This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Subcategories:
144 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 144
Material to categorize
  1. David Alm (2008). Consequentialism and the Autonomy of the Deontic. Utilitas 20 (2):199-216.
    I distinguish between two forms of consequentialism: reductionist and anti-reductionist. Reductionist consequentialism holds that the deontic properties of rightness and wrongness are identical with the axiological properties of optimality and suboptimality, respectively. Anti-reductionist consequentialism denies this identification, hence accepting what I call the autonomy of the deontic. In this article I ignore reductionist consequentialism. Instead I argue that anti-reductionist consequentialism is deeply problematic or even incoherent. Simply put, the main point is that the criterion of rightness of any ethical theory (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Linda F. Annis (1986). Merit Pay, Utilitarianism, and Desert. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 3 (1):33-41.
  3. Gustaf Arrhenius (2003). Feldman's Desert-Adjusted Utilitarianism and Population Ethics. Utilitas 15 (02):225-.
    Fred Feldman has proposed a desert-adjusted version of utilitarianism, , as a plausible population axiology. Among other things, he claims that justicism avoids Derek Parfit's . This paper explains the theory and tries to straighten out some of its ambiguities. Moreover, it is shown that it is not clear whether justicism avoids the repugnant conclusion and that it is has other counter-intuitive implications. It is concluded that justicism is not convincing as a population axiology.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Yitzhak Benbaji (2005). The Doctrine of Sufficiency: A Defence. Utilitas 17 (3):310-332.
    This article proposes an analysis of the doctrine of sufficiency. According to my reading, the doctrine's basic positive claim is ‘prioritarian’: benefiting x is of special moral importance where (and only where) x is badly off. Its negative claim is anti-egalitarian: most comparative facts expressed by statements of the type ‘x is worse off than y’ have no moral significance at all. This contradicts the ‘classical’ priority view according to which, although equality per se does not matter, whenever x is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Selim Berker (2013). The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism. Philosophical Issues 23 (1):363-387.
    A quasi-sequel to "Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions." Covers some of the same ground, but also extends the basic argument in an important way.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Brian Berkey (2012). Review of Gary E. Varner, Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition: Situating Animals in Hare's Two-Level Utilitarianism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Greg Bognar (2012). Empirical and Armchair Ethics. Utilitas 24 (04):467-482.
    In a recent paper, Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve present a novel argument against prioritarianism. The argument takes its starting point from empirical surveys on people's preferences in health care resource allocation problems. In this article, I first question whether the empirical findings support their argument, and then I make some general points about the use of ‘empirical ethics’ in ethical theory.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Nick Bostrom (2009). Astronomical Waste: The Opportunity Cost of Delayed Technological Development. Utilitas 15 (03):308-.
    With very advanced technology, a very large population of people living happy lives could be sustained in the accessible region of the universe. For every year that development of such technologies and colonization of the universe is delayed, there is therefore an opportunity cost: a potential good, lives worth living, is not being realized. Given some plausible assumptions, this cost is extremely large. However, the lesson for utilitarians is not that we ought to maximize the pace of technological development, but (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Hugh Breakey (2009). The Epistemic and Informational Requirements of Utilitarianism. Utilitas 21 (1):72-99.
    A recurring objection confronting utilitarianism is that its dictates require information that lies beyond the bounds of human epistemic wherewithal. Utilitarians require reliable knowledge of the social consequences of various policies, and of people’s preferences and utilities. Agreeing partway with the sceptics, I concur that the general rules-of-thumb offered by social science do not provide sufficient justification for the utilitarian legislator to rationally recommend a particular political regime, such as liberalism. Actual data about human preference-structures and utilities is required to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. John Brunero (2010). Consequentialism and the Wrong Kind of Reasons: A Reply to Lang. Utilitas 22 (3):351-359.
    In his article , Gerald Lang formulates the buck-passing account of value so as to resolve the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem. I argue against his formulation of buck-passing. Specifically, I argue that his formulation of buck-passing is not compatible with consequentialism (whether direct or indirect), and so it should be rejected.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Joanna M. Burch-Brown (2014). Clues for Consequentialists. Utilitas 26 (1):105-119.
