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  1. Linda Barclay (1999). Rights, Intrinsic Values and the Politics of Abortion. Utilitas 11 (02):215-.
    In Life's Dominion Ronald Dworkin argues that disagreement over the morality ofabortion is about how best to respect the intrinsic value of human life, rather than about foetal rights as many people mistakenly suppose. Dworkin argues that the state should be neutral indebates about intrinsic value and thus it should be neutral in the abortion debate. Through a consideration of the notion of intrinsic value, it is argued in this article that Dworkin'sargument fails. On the interpretation of which Dworkin seems (...)
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  2. Thom Brooks (2003). Kant's Theory of Punishment. Utilitas 15 (02):206-.
    The most widespread interpretation amongst contemporary theorists of Kant's theory of punishment is that it is retributivist. On the contrary, I will argue there are very different senses in which Kant discusses punishment. He endorses retribution for moral law transgressions and consequentialist considerations for positive law violations. When these standpoints are taken into consideration, Kant's theory of punishment is more coherent and unified than previously thought. This reading uncovers a new problem in Kant's theory of punishment. By assuming a potential (...)
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  3. Kimberley Brownlee (2010). Moral Demands, Moral Pragmatics, and Being Good. Utilitas 22 (3).
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  4. J. Campbell, M. O'Rourke & H. Silverstein (eds.) (forthcoming). Action, Ethics and Responsibility: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. 7. MIT Press.
    Overview -/- Most philosophical explorations of responsibility discuss the topic solely in terms of metaphysics and the "free will" problem. By contrast, these essays by leading philosophers view responsibility from a variety of perspectives—metaphysics, ethics, action theory, and the philosophy of law. After a broad, framing introduction by the volume's editors, the contributors consider such subjects as responsibility as it relates to the "free will" problem; the relation between responsibility and knowledge or ignorance; the relation between causal and moral responsibility; (...)
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  5. Stephanie Collins (2013). Duties to Make Friends. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):907-921.
    Why, morally speaking, ought we do more for our family and friends than for strangers? In other words, what is the justification of special duties? According to partialists, the answer to this question cannot be reduced to impartial moral principles. According to impartialists, it can. This paper briefly argues in favour of impartialism, before drawing out an implication of the impartialist view: in addition to justifying some currently recognised special duties, impartialism also generates new special duties that are not yet (...)
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  6. Rowan Cruft (2006). Against Individualistic Justifications of Property Rights. Utilitas 18 (2):154-172.
    In this article I argue that, despite the views of such theorists as Locke, Hart and Raz, most of a person's property rights cannot be individualistically justified. Instead most property rights, if justified at all, must be justified on non-individualistic (e.g. consequentialist) grounds. This, I suggest, implies that most property rights cannot be morally fundamental ‘human rights’.
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  7. Adam Cureton (2009). Degrees of Fairness and Proportional Chances. Utilitas 21 (2):217-221.
    Suppose the following: Two groups of people require our aid but we can help only one group; there are more people in the first group than the second group; every person in both groups has an equal claim on our aid; and we have a duty to help and no other special obligations or duties. I argue that there exists at least one fairness function, which is a function that measures the goodness of degrees of fairness, that implies that we (...)
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  8. David Enoch (2009). Wouldn't It Be Nice If P , Therefore, P (for a Moral P ). Utilitas 21 (2):222-224.
    Suppose that a world in which we have an utterly non-consequentialist moral status is a better world than one in which we don’t have such a status. Does this give any reason to believe that we have such moral status? Suppose that a world without moral luck is worse than a world with moral luck. Does this give any reason to believe that there is moral luck? The problem is that positive answers to these questions1 seem to commit us to (...)
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  9. Adam Etinson (2013). Human Rights, Claimability and the Uses of Abstraction. Utilitas 25 (4):463-486.
    This article addresses the so-called to human rights. Focusing specifically on the work of Onora O'Neill, the article challenges two important aspects of her version of this objection. First: its narrowness. O'Neill understands the claimability of a right to depend on the identification of its duty-bearers. But there is good reason to think that the claimability of a right depends on more than just that, which makes abstract (and not welfare) rights the most natural target of her objection (section II). (...)
