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Time and Change

Edited by Stephan Torre (University of Aberdeen, Northern Institute of Philosophy)
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  1. Aziz Ahmad (1974). Change, Time, and Causality: With Special Reference to Muslim Thought. Pakistan Philosophical Congress.
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  2. Gordon Belot (2007). The Representation of Time and Change in Mechanics. In John Earman & Jeremy Butterfield (eds.), Philosophy of Physics. Elsevier.
    This chapter is concerned with the representation of time and change in classical (i.e., non-quantum) physical theories. One of the main goals of the chapter is to attempt to clarify the nature and scope of the so-called problem of time: a knot of technical and interpretative problems that appear to stand in the way of attempts to quantize general relativity, and which have their roots in the general covariance of that theory. The most natural approach to these questions is via (...)
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  3. Jiri Benovsky (2012). The Causal Efficiency of the Passage of Time. Philosophia 40 (4):763-769.
    Does mere passage of time have causal powers ? Are properties like "being n days past" causally efficient ? A pervasive intuition among metaphysicians seems to be that they don't. Events and/or objects change, and they cause or are caused by other events and/or objects; but one does not see how just the mere passage of time could cause any difference in the world. In this paper, I shall discuss a case where it seems that mere passage of time does (...)
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  4. Jiri Benovsky (2011). The Relationist and Substantivalist Theories of Time: Foes or Friends? European Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):491-506.
    Abstract: There are two traditionally rival views about the nature of time: substantivalism that takes time to be a substance that exists independently of events located in it, and relationism that takes time to be constructed out of events. In this paper, first, I want to make some progress with respect to the debate between these two views, and I do this mainly by examining the strategies they use to face the possibilities of ‘empty time’ and ‘time without change’. As (...)
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  5. David Bostock (1980). Aristotle's A Ccount of Time. Phronesis 25 (1):148-169.
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  6. David Bostock (1978). Plato on Change and Time in the Parmenides. Phronesis 23 (3):229-242.
  7. David Bostock (1978). Plato on Change and Time in the Parmenides. Phronesis 23 (3):229-242.
  8. Jeffrey E. Brower (2011). Aristotelian Endurantism: A New Solution to the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics. Mind 119 (476):883-905.
    It is standardly assumed that there are three — and only three — ways to solve problem of temporary intrinsics: (a) embrace presentism, (b) relativize property possession to times, or (c) accept the doctrine of temporal parts. The first two solutions are favoured by endurantists, whereas the third is the perdurantist solution of choice. In this paper, I argue that there is a further type of solution available to endurantists, one that not only avoids the usual costs, but is structurally (...)
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  9. David J. Buller & Thomas R. Foster (1992). The New Paradox of Temporal Transience. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (168):357-366.
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  10. Ursula Coope (2009). Aristotle : Time and Change. In Robin Le Poidevin (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics. Routledge.
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  11. Ursula Coope (2001). Why Does Aristotle Say That There is No Time Without Change? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):359–367.
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  12. Denis Corish (2009). Could Time Be Change? Philosophy 84 (2):219-232.
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  13. William Lane Craig (1999). Oaklander on Mctaggart and Intrinsic Change. Analysis 59 (4):319–320.
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  14. William Lane Craig (1998). Mctaggart's Paradox and the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics. Analysis 58 (2):122–127.
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  15. Phillip D. Cummins (1965). Time for Change. Analysis 26 (2):41 - 43.
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  16. Barry Dainton (2008). The Experience of Time and Change. Philosophy Compass 3 (4):619-638.
    Can we directly experience change? Although some philosophers have denied it, the phenomenological evidence is unambiguous: we can, and do. But how is this possible? What structures or features of consciousness render such experience possible? A variety of very different answers to this question have been proposed, answers which have very different implications for the nature of consciousness itself. In this brief survey no attempt is made to engage with the often complex (and sometimes obscure) literature on this topic. Instead, (...)
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  17. M. Eddon (2010). Three Arguments From Temporary Intrinsics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):605-619.
    The Argument from Temporary Intrinsics is one of the canonical arguments against endurantism. I show that the two standard ways of presenting the argument have limited force. I then present a new version of the argument, which provides a more promising articulation of the underlying objection to endurantism. However, the premises of this argument conflict with the gauge theories of particle physics, and so this version of the argument is no more successful than its predecessors. I conclude that no version (...)
