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  1. Talia Mae Bettcher (2009). Feminist Perspectives on Trans Issues. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  2. Talia Bettcher & Ann Garry (2009). Introduction. Hypatia 24 (3):1-10.
  3. Talia Bettcher & Ann Garry (2009). Introduction to Hypatia Special Issue: ‘‘Transgender Studies and Feminism: Theory, Politics, and Gendered Realities. Hypatia 23 (4):1-10.
  4. Lisa Guenther (2010). Other Fecundities: Proust and Irigaray on Sexual Difference. Differences 21 (2).
    Irigaray's early work seeks to multiply possibilities for women's self-expression by recovering a sexual difference in which male and female are neither the same nor opposites, but irreducibly different modes of embodiment. In her more recent work, however, Irigaray has emphasized the duality of the sexes at the expense of multiplicity, enshrining the heterosexual couple as the model of sexual ethics. Alison Stone's recent revision of Irigaray supplements her account of sexual duality with a theory of bodily multiplicity derived from (...)
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  5. Gunnar Lund (2012). Across and Beyond: The Semantics of Transgender Identity. Stance 5:7-18.
    This paper examines two senses of the term “transgender:” transgender as across the gender binary and transgender as beyond the gender binary. Explored are the difficulties this ambiguity poses to transpeople. In short, using the theories of Ferdinand de Saussure and Richard Rorty, this paper argues that the meaning of “transgender” must simultaneously embrace both senses of the term, rather than one or the other.
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  6. Burkay Ozturk, Ethical First-Person Authority and The Moral Status of Rejecting.
    There are two popular ways of explaining why a person has authority over her own gender identity: epistemic FPA and ethical FPA. Both have problems. Epistemic FPA attributes to the self-identifier an unrealistic degree of doxastic reliability. Ethical FPA implies the existence of an unqualified obligation not to reject which is too strong to be plausible. This essay offers a third explanation called “weak FPA” and investigates how far first-person authority reaches in terms of grounding rights and obligating others. Weak (...)
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