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  1. Andrew Aberdein (2014). In Defence of Virtue: The Legitimacy of Agent-Based Argument Appraisal. Informal Logic 34 (1):77-93.
    Several authors have recently begun to apply virtue theory to argumentation. Critics of this programme have suggested that no such theory can avoid committing an ad hominem fallacy. This criticism is shown to trade unsuccessfully on an ambiguity in the definition of ad hominem. The ambiguity is resolved and a virtue-theoretic account of ad hominem reasoning is defended.
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  2. Surendra Arjoon (2000). Virtue Theory as a Dynamic Theory of Business. Journal of Business Ethics 28 (2):159 - 178.
    This paper develops a meta-theory of business based on virtue theory which links the concept of virtues, the common good, and the dynamic economy into a unifying and comprehensive theory of business. Traditional theories and models of business have outlived their usefulness as they are unable to adequately explain social reality. Virtue theory shows firms that pursue ethically-driven strategies can realise a greater profit potential than those firms who currently use profit-driven strategies. The theory expounds that the business of business (...)
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  3. Sherry Baker (2008). The Model of the Principled Advocate and the Pathological Partisan: A Virtue Ethics Construct of Opposing Archetypes of Public Relations and Advertising Practitioners. Journal of Mass Media Ethics 23 (3):235 – 253.
    Drawing upon contemporary virtue ethics theory, The Model of The Principled Advocate and The Pathological Partisan is introduced. Profiles are developed of diametrically opposed archetypes of public relations and advertising practitioners. The Principled Advocate represents the advocacy virtues of humility, truth, transparency, respect, care, authenticity, equity, and social responsibility. The Pathological Partisan represents the opposing vices of arrogance, deceit, secrecy, manipulation, disregard, artifice, injustice, and raw self-interest. One becomes either a Principled Advocate or a Pathological Partisan by habitually enacting or (...)
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  4. Donald Beggs (2003). The Idea of Group Moral Virtue. Journal of Social Philosophy 34 (3):457–474.
  5. Roberta M. Berry (2009). Pt. 3. The Malleability of Human Nature. Reflections on Secular Foundationalism and Our Human Future / Stephen Erickson ; Nature as Second Nature : Plasticity and Habit / Peter Wake ; The Posthumanist Challenge to a Partly Naturalized Virtue Ethics. [REVIEW] In Mark J. Cherry (ed.), The Normativity of the Natural: Human Goods, Human Virtues, and Human Flourishing. Springer
  6. Noell Birondo (2015). Aristotelian Eudaimonism and Patriotism. Dialogue and Universalism 25 (2):68-78.
    This paper concerns the prospects for an internal validation of the Aristotelian virtues of character. With respect to the more contentious trait of patriotism, this approach for validating some specific trait of character as a virtue of character provides a plausible and nuanced Aristotelian position that does not fall neatly into any of the categories provided by a recent mapping of the terrain surrounding the issue of patriotism. According to the approach advocated here, patriotism can plausibly, though qualifiedly, be defended (...)
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  7. Kimberley Brownlee (2010). Moral Aspirations and Ideals. Utilitas 22 (3):241-257.
    My aim is to vindicate two distinct and important moral categories – ideals and aspirations – which have received modest, and sometimes negative, attention in recent normative debates. An ideal is a conception of perfection or model of excellence around which we can shape our thoughts and actions. An aspiration, by contrast, is an attitudinal position of steadfast commitment to, striving for, or deep desire or longing for, an ideal. I locate these two concepts in relation to more familiar moral (...)
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  8. Stephen Buckle (2002). Aristotle's Republic or, Why Aristotle's Ethics is Not Virtue Ethics. Philosophy 77 (4):565-595.
    Modern virtue ethics is commonly presented as an alternative to Kantian and utilitarian views—to ethics focused on action and obligations—and it invokes Aristotle as a predecessor. This paper argues that the Nichomachean Ethics does not represent virtue ethics thus conceived, because the discussion of the virtues of character there serves a quasi-Platonic psychology: it is an account of how to tame the unruly (non-rational) elements of the human soul so that they can be ruled by reason and the laws it (...)
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  9. David Carr & J. W. Steutel (eds.) (1999). Virtue Ethics and Moral Education. Routledge.