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  18. Douglas Ehring (1997). Lewis, Temporary Intrinsics and Momentary Tropes. Analysis 57 (4):254–258.
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  19. Jan Faye, Tenses, Changes, and Space-Time.
    Here I develop the idea, which I have presented elsewhere, that time instants are abstract entities existing tenselessly and therefore that events and changes likewise may be said to exist tenselessly in virtue of their place at a certain space-time point.
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  20. M. Oreste Fiocco (2010). Temporary Intrinsics and Relativization. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (1):64-77.
    Some have concluded that the only appropriate response to the problem of temporary intrinsics is the view that familiar, concrete objects persist through time by perduring, that is, by having temporal parts. Many, including myself, believe this view of persistence is false, and so reject this conclusion. However, the most common attempts to resolve the problem and yet defend the view that familiar, concrete objects endure are self-defeating. This has heretofore gone unnoticed. I consider the most familiar such attempts, based (...)
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  21. Robert Francescotti (2008). Endurance and Discernibility. Metaphysica 9 (2):193-204.
    How can an object remain the same, numerically identical, while undergoing change? This is a worry for endurantists, who hold that for any stages, x and y, of a persisting object, x is numerically identical with y. Endurantists might try to avoid the problem of change by insisting that all properties are temporally anchored. It is argued here that while this strategy helps in many cases, it does not help in all. A type of case is presented in which a (...)
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  22. Andre Gallois, Identity Over Time. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Traditionally, this puzzle has been solved in various ways. Aristotle, for example, distinguished between “accidental” and “essential” changes. Accidental changes are ones that don't result in a change in an objects' identity after the change, such as when a house is painted, or one's hair turns gray, etc. Aristotle thought of these as changes in the accidental properties of a thing. Essential changes, by contrast, are those which don't preserve the identity of the object when it changes, such as when (...)
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  23. André Gallois (1998). Occasions of Identity: A Study in the Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness. Oxford University Press.
    Occasions of Identity is an exploration of timeless philosophical issues about persistence, change, time, and sameness. Andre Gallois offers a critical survey of various rival views about the nature of identity and change, and puts forward his own original theory. He supports the idea of occasional identities, arguing that it is coherent and helpful to suppose that things can be identical at one time but distinct at another. Gallois defends this view, demonstrating how it can solve puzzles about persistence dating (...)
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  24. Ian Gibson, Time, Objects, and Identity.
    This is a copy of my DPhil thesis, the abstract for which is as follows: The first third of this thesis argues for a B-theoretic conception of time according to which all times exist equally and the present is in no way privileged. I distinguish "ontological" A-theories from "non-ontological" ones, arguing that the latter are experientially unmotivated and barely coherent. With regard to the former, I focus mainly on presentism. After some remarks on how to formulate this (and eternalism) non-trivially, (...)
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  25. Steven D. Hales & Timothy A. Johnson (2007). Time for Change. Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):497-513.
    Metaphysical theories of change incorporate substantive commitments to theories of persistence. The two most prominent classes of such theories are endurantism and perdurantism. Defenders of endurance-style accounts of change, such as Klein, Hinchliff, and Oderberg, do so through appeal to a priori intuitions about change. We argue that this methodology is understandable but mistaken—an adequate metaphysics of change must accommodate all experiences of change, not merely intuitions about a limited variety of cases. Once we examine additional experiences of change, particularly (...)
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  26. Xiaoqiang Han (2009). Speaking of Flux. Acta Analytica 24 (1):33-42.
    The aim of this paper is to explain how the Heraclitean doctrine of universal flux must be rejected, while the notion of flux should and can be preserved. Against the reductionist account of subjectless change, a modern version of the Heraclitean doctrine advocated by revisionist metaphysics, I argue that (1) the idea of subjectless change is one that can and should be formulated in the established conceptual framework, and (2) subjectlessness is a feature that most aptly characterizes material changes. In (...)
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  27. Xiaoqiang Han (2008). Subjetless Change Revisted. E – L O G O S 1211:24.
