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Summary This category is used for topics that have not been a focus of major attention in the free will debate and which therefore do not have categories of their own devoted to them. 
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  1. Robert F. Allen, Free Will and Evaluation: Remarks on Noel Hendrickson's "Free Will Nihilism and the Question of Method".
    Noel Hendrickson believes that free will is separable from the “evaluative intuitions” with which it has been traditionally associated. But what are these intuitions? Answer: principles such as PAP, Β, and UR (6). The thesis that free will is separable from these principles, however, is hardly unique, as they are also eschewed by compatibilists who are unwilling to abdicate altogether evaluative intuitions. We are told in addition that there are “metaphysical senses” of free will that are not “relevant to responsibility” (...)
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  2. Roman Altshuler (forthcoming). Free Will, Narrative, and Retroactive Self-Constitution. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-17.
    John Fischer has recently argued that the value of acting freely is the value of self-expression. Drawing on David Velleman’s earlier work, Fischer holds that the value of a life is a narrative value and free will is valuable insofar as it allows us to shape the narrative structure of our lives. This account rests on Fischer’s distinction between regulative control and guidance control. While we lack the former kind of control, on Fischer’s view, the latter is all that is (...)
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  3. Edwina Barvosa-Carter (2007). Mestiza Autonomy as Relational Autonomy: Ambivalence & the Social Character of Free Will. Journal of Political Philosophy 15 (1):1–21.
  4. Nicholas Beale (2009). Freewill, Free Process, and Love. Think 8 (23):115-124.
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  5. S. I. Benn & W. L. Weinstein (1971). Being Free to Act, and Being a Free Man. Mind 80 (318):194-211.
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  6. Philip W. Bennett (1973). Evil, God, and the Free Will Defense. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):39 – 50.
    The author critically examines and rejects alvin plantinga's defense of the free will theodicy, As presented in chapter six of plantinga's "god and other minds". If the author's arguments are correct, Then any attempt on the part of the rational apologist to explain evil by reference to man's free will must be considered futile. Since the arguments presented will be seen as supporting natural atheology (which, For plantinga, Is "the attempt...To show that, Given what we know, It is impossible or (...)
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  7. Paul Benson (1994). Free Agency and Self-Worth. Journal of Philosophy 91 (12):650-58.
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  8. Paul H. Benson (1987). Ordinary Ability and Free Action. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (June):307-335.
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  9. S. Benson (1987). Freedom and Value. Journal of Philosophy 84 (September):465-87.
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  10. George Botterill (1977). Falsification and the Existence of God: A Discussion of Plantinga's Free Will Defence. Philosophical Quarterly 27 (107):114-134.
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  11. R. D. Bradley (1958). Free Will: Problem of Pseudo-Problem? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):33 – 45.
  12. Walter E. Broman (1989). Milton and Free Will: An Essay in Criticism and Philosophy (Review). Philosophy and Literature 13 (1):179-180.
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  13. Andrei A. Buckareff (2006). Hobartian Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontologism. Disputatio 2 (21):1 - 17.
    Mark Heller has recently offered a proposal in defense of a fairly strong version of doxastic voluntarism. Heller looks to the compatibilist theory of free will proposed by R.E. Hobart in the first half of the twentieth century for an account of doxastic control. Heller�s defense of Hobartian Voluntarism is motivated by an appeal to epistemic deontologism. In this paper I argue that Heller�s defense of a version of strong or direct doxastic voluntarism ultimately fails. I finally argue that the (...)
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  14. Steven M. Cahn (1967). Fate, Logic, and Time. New Haven, Yale University Press.
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  15. James Cain (2004). Free Will and the Problem of Evil. Religious Studies 40 (4):437-456.
    According to the free-will defence, the exercise of free will by creatures is of such value that God is willing to allow the existence of evil which comes from the misuse of free will. A well-known objection holds that the exercise of free will is compatible with determinism and thus, if God exists, God could have predetermined exactly how the will would be exercised; God could even have predetermined that free will would be exercised sinlessly. Thus, it is held, the (...)
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  16. L. S. Carrier (1986). Free Will and Intentional Action. Philosophia 16 (December):355-364.
    I argue for the following analysis of a freely willed action: an act is done of one's own free will, if and only if, it is an intentional act performed by one acting as a rational agent from unobstructed reasons, and so situated that he or she has the capacity to forbear from performing it.
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  17. Gregg Caruso (2008). Consciousness and Free Will: A Critique of the Argument From Introspection. Southwest Philosophy Review 24 (1):219-231.
