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  1. H. A. Abramson (ed.) (1950). Problems of Consciousness: Transactions of the First Conference. Josiah Macy Foundation.
  2. Kathleen Akins (ed.) (1996). Perception. Oxford University Press.
  3. Liliana Albertazzi (1999). The Time of Presentness. A Chapter in Positivistic and Descriptive Psychology. Axiomathes 10 (1-3):49-73.
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  4. D. A. Allport (1968). Phenomenal Similarity and the Perceptual Moment Hypothesis. British Journal of Psychology 59:395-406.
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  5. Holly Andersen (2013). The Representation of Time in Agency. In Adrian Bardon & Heather Dyke (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Philosophy of Time. Wiley-Blackwell.
    This paper outlines some key issues that arise when agency and temporality are considered jointly, from the perspective of psychology, cognitive neuroscience, phenomenology, and action theory. I address the difference between time simpliciter and time as represented as it figures in phenomena like intentional binding, goal-oriented action plans, emulation systems, and ‘temporal agency’. An examination of Husserl’s account of time consciousness highlights difficulties in generalizing his account to include a substantive notion of agency, a weakness inherited by explanatory projects like (...)
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  6. Kathleen M. Arnold, Kathleen B. McDermott & Karl K. Szpunar (2011). Individual Differences in Time Perspective Predict Autonoetic Experience. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):712-719.
    Tulving posited that the capacity to remember is one facet of a more general capacity—autonoetic consciousness. Autonoetic consciousness was proposed to underlie the ability for “mental time travel” both into the past and into the future to envision potential future episodes . The current study examines whether individual differences can predict autonoetic experience. Specifically, the Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory was administered to 133 undergraduate students, who also rated phenomenological experiences accompanying autobiographical remembering and episodic future thinking. Scores on two of (...)
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  7. Yochai Ataria & Yuval Neria (2013). Consciousness-Body-Time: How Do People Think Lacking Their Body? [REVIEW] Human Studies 36 (2):159-178.
    War captivity is an extreme traumatic experience typically involving exposure to repeated stressors, including torture, isolation, and humiliation. Captives are flung from their previous known world into an unfamiliar reality in which their state of consciousness may undergo significant change. In the present study extensive interviews were conducted with fifteen Israeli former prisoners of war who fell captive during the 1973 Yom Kippur war with the goal of examining the architecture of human thought in subjects lacking a sense of body (...)
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  8. Harald Atmanspacher, The Significance of Causally Coupled, Stable Neuronal Assemblies for the Psychological Time Arrow.
    Stable neuronal assemblies are generally regarded as neural correlates of mental representations. Their temporal sequence corresponds to the experience of a direction of time, sometimes called the psychological time arrow. We show that the stability of particular, biophysically motivated models of neuronal assemblies, called coupled map lattices, is supported by causal interactions among neurons and obstructed by non-causal or anti-causal interactions among neurons. This surprising relation between causality and stability suggests that those neuronal assemblies that are stable due to causal (...)
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  9. R. Banks & D. Cappon (1962). Effect of Reduced Sensory Input on Time Perception. Perceptual and Motor Skills 14.
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  10. Henri Bergson (1971). Time and Free Will. New York,Humanities Press.
  11. Richard A. Block (1996). Psychological Time and Memory Systems of the Brain. In J. T. Fraser & M. Soulsby (eds.), Dimensions of Time and Life: The Study of Time. , Volume 8.
  12. Richard A. Block (ed.) (1990). Cognitive Models of Psychological Time. Lawrence Erlbaum.
    Models of psychological time / Richard A. Block -- Implicit and explicit representations of time / John A. Michon -- The evasive art of subjective time...
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  13. Richard A. Block (1979). Time and Consciousness. In G. Underwood & R. Stevens (eds.), Aspects of Consciousness, Volume 1. Academic Press.
