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  1. Sherry Baker (2008). The Model of the Principled Advocate and the Pathological Partisan: A Virtue Ethics Construct of Opposing Archetypes of Public Relations and Advertising Practitioners. Journal of Mass Media Ethics 23 (3):235 – 253.
    Drawing upon contemporary virtue ethics theory, The Model of The Principled Advocate and The Pathological Partisan is introduced. Profiles are developed of diametrically opposed archetypes of public relations and advertising practitioners. The Principled Advocate represents the advocacy virtues of humility, truth, transparency, respect, care, authenticity, equity, and social responsibility. The Pathological Partisan represents the opposing vices of arrogance, deceit, secrecy, manipulation, disregard, artifice, injustice, and raw self-interest. One becomes either a Principled Advocate or a Pathological Partisan by habitually enacting or (...)
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  2. Roberta M. Berry (2009). Pt. 3. The Malleability of Human Nature. Reflections on Secular Foundationalism and Our Human Future / Stephen Erickson ; Nature as Second Nature : Plasticity and Habit / Peter Wake ; The Posthumanist Challenge to a Partly Naturalized Virtue Ethics. [REVIEW] In Mark J. Cherry (ed.), The Normativity of the Natural: Human Goods, Human Virtues, and Human Flourishing. Springer.
  3. Kimberley Brownlee (2010). Moral Aspirations and Ideals. Utilitas 22 (3):241-257.
    My aim is to vindicate two distinct and important moral categories – ideals and aspirations – which have received modest, and sometimes negative, attention in recent normative debates. An ideal is a conception of perfection or model of excellence around which we can shape our thoughts and actions. An aspiration, by contrast, is an attitudinal position of steadfast commitment to, striving for, or deep desire or longing for, an ideal. I locate these two concepts in relation to more familiar moral (...)
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  4. Stephen Buckle (2002). Aristotle's Republic or, Why Aristotle's Ethics is Not Virtue Ethics. Philosophy 77 (4):565-595.
    Modern virtue ethics is commonly presented as an alternative to Kantian and utilitarian views—to ethics focused on action and obligations—and it invokes Aristotle as a predecessor. This paper argues that the Nichomachean Ethics does not represent virtue ethics thus conceived, because the discussion of the virtues of character there serves a quasi-Platonic psychology: it is an account of how to tame the unruly (non-rational) elements of the human soul so that they can be ruled by reason and the laws it (...)
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  5. David Carr & J. W. Steutel (eds.) (1999). Virtue Ethics and Moral Education. Routledge.
    This book takes a major step in the philosophy of education by moving back past the Enlightenment and reinstating Aristotelian Virtue at the heart of moral education.
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  6. W. Scott Clifton (2013). Murdochian Moral Perception. Journal of Value Inquiry 47 (3):207-220.
    There has been a recent surge of interest in the moral philosophy of Iris Murdoch. One issue that has arisen is whether her view advocates a form of moral perception. In this paper I argue that her view does indeed advocate for a form of moral perception—what I call weak moral perception. In the process of moral reasoning weak moral perception plays a preparatory role for moral judgment, which means that moral judgment isn’t simply a matter of seeing what action (...)
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  7. Bradford Cokelet (forthcoming). Dispositions, Character, and the Value of Acts. In Christian Miller, R. Michael Furr, Angela Knobel & William Fleeson (eds.), Character: New Directions from Philosophy, Psychology, and Theology. Oxford University Press.
    This paper concerns the central virtue ethical thesis that the ethical quality of an agent's actions is a function of her dispositional character. Skeptics have rightly urged us to distinguish between an agent's particular intentions or occurrant motives and dispositional facts about her character, but they falsely contend that if we are attentive to this distinction, then we will see that the virtue ethical thesis is false. In this paper I present a new interpretation and defense of the virtue ethical (...)
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  8. Damian Cox, Marguerite La Caze & Michael Levine (2003). Integrity and the Fragile Self. Ashgate.
    This book examines the centrality of integrity in relation to a variety of philosophical and psychological concerns that impinge upon the ethical life.
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  9. Matthew J. Drake & John Teepen Schlachter (2008). A Virtue-Ethics Analysis of Supply Chain Collaboration. Journal of Business Ethics 82 (4):851 - 864.
