Truth, Misc

Edited by Patrick Greenough (University of St. Andrews)
Assistant editor: Michaela Lobo
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  1. The Synthetic Concept of Truth and its Descendants.Boris Culina - manuscript
    The concept of truth has many aims but only one source. The article describes the primary concept of truth, here called the synthetic concept of truth, according to which truth is the objective result of the synthesis of us and nature in the process of rational cognition. It is shown how various aspects of the concept of truth -- logical, scientific, and mathematical aspect -- arise from the synthetic concept of truth. Also, it is shown how the paradoxes of truth (...)
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  2. The Notion of Truth in Natural and Formal Languages.Pete Olcott - manuscript
    For any natural (human) or formal (mathematical) language L we know that an expression X of language L is true if and only if there are expressions Γ of language L that connect X to known facts. -/- By extending the notion of a Well Formed Formula to include syntactically formalized rules for rejecting semantically incorrect expressions we recognize and reject expressions that evaluate to neither True nor False.
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  3. The Paradox of Knowability and Epistemic Theories of Truth.Boris Rähme - manuscript
    The article suggests a reading of the term ‘epistemic account of truth’ which runs contrary to a widespread consensus with regard to what epistemic accounts are meant to provide, namely a definition of truth in epistemic terms. Section 1. introduces a variety of possible epistemic accounts that differ with regard to the strength of the epistemic constraints they impose on truth. Section 2. introduces the paradox of knowability and presents a slightly reconstructed version of a related argument brought forward by (...)
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  4. Revenge for Alethic Nihilism.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
    Note: This is a "pre-review" version, not the final version that will be published. -/- In “Nothing is True,” Will Gamester defends a form of alethic nihilism that still grants truth-talk a kind of legitimacy: an expressive role that is implemented via a pretense. He argues that this view has all of the strengths of deflationism, while also providing an elegant resolution of the Liar Paradox and its kin. For the alethic nihilist, Liar and related sentences are not true, and (...)
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  5. Fictional Truth: In Defence of the Reality Principle.Nils Franzén - forthcoming - In Emar Maier & Andreas Stokke (eds.), The Language of Fiction. Oxford University Press.
    A well-known theory about under which circumstances a statement is true in a fiction is The Reality Principle, which originate in the work of David Lewis: (RP) Where p1... pn are the primary fictional truths of a fiction F , it is true in F that q iff the following holds: were p1 ... pn the case, q would have been the case (Walton 1990: 44). RP has been subjected to a number of counterexamples, up to a point where, in (...)
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  6. How to Contradict an Expression of Intention.John Schwenkler - forthcoming - In Christopher Frey & Jennifer Frey (eds.), Practical Truth. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter interprets G. E. M. Anscombe’s discussion in §31 of Intention of the relationship between expressions of intention and descriptions of matters of fact. For Anscombe, a statement like “I’m raising my arm” or “I’m going to get up at 7:00”, which expresses an intention by saying what is happening or is going to happen, is contradicted only by an opposing command or the expression of an opposing intention. I first challenge an interpretation of this passage as claiming that (...)
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  7. Definition and Dispute: A Defence of Temporal Externalism.Derek Ball - 2024 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Many of our deepest disagreements turn on matters of definition. Philosophers discuss the definitions of knowledge, art, truth, and freedom, and social and political questions about personhood, health and disease, marriage and gender are also commonly thought of as turning in part on definitions. This book contributes to our understanding of how we engage with questions and disagreements of this kind. It argues that disputes about matters of definition are not just about the meanings of words or our concepts, and (...)
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  8. Guglielmo di Ockham e la filosofia come insegnamento del vero.Fabrizio Amerini - 2023 - Noctua 10 (1):1-45.
