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  1. Francesco Ademollo (2010). The Principle of Bivalence in De Interpretatione 4. In Brad Inwood (ed.), Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Volume 38. Oup Oxford.
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  2. Buchsbaum Arthur & Jean-Yves Béziau, Non Truth-Functional Many-Valuedness.
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  3. O. M. Bakuradze (1967). Truth and Value. Russian Studies in Philosophy 5 (4):25-28.
    Truth exists in the form of true propositions. Therefore identification of the nature of truth means identification of the conditions in which a proposition is true. A proposition is true if its content is not dependent upon the knower, and it constitutes a reflection of objective reality. Such a proposition yields knowledge. We shall call it a cognitive proposition.
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  4. Jean-Yves Beziau (2014). Yaroslav Shramko and Heinrich Wansing, Truth and Falsehood - An Inquiry Into Generalized Logical Values. Studia Logica 102 (5):1079-1085.
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  5. Ryan Christensen (2013). Is Truth Valuable? Philosophy 88 (3):451-466.
    This paper examines a puzzle about whether truth is a valuable property: Valuable properties, like beauty and moral goodness, come in degrees; but truth does not come in degrees. Hence, the argument concludes, truth is not valuable. This result is puzzling since it seems to conflict with a deep intuition that truth is valuable. It is suggested that a roughly Platonic theory, on which truth is distinguished into two different concepts, gives a satisfying answer to the puzzle. One of these (...)
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  6. Michael Cohen (1974). Truth-Tables and Truth. Analysis 35 (1):1 - 7.
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  7. Dan López de Sa (2009). Can One Get Bivalence From (Tarskian) Truth and Falsity? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):pp. 273-282.
  8. M. V. Dougherty (2004). Aristotle's Four Truth Values. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12 (4):585 – 609.
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  9. Xinli Wang (1999). Is the Notion of Semantic Presupposition Empty? Dialogos 34 (73):61-91.
    This paper is an attempt to clarify the notion of semantic presupposition and to refute Böer and Lycan's critique of that notion. The author presents a feasible and coherent formal definition of semantic presupposition after examining several popular definitions of the notion. In terms of this definition, two central arguments against semantic presupposition presented by Böer and Lycan are analyzed and responded to with care. It is concluded that the notion of semantic presupposition is not empty but rather is philosophically (...)
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