This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
About this topic
Summary This category is used for topics that have not been a focus of major attention in the free will debate and which therefore do not have categories of their own devoted to them. 
Key works N/A
Introductions N/A
  Show all references
Related categories
Siblings:
273 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
1 — 50 / 273
  1. Gan Hun Ahn (1999). The Free Will/Determinism Controversy: Its Implications for Moral Reasoning and Education. Dissertation, University of Missouri - Kansas City
    The purpose of this study is to propose a theory of moral education based on a concept of moral freedom that is philosophically sound and educationally meaningful. This was achieved through a critical analysis of several major positions regarding the free will/determinism controversy. ;The free will problem is examined in terms of the trichotomy of nonreconciling determinism/reconciling determinism/libertarianism. and by the dichotomy of incompatibilism vs. compatibilism. This study defends reconciling determinism in the trichotomy and compatibilism in the dichotomy. The difference (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Charlotte Alderwick (2014). Atemporal Essence and Existential Freedom in Schelling. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (1):115-137.
    Although it is clear in Schelling's Freiheitsschrift that he takes an agent's atemporal choice between good and evil to be central to understanding human freedom, there is no consensus in the literature and no adequate account of how to understand this choice. Further, the literature fails to render intelligible how existential freedom is possible in the light of this atemporal choice. I demonstrate that, despite their differences, the dominant accounts in the literature are all guilty of these failings and argue (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Robert Allen (2003). St. Augustine’s Free Will Theodicy and Natural Evil. Ars Disputandi 3.
    The problem of evil is an obstacle to justified belief in an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God . According to Saint Augustine’s free will theodicy , moral evil attends free will. Might something like AFWT also be used to account for natural evil? After all, it is possible that calamities such as famines, earthquakes, and floods are the effects of the sinful willing of certain persons, viz., ‘fallen angels.’ Working to destroy our faith, Satan and his cohorts could be responsible (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Robert F. Allen, Free Will and Evaluation: Remarks on Noel Hendrickson's "Free Will Nihilism and the Question of Method".
    Noel Hendrickson believes that free will is separable from the “evaluative intuitions” with which it has been traditionally associated. But what are these intuitions? Answer: principles such as PAP, Β, and UR (6). The thesis that free will is separable from these principles, however, is hardly unique, as they are also eschewed by compatibilists who are unwilling to abdicate altogether evaluative intuitions. We are told in addition that there are “metaphysical senses” of free will that are not “relevant to responsibility” (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Roman Altshuler (2015). Free Will, Narrative, and Retroactive Self-Constitution. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):867-883.
    John Fischer has recently argued that the value of acting freely is the value of self-expression. Drawing on David Velleman’s earlier work, Fischer holds that the value of a life is a narrative value and free will is valuable insofar as it allows us to shape the narrative structure of our lives. This account rests on Fischer’s distinction between regulative control and guidance control. While we lack the former kind of control, on Fischer’s view, the latter is all that is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. R. I. Anderson, On Molinism and Manipulation: Does Molinism Answer the Problems About Providence, Foreknowledge and Free Will?
    Molinism attempts to resolve the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human libertarian freedom by the inclusion of the divine will into the solution. Moreover, middle knowledge is providentially useful under the Molinist model because of the way God uses it. This speaks of an integral link between the divine will and intellect that works in such a way as to provide a foreknowledge solution and, allegedly, the best view of providence. Nevertheless, there have been several anti-Molinist arguments by analogy which (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. J. E. Barnhart (1977). Theodicy and the Free Will Defence: Response to Plantinga and Flew: J. E. BARNHART. Religious Studies 13 (4):439-453.
    Although Professor of Philosophy at Calvin College, Alvin Plantinga has developed a theodicy that is fundamentally Arminian rather than Calvinistic. Anthony Flew, although the son of an Arminian Christian minister, regards the Arminian view of ‘free will’ to be both unacceptable on its own terms and incompatible with classical Christian theism. In this paper I hope to disentangle some of the involved controversy regarding theodicy which has developed between Plantinga and Flew, and between Flew and myself. The major portion of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Edwina Barvosa-Carter (2007). Mestiza Autonomy as Relational Autonomy: Ambivalence & the Social Character of Free Will. Journal of Political Philosophy 15 (1):1–21.
