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  1. I. Barry'S. Argument (1996). Justice, Contestability, and Conceptions of the Good. Utilitas 8 (3).
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  2. Johannes Bechert (1991). The Problem of Semantic Incomparability. In Dietmar Zaefferer (ed.), Semantic Universals and Universal Semantics. Foris Publications. 12--60.
  3. Jeremy Bentham (2006). Value, Interest, and Well-Being. Utilitas 18 (4).
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  4. H. Bradbury & T. M. Nelson (1973). Transitivity and the Patterns of Adult Preferences. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 1 (5):337-339.
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  5. Will Braynen (2013). Moral Dimensions of Moral Hazards. Utilitas 26 (1):1-17.
    is an economic term which commonly refers to situations in which people have a tendency to increase their exposure to risk when the costs of their actions, should they get unlucky, befall someone else. Once insured, for example, a person might have little reason, financially speaking, to be careful if he will get fully reimbursed for his losses should things go wrong, especially if he does not risk an increase in his insurance premium fees. In this article, I argue that (...)
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  6. John Broome (2010). No Argument Against the Continuity of Value: Reply to Dorsey. Utilitas 22 (4):494-496.
    Dorsey rejects Conclusion, so he believes he must reject one of the premises. He argues that the best option is to reject Premise 3. Rejecting Premise 3 entails a certain sort of discontinuity in value. So Dorsey believes he has an argument for discontinuity.
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  7. Krister Bykvist (2010). John Broome, Weighing Lives (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), Pp. 286. Utilitas 22 (4):497-500.
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  8. Ruth Chang (2013). Incommensurability (and Incomparability). In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
  9. B. Colburn (2011). Adaptive Preferences and Autonomy. Utilitas 23 (1).
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  10. Ben Colburn (2011). Autonomy and Adaptive Preferences. Utilitas 23 (1):52-71.
    Adaptive preference formation is the unconscious altering of our preferences in light of the options we have available. Jon Elster has argued that this is bad because it undermines our autonomy. I agree, but think that Elster's explanation of why is lacking. So, I draw on a richer account of autonomy to give the following answer. Preferences formed through adaptation are characterized by covert influence (that is, explanations of which an agent herself is necessarily unaware), and covert influence undermines our (...)
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  11. Adam Cureton (2009). Degrees of Fairness and Proportional Chances. Utilitas 21 (2):217-221.
    Suppose the following: Two groups of people require our aid but we can help only one group; there are more people in the first group than the second group; every person in both groups has an equal claim on our aid; and we have a duty to help and no other special obligations or duties. I argue that there exists at least one fairness function, which is a function that measures the goodness of degrees of fairness, that implies that we (...)
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  12. Subject Darwall’S. (2006). Darwall on Welfare as Rational Care. Utilitas 18 (4).
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  13. J. de Wispelaere (2000). Andrew Mason (Ed.), Ideals on Equality. Utilitas 12 (2):243-247.
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  14. Tom Dougherty (2013). Aggregation, Beneficence and Chance. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (2):1-19.
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  15. Rem B. Edwards (ed.) (1995). Formal Axiology and its Critics. Rodopi.
    Formal Axiology and Its Critics consists of two parts, both of which present criticisms of the formal theory of values developed by Robert S. Hartman, replies to these criticisms, plus a short introduction to formal axiology.Part I consists of articles published or made public during the lifetime of Hartman to which he personally replied. It contains previously published replies to Hector Neri Castañeda, William Eckhardt, and Robert S. Brumbaugh, and previously unpublished replies to Charles Hartshorne, Rem B. Edwards, Robert E. (...)
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  16. Cécile Fabre (2010). Distributive Justice and Freedom: Cohen on Money and Labour. Utilitas 22 (4):393-412.
    In his recent Rescuing Justice and Equality, G. A. Cohen mounts a sustained critique of coerced labour, against the background of a radical egalitarian conception of distributive justice. In this article, I argue that Cohenian egalitarians are committed to holding the talented under a moral duty to choose socially useful work for the sake of the less fortunate. As I also show, Cohen's arguments against coerced labour fail, particularly in the light of his commitment to coercive taxation. In the course (...)
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  17. Cécile Fabre (2009). Is the Body Special? Review of Cecile Fabre, Whose Body is It Anyway? Justice and the Integrity of the Person. Utilitas 21 (2).
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  18. Guy Fletcher (2013). A Millian Objection to Reasons as Evidence. Utilitas 25 (3):417-420.
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  19. Bernard Gert (2004). Comments on Cahn's "the Happy Immoralist". Journal of Social Philosophy 35 (1):18–19.
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  20. Nicolito Gianan (2011). Delving Into the Ethical Dimension Of. Cultura. International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology 8 (1):63-82.