    This paper seeks to formulate the idea of subjectless change in the established conceptual scheme, which is so often thought to necessarily exclude it. The idea, first espoused by some pre-Socratic thinkers in the form of the universal flux doctrine, was subsequently abandoned due to its alleged logical incoherence. Its reintroduction in contemporary metaphysics is essentially part of a massive revolt against the established conceptual scheme; it serves as a conceptual tool to reinterpret the world and to represent it in (...)
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  28. Tobias Hansson Wahlberg (2009). Objects in Time: Studies of Persistence in B-Time. Dissertation, Lund University
    This thesis is about the conceptualization of persistence of physical, middle-sized objects within the theoretical framework of the revisionary ‘B-theory’ of time. According to the B-theory, time does not flow, but is an extended and inherently directed fourth dimension along which the history of the universe is ‘laid out’ once and for all. It is a widespread view among philosophers that if we accept the B-theory, the commonsensical ‘endurance theory’ of persistence will have to be rejected. The endurance theory says (...)
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  29. Tobias Hansson (2007). The Problem(s) of Change Revisited. Dialectica 61 (2):265–274.
    Two recurrent arguments levelled against the view that enduring objects survive change are examined within the framework of the B-theory of time: the argument from Leibniz's Law and the argument from Instantiation of Incompatible Properties. Both arguments are shown to be question-begging and hence unsuccessful.
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  30. Errol E. Harris (1957). Time and Change. Mind 66 (262):233-241.
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  31. Katherine Hawley (1998). Why Temporary Properties Are Not Relations Between Physical Objects and Times. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):211–216.
    Take this banana. It is now yellow, and when I bought it yesterday it was green. How can a single object be both green all over and yellow all over without contradiction? It is, of course, the passage of time which dissolves the contradiction, but how is this possible? How can a banana ripen? These questions raise the problem of change. The problem is sometimes called the problem of temporary intrinsics, but, as I shall explain below, this emphasis on intrinsic (...)
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  32. Frank Hofmann (2005). Temporally Localised Facts and the Problem of Intrinsic Change. Ratio 18 (1):39–47.
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  33. Thomas Hofweber (2009). The Meta-Problem of Change. Noûs 43 (2):286 - 314.
    The problem of change plays a central role in the metaphysics of time and material objects, and whoever does best in solving this problem has a leg up when it comes to choosing a metaphysics of time and material objects. But whether this central role of the problem of change in metaphysics is legitimate is not at all clear. This is so in part since it is not clear what the problem of change is, and why it is a problem (...)
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  34. Ingvar Johansson (2010). Review: Tobias Hansson Wahlberg, Objects in Time. Studies of Persistence in B-Time (2009). [REVIEW] Metaphysica 11 (1):93-94.
  35. Timothy A. Johnson (2007). Time for Change. Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):497-513.
    Metaphysical theories of change incorporate substantive commitments to theories of persistence. The two most prominent classes of such theories are endurantism and perdurantism. Defenders of endurance-style accounts of change, such as Klein, Hinchliff, and Oderberg, do so through appeal to a priori intuitions about change. We argue that this methodology is understandable but mistaken—an adequate metaphysics of change must accommodate all experiences of change, not merely intuitions about a limited variety of cases. Once we examine additional experiences of change, particularly (...)
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  36. R. H. K. (1970). Time, Change and Contradiction. The Review of Metaphysics 23 (3):569-569.
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  37. Robert Kilwardby (1987). On Time and Imagination =. Published for the British Academy by the Oxford University Press.
    The second volume in this series devoted to the writings of the English Dominican Robert Kilwardby, this work presents the Latin text of two Oxford treatises from the 1250s--one on time, the other on imagination. The treatise on time discusses its reality, connection with change, unity and beginning, the instant and time's relationship to eternity; the one on imagination examines the way imagery is acquired, retained and transmitted, and the relation between heart and head in the workings of common sense.
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  38. Charles J. Klein (1999). Change and Temporal Movement. American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (3):225 - 239.
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  39. Robin Le Poidevin (1991). Change, Cause, and Contradiction: A Defence of the Tenseless Theory of Time. St. Martin's Press.
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  40. Robin Le Poidevin & Murray MacBeath (eds.) (1993). The Philosophy of Time. Oxford University Press.