    Technological advancements in information systems over the past few decades have enabled firms to work with the major suppliers and customers in their supply chain in order to improve the performance of the entire channel. Tremendous benefits for all parties can be realized by sharing information and coordinating operations to reduce inventory requirements, improve quality, and increase customer satisfaction; but the companies must collaborate effectively to bring these gains to fruition. We consider two alternative methods of managing these interfirm supply (...)
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  10. Espen Gamlund (2011). Living Under the Guidance of Reason: Arne Naess's Interpretation of Spinoza. Inquiry 54 (1):2-17.
    There is no doubt that Spinoza values what he calls living under the guidance of reason, and that he somehow equates such a life with happiness. What is less clear is exactly how he conceives of such a life, and thus how he conceives of human happiness. According to Arne Naess's interpretation of Spinoza, the virtuous and free person will prefer the life of action, and happiness is best realised through living an active life “in the world”. Other scholars, however, (...)
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  11. Nicholas F. Gier (2001). The Dancing Ru: A Confucian Aesthetics of Virtue. Philosophy East and West 51 (2):280-305.
    The most constructive response to the crisis in moral theory has been the revival of virtue ethics, which has the advantages of being personal, contextual, and, as will be argued, normative as well. It is also proposed that the best way to refound virtue ethics is to return to the Greek concept of technē tou biou, literally "craft of life." The ancients did not distinguish between craft and fine art, and the meaning of technē, even in its Latin form, ars, (...)
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  12. Eric C. Limbs & Timothy L. Fort (2000). Nigerian Business Practices and Their Interface with Virtue Ethics. Journal of Business Ethics 26 (2):169 - 179.
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  13. Micah Lott (2013). Does Human Nature Conflict with Itself? Human Form and the Harmony of the Virtues. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):657-683.
    Does possessing some human virtues make it impossible for a person to possess other human virtues? Isaiah Berlin and Bernard Williams both answered “yes” to this question, and they argued that to hold otherwise—to accept the harmony of the virtues—required a blinkered and unrealistic view of “what it is to be human.” In this essay, I have two goals: (1) to show how the harmony of the virtues is best interpreted, and what is at stake in affirming or denying it; (...)
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  14. Piotr T. Makowski (2010). The Task of a Naturalist: An Epitaph for Philippa Foot (1920-2010). Ethics in Progress Quarterly 1 (1):197-201.
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  15. Christian Miller (forthcoming). Empathy as the Only Hope for the Virtue of Compassion and as Support for a Limited Unity of the Virtues. Philosophy, Theology, and the Sciences.
    This paper claims that altruistic motivation is necessary for possessing the virtue of compassion, and that research on empathy (in particular, work by Dan Batson) has been the only promising source of evidence for such motivation. Challenges to using empathy as a means to cultivating compassion are also considered.
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  16. Christian Miller (2013). Integrity. In Blackwell International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Blackwell. 1-11.
    Integrity is one of the leading normative concepts employed in our society. We frequently talk about the degree of integrity of community leaders and famous historical figures, and we highly value integrity in our elected public officials. But philosophers have had a difficult time arriving at consensus about what integrity consists in. Some claim that it is a purely formal relation of consistency, others that it has to do primarily with one‟s identity, and still others that it involves subjective or (...)
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  17. Christian Miller (2010). Character Traits, Social Psychology, and Impediments to Helping Behavior. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5:1-36.
    In a number of recent papers, I have begun to develop a new theory of character which is conceptually distinct both from traditional Aristotelian accounts as well as from the positive view of local traits outlined by John Doris. On my view, many human beings do have robust traits of character which play an important explanatory and predictive role, but which are triggered by certain situational variables which preclude them from counting as genuine Aristotelian virtues. Like others in this discussion, (...)
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  18. Matthew B. O'Brien & Robert C. Koons (2012). Objects of Intention: A Hylomorphic Critique of the New Natural Law Theory. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):655-703.
