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  1. Francesco Ademollo (2010). The Principle of Bivalence in De Interpretatione 4. In Brad Inwood (ed.), Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Volume 38. OUP Oxford
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  2. Buchsbaum Arthur & Jean-Yves Béziau, Non Truth-Functional Many-Valuedness.
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  3. Frederic Lewis Backfield (1983). Elements of a Realist Conception of Truth. Dissertation, University of Virginia
    The major assumption in my thesis is that truth is objective. This I characterize as the invariance of a claim's truth-value among people. The objectivity thesis is grounded in the correspondence 'theory' of truth, which in regard to the physical world is essentially the idea that truth is dependent upon the existence of mind-independent objects. Obviously ontological realism must incorporate this position. Various philosophers, including Putnam and Rorty, have suggested the idea of objects logically independent of experience leads to scepticism (...)
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  4. O. M. Bakuradze (1967). Truth and Value. Russian Studies in Philosophy 5 (4):25-28.
    Truth exists in the form of true propositions. Therefore identification of the nature of truth means identification of the conditions in which a proposition is true. A proposition is true if its content is not dependent upon the knower, and it constitutes a reflection of objective reality. Such a proposition yields knowledge. We shall call it a cognitive proposition.
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  5. Donald Mark Bauder (1991). Asking Questions of Nature. Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison
    I begin with one way of making a distinction between something that can be called Realism, and its alternatives. It is a semantic distinction--about whether sentences of the relevant part of language have truth conditions, where truth is correctness of representation. This kind of truth is not warranted assertibility, and is not guaranteed by acceptance or agreement. The issue to be addressed comes from the combination of two things. The first is the naturalness of the view that sentences have truth (...)
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  6. Jean-Yves Beziau (2014). Yaroslav Shramko and Heinrich Wansing, Truth and Falsehood - An Inquiry Into Generalized Logical Values. Studia Logica 102 (5):1079-1085.
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  7. Ryan Christensen (2013). Is Truth Valuable? Philosophy 88 (3):451-466.
    This paper examines a puzzle about whether truth is a valuable property: Valuable properties, like beauty and moral goodness, come in degrees; but truth does not come in degrees. Hence, the argument concludes, truth is not valuable. This result is puzzling since it seems to conflict with a deep intuition that truth is valuable. It is suggested that a roughly Platonic theory, on which truth is distinguished into two different concepts, gives a satisfying answer to the puzzle. One of these (...)
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  8. Michael Cohen (1974). Truth-Tables and Truth. Analysis 35 (1):1 - 7.
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  9. Dan López de Sa (2009). Can One Get Bivalence From (Tarskian) Truth and Falsity? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):pp. 273-282.
  10. M. V. Dougherty (2004). Aristotle's Four Truth Values. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12 (4):585 – 609.
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  11. H. Field (1998). Which Undecidable Sentences Have Truth Values? In H. G. Dales & Gianluigi Oliveri (eds.), Truth in Mathematics. Oxford University Press, Usa
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  12. John Justice (2015). Truth Be Told: Sense, Quantity, and Extension. Peter Lang.
    Truth Be Told explains how truth and falsity result from relations that sentences and their constituents have to the circumstances at which they are evaluated. It offers a precise analysis of truth and a diagnosis of the Liar paradox. Current semantic theory employs generalized quantifiers as the extensions of noun phrases. The book provides simpler extensions for noun phrases. These permit intuitive compositions of truth-values and a diagnosis of the Liar and Grelling paradoxes.
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  13. John Justice (ed.) (2015). Truth Be Told: Sense, Quantity, and Extension. Peter Lang.
    Truth Be Told explains how truth and falsity result from relations that sentences and their constituents have to the circumstances at which they are evaluated. It offers a precise analysis of truth and a diagnosis of the Liar paradox. Current semantic theory employs generalized quantifiers as the extensions of noun phrases. The book provides simpler extensions for noun phrases. These permit intuitive compositions of truth-values and a diagnosis of the Liar and Grelling paradoxes.
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  14. Yaroslav Shramko, Truth Values. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  15. Xinli Wang (1999). Is the Notion of Semantic Presupposition Empty? Dialogos 34 (73):61-91.
    This paper is an attempt to clarify the notion of semantic presupposition and to refute Böer and Lycan's critique of that notion. The author presents a feasible and coherent formal definition of semantic presupposition after examining several popular definitions of the notion. In terms of this definition, two central arguments against semantic presupposition presented by Böer and Lycan are analyzed and responded to with care. It is concluded that the notion of semantic presupposition is not empty but rather is philosophically (...)
