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  1. Chrisoula Andreou, Dynamic Choice. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Sometimes a series of choices do not serve one's concerns well even though each choice in the series seems perfectly well suited to serving one's concerns. In such cases, one has a dynamic choice problem. Otherwise put, one has a problem related to the fact that one's choices are spread out over time. This survey reviews some of the challenging choice situations and problematic preference structures that can prompt dynamic choice problems. It also reviews some proposed solutions, and explains how (...)
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  2. Chrisoula Andreou (2008). The Newxin Puzzle. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):415 - 422.
    A variety of thought experiments suggest that, if the standard picture of practical rationality is correct, then practical rationality is sometimes an obstacle to practical success. For some, this in turn suggests that there is something wrong with the standard picture. In particular, it has been argued that we should revise the standard picture so that practical rationality and practical success emerge as more closely connected than the current picture allows. In this paper, I construct a choice situation—which I refer (...)
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  3. Chrisoula Andreou (2004). Instrumentally Rational Myopic Planning. Philosophical Papers 33 (2):133-145.
    Abstract I challenge the view that, in cases where time for deliberation is not an issue, instrumental rationality precludes myopic planning. I show where there is room for instrumentally rational myopic planning, and then argue that such planning is possible not only in theory, it is something human beings can and do engage in. The possibility of such planning has, however, been disregarded, and this disregard has skewed related debates concerning instrumental rationality.
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  4. Michael Bratman (1998). Toxin, Temptation, and the Stability of Intention. In Jules L. Coleman, Christopher W. Morris & Gregory S. Kavka (eds.), Rational Commitment and Social Justice: Essays for Gregory Kavka. Cambridge University Press 59--83.
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  5. Timothy Chappell (2013). What Have I Done? Diametros 38:86-111.
    An externalist view of intention is developed on broadly Wittgensteinian grounds, and applied to show that the classic Thomist doctrine of double effect, though it has good uses in casuistry, has also been overused because of the internalism about intention that has generally been presupposed by its users. We need a good criterion of what counts as the content of our intentional actions; I argue, again on Wittgensteinian grounds, that the best criterion comes not from foresight, nor from foresight plus (...)
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  6. Randolph Clarke (2008). Autonomous Reasons for Intending. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):191 – 212.
    An autonomous reason for intending to A would be a reason for so intending that is not, and will not be, a reason for A-ing. Some puzzle cases, such as the one that figures in the toxin puzzle, suggest that there can be such reasons for intending, but these cases have special features that cloud the issue. This paper describes cases that more clearly favour the view that we can have practical reasons of this sort. Several objections to (...)
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  7. Randolph Clarke (2007). Commanding Intentions and Prize-Winning Decisions. Philosophical Studies 133 (3):391 - 409.
    It is widely held that any justifying reason for making a decision must also be a justifying reason for doing what one thereby decides to do. Desires to win decision prizes, such as the one that figures in Kavka’s toxin puzzle, might be thought to be exceptions to this principle, but the principle has been defended in the face of such examples. Similarly, it has been argued that a command to intend cannot give one a justifying reason to intend as (...)
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  8. Denise Drudy, Norma Harnedy, Séamus Fanning, Margaret Hannan & Lorraine Kyne (2007). Emergence and Control of Fluoroquinolone‐Resistant, Toxin A–Negative, Toxin B–Positive Clostridium Difficile. Emergence: Complexity and Organization 28 (8):932-940.
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  9. David Gauthier (1998). Rethinking the Toxin Puzzle. In Jules L. Coleman, Christopher W. Morris & Gregory S. Kavka (eds.), Rational Commitment and Social Justice: Essays for Gregory Kavka. Cambridge University Press 47--58.
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  10. Gilbert Harman (1998). The Toxin Puzzle. In Jules L. Coleman, Christopher W. Morris & Gregory S. Kavka (eds.), Rational Commitment and Social Justice: Essays for Gregory Kavka. Cambridge University Press 84--89.
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  11. Pamela Hieronymi (2006). Controlling Attitudes. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):45-74.
    I hope to show that, although belief is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, "believing at will" is impossible; one cannot believe in the way one ordinarily acts. Further, the same is true of intention: although intention is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, the features of belief that render believing less than voluntary are present for intention, as well. It turns out, perhaps surprisingly, that you can no more intend at will than believe at will.
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  12. Edward Hinchman (2010). Conspiracy, Commitment, and the Self. Ethics 120 (3):526-556.
    Practical commitment is Janus-faced, looking outward toward the expectations it creates and inward toward their basis in the agent’s will. This paper criticizes Kantian attempts to link these facets and proposes an alternative. Contra David Velleman, the availability of a conspiratorial perspective (not yours, not your interlocutor’s) is what allows you to understand yourself as making a lying promise – as committing yourself ‘outwardly’ with the deceptive reasoning that Velleman argues cannot provide a basis for self-understanding. Moreover, the intrapersonal availability (...)
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  13. Edward Hinchman (2003). Trust and Diachronic Agency. Noûs 37 (1):25–51.
    Some philosophers worry that it can never be reasonable to act simply on the basis of trust, yet you act on the basis of self-trust whenever you merely follow through on one of your own intentions. It is no more reasonable to follow through on an intention formed by an untrustworthy earlier self of yours than it is to act on the advice of an untrustworthy interlocutor. But reasonable mistrust equally presupposes untrustworthiness in the mistrusted, or evidence thereof. The concept (...)
