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Token Identity

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  • Bill Brewer (1998). Levels of Explanation and the Individuation of Events: A Difficulty for the Token Identity Theory. Acta Analytica 20 (20):7-24.
    We make how a person acts intelligible by revealing it as rational in the light of what she perceives, thinks, wants and so on. For example, we might explain that she reached out and picked up a glass because she was thirsty and saw that it contained water. In doing this, we are giving a causal explanation of her behaviour in terms of her antecedent beliefs, desires and other attitudes. Her wanting a drink and realizing that the glass contained one (...)
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  • Neil Campbell (1999). Putnam on the Token-Identity Theory. Philosophia 27 (3-4):567-574.
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  • Nancy D. Cartwright (1979). Do Token-Token Identity Theories Show Why We Don't Need Reductionism? Philosophical Studies 36 (July):85-90.
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  • Daniel D. Hutto (1999). Cognition Without Representation? In A. Reigler & Markus F. Peschl (eds.), Understanding Representation. Plenum Press.
    ionality which is processed by non-systematic connectionist networks and has its correctness conditions provided by a modest biose- mantics; but this type of content is not properly rep- resentational. Finally, I consider the consequences that such a verdict has on eliminativist views that look to connectionism as a means of radically re- conceiving our understanding of cognition.
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  • Noa Latham (2003). What is Token Physicalism? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (3):270-290.
    The distinction between token and type physicalism is a familiar feature of discussion of psychophysical relations. Token physicalism, or ontological physicalism, is the view that every token, or particular, in the spatiotemporal world is a physical particular. It is contrasted with type physicalism, or property physicalism -- the view that every first-order type, or property, instantiated in the spatiotemporal world is a physical property. Token physicalism is commonly viewed as a clear thesis, strictly weaker than property physicalism, strictly stronger than (...)
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  • Drew Leder (1985). Troubles with Token Identity. Philosophical Studies 47 (January):79-94.
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  • E. J. Lowe (1981). Against an Argument for Token Identity. Mind 90 (January):120-121.
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  • Yuval Lurie (1978). Correlating Brain States with Psychological Phenomena. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 56 (2):135-44.
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  • Cynthia Macdonald (1985). Mind-Body Identity and the Subjects of Events. Philosophical Studies 48 (July):73-82.
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  • Eric Marcus, Why There Are No Token States.
    Physicalism constrains philosophical thought in general, perhaps most powerfully when such thought is turned to the nature of the mind. The thought that everything mental must also be physical has been a demanding muse for most philosophers of mind, requiring the construction of ever more elaborate theories to surmount the formidable obstacles lying in the way of its substantiation. The core of any such theory is that something is both mental and physical. But which something? Objects, properties, events, states, processes, (...)
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  • Douglas Odegard (1971). The Sense of Mental Events-Corporeal Events. Synthese 22 (May):360-368.
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