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  10. James S. Fishkin (1989). Review: Patterns of Moral Complexity. [REVIEW] Political Theory 17 (1):153-156.
  11. Marc Fleurbaey & Alex Voorhoeve (2012). Egalitarianism and the Separateness of Persons. Utilitas 24 (3):381-398.
    The difference between the unity of the individual and the separateness of persons requires that there be a shift in the moral weight that we accord to changes in utility when we move from making intrapersonal tradeoffs to making interpersonal tradeoffs. We examine which forms of egalitarianism can, and which cannot, account for this shift. We argue that a form of egalitarianism which is concerned only with the extent of outcome inequality cannot account for this shift. We also argue that (...)
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  12. P. Forrest (1990). The Compatibility of Consequentialism with Deontological Convictions. Philosophical Inquiry 12 (1-2):22-31.
  13. Helen Frowe (forthcoming). Killing John to Save Mary: A Defence of the Distinction Between Killing and Letting Die. In J. Campbell, M. O’Rourke & H. Silverstein (eds.), Action, Ethics and Responsibility. MIT Press.
    Introduction This paper defends the moral significance of the distinction between killing and letting die. In the first part of the paper, I consider and reject Michael Tooley’s argument that initiating a causal process is morally equivalent to refraining from interfering in that process. The second part disputes Tooley’s suggestion it is merely external factors that make killing appear to be worse than letting die, when in reality the distinction is morally neutral. Tooley is mistaken to claim that we are (...)
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  14. Helen Frowe (2010). A Practical Account of Self-Defence. Law and Philosophy 29 (3):245-272.
    I argue that any successful account of permissible self- defence must be action-guiding, or practical . It must be able to inform people’s deliberation about what they are permitted to do when faced with an apparent threat to their lives. I argue that this forces us to accept that a person can be permitted to use self-defence against Apparent Threats: characters whom a person reasonably, but mistakenly, believes threaten her life. I defend a hybrid account of self-defence that prioritises an (...)
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  15. Helen Frowe (2009). The Justified Infliction of Unjust Harm. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (3):345 - 351.
  16. Helen Frowe (2008). Threats, Bystanders and Obstructors. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):365-372.
    In this paper I argue that the widespread view that obstructors are a special sort of bystander is mistaken. Obstructors make Victim worse off by their presence, and thus are more properly described as innocent threats. Only those characters who do not make Victim worse off by their presence can be classified as bystanders.
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  17. Bernard Gert (2010). F. M. Kamm, Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harms (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) Pp. X + 509. [REVIEW] Utilitas 22 (2):234-238.
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  18. Iwao Hirose (2004). Aggregation and Numbers. Utilitas 16 (1):62-79.
    This article considers the reach of arguments for saving the greater number without interpersonal aggregation, and argues that interpersonal aggregation is useful to encompass the proper respect due to each separate person. I first give a precise definition of interpersonal aggregation, which many non-utilitarians try to avoid. Then, I show that consequentialism and Scanlon can justify the case for the greater number without interpersonal aggregation. However, I propose the Aggregation Approach, which justifies the case for the greater number in some (...)
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  19. Michael Huemer (2009). A Paradox for Weak Deontology. Utilitas 21 (4):464-477.
    Deontological ethicists generally agree that there is a way of harming others such that it is wrong to harm others in that way for the sake of producing a comparable but greater benefit for others. Given plausible assumptions about this type of harm, this principle yields the paradoxical result that it may be wrong to do A, wrong to do B, but permissible to do (A and B).
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  20. Robert Huseby (2011). Spinning the Wheel or Tossing a Coin? Utilitas 23 (2):127-139.
    In the literature on the so-called numbers problem, some authors have recently argued that the individualist lottery (IL) avoids the flaws of the proportional lottery. This article first presents two recent defenses of the IL, and then argues that both are implausible if we focus, as we should, strictly on their non-consequentialist aspects. This conclusion holds even if we take account of the fact that the IL is arguably that solution to the numbers problem which best meets the marginal difference (...)
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  21. I. Individualistic Justification (2006). Against Individualistic Justifications of Property Rights. Utilitas 18 (2).
