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  1. Eran Asoulin, The Explanatory Role Of Externalism.
    I discuss externalism from the point of view of explanatory scientific theories. I ask what externalism is supposed to explain, and whether such an explanation is or should be a scientific one. In contrast to leading externalists, I argue that whatever merits externalism may possess, it is unable to provide a fruitful explanatory framework for a scientific theory of the mind. I argue that an externalist explanation of meaning is concerned with ascription of meaning rather than the mechanisms of meaning. (...)
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  2. Kent Bach & Reinaldo Elugardo (2003). Conceptual Minimalism and Anti-Individualism: A Reply to Goldberg. Noûs 37 (1):151-160.
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  3. Lynne Rudder Baker (1986). Just What Do We Have In Mind? In Theodore E. Uehling Peter A. French (ed.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy. University of Minnesota Press 25-48.
    M any philosophers who otherwise have disparate views on the mind share a fundamental assumption. The assumption is that mental processes, or at least those that explain behavior, are wholly determined by properties of the individual whose processes they are.' As elaborated by..
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  4. Yemima Ben-Menahem (ed.) (2005). Hilary Putnam (Contemporary Philosophy in Focus). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    The essays in this volume discuss Putnam's major philosophical contributions.
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  5. Akeel Bilgrami (1992). Belief and Meaning: The Unity and Locality of Mental Content. Blackwell.
    Belief and Meaning is a philosophical treatment of intentionality. It offers an original, logical and convincing account of intentional content which is local and contextual and which takes issues with standard theories of meaning.
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  6. Akeel Bilgrami (1989). Realism Without Internalism: A Critique of Searle on Intentionality. Journal of Philosophy 86 (February):57-72.
  7. Gregory Bochner (2014). The Anti-Individualist Revolution in the Philosophy of Language. Linguistics and Philosophy 37 (2):91-120.
    The canonical arguments against the description theory of names are usually taken to have established that the reference of a name as used on a given occasion is not semantically determined by the qualitative descriptions that the speaker may have in mind. The deepest moral of these arguments, on the received view, would be that the speaker’s narrow mental states play no semantic role in fixing reference. My central aim in this paper is to challenge this common understanding by highlighting (...)
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  8. George S. Boolos (ed.) (1990). Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam. Cambridge University Press.
    This volume is a report on the state of philosophy in a number of significant areas.
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  9. J. Brown (1998). Natural Kind Terms and Recognitional Capacities. Mind 107 (426):275-303.
    The main contribution of this paper is a new account of how a community may introduce a term for a natural kind in advance of knowing the correct scientific account of that kind. The account is motivated by the inadequacy of the currently dominant accounts of how a community may do this, namely those proposed by Kripke and by Putman. Their accounts fail to deal satisfactorily with the facts that (1) typically, an item that instantiates one natural kind instantiates several (...)
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  10. Jessica Brown (2004). Anti-Individualism and Knowledge. MIT Press.
    A persuasive monograph that answers the keyepistemological arguments against anti-individualism in thephilosophy of mind.
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  11. Anthony L. Brueckner (2003). Contents Just Aren't in the Head. Erkenntnis 58 (1):1-6.
    A. Horowitz has recently argued against semantic externalism. In this paper, I will show that his arguments are unsuccessful, owing to misconceptions regarding the nature of that semantic view.
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  12. Anthony L. Brueckner (1995). The Characteristic Thesis of Anti-Individualism. Analysis 55 (3):146-48.
    This is a response to an argument (by Michael McKinsey) purporting to show that anti-individualism is trivially true. I show that this argument rests upon a misconception of the basic claim of anti-individualism.
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  13. M. Bruns & Gianfranco Soldati (1994). Object-Dependent and Property-Dependent Concepts. Dialectica 48 (3-4):185-208.
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  14. Tyler Burge (2003). Social Anti-Individualism, Objective Reference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):682–690.
  15. Tyler Burge (1982). Other Bodies. In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought and Object. Oxford University Press
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  16. Tyler Burge (1979). Individualism and the Mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
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  17. Keith Butler (1998). Internal Affairs: Making Room for Psychosemantic Internalism. Kluwer.
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  18. John Campbell (1982). Extension and Psychic State: Twin Earth Revisited. Philosophical Studies 42 (June):67-90.
    Argues that natural kind terms are token-reflexive, with reference ultimately fixed to the underlying explanatory properties of the surface qualities of local matter.
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  19. J. Adam Carter & S. Orestis Palermos (forthcoming). Epistemic Internalism, Content Externalism and the Subjective/Objective Justification Distinction. American Philosophical Quarterly.
    Two arguments against the compatibility of epistemic internalism and content externalism are considered. Both arguments are shown to fail, because they equivocate on the concept of justification involved in their premises. To spell out the involved equivocation, a distinction between subjective and objective justification is introduced, which can also be independently motivated on the basis of a wide range of thought experiments to be found in the mainstream literature on epistemology. The subjective/objective justification distinction is also ideally suited for providing (...)
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  20. Noam A. Chomsky (2003). Internalist Explorations. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press
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  21. Carleton B. Christensen (2001). Escape From Twin Earth: Putnam's 'Logic' of Natural Kind Terms. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (2):123-150.