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  14. Edward S. Hinchman (2014). Narrative and the Stability of Intention. European Journal of Philosophy 22 (2):111-140.
    This paper addresses a problem concerning the rational stability of intention. When you form an intention to φ at some future time t, you thereby make it subjectively rational for you to follow through and φ at t, even if—hypothetically—you would abandon the intention were you to redeliberate at t. It is hard to understand how this is possible. Shouldn't the perspective of your acting self be what determines what is then subjectively rational for you? I aim to solve this (...)
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  15. Gregory S. Kavka (1983). The Toxin Puzzle. Analysis 43 (1):33-36.
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  16. Ken Levy (2009). On the Rationalist Solution to Gregory Kavka's Toxin Puzzle. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):267-289.
    Gregory Kavka's 'Toxin Puzzle' suggests that I cannot intend to perform a counter-preferential action A even if I have a strong self-interested reason to form this intention. The 'Rationalist Solution,' however, suggests that I can form this intention. For even though it is counter-preferential, A-ing is actually rational given that the intention behind it is rational. Two arguments are offered for this proposition that the rationality of the intention to A transfers to A-ing itself: the 'Self-Promise Argument' and David Gauthier's (...)
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  17. Alfred R. Mele (1996). Rational Intentions and the Toxin Puzzle. Proto Sociology 8:39-52.
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  18. Alfred R. Mele (1995). Effective Deliberation About What to Intend: Or Striking It Rich in a Toxin-Free Environment. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 79 (1):85 - 93.
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  19. Alfred R. Mele (1992). Intentions, Reasons, and Beliefs: Morals of the Toxin Puzzle. Philosophical Studies 68 (2):171 - 194.
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  20. Joe Mintoff (2007). Minimally Constrained Maximisation. In Bruno Verbeek (ed.), Reasons and Intentions. Ashgate Pub. Ltd.
    This chapter argues that, under certain conditions, forming an intention makes an action rational which would otherwise not have been rational, since intentions (together with beliefs) in and of themselves provide deductive reasons for further intentions and actions, an argument which builds on previous work by R M Hare, Michael Bratman and others, It also provides an articulation and defense of the concept of "minimally constrained maximization" as a unified general solution to the well-known paradoxes of rationality, including the paradox (...)
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  21. Joe Mintoff (1997). Rational Cooperation, Intention, and Reconsideration. Ethics 107 (4):612-643.
    In their attempt to provide a reason to be moral, contractarians such as David Gauthier are concerned with situations allowing a group of agents the chance of mutual benefit, so long as at least some of them are prepared to constrain their maximising behaviour. But what justifies this constraint? Gauthier argues that it could be rational (because maximising) to intend to constrain one's behaviour, and in certain circumstances to act on this intention. The purpose of this paper is to examine (...)
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  22. Joe Mintoff (1996). On a Problem for Contractarianism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1):98 – 116.
    To show it is sometimes rational to cooperate in the Prisoner's Dilemma, David Gauthier has claimed that if it is rational to form an intention then it is sometimes rational act on it. However, the Paradox of Deterrence and the Toxin Puzzle seem to put this general type of claim into doubt. For even if it is rational to form a deterrent intention, it is not rational act on it (if it is not successful); and even if it is rational (...)
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  23. Nishi Shah (2008). How Action Governs Intention. Philosophers' Imprint 8 (5):1-19.
    Why can't deliberation conclude in an intention except by considering whether to perform the intended action? I argue that the answer to this question entails that reasons for intention are determined by reasons for action. Understanding this feature of practical deliberation thus allows us to solve the toxin puzzle.
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  24. Nishi Shah (2008). How Action Governs Intention. Philosophers' Imprint 8 (5):1-19.
    Why can't deliberation conclude in an intention except by considering whether to perform the intended action? I argue that the answer to this question entails that reasons for intention are determined by reasons for action. Understanding this feature of practical deliberation thus allows us to solve the toxin puzzle.
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  25. Wolfgang Spohn (2012). Reversing 30 Years of Discussion: Why Causal Decision Theorists Should One-Box. Synthese 187 (1):95-122.
    The paper will show how one may rationalize one-boxing in Newcomb's problem and drinking the toxin in the Toxin puzzle within the confines of causal decision theory by ascending to so-called reflexive decision models which reflect how actions are caused by decision situations (beliefs, desires, and intentions) represented by ordinary unreflexive decision models.
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  26. Wolfgang Spohn, Dependency Equilibria and the Causal Structure of Decision and Game Situation.
    The paper attempts to rationalize cooperation in the one-shot prisoners' dilemma (PD). It starts by introducing (and preliminarily investigating) a new kind of equilibrium (differing from Aumann's correlated equilibria) according to which the players' actions may be correlated (sect. 2). In PD the Pareto-optimal among these equilibria is joint cooperation. Since these equilibria seem to contradict causal preconceptions, the paper continues with a standard analysis of the causal structure of decision situations (sect. 3). The analysis then raises to a reflexive (...)
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  27. Sergio Tenenbaum (2009). Knowing the Good and Knowing What One is Doing. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (sup1):91-117.
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