    Truth is a key notion in Ockham’s philosophical reductionist program, a notion that has been the object of contrasting interpretations in scholarship. My interpretation is that, for Ockham, ‘being true’ expresses an epistemological relation, namely the one through which our mind reflects on a proposition of language, compares it with an extra-mental state of affairs, and thus ascertains their correspondence. Placing truth at a point of intersection of language with mind and reality, Ockham’s interpretation of Aristotle’s characterization of philosophy as (...)
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  9. How to Conquer the Liar and Enthrone the Logical Concept of Truth.Boris Culina - 2023 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 23 (67):1-31.
    This article informally presents a solution to the paradoxes of truth and shows how the solution solves classical paradoxes (such as the original Liar) as well as the paradoxes that were invented as counterarguments for various proposed solutions (“the revenge of the Liar”). This solution complements the classical procedure of determining the truth values of sentences by its own failure and, when the procedure fails, through an appropriate semantic shift allows us to express the failure in a classical two-valued language. (...)
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  10. Edwards on truth pluralism.Matti Eklund - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (8):1481-1493.
    I critically discuss Douglas Edwards' construal of the debate over truth, and his case for truth pluralism. Toward the end I present a constructive suggestion on Edwards' behalf. This suggestion avoids the problems I have presented, whatever in the end its fate.
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  11. Nothing Is True.Will Gamester - 2023 - Journal of Philosophy 120 (6):314-338.
    This paper motivates and defends alethic nihilism, the theory that nothing is true. I first argue that alethic paradoxes like the Liar and Curry motivate nihilism; I then defend the view from objections. The critical discussion has two primary outcomes. First, a proof of concept. Alethic nihilism strikes many as silly or obviously false, even incoherent. I argue that it is in fact well-motivated and internally coherent. Second, I argue that deflationists about truth ought to be nihilists. Deflationists maintain that (...)
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  12. Truth as Consistent Assertion.Adam Rozycki - 2023 - Preprints.Org.
    This paper presents four key results. Firstly, it distinguishes between _partial_ and _consistent_ assertion of a sentence, and introduces the concept of an _equivocal_ sentence, which is both partially asserted and partially denied. Secondly, it proposes a novel definition of truth, stating that _a true sentence is one that is consistently asserted_. This definition is immune from the Liar paradox, does not restrict classical logic, and can be applied to declarative sentences in the language used by any particular person. Thirdly, (...)
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  13. The Twofold Objectivity of Truth.Howard Sankey - 2023 - Filozofia Nauki 31 (1):1-9.
    Truth about matters of fact is objective. This is not just because truth is objective. It is also because facts are objective. An objective fact makes an assertion of that fact true. The objectivity of the fact adds a further element of objectivity to the objective truth of the assertion. True assertions of fact are true because truth is objective and because the facts that make them true are objective. True assertions of fact are objective twice over. Their objectivity is (...)
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  14. Something is true.Jamin Asay - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):687-705.
    The thesis that nothing is true has long been thought to be a self-refuting position not worthy of serious philosophical consideration. Recently, however, the thesis of alethic nihilism—that nothing is true—has been explicitly defended (notably by David Liggins). Nihilism is also, I argue, a consequence of other views about truth that have recently been advocated, such as fictionalism about truth and the inconsistency account. After offering an account of alethic nihilism, and how it purports to avoid the self-refutation problem, I (...)
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  15. ¿Debemos preocuparnos por la verdad?Juan Diego Bogotá - 2021 - In Angel Rivera Novoa & Andres Buritica (eds.), Imágenes de la mente, el lenguaje y el conocimiento. Bogotá: pp. 233-250.
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  16. Truth in Fiction, Underdetermination, and the Experience of Actuality.Mark Bowker - 2021 - British Journal of Aesthetics 61 (4):437-454.
    It seems true to say that Sherlock Holmes is a detective, despite there being no Sherlock Holmes. When asked to explain this fact, philosophers of language often opt for some version of Lewis’s view that sentences like ‘Sherlock Holmes is a detective’ may be taken as abbreviations for sentences prefixed with ‘In the Sherlock Holmes stories …’. I present two problems for this view. First, I provide reason to deny that these sentences are abbreviations. In short, these sentences have aesthetic (...)