  9. Nicholas Beale (2009). Freewill, Free Process, and Love. Think 8 (23):115-124.
    Of all the philosophical challenges to theism in general and Christianity in particular, the one that Christians take most seriously is the Problem of Evil. It is clearly not logically contradictory to hold that there exists a Loving Ultimate Creator; and nevertheless there is a very substantial amount of evil and suffering in the world. But it is certainly problematic. Deeper scientific understandings of physics and evolution shed some light on this. It is also useful to reflect more deeply on (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. S. I. Benn & W. L. Weinstein (1971). Being Free to Act, and Being a Free Man. Mind 80 (318):194-211.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  11. Philip W. Bennett (1973). Evil, God, and the Free Will Defense. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):39 – 50.
    The author critically examines and rejects alvin plantinga's defense of the free will theodicy, As presented in chapter six of plantinga's "god and other minds". If the author's arguments are correct, Then any attempt on the part of the rational apologist to explain evil by reference to man's free will must be considered futile. Since the arguments presented will be seen as supporting natural atheology (which, For plantinga, Is "the attempt...To show that, Given what we know, It is impossible or (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Paul Benson (1994). Free Agency and Self-Worth. Journal of Philosophy 91 (12):650-58.
  13. Paul H. Benson (1987). Ordinary Ability and Free Action. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (June):307-335.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. S. Benson (1987). Freedom and Value. Journal of Philosophy 84 (September):465-87.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  15. Gunnar Björnsson (forthcoming). Explaining (Away) the Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility. In Philip Robichaud & Jan Willem Wieland (eds.), Responsibility - The Epistemic Condition. Oxford University Press
    It is clear that lack of awareness of the consequences of an action can undermine moral responsibility and blame for these consequences. But when and how it does so is controversial. Sometimes an agent believing that the outcome might occur is excused because it seemed unlikely to her, and sometimes an agent having no idea that it would occur is nevertheless to blame. A low or zero degree of belief might seem to excuse unless the agent “should have known better”, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. George Botterill (1977). Falsification and the Existence of God: A Discussion of Plantinga's Free Will Defence. Philosophical Quarterly 27 (107):114-134.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. R. D. Bradley (1958). Free Will: Problem of Pseudo-Problem? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):33 – 45.
  18. Shoshana Brassfield (2013). Cartesian Virtue and Freedom: Introduction. Essays in Philosophy 14 (2):1.
  19. Jacqueline Broad & Karen Detlefsen (forthcoming). Women and Liberty, 1600-1800: Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
    This book addresses the theme of liberty as it is found in the writing of women philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, or as it is theorized with respect to women and their lives. It covers both theoretical and practical philosophy, with chapters grappling with problems in the metaphysics of free will (both human and God’s), the liberty (or lack thereof) of women in their moral, personal lives as well as their social-political, public lives, and the interactions between the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Walter E. Broman (1989). Milton and Free Will: An Essay in Criticism and Philosophy (Review). Philosophy and Literature 13 (1):179-180.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Robert F. Brown (1991). Divine Omniscience, Immutability, Aseity and Human Free Will: ROBERT F. BROWN. Religious Studies 27 (3):285-295.
    If classical Western theism is correct that God's timeless omniscience is compatible with human free will, then it is incoherent to hold that this God can in any strict sense be immutable and a se as well as omniscient. That is my thesis. ‘Classical theism’ shall refer here to the tradition of philosophical theology centring on such mainstream authors as Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas. ‘Divine omniscience’ shall mean that the eternal God knows all events as a timeless observer of them. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Douglas Browning (1964). The Feeling of Freedom. Review of Metaphysics 18 (1):123 - 146.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. Andrei A. Buckareff (2006). Hobartian Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontologism. Disputatio 2 (21):1 - 17.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Steven M. Cahn (1967). Fate, Logic, and Time. New Haven, Yale University Press.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  25. James Cain (2004). Free Will and the Problem of Evil. Religious Studies 40 (4):437-456.
    According to the free-will defence, the exercise of free will by creatures is of such value that God is willing to allow the existence of evil which comes from the misuse of free will. A well-known objection holds that the exercise of free will is compatible with determinism and thus, if God exists, God could have predetermined exactly how the will would be exercised; God could even have predetermined that free will would be exercised sinlessly. Thus, it is held, the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  26. L. S. Carrier (1986). Free Will and Intentional Action. Philosophia 16 (December):355-364.
    I argue for the following analysis of a freely willed action: an act is done of one's own free will, if and only if, it is an intentional act performed by one acting as a rational agent from unobstructed reasons, and so situated that he or she has the capacity to forbear from performing it.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Gregg Caruso (2014). Précis of Derk Pereboom’s Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life. Science, Religion and Culture 1 (3):178-201.