    The “New Natural Law” Theory (NNL) of Germain Grisez, John Finnis, Joseph Boyle, and their collaborators offers a distinctive account of intentional action, which underlies a moral theory that aims to justify many aspects of traditional morality and Catholic doctrine. -/- In fact, we show that the NNL is committed to premises that entail the permissibility of many actions that are irreconcilable with traditional morality and Catholic doctrine, such as elective abortions. These consequences follow principally from two aspects of the (...)
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  19. Peter Olsthoorn (2013). Virtue Ethics in the Military. In Stan van Hooft (ed.), The Handbook of Virtue Ethics. Acumen. 365-374.
  20. David T. Risser (2009). Book Review: Nick Smith - I Was Wrong: The Meanings of Apologies. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (2):263-271.
  21. Alexander Sarch (2008). What's Wrong with Megalopsychia? Philosophy 83 (2):231-253.
    This paper looks at two accounts of Aristotle's views on the virtue of megalopsychia. The first, defended by Christopher Cordner, commits Aristotle to two claims about the virtuous person that might seem unpalatable to modern readers. The second account, defended by Roger Crips, does not commit Aristotle to these claims. Some might count this as an advantage of Crisp's account. However, I argue that Cordner's account, not Crisp's, is actually the better interpretation of Aristotle. Nonetheless, this does not ultimately spell (...)
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  22. Lisa Tessman (2013). “Virtue Ethics and Moral Failure: Lessons From Neuroscientific Moral Psychology”. In Michael Austin (ed.), Virtues in Action: New Essays in Applied Virtue Ethics. Palgrave Macmillan.
  23. Lisa Tessman (2001). Critical Virtue Ethics: Understanding Oppression as Morally Damaging. In Peggy DesAutels & Joanne Waugh (eds.), Feminists Doing Ethics. Rowman & Littlefield.
    A critically revised Aristotelian-based virtue ethics has something potentially useful to offer to those engaged in analyzing oppression and creating liberatory projects. A critical virtue ethics can help clarify one of the ways in which oppression interferes with flourishing; specifically, it helps clarify an aspect of oppression that can be called "moral damage.".
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  24. Liezl van Zyl (2011). Right Action and the Non-Virtuous Agent. Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (1):80-92.
    According to qualified-agent virtue ethics, an action is right if and only if it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances. I discuss two closely related objections to this view, both of which concern the actions of the non-virtuous. The first is that this criterion sometimes gives the wrong result, for in some cases a non-virtuous agent should not do what a virtuous person would characteristically do. A second objection is it altogether fails to apply whenever (...)
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  25. Liezl van Zyl (2009). Accidental Rightness. Philosophia 37 (1):91-104.
    In this paper I argue that the disagreement between modern moral philosophers and (some) virtue ethicists about whether motive affects rightness is a result of conceptual disagreement, and that when they develop a theory of ‘right action,’ the two parties respond to two very different questions. Whereas virtue ethicists tend to use ‘right’ as interchangeable with ‘good’ or ‘virtuous’ and as implying moral praise, modern moral philosophers use it as roughly equivalent to ‘in accordance with moral obligation.’ One implication of (...)
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  26. Liezl van Zyl (2007). Can Virtuous People Emerge From Tragic Dilemmas Having Acted Well? Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (1):50–61.
  27. Jonathan Webber (2013). Character, Attitude and Disposition. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (1).
    Recent debate over the empirical psychological presuppositions of virtue ethics has focused on reactive behavioural dispositions. But there are many character traits that cannot be understood properly in this way. Such traits are well described by attitude psychology. Moreover, the findings of attitude psychology support virtue ethics in three ways. First, they confirm the role of habituation in the development of character. Further, they show virtue ethics to be compatible with the situation manipulation experiments at the heart of the recent (...)
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  28. Jonathan Webber (2013). Cultivating Virtue. In Havi Carel & Darian Meacham (eds.), Phenomenology and Naturalism. Cambridge University Press. 239-259.
    Ought you to cultivate your own virtue? Various philosophers have argued that there is something suspect about directing one’s ethical attention towards oneself in this way. These arguments can be divided between those that deem aiming at virtue for its own sake to be narcissistic and those that consider aiming at virtue for the sake of good behaviour to involve a kind of doublethink. Underlying them all is the assumption that epistemic access to one’s own character requires an external point (...)
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