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  22. F. M. Kamm (2005). Aggregation and Two Moral Methods. Utilitas 17 (1):1-23.
    I begin by reconsidering the arguments of John Taurek and Elizabeth Anscombe on whether the number of people we can help counts morally. I then consider arguments that numbers should count given by F. M. Kamm and Thomas Scanlon, and criticism of them by Michael Otsuka. I examine how different conceptions of the moral method known as pairwise comparison are at work in these different arguments and what the ideas of balancing and tie-breaking signify for decision-making in various types of (...)
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  23. P. J. Kelly (1989). The Moral Foundation of Rights. L. W. Sumner, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987, Pp. X + 224. Utilitas 1 (02):307-.
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  24. Uriah Kriegel (2013). Animal Rights: A Non‐Consequentialist Approach. In K. Petrus & M. Wild (eds.), Animal Minds and Animal Ethics. Transcript.
    It is a curious fact about mainstream discussions of animal rights that they are dominated by consequentialist defenses thereof, when consequentialism in general has been on the wane in other areas of moral philosophy. In this paper, I describe an alternative, non‐consequentialist ethical framework (combining Kantian and virtue‐ethical elements) and argue that it grants (conscious) animals more expansive rights than consequentialist proponents of animal rights typically grant. The cornerstone of this non‐consequentialist framework is the thought that the virtuous agent is (...)
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  25. S. Matthew Liao (2008). Who Is Afraid of Numbers? Utilitas 20 (04):447-.
    In recent years, many nonconsequentialists such as Frances Kamm and Thomas Scanlon have been puzzling over what has come to be known as the Number Problem, which is how to show that the greater number in a rescue situation should be saved without aggregating the claims of the many , a typical kind of consequentialist move that seems to violate the separateness of persons. In this paper, I argue that these nonconsequentialists may be making the task more difficult than necessary, (...)
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  26. Burkhard Liebsch (2010). Transformative Trust?. Violated Trust and the Self : A Negativistic Approach. In Arne Grøn & Claudia Welz (eds.), Trust, Sociality, Selfhood. Mohr Siebeck.
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  27. Xiaofei Liu (2012). A Robust Defence of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. Utilitas 24 (01):63-81.
    Philosophers debate over the truth of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, the thesis that there is a morally significant difference between doing harm and merely allowing harm to happen. Deontologists tend to accept this doctrine, whereas consequentialists tend to reject it. A robust defence of this doctrine would require a conceptual distinction between doing and allowing that both matches our ordinary use of the concepts in a wide range of cases and enables a justification for the alleged moral difference. (...)
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  28. Jukka Mäkinen & Kakkuri-Knuuttila (2013). The Defence of Utilitarianism in Early Rawls: A Study of Methodological Development. [REVIEW] Utilitas 25 (1):1-31.
    Rawls scholarship has not paid much attention to Rawls's early methodological writings so far, pretty much focusing on the reflective equilibrium (RE) which he is understood to have adopted in A Theory of Justice. Nelson Goodman's coherence-theoretical formulations concerning the justification of inductive logic in Fact, Fiction and Forecast have been suggested as the source of the RE. Following Rawls's methodological development in his early works, we shall challenge both these views. Our analysis reveals that the basic elements of RE (...)
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  29. Rex Martin (2007). William A. Edmundson, an Introduction to Rights. Cambridge Introductions to Philosophy and Law Series (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), Pp. XV + 223. [REVIEW] Utilitas 19 (4):520-522.
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  30. Andrew Mason (2012). What Is the Point of Justice? Utilitas 24 (04):525-547.
    Conflicting answers to the question of what principles of justice are for may generate very different ways of theorizing about justice. Indeed divergent answers to it are at the heart of G. A. Cohen's disagreement with John Rawls. Cohen thinks that the roots of this disagreement lie in the constructivist method that Rawls employs, which mistakenly treats the principles that emerge from a procedure that involves factual assumptions as ultimate principles of justice. But I argue that even if Rawls were (...)
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  31. David McCarthy (2000). Harming and Allowing Harm. Ethics 110 (4):749-779.