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  14. Amanda R. Bolbecker, Zixi Cheng, Gary Felsten, King-Leung Kong, Corrinne C. M. Lim, Sheryl J. Nisly-Nagele, Lolin T. Wang-Bennett & Gerald S. Wasserman (2002). Two Asymmetries Governing Neural and Mental Timing. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):265-272.
    Mental timing studies may be influenced by powerful cognitive illusions that can produce an asymmetry in their rate of progress relative to neuronal timing studies. Both types of timing research are also governed by a temporal asymmetry, expressed by the fact that the direction of causation must follow time's arrow. Here we refresh our earlier suggestion that the temporal asymmetry offers promise as a means of timing mental activities. We update our earlier analysis of Libet's data within this framework. Then (...)
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  15. Bruno G. Breitmeyer (2002). In Support of Pockett's Critique of Libet's Studies of the Time Course of Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):280-283.
    Susan Pockett presents sound arguments supporting her reinterpretations of data that Libet and co-workers used to support a number of intriguing and influential conclusions regarding the microgenesis and timing of conscious sensory experience and volitionally controlled motor responses. The following analysis, extending and elaborating some of her main arguments, proposes that Libet's experimental methodologies and rationales, and thus also his interpretation of data, are flawed and that neglect or ignorance of methodological and empirical constraints well known to sensory psychologists risks (...)
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  16. Jason W. Brown (1991). Self and Process: Brain States and the Conscious Present. Springer-Verlag.
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  17. Jason W. Brown (1990). Psychology of Time Awareness. Brain and Cognition 14:144-64.
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  18. John Campbell, Ordinary Thinking About Time.
    I will describe two non-standard ways of thinking about time. The first is ubiquitous in animal cognition. I will call it ‘phase time’. Suppose for example you consider a hibernating animal. This animal might have representation of the various seasons of the year, and modulate its actions dependent on the season. But it need have no distinction between the winter of one year and the winter of another; it thinks of time only in terms of repeatable phases.
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  19. Jonathan Cohen (1954). The Experience of Time. Acta Psychologica 10:207-19.
  20. Time Consciousness (1992). Husserlian Foundations of Sartre's Treatment of Time Consciousness. In D. P. Chattopadhyaya, Lester E. Embree & Jitendranath Mohanty (eds.), Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy. Indian Council of Philosophical Research in Association with Motilal Banarsidass Publishers. 126.
  21. Barry F. Dainton (2003). Time in Experience: Reply to Gallagher. Psyche 9 (12).
    Consciousness exists in time, but time is also to be found within consciousness: we are directly aware of both persistence and change, at least over short intervals. On reflection this can seem baffling. How is it possible for us to be immediately aware of phenomena which are not (strictly speaking) present? What must consciousness be like for this to be possible? In "Stream of Consciousness" I argued that influential accounts of phenomenal temporality along the lines developed by Broad and Husserl (...)
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  22. John F. DeCarlo (2010). The Poisoning of Hamlet's Temporal Subjectivity. Journal of Philosophy: A Cross-Disciplinary Inquiry 5 (12):30-40.
    The paper addresses the question: why and how does Hamlet lose track of time in the Prayer-Closet scene sequence? While Deleuze aptly notes the poetic formula “the time is out of joint” is indicative of time no longer being subordinate to cyclical rhythms of nature, or as Polonius asserts: “Time is time”(II.ii.88), but rather movement being subordinated to time, it is argued that the HAMLET text goes further in its pre-figuration of Kant’s concept that time is a mysteriously autonomous form. (...)
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  23. Frank H. Durgin & Saul Sternberg (2002). The Time of Consciousness and Vice Versa. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):284-290.
    The temporal granularity of consciousness may be far less fine than the real-time information processing mechanisms that underlie our sensitivity to small temporal differences. It is suggested that conscious time perception, like space perception, is subject to errors that belie a unitary underlying representation. E. R. Clay's concept of the “specious present,” an extended moment represented in consciousness, is suggested as an alternative to the more common notion of instantaneous experience that underlies much reasoning based on the “time of arrival” (...)