  21. Bengt Hansson (1968). Choice Structures and Preference Relations. Synthese 18 (4):443 - 458.
  22. Nicole Hassoun (2009). Meeting Need. Utilitas 21 (3):250-275.
    This paper considers the question ‘How should institutions enable people to meet their needs in situations where there is no guarantee that all needs can be met?’ After considering and rejecting several simple principles for meeting needs, it suggests a new effectiveness principle that 1) gives greater weight to the needs of the less well off and 2) gives weight to enabling a greater number of people to meet their needs. The effectiveness principle has some advantage over the main competitors (...)
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  23. Jennifer Hawkins (2011). Daniel M. Haybron, The Pursuit of Unhappiness: The Elusive Psychology of Well-Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), Pp. Ix + 357. [REVIEW] Utilitas 23 (2):237-241.
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  24. Tim Henning (forthcoming). From Choice to Chance? Saving People, Fairness, and Lotteries. Philosophical Review.
    Many authors in ethics, economics and political science endorse the Lottery Requirement, i.e. the following thesis: Where different parties have equal moral claims to one indivisible good, it is morally obligatory to let a fair lottery decide which party is to receive the good. This article defends skepticism about the Lottery Requirement. Three broad strategies of defending such a requirement are distinguished: the surrogate satisfaction account, the procedural account and the ideal consent account. It is argued that none of these (...)
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  25. Ranjoo Seodu Herr (2010). Agency Without Autonomy: Valuational Agency. Journal of Global Ethics 6 (3):239-254.
    National minority women’s defense of nonliberal minority cultures that encompass sexist customs and rules has greatly perplexed liberal theorists. Many attempted to resolve this puzzle by attributing constrained agency to such women and dismissing their defense as unreasonable. This article argues that this liberal assessment of minority women’s position is philosophically indefensible and that the failure of mainstream liberalism to make sense of these women’s response indicates not that these women’s agency is compromised but rather that the liberal conception of (...)
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  26. Keith Horton (2011). Fairness and Fair Shares. Utilitas 23 (1):88.
    Some moral principles require agents to do more than their fair share of a common task, if others won’t do their fair share – each agent’s fair share being what they would be required to do if all contributed as they should. This seems to provide a strong basis for objecting to such principles. For it seems unfair to require agents who have already done their fair share to do more, just because other agents won’t do their fair share. The (...)
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  27. Leslaw Hostynski (2009). Chapter 1: AXIOLOGY-Formal Axiology of Henryk Elzenberg. Dialogue and Universalism 19 (8):19.
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  28. N. Hsieh (forthcoming). Is Incomparability a Problem for Anyone?, Forthcoming In. Economics and Philosophy.
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  29. Nien-hê Hsieh, Alan Strudler & David Wasserman (2007). Pairwise Comparison and Numbers Skepticism. Utilitas 19 (4):487-504.
    In this article, we defend pairwise comparison as a method to resolve conflicting claims from different people that cannot be jointly satisfied because of a scarcity of resources. We consider Michael Otsuka's recent challenge that pairwise comparison leads to intransitive choices for the (someone who believes the numbers should not count in forced choices among lives) and Frances Kamm's responses to Otsuka's challenge. We argue that Kamm's responses do not succeed, but that the threat they are designed to meet is (...)
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  30. Michael Huemer (2012). Against Equality and Priority. Utilitas 24 (04):483-501.
    -/- I start from three premises, roughly as follows: (1) that if possible world x is better than world y for every individual who exists in either world, then x is better than y; (2) that if x has a higher average utility, a higher total utility, and no more inequality than y, then x is better than y; (3) that better than is transitive. From these premises, it follows that benefits given to the worse off contribute no more to (...)
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  31. I. What Admirable Immorality & Nonadmirable Morality Are (1999). The Moral Aspect of Nonmoral Goods and Evils. Utilitas 11 (1).
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  32. Joyce L. Jenkins (2011). Dead and Gone. Utilitas 23 (2):228-234.
    I argue that desire satisfaction theories of welfare are not committed to the view that changes in welfare levels can happen after death, or that events that occur after death impact the agent's welfare levels now. My argument is that events that occur after death have only epistemological import. They may reveal that the person was successful (unsuccessful) in life, but the desire was already frustrated or satisfied before the person died. The virtue of the account is that it gives (...)
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  33. Jens Johansson & Karl Ekendahl (2013). Dead and Gone? Reply to Jenkins. Utilitas 26 (2):1-3.
    In a recent article, Joyce L. Jenkins challenges the common belief that desire satisfactionists are committed to the view that a person's welfare can be affected by posthumous events. Jenkins argues that desire satisfactionists can and should say that posthumous events only play an epistemic role: though such events cannot harm me, they can reveal that I have already been harmed by something else. In this response, however, we show that Jenkins's approach collapses into the view she aims to avoid.
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  34. Klemens Kappel (1997). Equality, Priority, and Time. Utilitas 9 (02):203-.