    Many still seem confident that the kind of semantic theory Putnam once proposed for natural kind terms is right. This paper seeks to show that this confidence is misplaced because the general idea underlying the theory is incoherent. Consequently, the theory must be rejected prior to any consideration of its epistemological, ontological or metaphysical acceptability. Part I sets the stage by showing that falsehoods, indeed absurdities, follow from the theory when one deliberately suspends certain devices Putnam built into it , (...)
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  22. Tim Crane (1991). All the Difference in the World. Philosophical Quarterly 41 (January):1-25.
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  23. Robert C. Cummins (1991). Methodological Reflections on Belief. In R. Bogdan (ed.), Mind and Common Sense. Cambridge University Press 53--70.
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  24. Steven Davis (2003). Arguments for Externalism. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. Csli
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  25. Michael Devitt (2001). A Shocking Idea About Meaning. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 55 (218):471-494.
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  26. Michael Devitt (1990). Meanings Just Ain't in the Head. In George S. Boolos (ed.), Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam. Cambridge University Press 79--104.
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  27. Fred Dretske (1993). The Nature of Thought. Philosophical Studies 70 (2):185-99.
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  28. Ronald P. Endicott (forthcoming). Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Macmillan Press.
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  29. Ronald P. Endicott (2005). Multiple Realizability. In D. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd edition. Thomson Gale, Macmillan Reference
    Multiple realizability has been at the heart of debates about whether the mind reduces to the brain, or whether the items of a special science reduce to the items of a physical science. I analyze the two central notions implied by the concept of multiple realizability: "multiplicity," otherwise known as property variability, and "realizability." Beginning with the latter, I distinguish three broad conceptual traditions. The Mathematical Tradition equates realization with a form of mapping between objects. Generally speaking, x realizes (or (...)
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  30. Michael Esfeld (2002). Externalism About Content: Its Social and Its Physical Roots. Filosoficky Casopis 50:387-400.
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  31. Katalin Farkas (2008). Phenomenal Intentionality Without Compromise. The Monist 91 (2):273-93.
    In recent years, several philosophers have defended the idea of phenomenal intentionality : the intrinsic directedness of certain conscious mental events which is inseparable from these events’ phenomenal character. On this conception, phenomenology is usually conceived as narrow, that is, as supervening on the internal states of subjects, and hence phenomenal intentionality is a form of narrow intentionality. However, defenders of this idea usually maintain that there is another kind of, externalistic intentionality, which depends on factors external to the subject. (...)
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  32. Katalin Farkas (2008). The Subject's Point of View. Oxford University Press.
    Descartes's philosophy has had a considerable influence on the modern conception of the mind, but many think that this influence has been largely negative. The main project of The Subject's Point of View is to argue that discarding certain elements of the Cartesian conception would be much more difficult than critics seem to allow, since it is tied to our understanding of basic notions, including the criteria for what makes someone a person, or one of us. The crucial feature of (...)
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  33. Katalin Farkas (2006). Semantic Internalism and Externalism. In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press
    Abstract: This paper introduces and analyses the doctrine of externalism about semantic content; discusses the Twin Earth argument for externalism and the assumptions behind it, and examines the question of whether externalism about content is compatible with a privileged knowledge of meanings and mental contents.
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  34. Katalin Farkas (2003). What is Externalism? Philosophical Studies 112 (3):187-208.
    The content of the externalist thesis about the mind depends crucially on how we define the distinction between the internal and the external. According to the usual understanding, the boundary between the internal and the external is the skull or the skin of the subject. In this paper I argue that the usual understanding is inadequate, and that only the new understanding of the external/internal distinction I suggest helps us to understand the issue of the compatibility of externalism and privileged (...)
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  35. Katalin Farkas (2003). Does Twin Earth Rest on a Mistake? Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (8):155-169.
    In this paper I argue against Twin-Earth externalism. The mistake that Twin Earth arguments rest on is the failure to appreciate the force of the following dilemma. Some features of things around us do matter for the purposes of conceptual classification, and others do not. The most plausible way to draw this distinction is to see whether a certain feature enters the cognitive perspective of the experiencing subject in relation to the kind in question or not. If it does, we (...)
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  36. Justin C. Fisher (2007). Why Nothing Mental is Just in the Head. Noûs 41 (2):318-334.
    Mental internalists hold that an individuals mental features at a given time supervene upon what is in that individuals head at that time. While many people reject mental internalism about content and justification, mental internalism is commonly accepted regarding such other mental features as rationality, emotion-types, propositional-attitude-types, moral character, and phenomenology. I construct a counter-example to mental internalism regarding all these features. My counter-example involves two creatures: a human and an alien from Pulse World. These creatures environments, behavioral dispositions and (...)
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  37. Juliet Floyd (2005). Putnam's 'the Meaning of Meaning': Externalism in Historical Context. In Yemima Ben-Menahem (ed.), Hilary Putnam (Contemporary Philosophy in Focus). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
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  38. Bryan Frances, A Philosophically Inexpensive Introduction to Twin-Earth.