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  24. Heather Dyke (2002). Mc Taggart and the Truth About Time. In Craig Callender (ed.), Time, Reality and Experience. Cambridge University Press. 137-.
    McTaggart famously argued that time is unreal. Today, almost no one agrees with his conclusion. But his argument remains the locus classicus for both the A-theory and the B-theory of time. I show how McTaggart’s argument provided the impetus for both of these opposing views of the nature of time. I also present and defend what I take to be the correct view of the nature of time.
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  25. Robert Efron (1970). The Measurement of Perceptual Durations. Studium Generale 23:550-561.
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  26. Ronald N. Ehrman, Charles P. O'Brien & J. W. Ternes (1983). Apes: A Digital-Circuit Simulation Program for Real-Time Control of Behavioral and Physiological Data Collection. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 21 (6):473-475.
  27. H. Eisler (1975). Subjective Duration and Psychophysics. Psychological Review 82:429-50.
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  28. Andreas K. Engel (2003). Time and Conscious Visual Processing. In Hede Helfrich (ed.), Time and Mind II: Information Processing Perspectives. Hogrefe & Huber Publishers. 141-159.
  29. Vyvyan Evans (2004). The Structure of Time: Language, Meaning and Temporal Cognition. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
    Drawing on findings in psychology, neuroscience, and utilising the perspective of cognitive linguistics, this work argues that our experience of time may...
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  30. Andrew A. Fingelkurts & Alexander A. Fingelkurts (2014). Present Moment, Past, and Future: Mental Kaleidoscope. Frontiers Psychology 5:395.
    It is the every person's daily phenomenal experience that conscious states represent their contents as occurring now. Following Droege (2009) we could state that consciousness has a peculiar affinity for presence. Some researchers even argue that conscious awareness necessarily demands that mental content is somehow held “frozen” within a discrete progressive present moment. Thus, phenomenal content seems to be minimally conscious if it is integrated into a single and coherent model of reality during a “virtual window” of presence.
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  31. J. T. Fraser (ed.) (1989). Time and Mind: Interdisciplinary Issues. International Universities Press.
  32. J. T. Fraser, F. Haber & G. Muller (eds.) (1972). The Study of Time. Springer-Verlag.
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  33. J. T. Fraser & Nathaniel M. Lawrence (eds.) (1975). The Study of Time II. Springer-Verlag.
  34. J. T. Fraser & M. Soulsby (eds.) (1996). Dimensions of Time and Life: The Study of Time. , Volume 8.
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  35. William J. Friedman (1990). About Time: Inventing the Fourth Dimension. Cambridge: MIT Press.
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  36. Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.) (1995). The Cognitive Neurosciences. MIT Press.
  37. Don Gifford (2011). Zones of Re-Membering: Time, Memory, and (Un)Consciousness. Rodopi.
    For Gifford, the profoundest explorer of the human consciousness, time, and memory is James Joyce and in its range of reference, wit, and humanity the spirit of ...
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  38. Joseph Glicksohn (2001). Temporal Cognition and the Phenomenology of Time: A Multiplicative Function for Apparent Duration. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):1-25.
    The literature on time perception is discussed. This is done with reference both to the ''cognitive-timer'' model for time estimation and to the subjective experience of apparent duration. Three assumptions underlying the model are scrutinized. I stress the strong interplay among attention, arousal, and time perception, which is at the base of the cognitive-timer model. It is suggested that a multiplicative function of two key components (the number of subjective time units and their size) should predict apparent duration. Implications for (...)
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  39. Gilberto Gomes (2002). On Experimental and Philosophical Investigations of Mental Timing: A Response to Commentary. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):304-307.
