement is not true (or at least can reasonably be doubted), he argues, if one assumes (a) the theory of persistence according to which objects are four-dimensional entities, persisting through perdurance, i.e. by having temporal parts that are numerically distinct, and (b) the thesis of unrestricted mereological composition (UMC), that is, that (...)
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  • Lynne Rudder Baker (2007). The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism. Cambridge University Press.
    Lynne Rudder Baker presents and defends a unique account of the material world: the Constitution View. In contrast to leading metaphysical views that take everyday things to be either non-existent or reducible to micro-objects, the Constitution View construes familiar things as irreducible parts of reality. Although they are ultimately constituted by microphysical particles, everyday objects are neither identical to, nor reducible to, the aggregates of microphysical particles that constitute them. The result is genuine ontological diversity: people, bacteria, donkeys, mountains and (...)
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  • Yuri Balashov, Times of Our Lives: Negotiating the Presence of Experience.
    On the B-theory of time, the experiences we have throughout our conscious lives have the same ontological status: they all tenselessly occur at their respective dates. But we do not seem to experience all of them on the same footing. In fact, we tend to believe that only our present experiences are real, to the exclusion of the past and future ones. The B-theorist has to maintain that this belief is an illusion and explain the origin of the illusion. The (...)
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  • Yuri Balashov, Temporal Parts and Superluminal Motion.
    Hud Hudson has recently suggested a scenario intended to show that, assuming the doctrine of temporal parts and a sufficiently liberal view of composition, there are material objects that move faster than light. I accept Hudson's conditional but contend that his modus ponens is less plausible that the corresponding modus tollens. Reversed in this way, the argument stemming from the scenario raises the cost of mereological liberalism and advances the case for a principled restriction on diachronic composition.
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  • Yuri Balashov, Noûs 33 (1999): 644-662.
    I offer an argument in defense of four-dimensionalism, the view that objects are temporally, as well as spatially extended. The argument is of the inference-to-the-best-explanation variety and is based on relativistic considerations. It deals with the situation in which one and the same object has different three-dimensional shapes at the same time and proceeds by asking what sort of thing it must be in order to present itself in such different ways in various “perspectives” (associated with moving reference frames) without (...)
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  • Yuri Balashov, On Stages, Worms, and Relativity.
    Four-dimensionalism, or perdurantism, the view that temporally extended objects persist through time by having (spatio-)temporal parts or stages, includes two varieties, the worm theory and the stage theory. According to the worm theory, perduring objects are four-dimensional wholes occupying determinate regions of spacetime and having temporal parts, or stages, each of them confined to a particular time. The stage theorist, however, claims, not that perduring objects have stages, but that the fundamental entities of the perdurantist ontology are stages. I argue (...)
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  • Yuri Balashov, Persistence and Space-Time: Philosophical Lessons of the Pole and Barn.
    Although considerations based on contemporary space-time theories, such as special and general relativity, seem highly relevant to the debate about persistence, their significance has not been duly appreciated. My goal in the paper is twofold: (1) to reformulate the rival positions in the debate (i.e., endurantism (three-dimensionalism) and perdurantism (four-dimensionalism, the doctrine of temporal parts)) in the framework of special relativistic space-time; and (2) to argue that, when so reformulated, perdurantism exhibits explanatory advantages over endurantism. The argument builds on the (...)
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  • Yuri Balashov (2009). Pegs, Boards, and Relativistic Perdurance. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):167-175.
    In an earlier work I developed an argument favoring one view of persistence (viz., perdurance) over its rivals, based on considerations of the relativity of three-dimensional spatial shapes of physical objects in Minkowski spacetime. The argument has since come under criticism (in the works of Theodore Sider, Kristie Miller, Ian Gibson, Oliver Pooley, and Thomas Sattig). Two related topics, explanatory virtues and explanatory relevance, are central to these critical discussions. In this paper I deal with these topics directly and respond (...)
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  • Yuri Balashov (2007). Defining ‚Exdurance'. Philosophical Studies 133 (1).
    On stage theory, ordinary continuants are instantaneous stages which persist by exduring—by bearing temporal counterpart relations to other such stages. Exduring objects lack temporal extension and there is a sense in which they are wholly present at multiple instants. How then is exdurance different from endurance? I offer a definition of ‚exdurance’ that clearly sets it apart from other modes of persistence.
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  • Yuri Balashov (2005). Special Relativity, Coexistence and Temporal Parts: A Reply to Gilmore. Philosophical Studies 124 (1).
    In two earlier works (Balashov, 2000a: Philosophical Studies 99, 129–166; 2000b: Philosophy of Science 67 (Suppl), S549–S562), I have argued that considerations based on special relativity and the notion of coexistence favor the perdurance view of persistence over its endurance rival. Cody Gilmore (2002: Philosophical Studies 109, 241–263) has subjected my argument to an insightful three fold critique. In the first part of this paper I respond briefly to Gilmore’s first two objections. I then grant his observation that anyone who (...)
