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  1. Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge (2012). Liars, Truthtellers and Naysayers: A Broader View of Semantic Pathology I. Language and Communication 32 (4):293-311.
    Semantic pathology is most widely recognized in the liar paradox, where an apparent inconsistency arises in ‘‘liar sentences’’ and their ilk. But the phenomenon of semantic pathology also manifests a sibling symptom—an apparent indeterminacy—which, while not largely discussed (save for the occasional nod to ‘‘truthteller sentences’’), is just as pervasive as, and exactly parallels, the symptom of inconsistency. Moreover, certain ‘‘dual symptom’’ cases, which we call naysayers, exhibit both inconsistency and indeterminacy and also manifest a higher-order indeterminacy between them. In (...)
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  2. Ermanno Bencivenga (1984). Supervaluations and Theories. Grazer Philosophische Studien 21:89-98.
    When applying supervaluations to the analysis of a theory, one may encounter the following problem: in supervaluational semantics, contingent statements often have existential presuppositions, and these presuppositions may either contradict the theory or make the application of supervaluations pointless. The most natural way of handling this problem consists in revising the semantics each time a specific theory is considered, and in making the status of the axioms of the theory technically indistinguishable from that of logical truths. Philosophically, this position has (...)
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  3. Alexandre Billon (2011). My Own Truth ---Pathologies of Self-Reference and Relative Truth. In Rahman Shahid, Primiero Giuseppe & Marion Mathieu (eds.), Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, Vol. 23. Springer
    emantic pathologies of self-reference include the Liar (‘this sentence is false’), the Truth-Teller (‘this sentence is true’) and the Open Pair (‘the neighbouring sentence is false’ ‘the neighbouring sentence is false’). Although they seem like perfectly meaningful declarative sentences, truth value assignment to their uses seems either inconsistent (the Liar) or arbitrary (the Truth-Teller and the Open-Pair). These pathologies thus call for a resolution. I propose such a resolution in terms of relative-truth: the truth value of a pathological sentence use (...)
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  4. Pablo Cobreros, Paul Egré, David Ripley & Robert van Rooij (2010). Tolerant, Classical, Strict. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (2):347-385.
    In this paper we investigate a semantics for first-order logic originally proposed by R. van Rooij to account for the idea that vague predicates are tolerant, that is, for the principle that if x is P, then y should be P whenever y is similar enough to x. The semantics, which makes use of indifference relations to model similarity, rests on the interaction of three notions of truth: the classical notion, and two dual notions simultaneously defined in terms of it, (...)
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  5. Pablo Cobreros & Luca Tranchini (2014). Supervaluationism: Truth, Value and Degree Functionality. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):136-144.
    This article deals with supervaluationism and the failure of truth-functionality. It draws some distinctions that may contribute to a better understanding of this semantic framework.
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  6. Hans G. Herzberger (1980). Supervaluations Without Truth-Value Gaps. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 6:15.
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  7. Teresa Marques (2004). Bivalence and the Challenge of Truth-Value Gaps. Dissertation, Stirling
    This thesis is concerned with the challenge truth-value gaps pose to the principle of bivalence. The central question addressed is: are truth-value gaps counterexamples to bivalence and is the supposition of counterexamples coherent? My aim is to examine putative cases of truth-value gaps against an argument by Timothy Williamson, which shows that the supposition of counterexamples to bivalence is contradictory. The upshot of his argument is that either problematic utterances say nothing, or they cannot be neither true nor false. I (...)
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  8. Lorenzo Peña (2006). Imperativos, preceptos y normas. Logos 39:111-142.
    The paper goes into the intricate logical relation between imperatives, precepts and norms. It shows that there need not be two senses of "ought", the one descriptive and the other prescriptive, since when the law-giver enacts a fresh statute he is hereby making a tru statement, whose truth is grounded on the statement itself.
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  9. Mark Richard (2010). Indeterminacy and Truth Value Gaps. In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. OUP Oxford
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  10. Achille C. Varzi (2007). Congiunzione e contraddizione. In Francesco Altea & Francesco Berto (eds.), Scenari dell’impossibile. La contraddizione nel pensiero contemporaneo. Il Poligrafo 63–86.
    Italian translation of "Conjunction and Contradiction" (2004), by Francesco Berto.
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  11. Achille C. Varzi (2004). Conjunction and Contradiction. In Graham Priest, J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays. Clarendon Press 93–110.