    Reinterpretations of Libet's results have received support from most commentaries. Libet's arguments against alternative hypotheses are contested. Latency depends on intensity. Integration of intensity and duration explains the Minimum Train Duration. Analogies of Libet's timing of intentions with control experiments indicate biases of opposite signs, according to intramodal or intermodal results. Rosenthal's view of nonconscious intentions becoming conscious after a delay is favored. Compatibilist free will is discussed.
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  40. Gilberto Gomes (2002). Problems in the Timing of Conscious Experience. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):191-97.
    Libet's arguments in defense of his interpretation of his experimental results are insufficient. The claims of my critical review do not suffer with his new statements.
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  41. Gilberto Gomes (2002). The Interpretation of Libet's Results on the Timing of Conscious Events: A Commentary. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):221-230.
    A commentary on articles by Klein, Pockett, and Trevena and Miller, in this issue, is given. Average shift in the point of subjective equality , calculated by Klein on Libet's data, and corresponding change in mean shift, calculated by Libet et al. , may be “corrected,” taking as a reference point the end of the minimum train duration. Values obtained, if significant, indicate a latency for conscious sensation of the skin stimulus of at least 230 ms. Pockett's main conclusions are (...)
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  42. W. Gooddy (1967). Introduction to Problems of Time Awareness. Studium Generale 20:33-41.
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  43. Marc Grosjean, David A. Rosenbaum & Catherine Elsinger (2001). Timing and Reaction Time. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 130 (2):256.
  44. Patrick Haggard & S. Clark (2003). Intentional Action: Conscious Experience and Neural Prediction. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):695-707.
    Intentional action involves both a series of neural events in the motor areas of the brain, and also a distinctive conscious experience that ''I'' am the author of the action. This paper investigates some possible ways in which these neural and phenomenal events may be related. Recent models of motor prediction are relevant to the conscious experience of action as well as to its neural control. Such models depend critically on matching the actual consequences of a movement against its internally (...)
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  45. Stuart R. Hameroff (2003). Time, Consciousness, and Quantum Events in Fundamental Space-Time Geometry. In R. Buccheri (ed.), The Nature of Time: Geometry, Physics and Perception. 77-89.
    1. Introduction: The problems of time and consciousness What is time? St. Augustine remarked that when no one asked him, he knew what time was; however when someone asked him, he did not. Is time a process which flows? Is time a dimension in which processes occur? Does time actually exist? The notion that time is a process which "flows" directionally may be illusory (the "myth of passage") for if time did flow it would do so in some medium or (...)
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  46. R. E. Hicks, George W. Miller, G. Gaes & K. Bierman (1977). Concurrent Processing Demands and the Experience of Time-in-Passing. American Journal of Psychology 90:431-46.
  47. Hudson Hoagland (1950). Consciousness and the Chemistry of Time. In H. A. Abramson (ed.), Problems of Consciousness: Transactions of the First Conference. Josiah Macy Foundation.
  48. Hudson Hoagland (1943). The Chemistry of Time. Scientific Monthly 56 (3):56-61.
  49. Christoph Hoerl (2012). Seeing Motion and Apparent Motion. European Journal of Philosophy (2):n/a-n/a.
    In apparent motion experiments, participants are presented with what is in fact a succession of two brief stationary stimuli at two different locations, but they report an impression of movement. Philosophers have recently debated whether apparent motion provides evidence in favour of a particular account of the nature of temporal experience. I argue that the existing discussion in this area is premised on a mistaken view of the phenomenology of apparent motion and, as a result, the space of possible philosophical (...)
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  50. Christoph Hoerl (2009). Time and Tense in Perceptual Experience. Philosophers' Imprint 9 (12):1-18.
    We can not just see, hear or feel how things are at a time, but we also have perceptual experiences as of things moving or changing. I argue that such temporal experiences have a content that is tenseless, i.e. best characterized in terms of notions such as 'before' and 'after' (rather than, say, 'past', 'present' and 'future'), and that such experiences are essentially of the nature of a process that takes up time, viz., the same time as the process that (...)
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