    I say that it’s philosophically inexpensive because I think it is more convincing than any other Twin-Earth thought experiment in that it sidesteps many of the standard objections to the usual thought experiments. I also discuss narrow contents and give an analysis of Putnam’s original argument.
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  39. Bryan Frances (2016). The Dual Concepts Objection to Content Externalism. American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2):123-138.
    Many philosophers have used premises about concepts and rationality to argue that the protagonists in the various Twin Earth thought experiments do not have the concepts that content externalists say they have. This essay argues that this popular internalist argument is flawed in many different ways, and more importantly it cannot be repaired in order to cast doubt on externalism.
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  40. Bryan Frances (1999). On the Explanatory Deficiencies of Linguistic Content. Philosophical Studies 93 (1):45-75.
    The Burge-Putnam thought experiments have generated the thesis that beliefs are not fixed by the constitution of the body. However, many philosophers have thought that if this is true then there must be another content-like property. Even if the contents of our attitudes such as the one in ‘believes that aluminum is a light metal’, do not supervene on our physical makeups, nevertheless people who are physical duplicates must be the same when it comes to evaluating their rationality and explaining (...)
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  41. Bryan Frances (1998). Propositional Attitudes and Physicalism. Dissertation, University of Minnesota
    Many theorists have contended that since the mind depends on the brain, the contents of our thoughts are determined by just the intrinsic physical properties of our bodies. In the first part of my dissertation I examine this theory's negation, anti-individualism, by investigating the "Twin-Earth" thought experiments of Putnam and Burge. Although anti-individualism has recently become widely accepted, I argue that none of the arguments given thus far are sound; nor has the theory been given a proper formulation. I also (...)
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  42. Bryan Frances, Twin Earth Thought Experiments.
  43. Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.) (2003). Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind: Essays on Tyler Burge. University of Chicago Press.
    This volume comprises a lively and thorough discussion between philosophers and Tyler Burge about Burge's recent, and already widely accepted, position in the theory of meaning, mind, and knowledge. This position is embodied by an externalist theory of meaning and an anti-individualist theory of mind and approach to self-knowledge. The authors of the eleven papers here expound their versions of this position and go on to critique Burge's version. Together with Burge's replies, this volume offers a major contribution to contemporary (...)
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  44. Ana Gavran (2004). Tim Crane on the Internalism-Externalism Debate. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):207-218.
    The subject of this paper is the debate between externalism and internalism about mental content presented by Tim Crane in Chapter 4 of his book Elements of Mind. Crane’s sympathies in this debate are with internalism. The paper attempts to show that Crane’s argumentation is not refuting the Twin Earth argument and externalism, and that in its basis it does not differ much from externalism itself Crane’s version of the argument for externalism features two key premises: (1) The content of (...)
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  45. Mikkel Gerken (2013). Epistemic Reasoning and the Mental. Palgrave Macmillan (Innovations in Philosophy).
    Epistemic Reasoning and the Mental integrates the epistemology of reasoning and philosophy of mind. The book contains introductions to basic concepts in the epistemology of inference and to important aspects of the philosophy of mind. By examining the fundamental competencies involved in reasoning, Gerken argues that reasoning's epistemic force depends on the external environment in ways that are both surprising and epistemologically important. -/- For example, Gerken argues that purportedly deductive reasoning that exhibits the fallacy of equivocation may nevertheless transmit (...)
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  46. Brie Gertler (2012). Understanding the Internalism-Externalism Debate: What is the Boundary of the Thinker? Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):51-75.
    Externalism about mental content is now widely accepted. It is therefore surprising that there is no established definition of externalism. I believe that this is a symptom of an unrecognized fact: that the labels 'mental content externalism'-and its complement 'mental content internalism'-are profoundly ambiguous. Under each of these labels falls a hodgepodge of sometimes conflicting claims about the organism's contribution to thought contents, the nature of the self, relations between the individual and her community, and the epistemic availability of thoughts. (...)
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  47. Anthony C. Grayling (2006). Internalist Constraints on Content Externalism. In Tomáš Marvan (ed.), What Determines Content?: The Internalism/Externalism Dispute. Cambridge Scholars Press
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  48. Mitchell S. Green (2000). The Status of Supposition. Noûs 34 (3):376–399.
    According to many forms of Externalism now popular in the Philosophy of Mind, the contents of our thoughts depend in part upon our physical or social milieu.1 These forms of Externalism leave unchallenged the thesis that the ~non-factive! attitudes we bear towards these contents are independent of physical or social milieu. This paper challenges that thesis. It is argued here that publicly forwarding a content as a supposition for the sake of argument is, under conditions not themselves guaranteeing the existence (...)
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  49. Gilbert Harman (1988). Wide Functionalism. In Stephen Schiffer & Susan Steele (eds.), Cognition and Representation. Westview Press
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  50. John Heil (2002). Mental Causation. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger. Blackwell 29--52.
    This volume presents a collection of new, specially written essays by a diverse group of philosophers, including Donald Davidson, Ted Honderich, and Philip Pettit, each of whom is widely known for defending a particular conception of minds and their place in nature.
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