    The article takes as its starting point the assumption that (a) competing accounts of moral rules should be judged by the distribution of benefits and burdens which would arise from everyone accepting these rules, and that (b) these benefits and burdens are understood in a way which has a substantial resource or freedom-based component. This starting point is compatible with contractualism and various forms of rule consequentialism, and will yield a morality in which people have significant freedoms. The main claim (...)
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  32. Jeff McMahan (2007). Infanticide. Utilitas 19 (2):131-159.
    It is sometimes suggested that if a moral theory implies that infanticide can sometimes be permissible, that is sufficient to discredit the theory. I argue in this article that the common-sense belief that infanticide is wrong, and perhaps even worse than the killing of an adult, is challenged not so much by theoretical considerations as by common-sense beliefs about abortion, the killing of non-human animals, and so on. Because there are no intrinsic differences between premature infants and viable fetuses, it (...)
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  33. Jeff Mcmahan (2007). 1. Thinking About the Unthinkable. Utilitas 19 (2).
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  34. András Miklós (2011). The Basic Structure and the Principles of Justice. Utilitas 23 (2):161-182.
    This paper develops an account of how economic and political institutions can limit the applicability of principles of justice even in non-relational cosmopolitan conceptions. It shows that fundamental principles of justice underdetermine fair distributive shares as well as justice-based requirements. It argues that institutions partially constitute the content of justice by determining distributive shares and by resolving indeterminacies about justice-based requirements resulting from strategic interaction and disagreement. In the absence of existing institutions principles of justice might not be applicable for (...)
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  35. Chris Mills (2013). The Problem of Paternal Motives. Utilitas 25 (4):446-462.
    In this article I assess the ability of motivational accounts of paternalism to respond to a particular challenge: can its proponents adequately explain the source of the distinctive form of disrespect that animates this view? In particular I examine the recent argument put forward by Jonathan Quong that we can explain the presumptive wrong of paternalism by relying on a Rawlsian account of moral status. I challenge the plausibility of Quong's argument, claiming that although this approach can provide a clear (...)
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  36. Phillip Montague (2000). Self-Defence and Innocence: Aggressors and Active Threats. Utilitas 12 (01):62-.
    Although people generally agree that innocent targets of culpable aggression are justified in harming the aggressors in self-defence, there is considerable disagreement regarding whether innocents are justified in defending themselves when their doing so would harm other innocent people. I argue in this essay that harming innocent aggressors and active innocent threats in self-defence is indeed justified under certain conditions, but that defensive actions in such cases are justified as permissions rather than as claim rights. This justification therefore differs from (...)
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  37. Eric Moore (2004). Ishtiyaque Haji, Deontic Morality and Control (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), Pp. XIV + 288. Utilitas 16 (3):349-351.
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  38. S. O'Neill (1995). Nicholas Rescher, Pluralism: Against the Demand for Consensus, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993, Pp. Viii + 208. Utilitas 7 (02):340-.
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  39. Onora Oneill (2004). Consequences for Non-Consequentialists. Utilitas 16 (1):1-11.
    Both consequentialist and non-consequentialist ethical reasoning have difficulties in accounting for the value of consequences. Taken neat, consequentialism is too fierce in its emphasis on success and disregard of luck, while non-consequentialism seemingly over-values inner states and undervalues actual results. In UneasyVirtue Julia Driver proposes a form of objective consequentialism which claims that characters are good if they typically (but not invariably) produce good results. This position addresses the problems moral luck raises for consequentialism, but requires some form of realism (...)
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  40. Ingmar Persson (1994). The Groundlessness of Natural Rights. Utilitas 6 (01):9-.
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  41. Thomas Porter (2012). In Defence of the Priority View. Utilitas 24 (03):349-364.
    In their paper ‘Why It Matters That Some Are Worse Off Than Others: An Argument against the Priority View’, Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve argue that prioritarianism is mistaken. I argue that their case against prioritarianism has much weaker foundations than it might at first seem. Their key argument is based on the claim that prioritarianism ignores the fact of the ‘separateness of persons’. However, prioritarianism, far from ignoring that fact, is a plausible response to it. It may be that (...)
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  42. Marc Ramsay (2011). Twinning and Fusion as Arguments Against the Moral Standing of the Early Human Embryo. Utilitas 23 (2):183-205.