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  • Yuri Balashov (2005). On Vagueness, 4d and Diachronic Universalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):523 – 531.
    I offer a new criticism of the argument from vagueness to four-dimensionalism [Sider 2001. The argument is modelled after an older argument for mereological universalism [Lewis 1986 and may be looked upon as a tightened-up and extended version of the latter. While I agree with other critics [Koslicki 2003; Markosian 2004 that the argument from vagueness fails precisely because of this affinity, my recipe for dealing with it is different. I reject the assumption, shared by Sider with his opponents, that (...)
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  • Yuri Balashov (2000). Relativity and Persistence. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):562.
    The nature of persistence of physical objects over time has been intensely debated in contemporary metaphysics. The two opposite views are widely known as "endurantism" (or "three-dimensionalism") and "perdurantism" ("four-dimensionalism"). According to the former, objects are extended in three spatial dimensions and persist through time by being wholly present at any moment at which they exist. On the rival account, objects are extended both in space and time and persist by having "temporal parts," no part being present at more than (...)
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  • Yuri Balashov (2000). Enduring and Perduring Objects in Minkowski Space-Time. Philosophical Studies 99 (2).
    I examine the issue of persistence over time in thecontext of the special theory of relativity (SR). Thefour-dimensional ontology of perduring objects isclearly favored by SR. But it is a different questionif and to what extent this ontology is required, andthe rival endurantist ontology ruled out, by thistheory. In addressing this question, I take theessential idea of endurantism, that objects are whollypresent at single moments of time, and argue that itcommits one to unacceptable conclusions regardingcoexistence, in the context of SR. (...)
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  • Yuri Balashov (1999). Relativistic Objects. Noûs 33 (4):644-662.
    I offer an argument in defense of four-dimensionalism, the view that objects are temporally, as well as spatially extended. The argument is of the inference-to-the-best-explanation variety and is based on relativistic considerations. It deals with the situation in which one and the same object has different three-dimensional shapes at the same time and proceeds by asking what sort of thing it must be in order to present itself in such different ways in various "perspectives" (associated with moving reference frames) without (...)
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  • Stephen Barkerand Phil Dowe (2005). Endurance is Paradoxical. Analysis 65 (285):69–74.
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  • Jiri Benovsky (2009). Eternalist Theories of Persistence Through Time: Where the Differences Really Lie. Axiomathes 19 (1).
    The eternalist endurantist and perdurantist theories of persistence through time come in various versions, namely the two versions of perdurantism: the worm view and the stage view , and the two versions of endurantism: indexicalism and adverbialism . Using as a starting point the instructive case of what is depicted by photographs, I will examine these four views, and compare them, with some interesting results. Notably, we will see that two traditional enemies—the perdurantist worm view and the endurantist theories—are more (...)
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  • Montse Bordes (1998). Abstract Particulars in a Four-Dimensional Frame. Dialectica 52:3-12.
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  • Montse Bordes (1997). Four-Dimensional Remarks: A Defence of Temporal Parts. Theoria (29):343-377.
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  • David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller (2006). Talking About a Universalist World. Philosophical Studies 130 (3).
    The paper defends a combination of perdurantism with mereological universalism by developing semantics of temporary predications of the sort ’some P is/was/will be (a) Q’. We argue that, in addition to the usual application of causal and other restrictions on sortals, the grammatical form of such statements allows for rather different regimentations along three separate dimensions, according to: (a) whether ‘P’ and ‘Q’ are being used as phase or substance sortal terms, (b) whether ‘is’, ‘was’, and ‘will be’ are the (...)
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  • Anthony Brueckner (2009). Endurantism and the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity. Theoria 75 (1):28-33.
    This paper considers the question whether a psychological approach to personal identity can be formulated within an endurantist, as opposed to four-dimensionalist, framework. Trenton Merricks has argued that this cannot be done. I argue to the contrary: a perfectly coherent endurantist version of the psychological approach can indeed be formulated.
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  • J. Butterfield (2006). The Rotating Discs Argument Defeated. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (1):1-45.
    The rotating discs argument (RDA) against perdurantism has been mostly discussed by metaphysicians, though the argument of course appeals to ideas from classical mechanics, especially about rotation. In contrast, I assess the RDA from the perspective of the philosophy of physics. I argue for three main conclusions. The first conclusion is that the RDA can be formulated more strongly than is usually recognized: it is not necessary to ‘imagine away’ the dynamical effects of rotation. The second is that in general (...)
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  • J. Butterfield (1985). Spatial and Temporal Parts. Philosophical Quarterly 35 (138):32-44.
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  • Jeremy Butterfield (2006). Against Pointillisme About Mechanics. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (4).