    There are two ways of understanding the notion of a contradiction: as a conjunction of a statement and its negation, or as a pair of statements one of which is the negation of the other. Correspondingly, there are two ways of understanding the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC), i.e., the law that says that no contradictions can be true. In this paper I offer some arguments to the effect that on the first (collective) reading LNC is non-negotiable, but on the second (...)
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  12. Achille C. Varzi (2000). Supervaluationism and Paraconsistency. In Diderik Batens, Chris Mortensen, Graham Priest & Jean Paul Van Bendegem (eds.), Frontiers in Paraconsistent Logic. Research Studies Press 279–297.
    Since its first appearance in 1966, the notion of a supervaluation has been regarded by many as a powerful tool for dealing with semantic gaps. Only recently, however, applications to semantic gluts have also been considered. In previous work I proposed a general framework exploiting the intrinsic gap/glut duality. Here I also examine an alternative account where gaps and gluts are treated on a par: although they reflect opposite situations, the semantic upshot is the same in both cases--the value of (...)
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  13. Marcelo VÁsconez (2006). 4. Contradictorial Gradualism Vs. Discontinuism: Two Views On Fuzziness And The Transition Problem. Logique Et Analyse 49.
  14. James Hewins Waldo (1980). Truth-Value Gaps in Natural Language. Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
    In the fourth chapter, I show how the semantics developed in the third chapter can be applied to the seemingly unrelated problem of discourse concerning fictional objects. Using the theory of nonexistent objects developed by Parsons as a point of departure, I show how this theory can be both simplified and enriched by the use of a truth-value gap semantics. ;In the third chapter, I develop a truth-value gap semantics for a fragment of English which includes both sortally correct and (...)
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  15. Xinli Wang (2007). Conceptual Schemes and Presuppositional Languages. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:119-124.
    The current discussions of conceptual schemes and related topics are misguided; for they are based on a tacit assumption that the difference between two schemes consists in the different distributions in truth-values. I argue that what should concern us, in the discussions of conceptual schemes and related issues, is not truth-values of assertions, but rather the truth-value-status of the sentences used to make the assertions. This is because the genuine conceptual innovation between alternative theories or languages does not lie in (...)
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  16. Xinli Wang (2003). Presuppositional Languages and the Failure of Cross-Language Understanding. Dialogue 42 (01):53-77.
    Why is mutual understanding between two substantially different comprehensive language communities often problematic and even unattainable? To answer this question, the author first introduces a notion of presuppositional languages. Based on the semantic structure of a presuppositional language, the author identifies a significant condition necessary for effective understanding of a language: the interpreter is able to effectively understand a language only if he/she is able to recognize and comprehend its metaphysical presuppositions. The essential role of the knowledge of metaphysical presuppositions (...)
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  17. Xinli Wang (1999). Is the Notion of Semantic Presupposition Empty? Dialogos 34 (73):61-91.
    This paper is an attempt to clarify the notion of semantic presupposition and to refute Böer and Lycan's critique of that notion. The author presents a feasible and coherent formal definition of semantic presupposition after examining several popular definitions of the notion. In terms of this definition, two central arguments against semantic presupposition presented by Böer and Lycan are analyzed and responded to with care. It is concluded that the notion of semantic presupposition is not empty but rather is philosophically (...)
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  18. Xinli Wang (1998). Truth-Value Gaps, Ontological Commitments, and Incommensurability (Doctoral Dissertation). Dissertation, The University of Connecticut
    According to the accepted translation-failure interpretation, the problem of incommensurability involves the nature of the meaning-referential relation between scientific languages. The incommensurability thesis is that some competing scientific languages are mutually untranslatable due to the radical variance of meaning or/and reference of the terms they employ. I argue that this interpretation faces many difficulties and cannot give us a tenable, coherent, and integrated notion of incommensurability. It has to be rejected. ;On the basis of two case studies, I find that (...)
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  19. Xinli Wang & 王 新力 (2004). 语言分类系统、真值间隔和不可通约性 — 对库恩关于不可通约性的分类学解释之重建. World Philosophy 世界哲学 2004 (5).