    This book takes a major step in the philosophy of education by moving back past the Enlightenment and reinstating Aristotelian Virtue at the heart of moral education.
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  10. W. Scott Clifton (2013). Murdochian Moral Perception. Journal of Value Inquiry 47 (3):207-220.
    There has been a recent surge of interest in the moral philosophy of Iris Murdoch. One issue that has arisen is whether her view advocates a form of moral perception. In this paper I argue that her view does indeed advocate for a form of moral perception—what I call weak moral perception. In the process of moral reasoning weak moral perception plays a preparatory role for moral judgment, which means that moral judgment isn’t simply a matter of seeing what action (...)
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  11. Robert Cochran Jr (2000). Professionalism in the Postmodern Age: Its Death, Attempts at Resuscitation, and Alternate Sources of Virtue. Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy 14 (1):305-320.
  12. Bradford Cokelet (forthcoming). Dispositions, Character, and the Value of Acts. In Christian Miller, R. Michael Furr, Angela Knobel & William Fleeson (eds.), Character: New Directions from Philosophy, Psychology, and Theology. Oxford University Press
    This paper concerns the central virtue ethical thesis that the ethical quality of an agent's actions is a function of her dispositional character. Skeptics have rightly urged us to distinguish between an agent's particular intentions or occurrant motives and dispositional facts about her character, but they falsely contend that if we are attentive to this distinction, then we will see that the virtue ethical thesis is false. In this paper I present a new interpretation and defense of the (...)
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  13. Damian Cox, Marguerite La Caze & Michael Levine (2003). Integrity and the Fragile Self. Ashgate.
    This book examines the centrality of integrity in relation to a variety of philosophical and psychological concerns that impinge upon the ethical life.
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  14. Matthew J. Drake & John Teepen Schlachter (2008). A Virtue-Ethics Analysis of Supply Chain Collaboration. Journal of Business Ethics 82 (4):851 - 864.
    Technological advancements in information systems over the past few decades have enabled firms to work with the major suppliers and customers in their supply chain in order to improve the performance of the entire channel. Tremendous benefits for all parties can be realized by sharing information and coordinating operations to reduce inventory requirements, improve quality, and increase customer satisfaction; but the companies must collaborate effectively to bring these gains to fruition. We consider two alternative methods of managing these interfirm supply (...)
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  15. Adrian Evans & Michael King (2012). Reflections on the Connection of Virtue Ethics to Therapeutic Jurisprudence. University of New South Wales Law Journal 35 (3):717-746.
    Therapeutic Jurisprudence (‘TJ’) and virtue ethics are major parallel forces for good in legal practice. Both seek to understand and mediate frailness in human behaviour and explain why such ‘goodness’ is important for lawyers and their clients. But while a TJ practitioner and a virtue ethicist are often in agreement, they are fraternal rather than identical twins. This paper is addressed to those practising lawyers for whom TJ may become a central motivation to practice law, by reflecting on the moral (...)
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  16. Espen Gamlund (2011). Living Under the Guidance of Reason: Arne Naess's Interpretation of Spinoza. Inquiry 54 (1):2-17.
    There is no doubt that Spinoza values what he calls living under the guidance of reason, and that he somehow equates such a life with happiness. What is less clear is exactly how he conceives of such a life, and thus how he conceives of human happiness. According to Arne Naess's interpretation of Spinoza, the virtuous and free person will prefer the life of action, and happiness is best realised through living an active life “in the world”. Other scholars, however, (...)
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  17. Martin Gibert & Mauro Rossi (2011). L'éthique de la Vertu Et le Critère de l'Action Correcte. Dialogue 50 (02):367-390.
    ABSTRACT : According to the most popular version of virtue ethics (Hursthouse, 1991; Zagzebsk,i 1996), the right action in a given situation is the action that a fully virtuous agent would do given the circumstances. However, this criterion raises two objections: in some situations, it does not determine the right action correctly, and in other situations, it does not determine any right action at all. In this article, we argue that these objections stem from either simple imaginative resistance or a (...)
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  18. Nicholas F. Gier (2001). The Dancing Ru: A Confucian Aesthetics of Virtue. Philosophy East and West 51 (2):280-305.
    The most constructive response to the crisis in moral theory has been the revival of virtue ethics, which has the advantages of being personal, contextual, and, as will be argued, normative as well. It is also proposed that the best way to refound virtue ethics is to return to the Greek concept of technē tou biou, literally "craft of life." The ancients did not distinguish between craft and fine art, and the meaning of technē, even in its Latin form, ars, (...)