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  16. Xinli Wang (1998). Truth-Value Gaps, Ontological Commitments, and Incommensurability (Doctoral Dissertation). Dissertation, The University of Connecticut
    According to the accepted translation-failure interpretation, the problem of incommensurability involves the nature of the meaning-referential relation between scientific languages. The incommensurability thesis is that some competing scientific languages are mutually untranslatable due to the radical variance of meaning or/and reference of the terms they employ. I argue that this interpretation faces many difficulties and cannot give us a tenable, coherent, and integrated notion of incommensurability. It has to be rejected. ;On the basis of two case studies, I find that (...)
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  17. Xinli Wang & 王 新力 (2004). 语言分类系统、真值间隔和不可通约性 — 对库恩关于不可通约性的分类学解释之重建. World Philosophy 世界哲学 2004 (5).
    摘要:通常所接受对库恩有关不可通约性的分类学解释的理解建立在不可译性概念之上,因而是相当不完善的。为了弥补此不足,本文在分类之逻辑语义理论 (a logical-semantic theory of taxonomy)、真值语义理论 (a semantic theory of truth-value),以及跨语言交流的真值条件理论 (a truth-value conditional theory of cross-language communication) 之基础上,对库恩有关不可通约性的分类学解释进行了重建。根据这种重建,如果两个科学语言具有不相匹配的分类结构,则当一科学语言的核心语句在其所属语境中具有真值、而在另一科学语言之语境中考虑缺乏真值时,这两 种科学语言乃不可通约。通过这种重建,库恩对于不可通约性的成熟解释并非基于保真 (truth-preserving) 可译性或不可译性的概念,而是基于保留真值状态 (truth-value-preserving) 的跨语言交流概念之上。这种重建使得库恩有关不可通约性的解释更具坚实的理论基础、也在概念上更加完整。.
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  18. Xinli Wang & 王 新力 (2002). 语言预设概念空泛无物吗?(A Defense of the Notion of Semantic Presupposition). In Bo Mou & 博 牟 (eds.), 留美哲学博士文选:当代基础理论研究 (Contemporary Inquiries into the Foundational Issues of Philosophy). 商务印书馆 (the Commercial Press, China) 190-224.
    斯特劳逊 (Strawson)的语义预设概念在语义学和语言哲学研究上颇有建树。尽管如此,语义预设概念一直遭受来自各方面的批判。概要说来,对语义预设概念之批判主要来自两个方面:其一,试图抽去语义预设概念的逻辑基础 ,即非真值概念 (the notion of truthvaluelessness),从而达到间接地拒斥语义预设概念之目的。其二,直接批判语义预设概念本身。他们或者论证此概念在理论上不自恰或微不足道,或者断定即使此概念本身在理论上自恰,但实为一空 洞无物之概念。因为我们根本找任何一个语义预设的具体例证。所以,语义预设概念不具任何真正的哲学意义。它只是一个当代神话,理应拒斥。 -/- 玻尔(S. Ber)和莱肯(W. Lycan)对语义预设概念的批判集中代表了以上两个方面。据我所知,迄今不曾有人对他们的批判予以全面和公正的反驳,以致于许多人人云亦云,使得他们的论点至今颇有影响。给予玻尔和莱恩的批判以全面反驳乃本文初 衷。于此相关,我以为很有必要澄清对语义预设概念的诸多误解,从而确立一个理论上自恰,实际上可行,和确有实质性内容的语义预设概念。基于以上考虑,我对语义预设概念批判之反驳包括正 反两个方面。在第二节,我试图建立一个自恰,完备,非庸俗的语义预设概念。基于这一概念,第三节对玻尔和莱恩反对语义预设的两个核心批判予以全面反驳。第四节着重辩护非真值概念。本文的最后结论是:各种批判并未损 伤斯特劳逊的语义预设概念的精髓。语 义预设概念非但不是一个当代神话,而且具有重大哲学意义。 .
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  19. Cory D. Wright (2014). Review of Elijah Millgram's 'Hard Truths'. Mind 123 (492):1218-1221.
  20. Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.) (2010). New Waves in Truth. Palgrave Macmillan.
    New Waves in Truth offers eighteen new and original research papers on truth and other alethic phenomena by twenty promising young scholars working on truth today. Contributions to the volume span truth ascriptions, deflationism, realism and the correspondence theory, the value of truth, and kinds of truth and truth-apt discourse. The research programs of the contributors are beginning to reset that agenda, and each is positioned to make new waves throughout the subject.
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