    This volume provides a balanced set of reviews which introduce the central topics in the philosophy of time. This is the first introductory anthology on the subject to appear for many years; the contributors are distinguished, and two of the essays are specially written for this collection. In their introduction, the editors summarize the background to the debate, and show the relevance of issues in the philosophy of time for other branches of philosophy and for science. Contributors include J.M.E. McTaggart, (...)
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  41. Robin Le Poidevin & D. H. Mellor (1987). Time, Change, and the `Indexical Fallacy'. Mind 96 (384):534-538.
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  42. Joseph A. Leighton (1908). Time, Change, and Time-Transcendence. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 5 (21):561-570.
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  43. David Lewis (2002). Tensing the Copula. Mind 111 (441):1-14.
    A solution to the problem of intrinsic change for enduring things should meet three conditions. It should not replace monadic intrinsic properties by relations. It should not replace the having simpliciter of properties by standing in some relation to them (unless having them simpliciter always means standing in some relation to them, which is refuted by Bradley's regress). It should not rely on an unexplained notion of having an intrinsic property at a time. Johnston's solution satisfies the first condition at (...)
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  44. Greg Littmann (2012). Moments of Change. Acta Analytica 27 (1):29-44.
    There is a strong intuition that for a change to occur, there must be a moment at which the change is taking place. It will be demonstrated that there are no such moments of change, since no state the changing thing could be in at any moment would suffice to make that moment a moment of change. A moment in which the changing thing is simply in the state changed from or the state changed to cannot be the moment of (...)
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  45. Lawrence B. Lombard (2003). The Lowe Road to the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics. Philosophical Studies 112 (2):163 - 185.
    It has been argued that there is a problem oftemporary intrinsics, the problem of explaininghow it is possible for things to possesssuccessively contrary properties, if a certaintheory about time, ``eternalism'', is true. Inthis paper, I consider whether there really issuch a problem and survey some standardsolutions to it. I argue for one of them, onewhich has been offered by Mark Johnston andPeter van Inwagen, and which I call the``exemplification-solution''''. I consider avariant on that solution offered by E.J. Lowe(and Sally Haslanger), (...)
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  46. Lawrence Brian Lombard (1994). The Doctrine of Temporal Parts and the "No-Change" Objection. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):365-372.
    The Doctrine of Temporal Parts (sometimes abbreviated herein as 'DTP') asserts that, for each portion (including infinitely small portions) of the smallest period of time during which a material object exists, there is an object-a temporal part of the material object in question-which exists at that and at no other time. In "Things Change," Mark Heller offers an argument for DTP, and responds to a objection, the "No-Change" objection, to that doctrine.2 My goal in this paper is to undermine both (...)
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  47. J. Macmurray, R. B. Braithwaite & C. D. Broad (1928). Symposium: Time and Change. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 8:143 - 188.
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  48. Ned Markosian (1994). The 3d/4d Controversy and Non-Present Objects. Philosophical Papers 23 (3):243-249.
    Worlds, Lewis says this: Let us say that something persists iff, somehow or other, it exists at various times; this is the neutral word. Something perdures iff it persists by having different temporal parts, or stages, at different times, though no one part of it is wholly present at more than one time; whereas it endures iff it persists by being wholly present at more than one time. Perdurance corresponds to the way a road persists through space; part of it (...)
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  49. Mohan Matthen (2010). Is Memory Preservation? Philosophical Studies 148 (1):3-14.
    Memory seems intuitively to consist in the preservation of some proposition (in the case of semantic memory) or sensory image (in the case of episodic memory). However, this intuition faces fatal difficulties. Semantic memory has to be updated to reflect the passage of time: it is not just preservation. And episodic memory can occur in a format (the observer perspective) in which the remembered image is different from the original sensory image. These difficulties indicate that memory cannot be preserved content. (...)
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  50. Ulrich Meyer (2003). The Metaphysics of Velocity. Philosophical Studies 112 (1):93 - 102.
    Some authors have recently arguedthat an objects velocity is logicallyindependent of its locations throughout time.Their aim is to deny the Russellianview that motion is merely a change oflocation, and to promote a rival account onwhich the connection between velocities andtrajectories is provided by the laws ofnature. I defend the Russellian view of motionagainst these attacks.