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  19. Matthew Kotzen (2015). The Normativity of Humor. Philosophical Issues 25 (1):396-414.
  20. Mark LeBar (2007). Prichard Vs. Plato: Intuition Vs. Reflection. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (5):pp. 1-32.
    This paper addresses a complaint, by Prichard, against Plato and other ancients. The charge is that they commit a mistake is in thinking that we are capable of giving reasons for the requirements of duty, rather than directly and immediately apprehending those requirements. I respond in two ways. First, Plato does not make the egregious mistake of substituting interest for duty, and thus giving the wrong kind of reason for duty’s requirements, as Prichard alleges. Second, we should see that the (...)
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  21. Eric C. Limbs & Timothy L. Fort (2000). Nigerian Business Practices and Their Interface with Virtue Ethics. Journal of Business Ethics 26 (2):169 - 179.
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  22. Micah Lott (2013). Does Human Nature Conflict with Itself? Human Form and the Harmony of the Virtues. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):657-683.
    Does possessing some human virtues make it impossible for a person to possess other human virtues? Isaiah Berlin and Bernard Williams both answered “yes” to this question, and they argued that to hold otherwise—to accept the harmony of the virtues—required a blinkered and unrealistic view of “what it is to be human.” In this essay, I have two goals: (1) to show how the harmony of the virtues is best interpreted, and what is at stake in affirming or denying it; (...)
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  23. Piotr T. Makowski (2010). The Task of a Naturalist: An Epitaph for Philippa Foot (1920-2010). Ethics in Progress Quarterly 1 (1):197-201.
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  24. David McPherson (2015). Homo Religiosus: Does Spirituality Have a Place in Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics? Religious Studies 51 (3):335-346.
    In this article I seek to show the importance of spirituality for a neo-Aristotelian account of ‘the good life’. First, I lay out my account of spirituality. Second, I discuss why the issue of the place of spirituality in the good life has often either been ignored or explicitly excluded from consideration by neo-Aristotelians. I suggest that a lot turns on how one understands the ‘ethical naturalism’ to which neo-Aristotelians are committed. Finally, I argue that through a deeper exploration of (...)
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  25. Gregory Mellema (1993). Quasi-Obligation and the Failure to Be Virtuous. Journal of Social Philosophy 24 (2):176-185.
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  26. Christian Miller (2015). Empathy as the Only Hope for the Virtue of Compassion and as Support for a Limited Unity of the Virtues. Philosophy, Theology, and the Sciences 2:89-113.
    This paper claims that altruistic motivation is necessary for possessing the virtue of compassion, and that research on empathy (in particular, work by Dan Batson) has been the only promising source of evidence for such motivation. Challenges to using empathy as a means to cultivating compassion are also considered.
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  27. Christian Miller (2013). Integrity. In Blackwell International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Blackwell 1-11.
    Integrity is one of the leading normative concepts employed in our society. We frequently talk about the degree of integrity of community leaders and famous historical figures, and we highly value integrity in our elected public officials. But philosophers have had a difficult time arriving at consensus about what integrity consists in. Some claim that it is a purely formal relation of consistency, others that it has to do primarily with one‟s identity, and still others that it involves subjective or (...)
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  28. Christian Miller (2010). Character Traits, Social Psychology, and Impediments to Helping Behavior. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5 (1):1-36.
    In a number of recent papers, I have begun to develop a new theory of character which is conceptually distinct both from traditional Aristotelian accounts as well as from the positive view of local traits outlined by John Doris. On my view, many human beings do have robust traits of character which play an important explanatory and predictive role, but which are triggered by certain situational variables which preclude them from counting as genuine Aristotelian virtues. Like others in this discussion, (...)
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  29. Christian B. Miller (2016). Should Christians Be Worried About Situationist Claims in Psychology and Philosophy? Faith and Philosophy 33 (1):48-73.
    The situationist movement in psychology and, more recently, in philosophy has been associated with a number of striking claims, including that most people do not have the moral virtues and vices, that any ethical theory which is wedded to such character traits is empirically inadequate, and that much of our behavior is causally influenced, to significant degrees, by psychological influences about which we are often unaware. Yet Christian philosophers have had virtually nothing to say about situationist claims. The goal of (...)