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  17. The Language Essence of Rational Cognition with some Philosophical Consequences.Boris Culina - 2021 - Tesis (Lima) 14 (19):631-656.
    The essential role of language in rational cognition is analysed. The approach is functional: only the results of the connection between language, reality, and thinking are considered. Scientific language is analysed as an extension and improvement of everyday language. The analysis gives a uniform view of language and rational cognition. The consequences for the nature of ontology, truth, logic, thinking, scientific theories, and mathematics are derived.
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  18. Not Wanted: On Scharp’s Solution to the Liar.Mark Pinder - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (6):1567-1584.
    Kevin Scharp argues that the concept of truth is defective, and is therefore unable to play its intended role in natural language truth-conditional semantics. As such, for this theoretical purpose, Scharp constructs two replacements: ascending truth and descending truth. Scharp applies the resultant theory, AD semantics, to the liar sentence, thereby obtaining a novel solution to the liar paradox. The aim of the present paper is fourfold. First, I show that, contrary to Scharp’s claims, AD semantics in fact yields an (...)
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  19. Precis: the world philosophy made.Scott Soames - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):2081-2085.
    Understanding Truth aims to illuminate the notion of truth, and the role it plays in our ordinary thought, as well as in our logical, philosophical, and scientific theories. Part one is concerned with substantive background issues: the identification of the bearers of truth, the basis for distinguishing truth from other notions, like certainty, with which it is often confused, and the formulation of positive responses to well-known forms of philosophical skepticism about truth. Part two explicates the formal theories of Alfred (...)
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  20. L’objectivité scientifique à l’heure de la post-vérité.Laurent Jodoin - 2020 - Mεtascience: Discours Général Scientifique 1:199-219.
    L’objectivité permettrait d’assurer la supériorité de la science par rapport à d’autres modes de connaissance. Elle doit donc être défendue, surtout en cette « ère de post-vérité » où les « faits alternatifs » remplacent les faits avérés, en politique comme ailleurs. Or les attaques proviennent autant de l’extérieur que de l’intérieur de la sphère philosophique. Il convient donc de tenter d’opérer la réconciliation la plus large possible avec deux représentants de clans (très) opposés, Mario Bunge et Bruno Latour. Réinvestissant (...)
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  21. Le métier de philosophe. Sous le mode du témoignage.Roberto Miguelez - 2020 - Mεtascience: Discours Général Scientifique 1:227-245.
    S’inspirant de Memorias. Entre dos mundos, ce texte se veut un témoignage et des commentaires de la perspective pédagogique développée par Mario Bunge dans le cadre de son enseignement de philosophie des sciences à l’Université de Buenos Aires dans les années soixante du siècle dernier. Perspective socratique du métier de philosophe qui ne renvoie cependant pas à une entreprise de dévoilement de la vérité, mais plutôt aux conditions de sa construction.
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  22. God* does not exist: a novel logical problem of evil.P. X. Monaghan - 2020 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 88 (2):181-195.
    I often tell my students that the only thing that is not controversial in philosophy is that everything else in it is controversial. While this might be a bit of an exaggeration, it does contain a kernel of truth, as many exaggerations do: philosophy is a highly contentious discipline. So it is remarkable the extent to which there is agreement in the philosophy of religion amongst theists, agnostics, and atheists alike that John Mackie’s argument for atheism is either invalid or (...)
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  23. The value of truth: introduction to the topical collection.Luca Moretti, Peter Hartl & Akos Gyarmathy - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1):1453-1460.
  24. Inside Out and Outside In: Art, Truth, and Phenomenology in Hans Urs von Balthasar.Brett David Potter - 2020 - Heythrop Journal 61 (3):424-436.
  25. What is Truth?George Douglas Campbell - 2019
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  26. Introduction: primitivism versus reductionism about the problem of the unity of the proposition.Manuel García-Carpintero & Bjørn Jespersen - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1209-1224.