    Some philosophers argue that, because it is subject to twinning and fusion, the early human embryo cannot hold strong moral standing. Supposedly, the fact that an early human embryo can twin or fuse with another embryo entails that it is not a distinct individual, thus precluding it from holding any level of moral standing. I argue that appeals to twinning and fusion fail to show that the early human embryo is not a distinct individual and that these appeals do not (...)
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  43. Marc Ramsay (2005). Teleological Egalitarianism Vs. The Slogan. Utilitas 17 (1):93-116.
    The Slogan holds that one situation cannot be worse (or better) than another unless there is someone for whom it is worse (or better). This principle appears to provide the basis for the levelling-down objection to teleological egalitarianism. Larry Temkin, however, argues that the Slogan is not a plausible moral ideal, since it stands against not just teleological egalitarianism, but also values such as freedom, rights, autonomy, virtue and desert. I argue that the Slogan is a plausible moral principle, one (...)
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  44. Jonathan Riley (2006). Liberal Rights in a Pareto-Optimal Code. Utilitas 18 (1):61-79.
    A Millian response is presented to Sen's celebrated Paretian liberal impossibility theorem. It is argued that Millian Paretian liberalism is possible, if the application of Paretian norms is restricted to the selection of an optimal code of liberal justice and rights, as well as to individual choices made in compliance with the rules of the code. Key steps in outlining the Millian response include suitably modifying Sen's social choice formulation of the idea of claim-right to personal liberty, and incorporating within (...)
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  45. M. A. Roberts (2007). The Non-Identity Fallacy: Harm, Probability and Another Look at Parfit's Depletion Example. Utilitas 19 (3):267-311.
    The non-identity problem is really a collection of problems having distinct logical features. For that reason, non-identity problems can be typed. This article focuses on just one type of non-identity problem, the problem, which includes Derek Parfit's depletion example and many others. The can't-expect-better problem uses an assessment about the low probability of any particular person's coming into existence to reason that an earlier wrong act does not harm that person. This article argues that that line of reasoning is unusually (...)
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  46. Luke Robinson (2013). Moral Absolutes. In Hugh LaFollette, John Deigh & Sarah Stroud (eds.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
    The term “moral absolute” refers to many different ideas. In contemporary moral philosophy, it most commonly refers to the idea of a moral prohibition or rule that holds without exception. Less commonly, it refers to the idea of a moral rule or standard that applies to all moral agents, rather than only to members of a particular society or culture or only to particular individuals (e.g., those who accept it). The present topic is moral absolutes in the first of these (...)
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  47. Michael Robinson (2010). Are Some Prima Facie Duties More Binding Than Others? Utilitas 22 (1):26-32.
    In The Right and the Good, W. D. Ross commits himself to the view that, in addition to being distinct and defeasible, some prima facie duties are more binding than others. David McNaughton has argued that there appears to be no way of making sense of this claim that is both coherent and consistent with Ross's overall picture. I offer an alternative way of understanding Ross's remarks about the comparative stringency of prima facie duties, which, in addition to being compatible (...)
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  48. Philip Schofield (2003). Jeremy Bentham's 'Nonsense Upon Stilts'. Utilitas 15 (01):1-.
    Jeremy Bentham's , hitherto known as , has recently appeared in definitive form in The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham. The essay contains what is arguably the most influential critique of natural rights, and by extension human rights, ever written. Bentham's fundamental argument was that natural rights lacked any ontological basis, except to the extent that they reflected the personal desires of those propagating them. Moreover, by purporting to have a basis in nature, the language of natural rights gave a (...)
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  49. Saul Smilansky (2003). Can Deontologists Be Moderate? Utilitas 15 (01):71-.
    There is a widespread view according to which deontology can be construed as a flexible, reasonable view, able to incorporate consequentialist considerations when it seems compelling to do so. According to this view, deontologists can be moderate, and their presentation as die-hard fanatics, even if true to some historical figures, is basically a slanderous and misleading philosophical straw man. I argue that deontologists, properly understood, are not moderate. In the way deontology is typically understood, a deontology, as such, conceptually needs (...)
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  50. O. C. So (1999). Response to Carlson and Qizilbash. Utilitas 11 (1).
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