    This paper forms part of a wider campaign: to deny pointillisme, the doctrine that a physical theory's fundamental quantities are defined at points of space or of spacetime, and represent intrinsic properties of such points or point-sized objects located there; so that properties of spatial or spatiotemporal regions and their material contents are determined by the point-by-point facts. More specifically, this paper argues against pointillisme about the concept of velocity in classical mechanics; especially against proposals by Tooley, Robinson and Lewis. (...)
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  • Jeremy Butterfield, The Rotating Discs Argument Defeated.
    The rotating discs argument (RDA) against perdurantism has been mostly discussed by metaphysicians, though the argument of course appeals to ideas from classical mechanics, especially about rotation. In contrast, I assess the RDA from the perspective of the philosophy of physics. I argue for three main conclusions. The first conclusion is that the RDA can be formulated more strongly than is usually recognized: it is not necessary to imagine away the dynamical effects of rotation. The second is that in general (...)
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  • Jeremy Butterfield, On the Persistence of Particles.
    This paper is about the metaphysical debate whether objects persist over time by the selfsame object existing at different times (nowadays called `endurance' by metaphysicians), or by different temporal parts, or stages, existing at different times (called ` perdurance'). I aim to illuminate the debate by using some elementary kinematics and real analysis: resources which metaphysicians have, surprisingly, not availed themselves of. There are two main results, which are of interest to both endurantists and perdurantists. (1): I describe a precise (...)
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  • Jeremy Butterfield, On the Persistence of Homogeneous Matter.
    Some recent philosophical debate about persistence has focussed on an argument against perdurantism that discusses rotating perfectly homogeneous discs (the `rotating discs argument'; RDA). The argument has been mostly discussed by metaphysicians, though it appeals to ideas from classical mechanics, especially about rotation. In contrast, I assess the RDA from the perspective of the philosophy of physics. After introducing the argument and emphasizing the relevance of physics (Sections 1 to 3), I review some metaphysicians' replies to the argument, especially those (...)
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  • Ben Caplan & Bob Bright (2005). Fusions and Ordinary Physical Objects. Philosophical Studies 125 (1).
    In “Tropes and Ordinary Physical Objects”, Kris McDaniel argues that ordinary physical objects are fusions of monadic and polyadic tropes. McDaniel calls his view “TOPO”—for “Theory of Ordinary Physical Objects”. He argues that we should accept TOPO because of the philosophical work that it allows us to do. Among other things, TOPO is supposed to allow endurantists to reply to Mark Heller’s argument for perdurantism. But, we argue in this paper, TOPO does not help endurantists do that; indeed, we argue (...)
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  • Ben Caplan & Carl Matheson (2006). Defending Musical Perdurantism. British Journal of Aesthetics 46 (1).
    If musical works are abstract objects, which cannot enter into causal relations, then how can we refer to musical works or know anything about them? Worse, how can any of our musical experiences be experiences of musical works? It would be nice to be able to sidestep these questions altogether. One way to do that would be to take musical works to be concrete objects. In this paper, we defend a theory according to which musical works are concrete objects. In (...)
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  • Christopher H. Conn (1999). Two Arguments for Lockean Four-Dimensionalism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 7 (3):429 – 446.
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  • Jack Copeland, Heather Dyke & Diane Proudfoot (2001). Temporal Parts and Their Individuation. Analysis 61 (4):289–293.
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  • Richard Cross (1999). Four-Dimensionalism and Identity Across Time: Henry of Ghent Vs. Bonaventure. Journal of the History of Philosophy 37 (3).
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  • Matthew Davidson, A Critical Notice of Theodore Sider's Four Dimensionalism.
    This is a critical notice of Theodore Sider's book, _Four-Dimensionalism_.
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  • George Djukic (2004). Do Four-Dimensionalists Have to Be Counterpart Theorists? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):292 – 311.
    In 'Four-Dimensional Objects' Peter van Inwagen gives two arguments for the claim that proponents of four-dimensionalism have to be counterpart theorists. Recently Jack Copeland, Heather Dyke, and Diane Proudfoot, echoing in part points made by Mark Heller in this journal in 1993, have sought to rebut one of van Inwagen's arguments. In this paper I shall criticize their discussion and by implication certain points made by Heller. In so doing I shall also rebut a possible objection to van Inwagen's second (...)
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  • Antony Eagle (forthcoming). Location and Perdurance. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics.
    Recently, Cody Gilmore has deployed an ingenious case involving backwards time travel to highlight an apparent conflict between the theory that objects persist by perduring, and the thesis that wholly coincident objects are impossible. However, careful attention to the concepts of location and parthood that Gilmore’s cases involve shows that the perdurantist faces no genuine objection from these cases, and that the perdurantist has a number of plausible and dialectically appropriate ways to avoid the supposed conflict.