    We present here the papers selected for the volume on the Unity of Propositions problems. After summarizing what the problems are, we locate them in a spectrum from those aiming to provide substantive, reductive explanations, to those with a more deflationary take on the problems.
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  27. How Can Human Symbols Represent God? A Critique of and Constructive Alternative to Robert C. Neville’s Account of “Indexical” Theological Truth.David Rohr - 2019 - American Journal of Theology and Philosophy 40 (2):73-97.
    Charles S. Peirce’s semeiotic—his theory about signs, reference, interpretation, meaning, and communication—is applicable with illuminating results to innumerable processes of semeiosis or sign interpretation. Robert C. Neville is the first deep student of Peirce’s semeiotic to have systematically applied that theory to the analysis and theory of theological signs, interpretation, and truth—hereafter, theological semeiotic. The result is easily the deepest and richest theological semeiotic currently available. Being the best, it is also most worthy of critique. In this essay, I argue (...)
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  28. Lying and Fiction.Emar Maier - 2018 - In Jörg Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 303-314.
    Lying and fiction both involve the deliberate production of statements that fail to obey Grice’s first Maxim of Quality (“do not say what you believe to be false”). The question thus arises if we can provide a uniform analysis for fiction and lies. In this chapter I discuss the similarities, but also some fundamental differences between lying and fiction. I argue that there’s little hope for a satisfying account within a traditional truth conditional semantic framework. Rather than immediately moving to (...)
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  29. Vías de aprehensión de lo cognoscible.Paulo Vélez-León - 2018 - In David G. Murray (ed.), Metaphysics 2015. Proceedings of the Sixth World Conference. Madrid: pp. 999-1012.
    El proceso de aprehensión de lo cognoscible, en la filosofía contemporánea, ha sido tratado desde diversas perspectivas, entre ellas la fenomenológica y la analítica. Cada una de estas perspectivas aportan unos presupuestos filosóficos y procesos metodológicos que nos proporcionan marcos de trabajo para indagar en las vías de aprehensión del conocimiento; sin embargo, empleadas por separado son insuficientes y limitadas. En absoluto se trata de procurar un método universal, sino de integrar e indagar sobre diversos presupuestos, procesos, patrones y estructuras (...)
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  30. The objectivity of truth, a core truism?Robert Barnard & Joseph Ulatowski - 2017 - Synthese 198 (2):717-733.
    A typical guiding principle of an account of truth is: “truth is objective,” or, to be clear, judging whether an assertion is true or false depends upon how things are in the world rather than how someone or some community believes it to be. Accordingly, whenever a claim is objectively true, its truth conditions ought not depend upon the context in which it is uttered or the utterer making the claim. Part of our ongoing empirical studies surveying people’s responses to (...)
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  31. The Open Future Square of Opposition: A Defense.Elijah Hess - 2017 - Sophia 56 (4):573-587.
    This essay explores the validity of Gregory Boyd’s open theistic account of the nature of the future. In particular, it is an investigation into whether Boyd’s logical square of opposition for future contingents provides a model of reality for free will theists that can preserve both bivalence and a classical conception of omniscience. In what follows, I argue that it can.
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  32. Consequences of Liberal Naturalism: Hilary Putnam's Naturalism, Realism, and Normativity.Brendan Hogan & Lawrence Marcelle - 2017 - Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 38 (2):463-97.
    This is a review article (15,000 words) of Putnam's Naturalism, Realism, and Normativity, (Harvard, 2016).
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  33. A Persistência dos Preconceitos.Diego Mileli - 2017 - Problemata - Revista Internacional de Filosofia 8 (2):19-35.
