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  1. Bill Brewer (1998). Levels of Explanation and the Individuation of Events: A Difficulty for the Token Identity Theory. Acta Analytica 20 (20):7-24.
    We make how a person acts intelligible by revealing it as rational in the light of what she perceives, thinks, wants and so on. For example, we might explain that she reached out and picked up a glass because she was thirsty and saw that it contained water. In doing this, we are giving a causal explanation of her behaviour in terms of her antecedent beliefs, desires and other attitudes. Her wanting a drink and realizing that the glass contained one (...)
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  2. Neil Campbell (1999). Putnam on the Token-Identity Theory. Philosophia 27 (3-4):567-574.
    Putnam raises two objections against the token-identity theory in his _Dewey Lectures. (1) Token-physicalism invokes a mysterious or _sui generis concept of identity between mental and physical event tokens; (2) The theory suffers from explanatory failure because it cannot individuate mental events using physical criteria. I argue that the first claim is false, since Davidson adopts the same criterion of identity Quine employs for ordinary objects which invokes a concept of identity we understand clearly enough. I then show that Putnam's (...)
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  3. Leonard S. Carrier (1981). Event Identity and a Significant Physicalism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):171-180.
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  4. Nancy D. Cartwright (1979). Do Token-Token Identity Theories Show Why We Don't Need Reductionism? Philosophical Studies 36 (July):85-90.
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  5. John A. Foster (1994). The Token-Identity Thesis. In Richard Warner & Tadeusz Szubka (eds.), The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Blackwell.
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  6. John Haugeland (1982). Weak Supervenience. American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (January):93-103.
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  7. Terence E. Horgan & Michael Tye (1985). Against the Token Identity Theory. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Ernest LePore (eds.), Action and Events. Blackwell.
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  8. Jennifer Hornsby (1981). Which Physical Events Are Mental Events? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 55:73-92.
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  9. Muhammad Ali Khalidi (2005). Against Functional Reductionism in Cognitive Science. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19 (3):319 – 333.
    Functional reductionism concerning mental properties has recently been advocated by Jaegwon Kim in order to solve the problem of the 'causal exclusion' of the mental. Adopting a reductionist strategy first proposed by David Lewis, he regards psychological properties as being 'higher-order' properties functionally defined over 'lower-order' properties, which are causally efficacious. Though functional reductionism is compatible with the multiple realizability of psychological properties, it is blocked if psychological properties are subdivided or crosscut by neurophysiological properties. I argue that there is (...)
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  10. Steven Orla Kimbrough (1979). On the Reduction of Genetics to Molecular Biology. Philosophy of Science 46 (3):389-406.
    The applicability of Nagel's concept of theory reduction, and related concepts of reduction, to the reduction of genetics to molecular biology is examined using the lactose operon in Escherichia coli as an example. Geneticists have produced the complete nucleotide sequence of two of the genes which compose this operon. If any example of reduction in genetics should fit Nagel's analysis, the lactose operon should. Nevertheless, Nagel's formal conditions of theory reduction are inapplicable in this case. Instead, it is argued that (...)
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  11. Noa Latham (2003). What is Token Physicalism? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (3):270-290.
    The distinction between token and type physicalism is a familiar feature of discussion of psychophysical relations. Token physicalism, or ontological physicalism, is the view that every token, or particular, in the spatiotemporal world is a physical particular. It is contrasted with type physicalism, or property physicalism -- the view that every first-order type, or property, instantiated in the spatiotemporal world is a physical property. Token physicalism is commonly viewed as a clear thesis, strictly weaker than property physicalism, strictly stronger than (...)
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  12. Drew Leder (1985). Troubles with Token Identity. Philosophical Studies 47 (January):79-94.
    The thesis of "token identity" or "token physicalism" advanced by fodor and others attempts to reconcile materialism with a non-Reductionist view of the special sciences. However, I argue that since the individual events or "tokens" of any science are only designated according to its general types, The former cannot be specified physicalistically while the latter are not. Though attempting to combat a positivistic view of the sciences, Fodor's thesis rests on a positivistic opposition of token and type.
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  13. E. J. Lowe (1981). Against an Argument for Token Identity. Mind 90 (January):120-121.
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  14. Yuval Lurie (1978). Correlating Brain States with Psychological Phenomena. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 56 (2):135-44.
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  15. Cynthia Macdonald (1985). Mind-Body Identity and the Subjects of Events. Philosophical Studies 48 (July):73-82.
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  16. Eric Marcus (2009). Why There Are No Token States. Journal of Philosophical Research 34:215-241.
    The thesis that mental states are physical states enjoys widespread popularity. After the abandonment of typeidentity theories, however, this thesis has typically been framed in terms of state tokens. I argue that token states are a philosopher’s fiction, and that debates about the identity of mental and physical state tokens thus rest on a mistake.
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  17. Brian P. McLaughlin & Ernest LePore (eds.) (1985). Actions and Events. Blackwell.
  18. Andrew Melnyk (2002). Physicalism. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. 573-587.
    Written with a student audience in mind, this article surveys the issues raises by the attempt to formulate, argue for, and explore the implications of a comprehensively physicalist view of the world.
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  19. Douglas Odegard (1971). The Sense of Mental Events-Corporeal Events. Synthese 22 (May):360-368.
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  20. Christopher Peacocke (1979). Argument for Token Identity. In , Holistic Explanation: Action, Space, Interpretation. Oxford University Press.
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  21. A. Reigler & Markus F. Peschl (eds.) (1999). Understanding Representation. Plenum Press.
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  22. Naomi Scheman (1996). Reply to Louise Antony. Hypatia 11 (3):150 - 153.
    In her discussion of Naomi Scheman's "Individualism and the Objects of Psychology" Louise Antony misses the import of an unpublished paper of Scheman's that she cites. That paper argues against token identity theories on the grounds that only the sort of psycho-physical parallelisms that token identity theorists, such as Davidson and Fodor, reject could license the claim that each mental state or event is some particular physical state or event.
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  23. Hans Bernhard Schmid (2005). Wir-Identität: Reflexiv Und Vorreflexiv. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 53 (3).
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  24. Peter K. Smith (1983). On Identifying the Mental with the Physical. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13 (June):227-238.
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  25. Justin Tiehen (2012). Psychophysical Reductionism Without Type Identities. American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (3):223-236.
    Nonreductive physicalists have a causal exclusion problem. Given certain theses all physicalists accept, including psychophysical supervenience and the causal closure of the physical realm, it is difficult to see how irreducible mental phenomena could make a causal difference to the world. The upshot, according to those who push the problem, is that we must embrace reductive physicalism. Only then is mental causation saved. -/- Grant the argument, at least provisionally. Here our focus is the conditional question: What form should one's (...)
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