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  • Antony Eagle (2007). Reply to Stone on Counterpart Theory and Four-Dimensionalism. Analysis 67:159–162.
    Recently, Jim Stone has argued that counterpart theory is incompatible with the existence of temporal parts. I demonstrate that there is no such incompatibility.
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  • Nikk Effingham, Temporal Parts and Time Travel.
    There is a consensus that we need an informative definition of what a temporal part is. I argue that the most popular definition does not work given both the standard perdurantist treatment of temporary intrinsics and the possibility of time travel (§1). I consider Sider’s attempts to remedy this problem (§2), a prima facie plausible alternative (§3) and then all extant alternatives to the popular definition (§4). Each approach is flawed. I then argue that we can give up on the (...)
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  • Nikk Effingham & Joseph Melia (2007). Endurantism and Timeless Worlds. Analysis 67 (294):140–147.
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  • Nikk Effingham & Jon Robson (2007). A Mereological Challenge to Endurantism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):633 – 640.
    In this paper, we argue that time travel is problematic for the endurantist. For it appears to be possible, given time travel, to construct a wall out of a single time travelling brick. This commits the endurantist to one of the following: (a) the wall is composed of the time travelling brick many times over; (b) the wall does not in fact exist at all; (c) the wall is identical to the brick. We argue that each of these options is (...)
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  • Andy Egan (2004). Second-Order Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):48 – 66.
    Problems about the accidental properties of properties motivate us--force us, I think--not to identify properties with the sets of their instances. If we identify them instead with functions from worlds to extensions, we get a theory of properties that is neutral with respect to disputes over counterpart theory, and we avoid a problem for Lewis's theory of events. Similar problems about the temporary properties of properties motivate us--though this time they probably don't force us--to give up this theory as well, (...)
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  • Douglas Ehring (2001). Temporal Parts and Bundle Theory. Philosophical Studies 104 (2).
    In this paper, I try to make a bundle theory of objects consistentwith a temporal parts theory of object persistence. To that end,I propose that such bundles are made up of tropes includingthe co-instantiation relation.
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  • Kit Fine (2008). In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements 83 (62):1-16.
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  • Bryan Frances, The Material Composition Problem.
    This is an essay for undergraduates. I set out the statue/clay problem in rich detail.
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  • By Robert Francescotti (2008). Psychological Continuity, Fission, and the Non-Branching Constraint. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):21–31.
    Those who endorse the Psychological Continuity Approach (PCA) to analyzing personal identity need to impose a non-branching constraint to get the intuitively correct result that in the case of fission, one person becomes two. With the help of Brueckner's (2005) discussion, it is shown here that the sort of non-branching clause that allows proponents of PCA to provide sufficient conditions for being the same person actually runs contrary to the very spirit of their theory. The problem is first presented in (...)
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  • Cord Friebe, Persistence in Minkowski Spacetime: The Irrelevance of the Endurance/Perdurance Distinction.
    Under the eternalist hypothesis that objects or events exist independently of being present two different views of persistence are on the market: Persisting objects endure if they are multiply located in (space-)time, and persisting objects perdure if they are singly located by having numerically different temporal parts. Recently, several authors (Balashov, Hales/Johnson, Gilmore, Gibson/Pooley) have argued that special relativity (SR) favours perdurantism over its endurantist rival. In my talk, I want to show that in fact the purported arguments are only (...)
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  • André Gallois (2004). Comments on Ted Sider: Four Dimensionalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):648–657.
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  • Ian Gibson, Time, Objects, and Identity.
    This is a copy of my DPhil thesis, the abstract for which is as follows: The first third of this thesis argues for a B-theoretic conception of time according to which all times exist equally and the present is in no way privileged. I distinguish "ontological" A-theories from "non-ontological" ones, arguing that the latter are experientially unmotivated and barely coherent. With regard to the former, I focus mainly on presentism. After some remarks on how to formulate this (and eternalism) non-trivially, (...)
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  • Ian Gibson & Oliver Pooley (2006). Relativistic Persistence. Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):157–198.
    We have two aims in this paper. The first is to provide the reader with a critical guide to recent work on relativity and persistence by Balashov, Gilmore and others. Much of this work investigates whether endurantism can be sustained in the context of relativity. Several arguments have been advanced that aim to show that it cannot. We find these unpersuasive, and will add our own criticisms to those we review. Our second aim, which complements the first, is to demarcate (...)
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  • Cody Gilmore (forthcoming). Why Parthood Might Be a Four-Place Relation, and How It Behaves If It Is. In Ludger Honnefelder, Benedikt Schick & Edmund Runggaldier (eds.), Unity and Time in Metaphysics. de Gruyter.
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  • Cody Gilmore (forthcoming). Coinciding Objects and Duration Properties: Reply to Eagle. In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 5. Oxford University Press.
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