    Neste artigo é defendido que 'os iluministas' não poderiam ser capazes de eliminar os preconceitos, como pretendiam, haja vista que atacavam o fenômeno do preconceito onde ele não estava, sendo o entrave no acesso à verdade apenas um efeito colateral do preconceito e não seu elemento central. Independente da possibilidade ou não de se eliminar os preconceitos, a estratégia adotada pelos filósofos desse período estava condenada ao fracasso. Para sustentar esta hipótese, primeiro será extraída uma noção geral do preconceito a (...)
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  34. Language and Ontological Emergence.J. T. M. Miller - 2017 - Philosophica 91 (1):105-143.
    Providing empirically supportable instances of ontological emergence is notoriously difficult. Typically, the literature has focused on two possible sources. The first is the mind and consciousness; the second is within physics, and more specifically certain quantum effects. In this paper, I wish to suggest that the literature has overlooked a further possible instance of emergence, taken from the special science of linguistics. In particular, I will focus on the property of truth-evaluability, taken to be a property of sentences as created (...)
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  35. Truth and Scientific Change.Gila Sher - 2017 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 48 (3):371-394.
    The paper seeks to answer two new questions about truth and scientific change: What lessons does the phenomenon of scientific change teach us about the nature of truth? What light do recent developments in the theory of truth, incorporating these lessons, throw on problems arising from the prevalence of scientific change, specifically, the problem of pessimistic meta-induction?
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  36. Metasemantics and Singular Reference.Ori Simchen - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):175-195.
    I consider two competing approaches to metasemantics: productivism, whereby endowment with semantic significance emerges directly from conditions surrounding the production or employment of the items semantically endowed; and interpretationism, whereby endowment with semantic significance emerges directly from conditions surrounding the interpretive consumption of such items. Focusing on the version of interpretationism developed by Lewis and his followers, I present a novel argument to the conclusion that such an approach cannot secure determinacy for singular reference. I then draw a larger moral (...)
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  37. Review of 'The Outer Limits of Reason' by Noson Yanofsky 403p(2013).Michael Starks - 2017 - Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization -- Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 3rd Ed 686p(2017).
    I give a detailed review of 'The Outer Limits of Reason' by Noson Yanofsky 403(2013) from a unified perspective of Wittgenstein and evolutionary psychology. I indicate that the difficulty with such issues as paradox in language and math, incompleteness, undecidability, computability, the brain and the universe as computers etc., all arise from the failure to look carefully at our use of language in the appropriate context and hence the failure to separate issues of scientific fact from issues of how language (...)
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  38. Commonsense Pluralism about Truth: An Empirical Defence.Joseph Ulatowski - 2017 - Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
    Truth is a pervasive feature of ordinary language, deserving of systematic study, and few theorists of truth have endeavoured to chronicle the tousled conceptual terrain forming the non-philosopher’s ordinary view. Joseph Ulatowski recasts the philosophical treatment of truth in light of historical and recent work in experimental philosophy. He argues that the commonsense view of truth is deeply fragmented along two axes, across different linguistic discourses and among different demographics. Call this endoxic alethic pluralism. To defend this view, four conclusions (...)
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  39. The Inaccuracy of Partial Truth in Yablovian If-Thenism.Joseph Ulatowski - 2017 - Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (2):206-211.
    Yablo has argued for an alternative form of if-thenism that is more conducive with his figurative fictionalism. This commentary sets out to challenge whether the remainder, ρ, tends to be an inaccurate representation of the conditions that are supposed to complete the enthymeme from φ to Ψ. Whilst by some accounts the inaccuracies shouldn't set off any alarm bells, the truth of ρ is too inexact. The content of ρ, a partial truth, must display a sensitivity to the contextual background (...)
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  40. Truth is not (Very) Intrinsically Valuable.Chase B. Wrenn - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):108-128.
    We might suppose it is not only instrumentally valuable for beliefs to be true, but that it is intrinsically valuable – truth makes a non-derivative, positive contribution to a belief's overall value. Some intrinsic goods are better than others, though, and this article considers the question of how good truth is, compared to other intrinsic goods. I argue that truth is the worst of all intrinsic goods; every other intrinsic good is better than it. I also suggest the best explanation (...)