    Derk Pereboom’s Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life provides the most lively and comprehensive defense of free will skepticism in the literature. It contains a reworked and expanded version of the view he first developed in Living without Free Will. Important objections to the early book are answered, some slight modifications are introduced, and the overall account is significantly embellished—for example, Pereboom proposes a new account of rational deliberation consistent with the belief that one’s actions are causally determined and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Gregg Caruso (2008). Consciousness and Free Will: A Critique of the Argument From Introspection. Southwest Philosophy Review 24 (1):219-231.
    One of the main libertarian arguments in support of free will is the argument from introspection. This argument places a great deal of faith in our conscious feeling of freedom and our introspective abilities. People often infer their own freedom from their introspective phenomenology of freedom. It is here argued that from the fact that I feel myself free, it does not necessarily follow that I am free. I maintain that it is our mistaken belief in the transparency and infallibility (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  29. Gregg Caruso (2008). Consciousness and Free Will. Southwest Philosophy Review 24 (1):219-231.
  30. Gregg D. Caruso (2015). Free Will Eliminativism: Reference, Error, and Phenomenology. Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2823-2833.
    Shaun Nichols has recently argued that while the folk notion of free will is associated with error, a question still remains whether the concept of free will should be eliminated or preserved. He maintains that like other eliminativist arguments in philosophy, arguments that free will is an illusion seem to depend on substantive assumptions about reference. According to free will eliminativists, people have deeply mistaken beliefs about free will and this entails that free will does not exist. However, an alternative (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. Gregg D. Caruso (2014). Precis of Derk Perebooms Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life. Science Religion and Culture 1 (3):178-201.
    Derk Perebooms Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life (2014) provides the most lively and comprehensive defense of free will skepticism in the literature. It contains a reworked and expanded version of the view he first developed in Living without Free Will (2001). Important objections to the early book are answered, some slight modifications are introduced, and the overall account is significantly embellished—for example, Pereboom proposes a new account of rational deliberation consistent with the belief that one’s actions are causally (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. Mark Anthony Case (2001). John Duns Scotus's Incompatibilist Theory of Will. Dissertation, Cornell University
    In this dissertation I argue that John Duns Scotus's theory of will commits him to a radical, yet plausible and attractive, incompatibilist account of free will. I call the incompatibilism he endorses "deliberative indeterminism." What makes a view like Scotus's "radical" is the fact that he posits indeterminism at the moment of choice, after an agent has deliberated about what to do. In doing this, he categorically denies that deliberation determines an agent's choice. In denying this he also denies the (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. Luca Castagnoli (2011). The Stoics on Determinism and Compatibilism. Ancient Philosophy 31 (1):228-235.
  34. Desmonde Clarke Catherine Wilson (ed.) (forthcoming). Oxford Handbook of Early Modern Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
  35. Timothy Chambers (2003). Free Will Defense: Do the Ends Justify the Means? Philosophia Christi 5 (1):251-258.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. Christopher Key Chapple (2014). Free Will and Voluntarism in Jainism. In Matthew R. Dasti & Edwin F. Bryant (eds.), Free Will, Agency, and Selfhood in Indian Philosophy. Oxford University Press
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Sean Clancy (2013). A Strong Compatibilist Account of Settling. Inquiry 56 (6):653-665.
  38. Randolph Clarke (2010). Are We Free to Obey the Laws? American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (4):389-401.
    It is often said that if free will is incompatible with determinism, then free actions must be anomic, not covered by any law of nature. Here it is argued that there is no need for incompatiblists to hold this view. Even if freedom requires indeterminism, our freedom can be freedom to obey the laws.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Guy Claxton (1999). Whodunnit? Unpicking the 'Seems' of Free Will. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8-9):8-9.
    The cornerstone of the dominant folk theory of free will is the presumption that conscious intentions are, at least sometimes, causally related to subsequent ‘voluntary’ actions. Like all folk theories that have become ‘second nature', this model skews perception and cognition to highlight phenomena and interpretations that are consistent with itself, and pathologize or render invisible those that are not. A variety of experimental, neurological and everyday phenomena are reviewed that cumulatively cast doubt on this comforting folk model. An alternative (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  40. Yishai Cohen (2016). Counterfactuals of Divine Freedom. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 79 (3):185-205.