    摘要:通常所接受对库恩有关不可通约性的分类学解释的理解建立在不可译性概念之上,因而是相当不完善的。为了弥补此不足,本文在分类之逻辑语义理论 (a logical-semantic theory of taxonomy)、真值语义理论 (a semantic theory of truth-value),以及跨语言交流的真值条件理论 (a truth-value conditional theory of cross-language communication) 之基础上,对库恩有关不可通约性的分类学解释进行了重建。根据这种重建,如果两个科学语言具有不相匹配的分类结构,则当一科学语言的核心语句在其所属语境中具有真值、而在另一科学语言之语境中考虑缺乏真值时,这两 种科学语言乃不可通约。通过这种重建,库恩对于不可通约性的成熟解释并非基于保真 (truth-preserving) 可译性或不可译性的概念,而是基于保留真值状态 (truth-value-preserving) 的跨语言交流概念之上。这种重建使得库恩有关不可通约性的解释更具坚实的理论基础、也在概念上更加完整。.
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  20. Xinli Wang & 王 新力 (2002). 语言预设概念空泛无物吗?(A Defense of the Notion of Semantic Presupposition). In Bo Mou & 博 牟 (eds.), 留美哲学博士文选:当代基础理论研究 (Contemporary Inquiries into the Foundational Issues of Philosophy). 商务印书馆 (the Commercial Press, China) 190-224.
    斯特劳逊 (Strawson)的语义预设概念在语义学和语言哲学研究上颇有建树。尽管如此,语义预设概念一直遭受来自各方面的批判。概要说来,对语义预设概念之批判主要来自两个方面:其一,试图抽去语义预设概念的逻辑基础 ,即非真值概念 (the notion of truthvaluelessness),从而达到间接地拒斥语义预设概念之目的。其二,直接批判语义预设概念本身。他们或者论证此概念在理论上不自恰或微不足道,或者断定即使此概念本身在理论上自恰,但实为一空 洞无物之概念。因为我们根本找任何一个语义预设的具体例证。所以,语义预设概念不具任何真正的哲学意义。它只是一个当代神话,理应拒斥。 -/- 玻尔(S. Ber)和莱肯(W. Lycan)对语义预设概念的批判集中代表了以上两个方面。据我所知,迄今不曾有人对他们的批判予以全面和公正的反驳,以致于许多人人云亦云,使得他们的论点至今颇有影响。给予玻尔和莱恩的批判以全面反驳乃本文初 衷。于此相关,我以为很有必要澄清对语义预设概念的诸多误解,从而确立一个理论上自恰,实际上可行,和确有实质性内容的语义预设概念。基于以上考虑,我对语义预设概念批判之反驳包括正 反两个方面。在第二节,我试图建立一个自恰,完备,非庸俗的语义预设概念。基于这一概念,第三节对玻尔和莱恩反对语义预设的两个核心批判予以全面反驳。第四节着重辩护非真值概念。本文的最后结论是:各种批判并未损 伤斯特劳逊的语义预设概念的精髓。语 义预设概念非但不是一个当代神话,而且具有重大哲学意义。 .
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  21. Xinli Wang(王新力) (2002). 语义预设概念空泛无物吗?(Is the Notion of Semantic Presupposition Empty?). In Contemporary Inquiries Into the Foundational Issues of Philosophy. The Commercial Press, China
    This paper is an attempt to clarify the notion of semantic presupposition and to refute Böer and Lycan's critique of that notion. The author presents a feasible and coherent formal definition of semantic presupposition after examining several popular definitions of the notion. In terms of this definition, two central arguments against semantic presupposition presented by Böer and Lycan are analyzed and responded to with care. It is concluded that the notion of semantic presupposition is not empty but rather is philosophically (...)
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  22. J. R. Welch (2007). Vagueness and Inductive Molding. Synthese 154 (1):147-172.
    Vagueness is epistemic, according to some. Vagueness is ontological, according to others. This article deploys what I take to be a compromise position. Predicates are coined in specific contexts for specific purposes, but these limited practices do not automatically fix the extensions of predicates over the domain of all objects. The linguistic community using the predicate has rarely considered, much less decided, all questions that might arise about the predicate’s extension. To this extent, the ontological view is correct. But a (...)
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  23. John R. Welch (2007). Vagueness and Inductive Molding. Synthese 154 (1):147 - 172.
    Vagueness is epistemic, according to some. Vagueness is ontological, according to others. This article deploys what I take to be a compromise position. Predicates are coined in specific contexts for specific purposes, but these limited practices do not automatically fix the extensions of predicates over the domain of all objects. The linguistic community using the predicate has rarely considered, much less decided, all questions that might arise about the predicate’s extension. To this extent, the ontological view is correct. But a (...)
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