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  41. Knights, Knaves, Truth, Truthfulness, Grounding, Tethering, Aboutness, and Paradox.Stephen Yablo - 2017 - In Brian Rayman & Melvin Fitting (eds.), Raymond Smullyan on Self Reference. Springer Verlag.
  42. Political Liberalism. Reason and Truth in Politics.Dorota Sepczyńska - 2016 - Diametros 48:105-118.
    In this article I try to prove that John Rawls, in his lectures published in _Political Liberalism_ and later works, recommended the independence of one’s world-view and politics, and that at the same time he allowed the existence of non-conflicting factual truths in politics. His reflections on the problem of truth in the political realm are closely related to his reflections on reason, not only the public one. Thus, the aim of this article is to present and analyze Rawls’ understanding (...)
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  43. Sonnet on truth.David Tribe - 2016 - Australian Humanist, The 121:11.
    Tribe, David When asked, we say we always speak the truth - in courts of law, the whole truth, nothing but...
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  44. Aristotle on Predication.Phil Corkum - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (3):793-813.
    A predicate logic typically has a heterogeneous semantic theory. Subjects and predicates have distinct semantic roles: subjects refer; predicates characterize. A sentence expresses a truth if the object to which the subject refers is correctly characterized by the predicate. Traditional term logic, by contrast, has a homogeneous theory: both subjects and predicates refer; and a sentence is true if the subject and predicate name one and the same thing. In this paper, I will examine evidence for ascribing to Aristotle the (...)
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  45. Objectivity and the Parochial, by Charles Travis. [REVIEW]Craig French - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):693-696.
    Book Review of Charles Travis's Objectivity and the Parochial.
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  46. The Possibility of Truth by Convention.Jared Warren - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258):84-93.
    An influential argument against the possibility of truth by linguistic convention holds that while conventions can determine which proposition a given sentence expresses, they (conventions) are powerless to make propositions true or false. This argument has been offered in the literature by Lewy, Yablo, Boghossian, Sider and others. But despite its influence and prima facie plausibility, the argument: (i) equivocates between different senses of “making true”; (ii) mistakenly assumes hyperintensional contexts are intensional; and (iii) relies upon an implausible vision of (...)
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  47. Truth is (Still) the Norm for Assertion: A Reply to Littlejohn.Daniel Whiting - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (6):1245-1253.
    In a paper in this journal, I defend the view that truth is the fundamental norm for assertion and, in doing so, reject the view that knowledge is the fundamental norm for assertion. In a recent response, Littlejohn raises a number of objections against my arguments. In this reply, I argue that Littlejohn’s objections are unsuccessful.
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  48. Semantic Paradox and Alethic Undecidability.Stephen Barker - 2014 - Analysis 74 (2):201-209.
    I use the principle of truth-maker maximalism to provide a new solution to the semantic paradoxes. According to the solution, AUS, its undecidable whether paradoxical sentences are grounded or ungrounded. From this it follows that their alethic status is undecidable. We cannot assert, in principle, whether paradoxical sentences are true, false, either true or false, neither true nor false, both true and false, and so on. AUS involves no ad hoc modification of logic, denial of the T-schema's validity, or obvious (...)
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  49. When Truth Gives Out. [REVIEW]Nate Charlow - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (3):367-371.
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  50. Is Truth a Chimera?Cesare Cozzo - 2014 - In Cesare Cozzo & Emiliano Ippoliti (eds.), From a Heuristic Point of View. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 107-24.
    In his book Perché ancora la filosofia Carlo Cellucci argues that truth does not play any role in (modern) science: truth is only a chimera that prevents us «from adequately understanding the character of knowledge» and therefore «must be disposed of». I summarize Cellucci’s evidence for his contention that truth is a chimera. I then raise four objections to Cellucci’s views on truth. My conclusion is that, Cellucci’s arguments notwithstanding, a notion of truth is necessary for the human activity of (...)
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