    One of the main libertarian arguments in support of free will is the argument from introspection. This argument places a great deal of faith in our conscious feeling of freedom and our introspective abilities. People often infer their own freedom from their introspective phenomenology of freedom. It is here argued that from the fact that I feel myself free, it does not necessarily follow that I am free. I maintain that it is our mistaken belief in the transparency and infallibility (...)
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  18. Gregg Caruso (2008). Consciousness and Free Will. Southwest Philosophy Review 24 (1):219-231.
  19. Luca Castagnoli (2011). The Stoics on Determinism and Compatibilism. Ancient Philosophy 31 (1):228-235.
  20. Desmonde Clarke Catherine Wilson (ed.) (forthcoming). Oxford Handbook of Early Modern Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
  21. Christopher Key Chapple (2014). Free Will and Voluntarism in Jainism. In Matthew R. Dasti & Edwin F. Bryant (eds.), Free Will, Agency, and Selfhood in Indian Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
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  22. Sean Clancy (2013). A Strong Compatibilist Account of Settling. Inquiry 56 (6):653-665.
  23. Randolph Clarke (2010). Are We Free to Obey the Laws? American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (4):389-401.
    It is often said that if free will is incompatible with determinism, then free actions must be anomic, not covered by any law of nature. Here it is argued that there is no need for incompatiblists to hold this view. Even if freedom requires indeterminism, our freedom can be freedom to obey the laws.
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  24. Daniel O. Dahlstrom (2007). The Development of Freedom. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 81:35-52.
    This paper elaborates four asymmetrical, developmental stages of the phenomenon of human freedom, starting with a rudimentary sort of freedom, thebasic experience of a relatively unencumbered power to act in alternative ways. The paper argues that structural elements of this rudimentary form of freedomare demonstrable in three distinct, supervening forms of freedom: instrumental freedom, the experience of the self-reflective ability to pursue certain aims, perfectionist freedom, the experience of the capacity to master oneself according to some ideal, and, finally, interpersonal (...)
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  25. Russell Daw & Torin Alter (2001). Free Acts and Robot Cats. Philosophical Studies 102 (3):345-57.
    (H1) ‘Free action’ is subject to the causal theory of reference and thus that (H2) The essential nature of free actions can be discovered only by empirical investigation, not by conceptual analysis. Heller’s proposal, if true, would have significant philosophical implications. Consider the enduring issue we will call the Compatibility Issue (hereafter CI): whether the thesis of determinism is logically compatible with the claim that..
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  26. Frank B. Dilley (1990). The Free-Will Defence and Worlds Without Moral Evil. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 27 (1/2):1 - 15.
  27. Richard Double (1989). Puppeteers, Hypnotists, and Neurosurgeons. Philosophical Studies 56 (June):163-73.
    The objection to R-S accounts that was raised by the possibility of external agents requires the acceptance of two premises, viz., that all R-S accounts allow for puppeteers and that puppeteers necessarily make us unfree. The Metaphilosophical reply shows that to the extent that puppeteers are more problematic than determinism per se, pup-peteers may be explicitly excluded since they violate our paradigm of free will. The Metaphilosophical reply also suggests that we should not expect our mature R-S account to supply (...)
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  28. Matej Drascek & Stane Maticic (2008). What Managers Could See in the Philosophical Block of “Free Will”? Journal of Business Ethics 81 (1):1 - 14.
    Business ethics’ theories have come under a lot of criticism lately. The problem has been the lack of a philosophical base or the inadequate implementation of it. We are trying to solve this problem by examining the roots of ethics and then applying it to the business environment. The root that has been undeservedly overlooked has been the concept of free will, the oldest philosophical problem on which every ethics theory lies. We have chosen two theories that we think would (...)
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  29. Carol S. Dweck & Daniel C. Molden (2008). 4 Self-Theories: The Construction of Free Will. In John Baer, James C. Kaufman & Roy F. Baumeister (eds.), Are We Free?: Psychology and Free Will. Oxford University Press. 44.
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  30. John Martin Fischer (2005). Free Will, Death, and Immortality: The Role of Narrative. Philosophical Papers 34 (3):379-403.
    In this paper I explore in a preliminary way the interconnections among narrative explanation, narrative value, free will, an immortality. I build on the fascinating an suggestive work of David Velleman. I offer the hypothesis that our acting freely is what gives our lives a distinctive kind of value - narrative value. Free Will, then, is connected to the capacity to lead a meaningful life in a quite specific way: it is the ingredient which, when aded to others, enows us (...)
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  31. John Martin Fischer (ed.) (2005). Free Will: Critical Concepts in Philosophy. Routledge.