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  51. M. Joshua Mozersky (2011). McTaggart's Argument Against the Reality of Time. In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  52. M. Joshua Mozersky (2011). Presentism. In Craig Callender (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Time. Oxford University Press.
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  53. M. Joshua Mozersky (2009-10). Three-Dimensionalism Via an Account of Temporal Predicates. Chronos 11.
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  54. Gregory M. Nixon (2010). Editorial: Time & Experience: Twins of the Eternal Now? Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 1 (5):482-489.
    In what follows, I suggest that, against most theories of time, there really is an actual present, a now, but that such an eternal moment cannot be found before or after time. It may even be semantically incoherent to say that such an eternal present exists since “it” is changeless and formless (presumably a dynamic chaos without location or duration) yet with creative potential. Such a field of near-infinite potential energy could have had no beginning and will have no end, (...)
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  55. L. Nathan Oaklander (1999). Craig on Mctaggart's Paradox and the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics. Analysis 59 (264):314–318.
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  56. L. Nathan Oaklander & Quentin Smith (1995). Time, Change and Freedom. Routledge.
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  57. Ian Phillips (2009). Experience and Time. Dissertation, UCL
    We are no less directly acquainted with the temporal structure of the world than with its spatial structure. We hear one word succeeding another; feel two taps as simultaneous; or see the glow of a firework persisting, before it finally fizzles and fades. However, time is special, for we not only experience temporal properties; experience itself is structured in time. -/- Part One articulates a natural framework for thinking about experience in time. I claim (i) that experience in its experiential (...)
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  58. Robin Le Poidevin & D. H. Mellor (1987). Time, Change, and the 'Indexical Fallacy'. Mind 96 (384):534-538.
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  59. Vernon Pratt (1970). Time for a Change. Analysis 30 (3):111 - 112.
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  60. Vernon Pratt (1968). Time to Stop. Analysis 29 (2):52 - 53.
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  61. Jennifer Radden (1995). Shame and Blame: The Self Through Time and Change. Dialogue 34 (01):61-.
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  62. Michael J. Raven (2011). There is a Problem of Change. Philosophical Studies 155 (1):23-35.
    Impostors are pseudo-problems masquerading as genuine problems. Impostors should be exposed. The problem of change appears genuine. But some, such as Hofweber ( 2009 ) and Rychter ( 2009 ), have recently denounced it as an impostor. They allege that it is mysterious how to answer the meta - problem of saying what problem it is: for even if any problem is genuinely about change per se, they argue, it is either empirical or trivially dissolved by conceptual analysis. There is (...)
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  63. Rupert Read (2003). Against 'Time–Slices'. Philosophical Investigations 26 (1):24–43.
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  64. D. H. Mellor Robin Le Poidevin (1987). Time, Change, and the `Indexical Fallacy'. Mind 96 (384).
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  65. Steven M. Rosen (1975). The Unity of Changelessness and Change: A Visual Geometry of World and Man. Main Currents in Modern Thought 31 (4):115-120.
    This paper examines the interplay of changelessness and change, being and becoming, from an historical and dialectical standpoint. Topological paradox is employed to elucidate the dynamic interweaving of these ontological opposites. The essay concludes by exploring the relevance of the dialectic to question of human freedom.
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  66. Carl Rubino (2002). The Consolations of Uncertainty: Time, Change, and Complexity. Emergence 4 (1):200-206.
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  67. David Sanson, Once Present, Now Past.
    If reality is temporary, then reality changes, and if reality changes, the past has explanatory work to do, and it cannot do that work unless it is no longer real. This tells against the Moving Now Theory, the Growing Block Theory, and any form of Presentism that attempts to understand the past in terms of the present, including Tensed Properties Presentism and Tensed Facts Presentism. It tells in favor of a form Presentism that allows us to appeal to unreal past (...)
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  68. G. Schlesinger (1970). Change and Time. Journal of Philosophy 67 (9):294-300.
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  69. Michael Scott (1995). Time and Change. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (179):213-218.
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  70. Sydney Shoemaker (1969). Time Without Change. Journal of Philosophy 66 (12):363-381.
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  71. Theodore Sider (2000). The Stage View and Temporary Intrinsics. Analysis 60 (1):84–88.
