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  1. Barbara Abbott (1997). Models, Truth and Semantics. Linguistics and Philosophy 20 (2):117-138.
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  2. Ernest Adams (2002). Truth Values and the Value of Truth. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (3):207–222.
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  3. Linda Martin Alcoff, Knowing Self in Power and Truth.
    In her book, Real Knowing (Cornell UP, 1996), and in many articles, she argues, in opposition to many post-structuralists and pragmatists, for the preservation of a notion of truth as partly referential albeit inextricably tied to a context. Furthermore, and in connection to this, she also critiques pure proceduralism in the normative dimension, defending instead a notion of normativity that is substantive but context related, thus, not universal or absolute.
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  4. H. G. Alexander (1937). Language and Metaphysical Truth. Journal of Philosophy 34 (24):645-652.
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  5. Barry Allen (1993). Truth in Philosophy. Harvard University Press.
    " Barry Allen shows what truth has come to mean in the philosophical tradition, what is wrong with many of the ways of conceiving truth, and why philosophers ...
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  6. Livio Amato (1977). Thank You: The Language of Truth. [S.N.].
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  7. Alan R. Anderson & Nuel D. Belnap (1975). Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Neccessity, Vol. I. Princeton University Press.
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  8. Alan Ross Anderson (1970). St. Paul'€™s Epistle to Titus. In Robert L. Martin (ed.), The Paradox of the Liar. Ridgeview.
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  9. Alan Anderson, Belnap R., D. Nuel & J. Michael Dunn (1992). Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity, Vol. Ii. Princeton University Press.
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  10. David J. Anderson & Edward N. Zalta (2004). Frege, Boolos, and Logical Objects. Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (1):1-26.
    In this paper, the authors discuss Frege's theory of "logical objects" (extensions, numbers, truth-values) and the recent attempts to rehabilitate it. We show that the 'eta' relation George Boolos deployed on Frege's behalf is similar, if not identical, to the encoding mode of predication that underlies the theory of abstract objects. Whereas Boolos accepted unrestricted Comprehension for Properties and used the 'eta' relation to assert the existence of logical objects under certain highly restricted conditions, the theory of abstract objects uses (...)
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  11. Anthony Appiah (1986). For Truth in Semantics. B. Blackwell.
  12. D. M. Armstrong (1973). Belief, Truth and Knowledge. London,Cambridge University Press.
    The book as a whole if offered as a contribution to a naturalistic account of man.
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  13. Jody Azzouni (2005). Tarski, Quine, and the Transcendence of the Vernacular “True”. Synthese 142 (3):273 - 288.
    It is argued that the blind ascriptive role for the word true, its use, that is, in conjunction with descriptions of classes of sentences or with proper names of sentences (but not quote-names), is one which applies indiscriminately to sentences regardless of whether these are in languages we speak, can understand, or can translate into sentences that we do speak (and understand). Formal analogues of the ordinary word true as they arise in Tarskis seminal work, and in others, cannot replicate (...)
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  14. Jody Azzouni (2001). Truth Via Anaphorically Unrestricted Quantifiers. Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (4):329-354.
    A new approach to truth is offered which dispenses with the truth predicate, and replaces it with a special kind of quantifier which simultaneously binds variables in sentential and nominal positions. The resulting theory of truth for a (first-order) language is shown to be able to handle blind truth ascriptions, and is shown to be compatible with a characterization of the semantic and syntactic principles governing that language. Comparisons with other approaches to truth are drawn. An axiomatization of AU-quantifiers and (...)
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  15. Charles M. Bakewell (1908). On the Meaning of Truth. Philosophical Review 17 (6):579-591.
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  16. Juan Barba (1998). Construction of Truth Predicates: Approximation Versus Revision. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 4 (4):399-417.
  17. Stephen Barker (2014). Semantic Paradox and Alethic Undecidability. Analysis 74 (2):201-209.
    I use the principle of truth-maker maximalism to provide a new solution to the semantic paradoxes. According to the solution, AUS, its undecidable whether paradoxical sentences are grounded or ungrounded. From this it follows that their alethic status is undecidable. We cannot assert, in principle, whether paradoxical sentences are true, false, either true or false, neither true nor false, both true and false, and so on. AUS involves no ad hoc modification of logic, denial of the T-schema's validity, or obvious (...)
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  18. Arvid Båve (2010). Deflationism and the Primary Truth Bearer. Synthese 173 (3):281 - 297.
    The paper discusses what kind of truth bearer, or truth-ascription, a deflationist should take as primary. I first present number of arguments against a sententialist view. I then present a deflationary theory which takes propositions as primary, and try to show that it deals neatly with a wide range of linguistic data. Next, I consider both the view that there is no primary truth bearer, and the most common account of sentence truth given by deflationists who take propositions as primary, (...)
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  19. Arvid Båve (2009). Why is a Truth-Predicate Like a Pronoun? Philosophical Studies 145 (2):297 - 310.