    The lifetime equality view (the view that it is good if people's lives on the whole are equally worth living) has recently been met with the objection that it does not rule out simultaneous inequality: two persons may lead equally good lives on the whole and yet there may at any time be great differences in their level of well-being. And simultaneous inequality, it is held, ought to be a concern of egalitarians. The paper discusses this and related objections to (...)
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  35. Sigmund Koch (1969). Axiology, and Science. In Marjorie Glicksman Grene (ed.), The Anatomy of Knowledge: Papers Presented to the Study Group on Foundations of Cultural Unity, Bowdoin College, 1965 and 1966. London, Routledge & K. Paul. 119.
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  36. Michele M. Moody-Adams (1999). James Griffin's Value Judgement: Improving Our Ethical Beliefs Is. Utilitas 11 (1).
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  37. G. E. Moore & W. D. Ross (2009). Some Difficult Intuitions for the Principle of Universality. Utilitas 21 (4).
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  38. E. Moutsopoulos (1987). Art as an Axiology of Man. Filosofia 17:120-152.
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  39. Mozaffar Qizilbash (2007). The Mere Addition Paradox, Parity and Vagueness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):129–151.
    Derek Parfit’s mere addition paradox has generated a large literature. This paper articulates one response to this paradox - which Parfit hirnself suggested - in terms of a formal account of the relation of parity. I term this response the ‘parity view’. It is consistent with transitivity of ‘at least as good as’, but implies incompleteness of this relation. The parity view is compatible with critical-band utilitarianism if this is adjusted to allow for vagueness. John Broome argues against accounts which (...)
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  40. Wlodek Rabinowicz, Value Relations: Old Wine in New Barrels.
    In Rabinowicz 2008, I considered how value relations can best be analyzed in terms of fitting pro-­‐attitudes. In the formal model presented in that paper fitting pro-­‐attitudes are represented by the class of permissible preference orderings on a domain of items that are being compared. As it turns out, this approach opens up for a multiplicity of different types of value relationships, along with the standard relations of "better", "worse", "equally as good as" and "incomparable in value". Unfortunately, though, the (...)
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  41. Wlodek Rabinowicz (2002). Prioritarianism for Prospects. Utilitas 14 (01):2-21.
    The Interpersonal Addition Theorem, due to John Broome, states that, given certain seemingly innocuous assumptions, the overall utility of an uncertain prospect can be represented as the sum of its individual (expected) utilities. Given ‘Bernoulli's hypothesis’ according to which individual utility coincides with individual welfare, this result appears to be incompatible with the Priority View. On that view, due to Derek Parfit, the benefits to the worse off should count for more, in the overall evaluation, than the comparable benefits to (...)
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  42. Saul Smilansky (2010). Moral Aspirations and Ideals. Utilitas 22 (3).
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  43. Wp SWp, Wswp Swsw & Wswswp Swswsw (1994). The Multiplication of Utility. Utilitas 6 (2).
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  44. L. A. Zadeh (1977). Linguistic Characterization of Preference Relations as a Basis for Choice in Social Systems. Erkenntnis 11 (1):383 - 410.
  45. B. Zboril (1992). The Foundations of Axiology. Filosoficky Casopis 40 (3):468-475.
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Values and Norms
  1. Alan Ross Anderson (1958). The Logic of Norms. Logique Et Analyse 1 (2):84.
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  2. Jonny Anomaly & Geoffrey Brennan (2014). Social Norms, The Invisible Hand, and the Law. University of Queensland Law Journal 33 (2).
  3. Marcus Arvan (2013). Groundwork for a New Moral Epistemology. Klesis 27:155-190.
    This paper argues that virtue ethics and prevailing epistemic norms in moral and political philosophy more generally both support a new kind of empirically-informed moral-virtue epistemology, or “experimental ethics” – an epistemology according to which disputed normative premises in moral and political philosophy should be epistemically evaluated on the basis of empirically-observed relationships they bear to morally admirable and morally repugnant psycho-behavioral traits, as defined by cross-cultural, cross-historical, and cross-debate agreement on the moral valence of particular traits and behaviors.
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  4. Robert Audi (2005). The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value. Princeton Up.
    "Robert Audi's magisterial "The Good in the Right" offers the most comprehensive and developed account of rational ethical intuitionism to date."--Roger Crisp, St. Anne's College, University of Oxford "This is an excellent book.
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  5. Carla Bagnoli (2006). Breaking Ties: The Significance of Choice in Symmetrical Moral Dilemmas. Dialectica 60 (2):157–170.
    In symmetrical moral dilemmas, the agent faces a choice between two incompatible actions, which are equally justified on the basis of the same value. These cases are generally discounted as spurious or irrelevant on the assumption that, when there is no failure of commensurability, choice between symmetrical requirements is indifferent and can be determined by randomization. Alternatively, this article argues that the appeal to randomization allows the agent to overcome a deliberative impasse, but it does not really resolve the moral (...)
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