    Four-dimensionalism, as I’ll use the term, is the doctrine that reality is spread out in time as well as space.1 Just as objects that are located at multiple regions of space contain parts confined to those regions of space, so objects that are located at multiple regions of time contain parts — temporal parts — that are confined to those regions of time. (Or better: an object that occupies an extended spatiotemporal region R has parts confined to the various subregions (...)
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  72. Joseph Wayne Smith (1990). Time, Change and Contradiction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (2):178 – 188.
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  73. Quentin Smith (1995). Time, Change, and Freedom: An Introduction to Metaphysics. Routledge.
    Time, Change and Freedom is the first introduction to metaphysics that uses the idea of time as a unifying principle. Time is used to relate the many issues involved in the complex study of metaphysics. Sections of the book are written in dialogue form which allows the reader to question the theories while they read and have those queries answered in the text. In addition, the authors provide glossaries of key terms as well as recommendations for further reading at the (...)
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  74. Frederick J. Teggart (1926). The Humanistic Study of Change in Time. Journal of Philosophy 23 (12):309-315.
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  75. Roger Teichmann (1993). Time and Change. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (171):158-177.
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  76. Tobias Hansson Wahlberg (2010). The Tenseless Copula in Temporal Predication. Erkenntnis 72 (2):267 - 280.
    In this paper I explore how the tenseless copula is to be interpreted in sentences of the form “ a is F at t ”, where “ a ” denotes a persisting, changeable object, “ F ” stands for a prima facie intrinsic property and “ t ” for a B-time. I argue that the interpretation of the copula depends on the logical role assigned to the time clause. Having rejected the idea that the time clause is to be treated (...)
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  77. R. Wasserman (2003). The Argument From Temporary Intrinsics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):413 – 419.
    The problem of temporary intrinsics is the problem of how persisting objects can have different intrinsic properties at different times. The relativizer responds to this problem by replacing ordinary intrinsic properties with relations to times. In this note, I identify and respond to three different objections to the relativizer's proposal, each of which can be traced to the work of David Lewis.
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  78. Ryan Wasserman (2010). Teaching & Learning Guide For: The Problem of Change. Philosophy Compass 5 (3):283-286.
    Our world is a world of change. Children are born and grow into adults. Material possessions rust and decay with age and ultimately perish. Yet scepticism about change is as old as philosophy itself. Heraclitus, for example, argued that nothing could survive the replacement of parts, so that it is impossible to step into the same river twice. Zeno argued that motion is paradoxical, so that nothing can alter its location. Parmenides and his followers went even further, arguing that the (...)
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  79. Ryan Wasserman (2006). The Problem of Change. Philosophy Compass 1 (1):48–57.
    Our world is a world of change. Children are born and grow into adults. Material possessions rust and decay with age and ultimately perish. Yet scepticism about change is as old as philosophy itself. Heraclitus, for example, argued that nothing could survive the replacement of parts, so that it is impossible to step into the same river twice. Zeno argued that motion is paradoxical, so that nothing can alter its location. Parmenides and his followers went even further, arguing that the (...)
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  80. Wayne Waxman (1993). Time and Change in Kant and Mctaggart. Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 16 (1):179-186.
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  81. Brian Weatherson, Growing Individuals and Temporary Intrinsics.
    I argue that ordinary objects are fusions of past and present, but not future, temporal parts. This theory provides the neatest solution to some puzzles concerning intrinsic properties, and is supported by some surprising linguistic data. (This paper is probably inconsistent with some other papers I've written, but the line it runs is at least amusing and original.).
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  82. S. G. Williams (1986). On the Logical Possibility of Time Without Change. Analysis 46 (3):122 - 125.
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  83. Dean W. Zimmerman (1996). Persistence and Presentism. Philosophical Papers 25 (2):115-126.
    The ‘friends of temporal parts’ and their opponents disagree about how things persist through time. The former, who hold what is sometimes called a ‘4D’ theory of persistence, typically claim that all objects that last for any period of time are spread out through time in the same way that spatially extended objects are spread out through space — a different part for each region that the object fills. David Lewis calls this manner of persisting ‘perdurance’. The opposing, ‘3D’ theory (...)
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