    I begin with an exposition of the two main variants of the Prosentential Theory of Truth (PT), those of Dorothy Grover et al. and Robert Brandom. Three main types of criticisms are then put forward: (1) material criticisms to the effect that (PT) does not adequately explain the linguistic data, (2) an objection to the effect that no variant of (PT) gives a properly unified account of the various occurrences of "true" in English, and, most importantly, (3) a charge that (...)
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  20. Arvid Båve (2006). Deflationism: A Use-Theoretic Analysis of the Truth-Predicate. Dissertation, Stockholm University
    I here develop a specific version of the deflationary theory of truth. I adopt a terminology on which deflationism holds that an exhaustive account of truth is given by the equivalence between truth-ascriptions and de-nominalised (or disquoted) sentences. An adequate truth-theory, it is argued, must be finite, non-circular, and give a unified account of all occurrences of “true”. I also argue that it must descriptively capture the ordinary meaning of “true”, which is plausibly taken to be unambiguous. Ch. 2 is (...)
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  21. JC Beall (2000). On Mixed Inferences and Pluralism About Truth Predicates. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):380-382.
  22. Michael Beaney (ed.) (1997). The Frege Reader. Blackwell.
    This is the first single-volume edition and translation of Frege's philosophical writings to include his seminal papers as well as substantial selections from ...
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  23. Jeanette M. A. Beer (1981). Narrative Conventions of Truth in the Middle Ages. Librairie Droz.
    ETUDES DE PHILOLOGIE 38 ETD'HISTOIRE JEANETTE MA BEER Narrative Conventions of Truth in the Middle Ages GENEVE ...
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  24. Simon Blackburn (1984). Spreading the Word. Clarendon Press.
    Provides a comprehensive introduction to the major philosophical theories attempting to explain the workings of language.
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  25. Paul A. Boghossian (1990). The Status of Content. Philosophical Review 99 (2):157-84.
    A n irrealist conception of a given region of discourse is the view that no real properties answer to the central predicates of the region in question. Any such conception emerges, invariably, as the result of the interaction of two forces. An account of the meaning of the central predicates, along with a conception of the sorts of property the world may contain, conspire to show that, if the predicates of the region are taken to express properties, their extensions would (...)
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  26. C. D. Broad (1933). Examination of Mctaggart'€™s Philosophy, Vol. 1. Cambridge University Press.
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  27. Tyler Burge (1979). Semantical Paradox. Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):169-198.
  28. Tyler Burge (1974). Demonstrative Constructions, Reference, and Truth. Journal of Philosophy 71 (7):205-223.
  29. John P. Burgess (1986). The Truth is Never Simple. Journal of Symbolic Logic 51 (3):663-681.
    The complexity of the set of truths of arithmetic is determined for various theories of truth deriving from Kripke and from Gupta and Herzberger.
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  30. Richard James Campbell (2011). The Concept of Truth. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Machine generated contents note: -- Preface -- Introduction: Truth in Trouble -- The Linguistic Conception of Truth -- The Functions Truth Serves -- Truth in Action -- Acting Truly -- The Genesis of Representations -- Acts of Assertion -- The Truth of Statements -- The Challenge of Sceptical Relativism -- Truth as Faithfulness -- Bibliography -- Index.
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  31. Rudolf Carnap (1959). Introduction to Semantics. Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
  32. J. Carter (2011). Kvanvig on Pointless Truths and the Cognitive Ideal. Acta Analytica 26 (3):285-293.
    Jonathan Kvanvig has recently attempted to reconcile the problem of (apparently) pointless truths with the claim that the value of truth is unrestricted—that truth is always and everywhere valuable. In this paper, I critically evaluate Kvanvig’s argument and show it to be defective at a crucial juncture. I propose my own alternative strategy for generating Kvanvig’s result—an alternative that parts ways with Kvanvig’s own conception of the cognitively ideal.
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  33. Alonzo Church (1943). Review of Rudolf Carnap, Introduction to Semantics. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 52 (1):298--304.
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  34. Roy T. Cook (2011). Alethic Pluralism, Generic Truth and Mixed Conjunctions. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):624-629.
    A difficulty for alethic pluralism has been the idea that semantic evaluation of conjunctions whose conjuncts come from discourses with distinct truth properties requires a third notion of truth which applies to both of the original discourses. But this line of reasoning does not entail that there exists a single generic truth property that applies to all statements and all discourses, unless it is supplemented with additional, controversial, premises. So the problem of mixed conjunctions, while highlighting other aspects of alethic (...)
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  35. Phil Corkum (2013). Aristotle on Predication. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2).
    A predicate logic typically has a heterogeneous semantic theory. Subjects and predicates have distinct semantic roles: subjects refer; predicates characterize. A sentence expresses a truth if the object to which the subject refers is correctly characterized by the predicate. Traditional term logic, by contrast, has a homogeneous theory: both subjects and predicates refer; and a sentence is true if the subject and predicate name one and the same thing. In this paper, I will examine evidence for ascribing to Aristotle the (...)
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  36. Cesare Cozzo (2014). Is Truth a Chimera? In Cesare Cozzo & Emiliano Ippoliti (eds.), From a Heuristic Point of View. Cambridge Scholars. 107-24.