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  30. Matthew B. O'Brien & Robert C. Koons (2012). Objects of Intention: A Hylomorphic Critique of the New Natural Law Theory. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):655-703.
    The “New Natural Law” Theory (NNL) of Germain Grisez, John Finnis, Joseph Boyle, and their collaborators offers a distinctive account of intentional action, which underlies a moral theory that aims to justify many aspects of traditional morality and Catholic doctrine. -/- In fact, we show that the NNL is committed to premises that entail the permissibility of many actions that are irreconcilable with traditional morality and Catholic doctrine, such as elective abortions. These consequences follow principally from two aspects of the (...)
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  31. Justin Oakley (1996). Varieties of Virtue Ethics. Ratio 9 (2):128-152.
  32. Peter Olsthoorn (2013). Virtue Ethics in the Military. In Stan van Hooft (ed.), The Handbook of Virtue Ethics. Acumen 365-374.
    In addition to the traditional reliance on rules and codes in regulating the conduct of military personnel, most of today’s militaries put their money on character building in trying to make their soldiers virtuous. Especially in recent years it has time and again been argued that virtue ethics, with its emphasis on character building, provides a better basis for military ethics than deontological ethics or utilitarian ethics. Although virtue ethics comes in many varieties these days, in many texts on military (...)
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  33. Daniel Putman (1997). The Intellectual Bias of Virtue Ethics. Philosophy 72 (280):303 - 311.
  34. William Rehg & Darin Davis (2003). Conceptual Gerrymandering? The Alignment of Hursthouse's Naturalistic Virtue Ethics with Neo-Kantian Non-Naturalism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):583-600.
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  35. David T. Risser (2009). Book Review: Nick Smith - I Was Wrong: The Meanings of Apologies. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (2):263-271.
  36. Alex Sager (2013). Philosophy of Leisure. In Tony Blackshaw (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Leisure Studies. Routledge 5-14.
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  37. Alexander Sarch (2008). What's Wrong with Megalopsychia? Philosophy 83 (2):231-253.
    This paper looks at two accounts of Aristotle's views on the virtue of megalopsychia. The first, defended by Christopher Cordner, commits Aristotle to two claims about the virtuous person that might seem unpalatable to modern readers. The second account, defended by Roger Crips, does not commit Aristotle to these claims. Some might count this as an advantage of Crisp's account. However, I argue that Cordner's account, not Crisp's, is actually the better interpretation of Aristotle. Nonetheless, this does not ultimately spell (...)
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  38. Nicholas Schroeder (2015). The Problem of Continence in Contemporary Virtue Ethics. Journal of Ethics 19 (1):85-104.
    The harmony thesis claims that a virtuous agent will not experience inner conflict or pain when acting. The continent agent, on the other hand, is conflicted or pained when acting virtuously, making him inferior to the virtuous agent. But following Karen Stohr’s counterexample, we can imagine a case like a company owner who needs to fire some of her employees to save her company, where acting with conflict or pain is not only appropriate, but necessary in the situation. This creates (...)
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  39. Rebecca Stangl (2010). Asymmetrical Virtue Particularism. Ethics 121 (1):37-57.
    In this essay, I defend an account of right action that I shall call “asymmetrical virtue particularism.” An action, on this account, is right just insofar as it is overall virtuous. But the virtuousness of an action in any particular respect, X, is deontically variant; it can fail to be right-making, either because it is deontically irrelevant or because it is wrong-making. Finally, the account is asymmetrical insofar as the viciousness of actions is not deontically variant; if any action is (...)
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  40. Rebecca Stangl (2008). A Dilemma for Particularist Virtue Ethics. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):665-678.
    There is an obvious affinity between virtue ethics and particularism. Both stress the complexify of the moral life, the inadequacy of rule-following as a guide to moral deliberation, and the importance of judgement in discerning the morally relevant features of particular situations. Yet it remains an open question how deep the affinity goes. I argue that the radical form of particularism defended by Jonathan Dancy has surprisingly strong implications for virtue ethics. Adopting such a view would require the virtue theorist (...)
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  41. Karen Stohr (2002). Virtue Ethics and Kant's Cold-Hearted Benefactor. Journal of Value Inquiry 32 (2-3):187-204.