    Contrary to the commonly held position of Luis de Molina, Thomas Flint and others, I argue that counterfactuals of divine freedom are pre-volitional for God within the Molinist framework. That is, CDFs are not true even partly in virtue of some act of God’s will. As a result, I argue that the Molinist God fails to satisfy an epistemic openness requirement for rational deliberation, and thus she cannot rationally deliberate about which world to actualize.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. John J. Compton (2001). The Persistence of the Problem of Freedom. Review of Metaphysics 55 (1):95 - 115.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  42. Jay Angelo Corlett (1992). Moral Compatibilism: Rights, Responsibility, Punishment and Compensation. Dissertation, The University of Arizona
    The moral status of collectives is an important problem for any plausible moral, social and political philosophy. Are collectives proper subjects of moral rights and moral responsibility ascriptions? Is it morally justified for the state to punish collectives for criminal offenses, or for the state to force collectives to pay compensation for tort offenses? Moral Individualism denies that collectives are properly ascribed properties such as moral rights, moral liability, and punishability, while Moral Collectivism affirms that some collectives may be legitimately (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. Christopher Cowley (2014). Moral Responsibility. Routledge.
    How and to what degree are we responsible for our characters, our lives, our misfortunes, our relationships and our children? This question is at the heart of "Moral Responsibility". The book explores accusations and denials of moral responsibility for particular acts, responsibility for character, and the role of luck and fate in ethics. Moral responsibility as the grounds for a retributivist theory of punishment is examined, alongside discussions of forgiveness, parental responsibility, and responsibility before God. The book also discusses collective (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. Daniel O. Dahlstrom (2007). The Development of Freedom. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 81:35-52.
    This paper elaborates four asymmetrical, developmental stages of the phenomenon of human freedom, starting with a rudimentary sort of freedom, thebasic experience of a relatively unencumbered power to act in alternative ways. The paper argues that structural elements of this rudimentary form of freedomare demonstrable in three distinct, supervening forms of freedom: instrumental freedom, the experience of the self-reflective ability to pursue certain aims, perfectionist freedom, the experience of the capacity to master oneself according to some ideal, and, finally, interpersonal (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Paul Davis (1989). The Cheap Tricks of Compatibilism and Why the Problem of Free Will Won't Go Away. Dissertation, The University of Edinburgh (United Kingdom)
    Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;In common with a great many philosophical problems, free will/determinism has something of a chequered history. In the same way in which it may come more easily to say what it is that empiricism denies rather than what it asserts, we could fairly painlessly grant the likes of Strawson that the terms "free will" and "determinism" do not each, within philosophical history, mark off single unambiguous theories going up (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. Stephen T. Davis (1972). A Defence of the Free Will Defence: STEPHEN T. DAVIS. Religious Studies 8 (4):335-344.
    In this paper I shall discuss a certain theodicy, or line of argument in response to the problem of evil, viz, the so-called ‘free will defence’. What I propose to do is defend this theodicy against an objection that has been made to it in recent years.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Russell Ernest Daw (1995). Free Will and Determinism: An Assessment of the Traditional Approach to the Compatibility Issue. Dissertation, University of Virginia
    This dissertation is a systematic and fairly comprehensive assessment of the way in which philosophers have traditionally approached the issue of whether determinism is compatible with the sort of freedom that allows for ascriptions of moral responsibility. After providing a brief historical overview of a line of argument regarding the compatibility of free-will and determinism that runs from Hobbes through Hume, Mill, Moore, Schlick, Ayer, and numerous others, I draw out the methodological assumptions implicit in that line of argument: The (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. Russell Daw & Torin Alter (2001). Free Acts and Robot Cats. Philosophical Studies 102 (3):345-57.
    ‘Free action’ is subject to the causal theory of reference and thus that The essential nature of free actions can be discovered only by empirical investigation, not by conceptual analysis. Heller ’s proposal, if true, would have significant philosophical implications. Consider the enduring issue we will call the Compatibility Issue : whether the thesis of determinism is logically compatible with the claim that.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. Charles Devellennes (2014). Choice, Blind Spots and Free Will An Autopoietic Critique of Isaiah Berlin's Liberalism. Philosophy and Social Criticism 40 (9):895-911.
    This article shows that the concept of choice is central to Isaiah Berlin’s liberalism. It argues that his valuing of choice is anchored in a particular conception of human nature, one that assumes and presupposes free will. Berlin’s works sketch a metaphysics of choice, and his reluctance to situate himself openly in the debate on free will is unconvincing. By introducing the theory of autopoiesis, this article further suggests that there is a way to take Berlin’s value pluralism seriously, by (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. Frank B. Dilley (1990). The Free-Will Defence and Worlds Without Moral Evil. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 27 (1/2):1 - 15.
1 — 50 / 273