    Over the last three decades there has been a tremendous amount of philosophical work in the Anglo-American tradition on the cluster of topics pertaining to Free Will. Of course, this work has in many instances built on and extended the historical treatments of this great area of philosophical interest. The issues range from fairly abstract philosophical questions about the logic of arguments about human freedom (and its relationship to prior predictability of our choices and actions, or God's foreknowledge, or causal (...)
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  32. Antony Flew (1964). Divine Omnipotence and Human Freedom. In , New Essays in Philosophical Theology. New York, Macmillan.
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  33. P. Forrest (2002). The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (4):542-542.
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  34. Bernard Forthomme (2010). Les Aventures de la Volonté Perverse. Lessius.
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  35. Francis Galton (1884). Free-Will--Observations and Inferences. Mind 9 (35):406-413.
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  36. Martin Ganeri (2014). Free Will, Agency, and Selfhood in Rāmānuja. In Matthew R. Dasti & Edwin F. Bryant (eds.), Free Will, Agency, and Selfhood in Indian Philosophy. Oxford University Press. 232.
  37. Ken Gemes (2009). Nietzsche on Free Will, Autonomy, and the Sovereign Individual. In Ken Gemes & Simon May (eds.), Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy. Oxford University Press. 321-338.
    [Ken Gemes] In some texts Nietzsche vehemently denies the possibility of free will; in others he seems to positively countenance its existence. This paper distinguishes two different notions of free will. Agency free will is intrinsically tied to the question of agency, what constitutes an action as opposed to a mere doing. Deserts free will is intrinsically tied to the question of desert, of who does and does not merit punishment and reward. It is shown that we can render Nietzsche's (...)
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  38. Clark Glymour (2004). We Believe in Freedom of the Will so That We Can Learn. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):661-662.
    The central theoretical issue of Wegner's book is: Why do we have the illusion of conscious will? I suggest that learning requires belief in the autonomy of action. You should believe in freedom of the will because if you have it you're right, and if you don't have it you couldn't have done otherwise anyway. —Sam Buss (Lecture at University of California, San Diego, 2000).
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  39. Stewart Goetz (2013). Laws, Mind, and Free Will, by Steven Horst. Mind 122 (486):fzt062.
  40. David Gordon (1975). Free-Will and the Undesirability of Moral Education. Educational Theory 25 (4):407-416.
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  41. Jeffrey Gordon (1982). Introspective Method and Human Freedom. Southwest Philosophical Studies 8 (October):67-77.
  42. C. K. Grant (1952). Free Will: A Reply to Professor Campbell's Is 'Free Will' a Pseudo-Problem?. Mind 61 (July):381-385.
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  43. Patricia Greenspan (2012). Free Will and Rational Coherency. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):185-200.
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  44. Nel Grillaert (2006). Determining One's Fate: A Delineation of Nietzsche's Conception of Free Will. Journal of Nietzsche Studies 31 (1):42-60.
  45. Charles B. Guignon (2002). Ontological Presuppositions of the Determinism--Free Will Debate. In Harald Atmanspacher & Robert C. Bishop (eds.), Between Chance and Choice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic. 321--338.
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  46. Jean-Baptiste Guillon (2014). Van Inwagen on Introspected Freedom. Philosophical Studies 168 (3):645-663.
    Any philosopher who defends Free Will should have an answer to the epistemological question: “how do we know that we have such a capacity?” A traditional answer to this question is that we have some form of introspective access to our own Free Will. In recent times though, many philosophers have considered any such introspectionist theory as so obviously wrong that it hardly needs discussion, especially when Free Will is understood in libertarian terms. One of the rare objections to appear (...)
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  47. Ishtiyaque Haji (2012). Reason's Debt to Freedom: Normative Appraisals, Reasons, and Free Will. Oup Usa.
    To have free will with respect to an act is to have the ability both to perform and to refrain from performing it. In this book, Ishtiyaque Haji argues that no one can have practical reasons of a certain sort - "objective reasons" - to perform some act unless one has free will regarding that act.
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  48. Ishtiyaque Haji (2010). Intrinsic Value, Alternative Possibilities, and Reason. Journal of Ethics 14 (2):149-171.
    I address three issues in this paper: first, just as many have thought that there is a requirement of alternative possibilities for the truth of judgments of moral responsibility, is there reason to think that the truth of judgments of intrinsic value also presupposes our having alternatives? Second, if there is this sort of requirement for the truth of judgments of intrinsic value, is there an analogous requirement for the truth of judgments of moral obligation on the supposition that obligation (...)
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  49. Ishtiyaque Haji (2000). On Responsibility, History and Taking Responsibility. Journal of Ethics 4 (4):392-400.
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  50. Ishtiyaque Haji (2000). Replies to Kane and Fischer. Journal of Ethics 4 (4):364-367.
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