  42. Frans Svensson (2010). Virtue Ethics and the Search for an Account of Right Action. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (3):255 - 271.
    Conceived of as a contender to other theories in substantive ethics, virtue ethics is often associated with, in essence, the following account or criterion of right action: VR: An action A is right for S in circumstances C if and only if a fully virtuous agent would characteristically do A in C. There are serious objections to VR, which take the form of counter-examples. They present us with different scenarios in which less than fully virtuous persons would be acting rightly (...)
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  43. Frans Svensson (2008). Virtue Ethics and Elitism. Philosophical Papers 37 (1):131-155.
    Because of its reliance on a basically Aristotelian conception of virtue, contemporary virtue ethics is often criticised for being inherently elitist. I argue that this objection is mistaken. The core of my argument is that we need to take seriously that virtue, according to Aristotle, is something that we acquire gradually, via a developmental process. People are not just stuck with their characters once and for all, but can always aspire to become better (more virtuous). And that is plausibly the (...)
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  44. Lisa Tessman (2013). “Virtue Ethics and Moral Failure: Lessons From Neuroscientific Moral Psychology”. In Michael Austin (ed.), Virtues in Action: New Essays in Applied Virtue Ethics. Palgrave Macmillan
  45. Lisa Tessman (2001). Critical Virtue Ethics: Understanding Oppression as Morally Damaging. In Peggy DesAutels & Joanne Waugh (eds.), Feminists Doing Ethics. Rowman & Littlefield
    A critically revised Aristotelian-based virtue ethics has something potentially useful to offer to those engaged in analyzing oppression and creating liberatory projects. A critical virtue ethics can help clarify one of the ways in which oppression interferes with flourishing; specifically, it helps clarify an aspect of oppression that can be called "moral damage.".
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  46. Liezl van Zyl (2011). Right Action and the Non-Virtuous Agent. Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (1):80-92.
    According to qualified-agent virtue ethics, an action is right if and only if it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances. I discuss two closely related objections to this view, both of which concern the actions of the non-virtuous. The first is that this criterion sometimes gives the wrong result, for in some cases a non-virtuous agent should not do what a virtuous person would characteristically do. A second objection is it altogether fails (...)
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  47. Liezl van Zyl (2009). Accidental Rightness. Philosophia 37 (1):91-104.
    In this paper I argue that the disagreement between modern moral philosophers and (some) virtue ethicists about whether motive affects rightness is a result of conceptual disagreement, and that when they develop a theory of ‘right action,’ the two parties respond to two very different questions. Whereas virtue ethicists tend to use ‘right’ as interchangeable with ‘good’ or ‘virtuous’ and as implying moral praise, modern moral philosophers use it as roughly equivalent to ‘in accordance with moral obligation.’ One implication of (...)
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  48. Liezl van Zyl (2007). Can Virtuous People Emerge From Tragic Dilemmas Having Acted Well? Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (1):50–61.
    A tragic dilemma is thought to arise when an agent, through no fault of her own, finds herself in a situation where she must choose between two courses of action, both of which it would be wrong to undertake. I focus on tragic dilemmas that are resolvable, that is, where a reason can be given in favour of one course of action over another, and my aim is to examine whether Hursthouse's virtue-ethical account of right action succeeds in avoiding two (...)
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  49. Jonathan Webber (2013). Cultivating Virtue. In Havi Carel & Darian Meacham (eds.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press 239-259.
    Ought you to cultivate your own virtue? Various philosophers have argued that there is something suspect about directing one’s ethical attention towards oneself in this way. These arguments can be divided between those that deem aiming at virtue for its own sake to be narcissistic and those that consider aiming at virtue for the sake of good behaviour to involve a kind of doublethink. Underlying them all is the assumption that epistemic access to one’s own character requires an external point (...)
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  50. Jonathan Webber (2013). Character, Attitude and Disposition. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):1082-1096.
    Recent debate over the empirical psychological presuppositions of virtue ethics has focused on reactive behavioural dispositions. But there are many character traits that cannot be understood properly in this way. Such traits are well described by attitude psychology. Moreover, the findings of attitude psychology support virtue ethics in three ways. First, they confirm the role of habituation in the development of character. Further, they show virtue ethics to be compatible with the situation manipulation experiments at the heart of the recent (...)
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