    In an influential paper, James Lenman argues that consequentialism can provide no basis for ethical guidance, because we are irredeemably ignorant of most of the consequences of our actions. If our ignorance of distant consequences is great, he says, we can have little reason to recommend one action over another on consequentialist grounds. In this article, I show that for reasons to do with statistical theory, the cluelessness objection is too pessimistic. We have good reason to believe that certain patterns (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Joanna M. Burch-Brown (2014). Martin Peterson, The Dimensions of Consequentialism: Ethics, Equality and Risk (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), Pp. Vii + 217. [REVIEW] Utilitas 26 (2):223-226.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Krister Bykvist (2003). Normative Supervenience and Consequentialism. Utilitas 15 (01):27-.
    Act-consequentialism is usually taken to be the view that we ought to perform the act that will have the best consequences. But this definition ignores the possibility of various non-maximizing forms of act-consequentialism, e.g. satisficing theories that tell us to perform the act whose consequences will be good enough. What seems crucial to act-consequentialism is not that we ought to maximize value but that the normative status of alternative actions depends solely on the values of their outcomes. The purpose of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Michael Byron (2002). Consequentialist Friendship and Quasi-Instrumental Goods. Utilitas 14 (02):249-.
    Recent literature defends consequentialism against the charge that consequentialists cannot be friends. This paper argues in rebuttal that consequentialists value friends for the wrong reasons. Even if they are motivated by love and affection, consequentialists must act as if they valued their friends as merely instrumental goods, a mode of valuing I call . I conclude by suggesting the root cause of the problem of intrinsic value for consequentialism.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Todd Calder (2007). Against Consequentialist Theories of Virtue and Vice. Utilitas 19 (2):201-219.
    Consequentialist theories of virtue and vice, such as the theories of Jeremy Bentham and Julia Driver, characterize virtue and vice in terms of the consequential, or instrumental, properties of these character traits. There are two problems with theories of this sort. First they imply that, under the right circumstances, paradigmatic virtues, such as benevolence, are vices and paradigmatic vices, such as maliciousness, are virtues. This is conceptually problematic. Second, they say nothing about the intrinsic nature of the virtues and vices, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Erik Carlson (1997). Consequentialism, Distribution and Desert. Utilitas 9 (03):307-.
    This paper criticizes the consequentialist theory recently put forward by Fred Feldman. I argue that this theory violates two crucial requirements. Another theory, proposed by Peter Vallentyne, is similarly flawed. Feldman's basic ideas could, however, be developed into a more plausible theory. I suggest one possible way of doing this.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Miguel Catalán-González (2004). Utilitarianism and Moral Valuation of Lying. Philosophical Inquiry 26 (3):33-39.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Richard Yetter Chappell (2014). The Limits of Kindness. By Caspar Hare. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 201403.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Tim Chappell (1992). Consequentialism and Abortion. Philosophy Now 4:17-18.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Dale L. Clark (2009). Aesop's Fox: Consequentialist Virtue Meets Egocentric Bias. Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):727 – 737.
    In her book Uneasy Virtue, Julia Driver presents an account of motive or trait utilitarianism, one that has been taken as “the most detailed and thoroughly defended recent formulation” of consequential virtue ethics. On Driver's account character traits are morally virtuous if and only if they generally lead to good consequences for society. Various commentators have taken Driver to task over this account of virtue, which she terms “pure evaluational externalism.” They object that, on Driver's account of virtue, it could (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Dennis R. Cooley (2000). Readjusting Utility for Justice. Journal of Philosophical Research 25:363-380.
    Despite the best efforts of utilitarians, justice remains a serious problem for consequentialism. Many counterexamples have been described which show that an agent may be obligated to do a gross injustice, according to hedonic utilitarianism, just because it maximizes utility. Fred Feldman attempts to avoid this result by adjusting utility for justice.In this paper, I examine Feldman’s axiology and his normative theory of world utilitarianism, and show that, ultimately, he is not successful in his endeavor. Though Feldman’s theories may not (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Garrett Cullity, Brad Hooker & Tim Mulgan (2011). Intuitions and the Demands of Consequentialism. Utilitas 23 (1).
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. J. Dancy (ed.) (1997). Reading Parfit. Blackwell.