    In his book Perché ancora la filosofia Carlo Cellucci argues that truth does not play any role in (modern) science: truth is only a chimera that prevents us «from adequately understanding the character of knowledge» and therefore «must be disposed of». I summarize Cellucci’s evidence for his contention that truth is a chimera. I then raise four objections to Cellucci’s views on truth. My conclusion is that, Cellucci’s arguments notwithstanding, a notion of truth is necessary for the human activity of (...)
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  37. Robert C. Cummins (1975). Truth and Logical Form. Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 (1):29 - 44.
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  38. Wilhelm Dancă (ed.) (2008). Truth and Morality: The Role of Truth in Public Life. Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.
    the background. In this case (and I have in mind Kant's "On the Supposed Right to Lie because of Philanthropic Concerns"1), the commitment to truth ...
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  39. Marian David (2005). On 'Truth is Good'. Philosophical Books 46 (4):292-301.
    As to the preference which most people—as long as they are not annoyed by instances—feel in favor of true propositions, this must be based, apparently, upon an ultimate ethical proposition: ‘It is good to believe true propositions, and bad to believe false ones’. This proposition, it is to be hoped, is true; but if it is not, there is no reason to think that we do ill in believing it. Bertrand Russell, “Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions” (1904).
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  40. Donald Davidson (1973). Radical Interpretation. Dialectica 27 (1):314-328.
  41. Michael R. DePaul & Linda Zagzebski (eds.) (2003). Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    The idea of a virtue has traditionally been important in ethics, but only recently has gained attention as an idea that can explain how we ought to form beliefs as well as how we ought to act. Moral philosophers and epistemologists have different approaches to the idea of intellectual virtue; here, Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski bring work from both fields together for the first time to address all of the important issues. It will be required reading for anyone working (...)
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  42. Michael Devitt (1981). Designation. Columbia University Press.
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  43. Julian Dodd (2000). An Identity Theory of Truth. St. Martin's Press.
    This book argues that correspondence theories of truth fail because the relation that holds between a true thought and a fact is that of identity, not correspondence. Facts are not complexes of worldly entities which make thoughts true they are merely true thoughts. According to Julian Dodd, the resulting modest identity theory , while not defining truth, correctly diagnoses the failure of correspondence theories, and thereby prepares the ground for a defensible deflation of the concept of truth.
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  44. Michael Dummett (2006). Thought and Reality. Oxford University Press.
    In this short, lucid, rich book, Sir Michael Dummett, perhaps the most eminent living British philosopher, sets out his views about some of the deepest questions in philosophy. The fundamental question of metaphysics is: what does reality consist of? Dummett puts forward his controversial view of reality as indeterminate: there may be no fact of the matter about whether an object does or does not have a given property.
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  45. Gary Ebbs (2009). Truth and Words. Oxford University Press.
    Gary Ebbs shows that this appearance is illusory.
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  46. P. Eldridge-Smith (2012). Pinocchio Beards the Barber. Analysis 72 (4):749-752.
    The Pinocchio paradox poses one dialetheia too many for semantic dialetheists (Eldridge-Smith 2011). However, Beall (2011) thinks that the Pinocchio scenario is merely an impossible story, like that of the village barber who shaves just those villagers who do not shave themselves. Meanwhile, Beall maintains that Liar paradoxes generate dialetheia. The Barber scenario is self-contradictory, yet the Pinocchio scenario requires a principle of truth for a contradiction. In this and other respects the Pinocchio paradox is a version of the Liar, (...)
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  47. John Etchemendy (1988). Models, Semantics and Logical Truth. Linguistics and Philosophy 11 (1):91 - 106.
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  48. M. Oreste Fiocco (forthcoming). Fatalism and the Metaphysics of Contingency. In Steven M. Cahn & Maureen Eckert (eds.), Freedom and the Self: Essays in the Philosophy of David Foster Wallace. Columbia University Press.
    Contingency is the presence of non-actualized possibility in the world. Fatalism is a view of reality on which there is no contingency. Since it is contingency that permits agency, there has traditionally been much interest in contingency. This interest has long been embarrassed by the contention that simple and plausible assumptions about the world lead to fatalism. I begin with an Aristotelian argument as presented by Richard Taylor. Appreciation of this argument has been stultified by a question pertaining to the (...)
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  49. Joseph S. Fulda (1989). The Logic of the Whole Truth. Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal 15 (2):435-446.
    Note: The author holds the copyright, and there was no agreement, express or implied, not to use a facsimile PDF. -/- Using erotetic logic, the paper defines the "the whole truth" in a manner consistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedent. It cannot mean "the whole story," as witnesses in an adversary system are permitted /only/ to answer the questions put to them, nor are they permitted to speculate, add irrelevant material, etc. Nor can it mean not to add an admixture (...)
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  50. Gottfried Gabriel (1984). Fregean Connection: Bedeutung, Value and Truth-Value. Philosophical Quarterly 34 (136):372-376.
    It is shown how frege's problematic connection between truth-Value and "bedeutung" (of a sentence) becomes more plausible when set against the background of german language and philosophy, Especially by comparing frege's position with the value-Theoretical school of neo-Kantianism (w windelband).
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