  24. Jonathan Dancy (2000). Mill's Puzzling Footnote. Utilitas 12 (02):219-.
    This paper discusses various possible interpretations of a complex footnote in Mill's Utilitarianism.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Jonathan Dancy (1998). Wiggins and Ross. Utilitas 10 (3):281-285.
    Ross's attempt to undermine the consequentialist understanding of the relation between duties and outcomes might give him greater defence against the danger that outcome-related duties will come to constitute a norm, to the disadvantage of all others.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Stephen Darwall (1998). Under Moore's Spell. Utilitas 10 (03):286-.
    As David Wiggins points out, although Ross is best known for opposing Moore's consequentialism, Ross comes very close to capitulation to Moore when he accepts, as required by beneficence, a prima facie duty to maximize the good. I argue that what lies behind this is Ross's acceptance of Moore's doctrine of agent-neutral intrinsic value, a notion that is not required by, but is indeed is in tension with, beneficence as doing good to or for others.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Richard Davis, The Ins and Outs of Virtue and Vice.
    According to the nineteenth century English philosopher John Stuart Mill, all human beings desire to live lives pregnant with happiness; we all long to be the recipients of liberal amounts of varied, high quality pleasures with pain making as brief an appearance in our conscious experience as possible. Happiness is the one and only thing we desire for its own sake; everything else is desirable simply as a means to securing happiness. Perhaps this is so. Mill, however, went on to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Helena de Bres (2011). What's Special About the State? Utilitas 23 (2):140-160.
    any of us think that we have duties of distributive justice towards our fellow citizens that we do not have towards foreigners. Is that thought justified? This paper considers the nature of the state's relationship to distributive justice from the perspective of utilitarianism, a theory that is barely represented in contemporary philosophical debates on this question. My strategy is to mount a utilitarian case for state-specific duties of distributive justice that is similar in its basic structure to the one that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Julia Driver (2005). Consequentialism and Feminist Ethics. Hypatia 20 (4):183-199.
    : This essay attempts to show that sophisticated consequentialism is able to accommodate the concerns that have traditionally been raised by feminist writers in ethics. Those concerns have primarily to do with the fact that consequentialism is seen as both too demanding of the individual and neglectful of the agent's special obligations to family and friends. Here, I argue that instrumental justification for partiality can be provided, for example, even though an attitude of partiality is not characterized itself in instrumental (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Julia Driver (2004). Response to My Critics. Utilitas 16 (1):33-41.
    This essay is a rejoinder to comments on Uneasy Virtue made by Onora O'Neill, John Skorupski, and Michael Slote in this issue. In Uneasy Virtue I presented criticisms of traditional virtue theory. I also presented an alternative – a consequentialist account of virtue, one which is a form of ‘pure evaluational externalism’. This type of theory holds that the moral quality of character traits is determined by factors external to agency (e.g. consequences). All three commentators took exception to this account. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Julia Driver (2001). Introduction. Utilitas 13 (02):137-.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Lisa A. Eckenwiler (2001). Dale Jamieson (Ed.), Singer and His Critics, Oxford, Blackwell, 1999, Pp. V + 368. Utilitas 13 (03):376-.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Ben Eggleston (2003). Does Participation Matter? An Inconsistency in Parfit's Moral Mathematics. Utilitas 15 (01):92-.
    Consequentialists typically think that the moral quality of one's conduct depends on the difference one makes. But consequentialists may also think that even if one is not making a difference, the moral quality of one's conduct can still be affected by whether one is participating (even if only ineffectually, or redundantly) in an endeavour that does make a difference. Derek Parfit discusses this issue participation in the chapter of Reasons and Persons that he devotes to what he calls . In (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Fred Feldman (1995). Justice, Desert, and the Repugnant Conclusion. Utilitas 7 (02):189-.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. John Finnis (1990). Incoherence and Consequentialism (or Proportionalism). American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 64 (2):271-277.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. P. Forrest (1990). The Compatibility of Consequentialism with Deontological Convictions. Philosophical Inquiry 12 (1-2):22-31.
  37. Christopher Freiman (2012). Why Poverty Matters Most: Towards a Humanitarian Theory of Social Justice. Utilitas 24 (01):26-40.
    Sufficientarians claim that what matters most is that people have enough. I develop and defend a revised sufficientarian conception of justice. I claim that it furnishes the best specification of a general humanitarian ideal of social justice: our main moral concern should be helping those who are badly off in absolute terms. Rival humanitarian views such as egalitarianism, prioritarianism and the difference principle face serious objections from which sufficientarianism is exempt. Moreover, a revised conception of sufficientarianism can meet the most (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Alan H. Goldman (2008). Michael Byron (Ed.), Satisficing and Maximizing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), Pp. 244. Utilitas 20 (2):254-256.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Charles Goodman (2008). Consequentialism, Agent-Neutrality, and Mahāyāna Ethics. Philosophy East and West 58 (1):17-35.
    : What kinds of comparisons can legitimately be made between Mahāyāna Buddhism and Western ethical theories? Mahāyānists aspire to alleviate the suffering, promote the happiness, and advance the moral perfection of all sentient beings. This aspiration is best understood as expressing a form of universalist consequentialism. Many Indian Mahāyāna texts seem committed to claims about agent-neutrality that imply consequentialism and are not compatible with virtue ethics. Within the Mahāyāna tradition, there is some diversity of views: Asaṅga seems to hold a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. James Griffin (1994). The Distinction Between Criterion and Decision Procedure: A Reply to Madison Powers. Utilitas 6 (02):177-.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Germain Grisez (1977). Choice and Consequentialism. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 51:144-152.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Marco E. L. Guidi (2004). Mariangela Ripoli, Itinerari Della Felicità: La Filosofia Giuspolitica di Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, John Stuart Mill (Turin: Giappichelli, 2001), Pp. 346. Utilitas 16 (3):341-343.
  43. R. M. Hare (1993). Could Kant Have Been A Utilitarian? Utilitas 5 (01):1.
    … the supreme end, the happiness of all mankind (Kr V A851/NKS 665).
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. R. M. Hare (1992). Utilitarianism and Moral Education. Studies in Philosophy and Education 11 (3):197-205.
  45. D. W. Haslett (1996). On Life, Death, and Abortion. Utilitas 8 (02):159-.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Daniel Hausman (2006). Consequentialism and Preference Formation in Economics and Game Theory. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 81 (59):111-.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Bashshar Haydar (2002). Consequentialism and the Doing-Allowing Distinction. Utilitas 14 (01):96-.
    This paper takes a closer look at the incompatibility thesis, namely the claim that consequentialism is incompatible with accepting the moral relevance of the doing-allowing distinction. I examine two attempts to reject the incompatibility thesis, the first by Samuel Scheffler and the second by Frances Kamm. I argue that both attempts fail to provide an adequate ground for rejecting the incompatibility thesis. I then put forward an account of what I take to be at stake in accepting or rejecting the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Avram Hiller, Ramona Ilea & Leonard Kahn (eds.) (2013). Consequentialism and Environmental Ethics. Routledge.

    This volume works to connect issues in environmental ethics with the best work in contemporary normative theory. Environmental issues challenge contemporary ethical theorists to account for topics that traditional ethical theories do not address to any significant extent. This book articulates and evaluates consequentialist responses to that challenge. Contributors provide a thorough and well-rounded analysis of the benefits and limitations of the consequentialist perspective in addressing environmental issues. In particular, the contributors use consequentialist theory to address central questions in environmental (...)

    . (shrink)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Alison Hills (2003). The Significance of the Dualism of Practical Reason. Utilitas 15 (03):315-.
    Sidgwick argued that utilitarianism and egoism were in conflict, that neither theory was better justified than the other, and concluded that there was a and all that remained to him was . The dualism argument introduced by Sidgwick is an extremely powerful sceptical argument that no theory of ethics is rationally required: it cannot be shown that a moral sceptic or an egoist ought to accept the moral theory, otherwise she is unreasonable. I explain two ways in which the significance (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Iwao Hirose (2004). Aggregation and Numbers. Utilitas 16 (1):62-79.
    This article considers the reach of arguments for saving the greater number without interpersonal aggregation, and argues that interpersonal aggregation is useful to encompass the proper respect due to each separate person. I first give a precise definition of interpersonal aggregation, which many non-utilitarians try to avoid. Then, I show that consequentialism and Scanlon can justify the case for the greater number without interpersonal aggregation. However, I propose the Aggregation Approach, which justifies the case for the greater number in some (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 144